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The Republic

Plato (c. 428-348 BCE)

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Publication record

Title	The Republic
Author	Plato (c. 428-348 BCE)
Translator	Paul Shorey
Edition	Bookstacks TEI edition, based on the Perseus English electronic edition
Source	Plato in Twelve Volumes. Harvard University Press. 1935-37
Published	20 August 2026
Edition ID	plato-republic-eng-shorey
Canonical URI	bookstacks.org

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No ISBN has been assigned. The stable Bookstacks edition identifier and canonical URI above serve as the publication record for this digital edition. Bookstacks asserts no additional restriction over this generated PDF beyond the canonical source terms.

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Book 1

I[1] went down yesterday to the Peiraeus[2] with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions[3] to the Goddess,[4] and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration.[5] I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show, made by the marching of the Thracian contingent. After we had said our prayers and seen the spectacle we were starting for town when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us from a distance as we were hastening homeward[6] and ordered his boy[7] run and bid us to wait[8] for him, and the boy caught hold[9] of my himation from behind and said,

[1]Socrates narrates in the first person, as in the *Charmides* and *Lysis*; see Introduction p. vii, Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, i. p. 84. Demetrius, *On Style*, 205, cites this sentence as an example of "trimeter members." Editors give references for the anecdote that it was found in Plato's tablets with many variations. For Plato's description of such painstaking Cf. *Phaedrus* 278 D. Cicero *De sen.*. 5. 13 "scribens est mortuus."

[2]Cf. 439 E; about a five-mile walk.

[3]Plato and Xenophon represent Socrates as worshipping the gods, *νόμῳ πόλεως*. Athanasius, *Contra gentes*, 9, censures Plato for thus adoring an Artemis made with hands, and the fathers and medieval writers frequently cite the passage for Plato's regrettable concessions to polytheism—"persuasio civilis" as Minucius Felix styles it. Cf. Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* xiii. 13. 66.

[4]Presumably Bendis (354 A), though, as the scholiast observes, Athena is *ἡ θεός* for an Athenian. For foreign cults at the Peiraeus see Holm, *History of Greece* , iii. p. 189.

[5]See Introduction.

[6]"Headed homeward" is more exact and perhaps better.

[7]A Greek gentleman would always be so attended. Cf. *Charmides* 155 A, *Meno* 82 B, *Protagoras* 310 C, Demosthenes xlvii. 36.

[8]The "bounder" in Theophrastus, *Char.* xi. (xvii.), if he sees persons in a hurry will ask them to wait.

[9]*Charmides* 153 B, *Parmenides* 126 A, 449 B.

"Polemarchus wants you to wait." And I turned around and asked where his master[10] was.

"There he is," he said,

"behind you, coming this way. Wait for him."

"So we will," said Glaucon, and shortly after Polemarchus came up and Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a few others apparently from the procession. Whereupon Polemarchus said,

"Socrates, you appear to have turned your faces townward and to be going to leave us."

"Not a bad guess," said I.

"But you see how many we are?" he said.

"Surely."

"You must either then prove yourselves the better men[11] or stay here."

"Why, is there not left," said I,

"the alternative of our persuading[12] you that you ought to let us go?"

"But could you persuade us," said he,

"if we refused to listen?"

"Nohow," said Glaucon.

"Well, we won't listen, and you might as well make up your minds to it."

"Do you mean to say," interposed Adeimantus,

"that you haven't heard that there is to be a torchlight race[13] this evening on horseback in honor of the Goddess?"

"On horseback?" said I.

"That is a new idea. Will they carry torches and pass them along to one another as they race with the horses, or how do you mean?"

"That's the way of it," said Polemarchus,

"and, besides, there is to be a night festival which will be worth seeing. For after dinner we will get up[14] and go out and see the sights

[10] "Ipse," Cf. *Protagoras* 314 D; "ipse dixit;" "Now you are not "ipse," for I am he."—Shakes.

[11] Cf. the playful threat in *Philebus* 16 A, *Phaedrus* 236 C, Horace, *Satire* i. 4. 142.

[12] For the characteristic Socratic contrast between force and persuasion cf. 411 D, and the anecdote in Diogenes Laertius vii. 24.

[13] See Sterrett in *AJP* xxii. p. 393. "The torch was passed down the lines which competed as wholes." Cf. Swinburne, *Hymn of Man*: "Where the runners outwear each other, but running with lampless hands,No man takes light from his brother, till blind at the goal he stands." For the metaphorical transmission of the torch of life cf. Plato, *Laws*, 776 B, Lucretius ii. 79.

and meet a lot of the lads there and have good talk. So stay and do as we ask."[15]

"It looks as if we should have to stay," said Glaucon.

"Well," said I,

"if it so be, so be it." So we went with them to Polemarchus's house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, yes, and[16] Thrasymachus, too, of Chalcedon, and Charmantides of the deme of Paeania, and Kleitophon the son of Aristonymus. And the father of Polemarchus, Cephalus, was also at home. And I thought him much aged, for it was a long time since I had seen him. He was sitting on a sort of couch with cushions and he had a chaplet[17] on his head, for he had just finished sacrificing in the court. So we went and sat down beside him, for there were seats there disposed in a circle.[18] As soon as he saw me Cephalus greeted me and said,

"You are not a very frequent[19] visitor, Socrates. You don't often come down to the Peiraeus to see us. That is not right. For if I were still able to make the journey up to town easily there would be no need of your resorting hither, but we would go to visit you. But as it is you should not space too widely your visits here. For I would have you know that, for my part, as the satisfactions of the body decay,[20] in the same measure my desire for the pleasures of good talk and my delight in them increase. Don't refuse then, but be yourself a companion to these lads and make our house your resort and regard us as your very good friends and intimates."

"Why, yes, Cephalus," said I,

"and I enjoy talking with the very aged. For to my thinking we have to learn of them as it were from wayfarers[21] who have preceded

[14]Rise from the table. This is forgotten.

[15]In "American," the colloquial Greek means "be a sport."

[16]The particles single out Thrasymachus for ironical emphasis. Proclus in *Tim.* 3 E preserves them in his enumeration of the dramatis personae.

[17]A companion picture to the fair vision of the youthful Lysis (*Lysis*, 207 A). The wreath was worn at the sacrifice.

[18]For the seats compare *Protagoras* 317 D-E, Cicero *Laelius* 1. 2 "in hemicyclio sedentem."

[19]The language recalls the Homeric formula, "πάρος γε μὲν οὔτι θαμίζεις", *Iliad* xviii. 386, *Odyssey* v. 88, Jebb on *O.C.* 672. Cephalus' friendly urgency to Socrates is in the tone of *Laches* 181 C.

[20]Plato characteristically contrasts the transitory pleasures of the body with the enduring joys of the mind. *Phaedrus* 258 E. Anaximenes imitates and expands the passage, Stobaeus, 117. 5. Pleasures are not strictly speaking "of" the body, but "in" or "relating to" it. See my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 45.

[21]Much of this passage, including the comparison of old men to travellers, is copied

us on a road on which we too, it may be, must some time fare—what[22] it is like—is it rough[23] and hard going or easy and pleasant to travel. And so now I would fain learn of you what you think of this thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that the poets call "the threshold[24] of old age." Is it a hard part of life to bear or what report have you to make of it?"

"Yes, indeed, Socrates," he said,

"I will tell you my own feeling about it. For it often happens that some of us elders of about the same age come together and verify[25] the old saw of like to like. At these reunions most of us make lament, longing for the lost joys of youth and recalling to mind the pleasures of wine, women, and feasts, and other things thereto appertaining, and they repine in the belief that the greatest things have been taken from them and that then they lived well and now it is no life at all.[26] And some of them complain of the indignities that friends and kinsmen put upon old age and thereto recite a doleful litany[27] of all the miseries for which they blame old age. But in my opinion, Socrates, they do not put the blame on the real cause.[28] For if it were the cause I too should have had the same experience so far as old age is concerned, and so would all others who have come to this time of life. But in fact I have ere now met with others who do not feel in this way, and in particular I remember hearing Sophocles the poet greeted by a fellow

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by Cicero, *De sen.* 3 ff.

[22]Cf. Horace, *Epistles* i. 11 "Quid tibi visa Chios?" The vague neuter and the slight anacoluthon give a colloquial turn to the sentence.

[23]Hesiod, *Works and Days* 290, says that the path of virtue is rough at first and then grows easy.

[24]This, whatever its precise meaning, was a familiar phrase like our "One foot in the grave." Cf. Leaf on *Iliad* xxii. 60, xxiv 487; Hyperides (i. xx. 13) employs it without apology in prose.

[25]Lit. preserving. For the reverse Cf. *Symposium* 174 B. Cicero renders, "similes cum similibus veteri proverbio facile congregantur." The proverb is *ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει* *Phaedrus* 240 C, or, as in *Lysis* 214 A, *Protagoras* 337 D, *Symposium* 195 B, the reference may be to Homer's "ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον", *Odyssey* xvii. 218. Milton, *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, x., "The ancient proverb in Homer . . . entitles this work of leading each like person to his like, peculiarly to God, himself."

[26]The sentiment of the sensualist from Mimnermus to Byron; cf. also Simonides fr. 71, Sophocles *Antigone* 1165, Antiphanes, in Stobaeus 63. 12. For the application to old age Cf. *Anth. Pal.* ix. 127, Horace *Epistles* ii. 2. 55, and the *ψόγος γήρως* in Stobaeus, 116.

[27]For such a litany cf. Sophocles *O. C.* 1235.

[28]This suggests Aristotle's fallacy of the false cause, *Soph. El.* 167 b 21. Cf. *Philebus* 28 A and Isocrates xv. 230.

who asked, "How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your natural force still unabated?" And he replied, "Hush, man, most gladly have I escaped this thing you talk of, as if I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master."[29] I thought it a good answer then and now I think so still more. For in very truth there comes to old age a great tranquillity in such matters and a blessed release. When the fierce tensions[30] of the passions and desires relax, then is the word of Sophocles approved, and we are rid of many and mad[31] masters. But indeed in respect of these complaints and in the matter of our relations with kinsmen and friends there is just one cause, Socrates—not old age, but the character of the man. For if men are temperate and cheerful[32] even old age is only moderately burdensome. But if the reverse, old age, Socrates, and youth are hard for such dispositions." And I was filled with admiration[33] for the man by these words, and desirous of hearing more I tried to draw him out and said, "I fancy, Cephalus, that most people, when they hear you talk in this way, are not convinced but think that you bear old age lightly not because of your character but because of your wealth. "For the rich," they say, "have many consolations.""[34]

"You are right," he said.

"They don't accept my view and there is something in their objection, though not so much as they suppose. But the retort of Themistocles comes in pat here, who, when a man from the little island of Seriphus[35] grew abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to himself but to the city from which he came, replied that neither would he himself ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus

[29]Allusions to the passage are frequent. Theon, *Progymn.* ii. 66 (Spengel), turns to the anecdote in an edifying *χρεία*. Ammianus Marcellinus xxv. 4. 2 tells us that the chastity of the emperor Julian drew its inspiration hence. Schopenhauer often dwelt on the thought, cf. Cicero *Cato M.* 14, Plutarch, *De cupid. divit.* 5, *An seni* p. 788, Athen. xii. p. 510, Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* 1. 13.

[30]Cf. *Phaedo* 86 C, *Philebus* 47 A, *Laws* 645 B, 644 E *σπῶσι*.

[31]Cf. Euripides *I. A.* 547 "μαινομένων οἴστρων".

[32]For Sophocles as *εὔκολος* cf. Aristophanes *Frogs* 82, and on this quality, *Laws* 791 C.

[33]Cephalus prefigures the old age of the righteous, *infra* 612-613. There is then no parody of Antisthenes as Joel fancies.

[34]Cf. Teles. (Hense, pp.9-10), Philemon in Plutarch p. 358, Musonius, Stobaeus 117. 8. A fragment of Anaxandrides in Stobaeus *Florileg.* 68. 1 is almost a paraphrase of this passage. Thucydides ii. 44 says that honour, not money, is the consolation of old age.

[35]Lit. "the" Seriphean of the anecdote, which, however, Herodotus (viii. 125) tells of another. Cicero *Cato M.* 8 "Seriphio cuidam."

nor the other if he had been an Athenian. And the same principle applies excellently to those who not being rich take old age hard; for neither would the reasonable man find it altogether easy to endure old age conjoined with poverty, nor would the unreasonable man by the attainment of riches ever attain to self-contentment and a cheerful temper."

"May I ask, Cephalus," said I,

"whether you inherited most of your possessions or acquired them yourself?"

"Acquired, eh?" he said.

"As a moneymaker, I hold a place somewhere halfway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather and namesake[36] inherited about as much property as I now possess and multiplied it many times, my father Lysanias reduced it below the present amount, and I am content if I shall leave the estate to these boys not less but by some slight measure more than my inheritance."

"The reason I asked," I said,

"is that you appear to me not to be over-fond of money. And that is generally the case with those who have not earned it themselves.[37] But those who have themselves acquired it have a double reason in comparison with other men for loving it. For just as poets feel complacency about their own poems and fathers about their own sons,[38] so men who have made money take this money seriously as their own creation and they also value it for its uses as other people do. So they are hard to talk to since they are unwilling to commend anything except wealth."

"You are right," he replied.

"I assuredly am," said I.

"But tell me further this. What do you regard as the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the possession of property?"

"Something," he said,

"which I might not easily bring many to believe if I told them.[39]

[36]Cephalus, Lysanias, Cephalus, and so frequently.

[37]Aristotle makes a similar observation, *Eth. Nic.* iv. 1.20, *Rhet.* i. 11. 26, ii. 16. 4. For nouveaux riches, *γενναῖοι ἐκ βαλλαντίου*, see Starkie on Aristophanes *Wasps*, 1309.

[38]Cf. *Theaetetus* 160 E, *Symposium* 209 C, *Phaedrus* 274 E, with Epaminondas' saying, that Leuctra and Mantineia were his children.

[39]Cf. Walter Scott's "Be a good man, my dear; nothing else will give you any comfort, when you come to lie here." Perhaps the earliest positive expression of faith in future life and judgement for sin is Pindar's *Second Olympian.* See Rohde's *Psyche* and Adam in *Cambridge Praelections.* The Epicureans and sometimes the Stoics

For let me tell you, Socrates," he said,

"that when a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did not occur to him. The tales that are told of the world below and how the men who have done wrong here must pay the penalty there,[40] though he may have laughed them down[41] hitherto, then begin to torture his soul with the doubt that there may be some truth in them. And apart from that the man himself[42] either from the weakness of old age or possibly as being now nearer to the things beyond has a somewhat clearer view of them. Be that as it may, he is filled with doubt, surmises, and alarms and begins to reckon up and consider whether he has ever wronged anyone."

"Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts up[43] even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is conscious of no wrong that he has done a sweet hope[44] ever attends and a goodly to be nurse of his old age, as Pindar[45]

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unfairly reprobated Plato's appeal here to this motive, which he disregards in his main argument and returns to only in the tenth book. Cf. 363 C-D, 386 B, 613 E ff., also 496 E, 498 D, 608 D.

[40]Cf. 498 C and Pindar *Ol.* ii. 64. But 500 D, "there" is the realm of Platonic ideas.

[41]Cf. *Gorgias* 523 A, 527 A.

[42]The conclusion logically expected, "is more credulous," shifts to the alternative preferred by Plato. *ὥσπερ* marks the figurative sense of "nearer". *καθορᾷ* is not "takes a more careful view of it" (Goodwin) but wins a glimpse, catches sight of those obscure things, as a sailor descries land. So often in Plato. Cf. *Epin.* 985 C. Sir Thomas Browne, *Christ. Morals*, iii. 22 "And having been long tossed in the Ocean of the world, he will by that time feel the draught of another." Waller on the Divine Poems—"The Soul's Dark Cottage, batter'd and decay'd,Lets in new light through chinks that time has made . . . Leaving the old, both worlds at once they viewThat stand upon the threshold of the new." Rabelais, iii. 21 "Aussi les anges, les heroes, les bons demons (selon la doctrine des Platonicques) voyans les humains prochains de mort comme deport très sceur et salutaire—les saluent les consolent, parlent avec eux et ja commencement leur communicquer art de divination."

[43]Polyb. v. 52. 13, and for the thought Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* 127 A, *Job* iv. 13-14. Tennyson, *Vastness* ix.—"Pain, that has crawl'd from the corpse of Pleasure, a worm which writhes all day, and at nightStirs up again in the heart of the sleeper, and stings him back to the curse of the light."

[44]The better hope of the initiated, often mentioned in connection with the mysteries, blends with the better hope of the righteous (Isocrates i. 39, iv. 20, viii. 34, Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, ii. 73), and in the conclusion of the Pindar passage almost becomes the hope against which Greek moralists warn us. Cf. Pindar *Nem.* xi. "in fine", Sophocles *Antigone* 615, *Thuc. 2.62*, *Thuc. 3.45.*

[45]Pindar, Fragment 214, L.C.L. Edition.

too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and piety"sweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanies Hope, who chiefly rules the changeful mind of mortals. " *Pindar Frag. 214, Loeb* That is a fine saying and an admirable. It is for this, then, that I affirm that the possession of wealth is of most value not it may be to every man but to the good man. Not to cheat any man even unintentionally or play him false, not remaining in debt to a god[46] for some sacrifice or to a man for money, so to depart in fear to that other world—to this result the possession of property contributes not a little. It has also many other uses. But, setting one thing against another, I would lay it down, Socrates, that for a man of sense this is the chief service of wealth."

"An admirable sentiment, Cephalus," said I.

"But speaking of this very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualification[47] that it is truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I mean, for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly—nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth to one who was in that state."

"You are right," he replied.

"Then this is not the definition of justice: to tell the truth and return what one has received."

"Nay, but it is, Socrates," said Polemarchus breaking in,

"if indeed we are to put any faith in Simonides."

"Very well," said Cephalus,

"indeed I make over the whole argument[48] to you. For it is time for me to attend the sacrifices."

"Well," said I,

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[46]Cf. the famous, "We owe a cock to Aesculapius," *Phaedo* 118 A. Cf. further, Browne, *Christian Morals*, i. 26 "Well content if they be but rich enough to be honest, and to give every man his due."

[47]It is Platonic Doctrine that no act is per se good or bad. *Plat. Sym. 181a.* This opens the door to casuistry, *Xen. Mem. 4.2.12*, *Cic. De offic. 3.25.* For the argument cf. *Xen. Mem. 4.2.18*, *Cic. De offic. 3.25.* For the proverb, "a knife to a child" or a madman cf. *Athen. 5.52*, Iambl. Protrep. 18k, Jebb's *Bentley*, p. 69, where Jebb misses Bentley's allusion to it.

[48]The argument, or one side of it, is often treated as a thesis which may be thus transferred. Cf. *Philebus* 12 A, *Charmides* 162 E, *Protagoras* 331 A.

"is not Polemarchus the heir of everything that is yours?"

"Certainly," said he with a laugh, and at the same time went out to the sacred rites.[49]

"Tell me, then, you the inheritor of the argument, what it is that you affirm that Simonides says and rightly says about justice."

"That it is just," he replied,

"to render to each his due.[50] In saying this I think he speaks well." "I must admit," said I,

"that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man.[51] But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit[52] to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is it not?"

"Yes."

"But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being his right mind."

"True," said he.

"It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due."

"Something else in very deed," he replied,

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[49]Cicero *Ad Att.* iv. 16 "Credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset," Bagehot, *Hartley Coleridge*, "It (metaphysical debate) attracts the scorn of middle-aged men, who depart *πρὸς τὰ ἱερά*," etc.

[50]The defintion is not found in the fragments of Simonides. Cf. 433 E, and the Roman Jurists' "Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuens." For the various meanings of the Greek word cf. my Articles "Righteousness" and "Theognis" in Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

[51]The Platonic Socrates ironically treats the poets as inspired but not wise because they cannot explain their fine sayings. *Apology* 22 A-B, *Ion* 542 A. He always assumes that the utterances of the "wise" men must be true. *Theaetetus* 152 B, *Phaedrus* 260 A, *Laws* 888 E, *Euthydemus* 280 A. But they are often obscure, and he reserves for himself the right of interpretation (335 E). Since the poets contradict one another and cannot be cross-examined they are not to be taken seriously as authorities. *Protagoras* 347 E, *Meno* 71 D, *Lysis* 214-215, *Hippias Minor* 365 D.

[52]Owing to the rarity of banks "reddere depositum" was throughout antiquity the typical instance of just conduct. Cf. 442 E, Mayor on Juvenal *Satire* 13. 15, Herodotus. vi. 86, Democr. fr. 265 Diels, Philo, *De spec. leg.* 4. 67. Salt was a symbol of justice because it preserves *ἃ παραλαμβάνει*: Diogenes Laertius viii. 35. Earth is "iustissima tellus" because she returns the seed with interest. Socrates' distinction between the fact of returning a deposit, and returning it rightly is expressed in Stoic terminology: "ut si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere," Cicero *De fin.* iii. 18.

"for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil."

"I see," said I;

"you mean that[53] he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn't that what you say Simonides means?"

"Quite so."

"But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due?"

"By all means," he said,

"what is due[54] and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil."

"It was a riddling[55] definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the manner of poets; for while his meaning, it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was "the due.""

"What else do you suppose?" said he.

"In heaven's name!" said I,

"suppose[56] someone had questioned him thus: "Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine."[57] What do you take it would have been his answer?"

"Obviously," he said,

"the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks."

"And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art?"

"Seasoning to meats."

"Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice."

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[53] Adam insists that the meaning of *μανθάνω ὅτι* here and everywhere is it is because.

[54] In the Greek the particles indicate slight irritation in the speaker.

[55] Cf. *Lysis* 214 D, *Charmides* 162 A, *Theaetetus* 152 C, 194 C, *Alc. II.* 147 B. The poet, like the soothsayer, is "inspired", but only the thinker can interpret his meaning. Cf. 331 E, *Tim.* 72 A. Allegory and the allegorical interpretation are always conscious and often ironical in Plato.

[56] Socrates often presents an argument in this polite form. Cf. 337 A-B, 341 E, *Gorgias* 451 B, *Hippias Major* 287 B ff., Thompson on *Meno* 72 B.

[57] Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by the analogy of the arts and their more specific functions. Cf. *Gorgias* 451 A, *Protagoras* 311 B, 318 B. The idiomatic double question must be retained in the translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly's Pickwick examination: "Who thinks that in which pocket of what garment and where he has left what entreating him to return to whom and how many what and all how big?"

"If we are to follow the previous examples,[58] Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies."

"To do good to friends and evil to enemies,[59] then, is justice in his meaning?"

"I think so."

"Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health?"

"The physician."

"And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea?"

"The pilot."

"Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies?"

"In making war and as an ally, I should say."

"Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them."

"True."

"And so to those who are not at sea the pilot."

"Yes."

"Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?"

"By no means."

"There is a use then even in peace for justice?"

"Yes, it is useful."

"But so is agriculture, isn't it?"

"Yes."

"Namely, for the getting of a harvest?"

"Yes."

"But likewise the cobbler's art?"

"Yes."

"Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes."

"Certainly."

"Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace?"

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[58]Similarly *Protagoras* 312 A.

[59]Simonides' defintion is reduced to the formula of traditional Greek morality which Plato was the first to transcend not only in the *Republic infra*, 335 D-336 A, but in the *Crito* 49 B-C. It is often expressed by Xenophon (*Memorabilia* ii. 3. 14, ii. 6. 35) and Isocrates (i. 26). But the polemic is not especially aimed at them. Cf. Schmidt, *Ethik*, ii. 313, 319, 363, Pindar, *Pyth.* ii. 85, Aeschylus *Choeph.* 123, Jebb, introduction to Sopocles *Ajax*, p. xxxix, Thumser, *Staats-Altertumer*, p. 549, n. 6, Thompson on *Meno* 71 E.

"In engagements and dealings, Socrates."

"And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else?"

"Associations, of course."

"Is it the just man, then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draught-player?"

"The player."

"And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder?"

"By no means."

"Then what is the association[60] in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords?"

"For money-dealings,[61] I think."

"Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn't it so?"

"Apparently."

"And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot."

"It would seem so."

"What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner?"

"When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates."

"You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idle[62]?"

"Quite so."

"Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it?"

"It looks that way."

"And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vinedresser's art is useful?"

"Apparently."

"And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be

[60] Justice (the political art) must be something as definite as the special arts, yet of universal scope. This twofold requirement no definition of a virtue in the minor dialogues is ever able to satisfy. It is met only by the theory worked out in the *Republic*. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 14.

[61] Justice is more nearly defined as having to do with money or legal obligations—the common-sense view to which Aristotle inclines.

[62] Interest is ignored. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1120 a 9, splits hairs on this.

made use of, the military art and music."

"Necessarily."

"And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful?"

"It looks that way."

"Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worth[63] if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard against[64] a blow?"

"Assuredly."

"Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection?"

"I think so."

"But again the very same man is a good guardian of an army who is good at stealing a march[65] upon the enemy in respect of their designs and proceedings generally."

"Certainly."

"Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skilful guardian, of that he is also a skilful thief?"

"It seems so."

"If then the just man is an expert in guarding money he is an expert in stealing it."

"The argument certainly points that way."[66]

"A kind of thief then the just man it seems has turned out to be, and it is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer.[67] For he regards with complacency Autolycus,[68] the maternal uncle of Odysseus, and

[63] A virtue is presumably a good. A defintion that makes justice useless is ipso facto refuted. This line of argument is a standardized procedure in the minor dialogues. Cf. my *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 78. The argument continues: The arts are faculties of opposites. The fallacy is intentional, as in *Hippias Minor* 365, where it is argued that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary. This impressed Aristotle, who met it with his distinction between habit and faculty (ἕξις and δύναμις). Cf *Topics*, vi. 12. 6, *Eth. Nic.* v. 1. 4, vi. 5. 7, *Met.* 1046 b, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 38.

[64] The shift from the active to the middle here helps Plato to his transition from guarding to guarding against.

[65] The play on the Greek word recalls Shakespeare's "If you do take a thief . . . let him show himself what he is and steal out of your company," *Much Ado*, III. iii.

[66] The qualified assent here marks the speaker's perception that something is wrong. But often it expresses modesty or is a mere mannerism. Cf. 399 D, 401 D, 409 C, 410 A, 553 E, etc.

[67] Plato playfully follows the fashion of tracing all modern wisdom to Homer. Cf. *Theaetetus* 152 E.

says "he was gifted beyond all men in thievery and perjury." *Hom. Od. 19.395* So justice, according to you and Homer and Simonides, seems to be a kind of stealing, with the qualification that it is for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies. Isn't that what you meant?"

"No, by Zeus," he replied.

"I no longer know what I did mean.[69] Yet this I still believe, that justice benefits friends and harms enemies."

"May I ask whether by friends you mean those who seem[70] to a man to be worthy or those who really are so, even if they do not seem, and similarly of enemies?"

"It is likely," he said,

"that men will love those whom they suppose to be good and dislike those whom they deem bad."

"Do not men make mistakes in this matter so that many seem good to them who are not and the reverse?"

"They do."

"For those, then, who thus err the good are their enemies and the bad their friends?"

"Certainly."

"But all the same is then just for them to benefit the bad and injure the good?"

"It would seem so."

"But again the good are just and incapable of injustice."

"True."

"On your reasoning then it is just to wrong those who do no injustice."

"Nay, nay, Socrates," he said,

"the reasoning can't be right."[71]

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[68] "A snapper-up of unconsidered trifles" (*Winter's Tale*, IV. iii. 26), whom Homer celebrates (*Hom. Od. 19.395*). The naivete of Homer's "amoral" standpoint (Cf. *Odyssey* xiii. 290 ff.) tickles Plato's sense of humor, and he amuses himself by showing that the popular rule "help friends and harm enemies" is on the same ethical plane. So in the *Euthyphro*, popular piety is gravely reduced to a kind of *καπηλεία* or retail trade in prayer and blessings. Cf. also Dio Chrys. *Or.* xi. 315 R., and modern laments over the "Decay of Lying."

[69] For humorous bewilderment of Socrates' interlocutors cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* iv. 2. 19, *Lysis* 216 C, *Alc. I.* 127 D, *Meno* 80, *Euthyphro* 11 B, *Symposium* 201 B, *Theaetetus* 149 A, 169 C.

[70] The antithesis of "seeming" and "being" is a common category of early Greek and Platonic thought. Cf. 361 A-B, 365 C, Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 788, and the fragments of Parmenides. This discussion of the true *φίλος* recalls the manner of the *Lysis*; cf. Aristotle *Topics* i. 8. 5.

[71] Or, "that is an immoral conclusion."

"Then," said I,

"it is just to harm the unjust and benefit the just."

"That seems a better conclusion than the other."

"It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have misjudged men that it is just to harm their friends, for they have got bad ones, and to benefit their enemies, for they are good. And so we shall find ourselves saying the very opposite of what we affirmed Simonides to mean."

"Most certainly," he said,

"it does work out so. But let us change our ground; for it looks as if we were wrong in the notion we took up about the friend and the enemy."

"What notion, Polemarchus?"

"That the man who seems to us good is the friend."

"And to what shall we change it now?" said I.

"That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that he who seems but is not really so seems but is not really the friend. And there will be the same assumption about the enemy."

"Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy."

"Yes."

"So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad?"

"By all means," he said,

"that, I think, would be the right way to put it."

"Is it then," said I,

"the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever?"[72]

"Certainly it is," he replied;

"a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies."

"When horses[73] are harmed does it make them better or worse?"

"Worse."

"In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses?"

"Of horses."

"And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue?"

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[72]After the word-fence the ethical idea is reached which Plato was the first to affirm.

[73]For Socratic comparison of animals and men Cf. *Apology* 30 C, *Euthyphro* 13 B-C, and on 451 C.

"Necessarily."

"And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse?"

"Assuredly."

"And is not justice the specific virtue of man?"[74]

"That too must be granted."

"Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust."

"It seems so."

"Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music?"

"Impossible."

"Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses?"

"No."

"By justice then do the just make men unjust, or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad?"

"Nay, it is impossible."

"It is not, I take it, the function[75] of heat to chill but of its opposite."

"Yes."

"Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite."

"Assuredly."

"Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite."

"So it appears."

"But the just man is good?"

"Certainly."

"It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite."

"I think you are altogether right, Socrates."

"If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this, that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies

[74]The desired conclusion and all the idealistic paradoxes of Socrates, and later of Stoicism, follow at once from the assumption that justice, being the specific virtue of man, is human excellence generally, so that nothing is of import except justice, and no real wrong (or harm) can be done to a man except by making him less just (or wise, or good). Cf *Apology* 41 D, *Crito* 44 D. The ambiguity of *ἀρετή* is similarly used 353 and 609 B-D.

[75]The special "work" (Xenophon *Memorabilia* iv. 2. 12, iv. 6. 14) is generalized as the idea of specific function, which after Plato and Aristotle retains a prominent place in the moralizing of the Stoics and in all philosophizing. See 351 D, 352 E, Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* i. 7. 10, *Idea of Good* p. 210, Diogenes Laertius vii. 103, Porphyr.*De abstin.* ii. 41, Courtney, *Studies in Philosophy* p. 125, Spencer, *Data of Ethics* 12.

from the just man[76] and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone."

"I concede it," he said.

"We will take up arms against him, then," said I,

"you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or Bias[77] or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed said such a thing."

"I, for my part," he said,

"am ready to join in the battle with you."

"Do you know," said I,

"to whom I think the saying belongs—this statement that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies?"

"To whom?" he said.

"I think it was the saying of Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias[78] the Theban or some other rich man who had great power in his own conceit."[79]

"That is most true," he replied.

"Very well," said I,

"since it has been made clear that this too is not justice and the just, what else is there that we might say justice to be?"[80] Now Thrasymachus,[81] even while we were conversing, had been trying several times to break in and lay hold of the discussion but he was restrained by those who sat by him who wished to hear the argument out. But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn't any longer hold his peace. But gathering himself up like a wild beast he hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces. And Polemarchus and I were frightened and fluttered apart, and he bawled out into our midst,

"What balderdash is this that you have been talking, and why do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? But if

[76]Xenophon approves the doctrine (*Memorabilia* ii. 6. 35, ii. 3. 14) and attributes it to Simonides (*Hiero* 2. 2). But Plato is not thinking specially of him. See on 332 p.

[77]For the legend and the varying lists of the Seven Wise Men see Zeller i. 158, n. 2. No sage or saint could have taught unedifying doctrine. His meaning must have been right. Cf. 331 E, 332 B, *Protagoras* 345 D, Simplic. on Aristotle *Physics* 107. 30.

[78]Cf. Thompson, *Meno* xl.

[79]It is a Socratic paradox that "doing as one likes" is not power or freedom unless one likes the good. Cf. *Gorgias* 467 A, 577 D.

[80]Cf. Introduction pp. ix-x.

[81]Cf. Introduction.

you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don't merely ask questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone gives—since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them,[82] but do you yourself answer and tell what you say the just is. And don't you be telling me[83] that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won't take from you any such drivel as that!" And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have lost my voice.[84] But as it is, at the very moment when he began to be exasperated by the course of the argument I glanced at him first, so that I became capable of answering him and said with a light tremor:

"Thrasymachus, don't be harsh[85] with us. If I and my friend have made mistakes in the consideration of the question, rest assured that it is unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not suppose that while[86] if our quest were for gold[87] we would never willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in the search and so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for justice, a thing more precious than much fine gold, we should then be so foolish as to give way to one another and not rather do our serious best to have it discovered."

"You surely must not suppose that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more reasonably receive from clever fellows like you than severity." And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said,

"Ye gods! here we have the well-known irony[88] of Socrates, and I

[82]Cf. *Gorgias* 483 A, Aristotle *Soph. El.* 183 b 7. "Socrates asked questions but did not answer, for he admitted that he did not know." For similar complaints cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* i. 2. 36, iv. 4. 9, *Theaetetus* 150 C, *Clitophon passim.*

[83]Thrasymachus objects to definition by substitution of synonyms (Cf. *Clitophon* 409 C). He demands an analysis of the underlying facts (338 D-E), such as is given in the later books.

[84]For the fancy that to be seen first by the wolf makes dumb see Virgil *Eclogues* 9. 53, Theocr. 14. 22, Pliny, *N.H.* viii. 34, Milton, *Epitaphium Damonis* 27 "nisi me lupus ante videbit."

[85]For similar irony Cf. *Gorgias* 461 C-D, 489 D.

[86]For this type of "a fortiori" or "ex contrario" argument cf. 589 E, 600 C-D, *Crito* 46 D, *Laws* 647 C, 931 C, *Protagoras* 325 B-C, *Phaedo* 68 A, Thompson on *Meno* 91 E.

[87]Cf. Heracleitus fr. 22 Diels, and Ruskin, *King's Treasuries* "The physical type of wisdom, gold," *Psalms* xix. 10.

[88]Cf. *Symposium* 216 E, and Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* iii. p. 277.

knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you."

"That's because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve, and in putting the question warned him: don't you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won't accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, "Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, or what do you mean?" What would have been your answer to him?"

"Humph!" said he,

"how very like the two cases are!"

"There is nothing to prevent," said I;

"yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don't?"

"Is that, then," said he,

"what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers?"

"I shouldn't be surprised," I said,

"if on reflection that would be my view."

"What then," he said,

"if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve?"

"Why, what else," said I,

"than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer."

"I like your simplicity,"[89] said he;

"but in addition to "learning"you must pay a fine of money."

[89]In "American," "nerve." Socrates' statement that *παθεῖν* due him is *μαθεῖν* (gratis) affects Thrasymachus as the dicasts were affected by the proposal in the *Apology* that his punishment should be—to dine at the City Hall. The pun on the legal formula could be remotely rendered: "In addition to the recovery of your wits, you must pay a fine." Plato constantly harps on the taking of pay by the Sophists, but Thrasymachus is trying to jest, too.

"Well, I will when I have got it," I said.

"It is there," said Glaucon:

"if money is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates."

"Oh yes, of course," said he,

"so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies."

"Why, how," I said,

"my dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn't give any of his suppositions as an answer? Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don't be obstinate, but do me the favor to reply and don't be chary[90] of your wisdom, and instruct Glaucon here and the rest of us." When I had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It was quite plain that Thrasymachus was eager to speak in order that he might do himself credit, since he believed that he had a most excellent answer to our question. But he demurred and pretended to make a point of my being the respondent. Finally he gave way and then said,

"Here you have the wisdom of Socrates, to refuse himself to teach, but go about and learn from others and not even pay thanks[91] therefor."

"That I learn from others," I said,

"you said truly, Thrasymachus. But in saying that I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack.[92] But that I praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know forthwith as soon as you have given your answer. For I think that you will speak well."

"Hearken and hear then," said he.

"I affirm that the just is nothing else than[93] the advantage of the stronger.[94] Well, why don't you applaud? Nay, you'll do anything but

[90] "Grudging." Cf. *Laches* 200 B.

[91] Cf. *Cratylus* 391 B.

[92] Socrates' poverty (*Apology* 38 A-B) was denied by some later writers who disliked to have him classed with the Cynics.

[93] For this dogmatic formulation of a definition Cf. *Theaetetus* 151 E.

[94] To idealists law is the perfection of reason, or *νοῦ διανομή*, *Laws* 714 A; "her seat

that."

"Provided only I first understand your meaning," said I;

"for I don't yet apprehend it. The advantage of the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do you mean by this? I presume you don't intend to affirm this, that if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and the flesh of beeves[95] is advantageous for him, for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker than he both advantageous and just."

"You're a buffoon,[96] Socrates, and take my statement[97] in the most detrimental sense."

"Not at all, my dear fellow" said I;

"I only want you to make your meaning plainer."[98]

"Don't you know then," said he,

"that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy rules, in others aristocracy?"[99]

"Assuredly."

"And is not this the thing that is strong and has the mastery[100] in

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is in the bosom of God" (Hooker). To the political positivist there is no justice outside of positive law, and "law is the command of a political superior to a political inferior." "Whatsoever any state decrees and establishes is just for the state while it is in force," *Theaetetus* 177 D. The formula "justice is the advantage of the superior" means, as explained in *Laws* 714, that the ruling class legislates in its own interest, that is, to keep itself in power. This interpretation is here drawn out of Thrasymachus by Socrates' affected misapprehensions (cf. further Pascal, *Pensees* iv. 4, "la commodite du souverain." Leibniz approves Thrasymachus's definition: "justum potentiori utile . . . nam Deus ceteris potentior!").

[95]The unwholesomeness of this diet for the ordinary man proves nothing for Plato's alleged vegetarianism. The Athenians ate but little meat.

[96]The Greek is stronger—a beastly cad. A common term of abuse in the orators. Cf. Aristophanes *Frogs* 465, Theophrast.*Char.* xvii. (Jebb).

[97]Cf. 392 C, 394 B, 424 C, *Meno* 78 C, *Euthydemus* 295 C, *Gorgias* 451 A δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις, you take my meaning fairly. For complaints of unfair argument cf. 340 D, *Charmides* 166 C, *Meno* 80 A, *Theaetetus* 167 E, *Gorgias* 461 B-C, 482 E.

[98]This is the point. Thrasymachus is represented as challenging assent before explaining his meaning, and Socrates forces him to be more explicit by jocosely putting a perverse interpretation on his words. Similarly in *Gorgias* 451 E, 453 B, 489 D, 490 C, *Laws* 714 C. To the misunderstanding of such dramatic passages is due the impression of hasty readers that Plato is a sophist.

[99]These three forms of government are mentioned by Pindar, *Pyth.* ii. 86, Aeschines *In Ctes.* 6. See 445 D, Whibley, *Greek Oligarchies*, and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 62.

[100]κρατεῖ with emphasis to suggest κρείττων. Cf. *Menexenus* 238 D, Xenophon *Memorabilia* 1. 2. 43. Platonic dialectic proceeds by minute steps and linked synonyms. Cf. 333 A, 339 A, 342 C, 346 A, 353 E, 354 A-B, 369 C, 370 A-B, 379 B, 380-381, 394 B, 400 C, 402 D, 412 D, 433-434, 486, 585 C, *Meno* 77 B, *Lysis* 215 B,

each—the ruling party?"

"Certainly."

"And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the rulers'—advantage and the man who deviates[101] from this law they chastise as a law-breaker and a wrongdoer."

"This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states —the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere,[102] the advantage of the stronger."

"Now," said I,

"I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer. But you add thereto that of the stronger."

"A trifling addition[103] perhaps you think it," he said.

"It is not yet clear[104] whether it is a big one either; but that we must inquire whether what you say is true, is clear.[105] For since I too admit that the just is something that is of advantage[106]—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don't profess to know,[107] we must pursue the inquiry."

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where L. and S. miss the point.

[101]On this view justice is simply *τὸ νόμιμον* (Xenophon *Memorabilia* iv. 4. 12; Cf. *Gorgias* 504 D). This is the doctrine of the "Old Oligarch," [Xenophon] *Rep. Ath.* 2. Against this conception of class domination as political justice, Plato (*Laws* 713 ff.) and Aristotle *Politics* iii. 7) protest. Cf. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, chap. ii.: "We only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government" etc.

[102]Thrasymachus makes it plain that he, unlike Meno (71 E), Euthyphro (5 ff.), Laches (191 E), Hippias (*Hippias Major* 286 ff.), and even Theaetetus (146 C-D) at first, understands the nature of a definition.

[103]Cf. *Laches* 182 C.

[104]For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, *Lysis* 203 B, Sophocles *O.T.* 327.

[105]For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, *Lysis* 203 B, Sophocles *O.T.* 327.

[106]For Plato's so-called utilitarianism or eudaemonism see 457 B, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 21-22, Gomperz, ii. p. 262. He would have nearly accepted Bentham's statement that while the proper end of government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the actual end of every government is the greatest happiness of the governors. Cf. Leslie Stephen, *English Utilitarianism*, i. p. 282, ii. p. 89.

"Inquire away," he said.

"I will do so," said I.

"Tell me, then; you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just?"

"I do."

"May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallible[108] or capable sometimes of error?"

"Surely," he said,

"they are liable to err."

"Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not?"

"So I suppose."

"And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not?"

"That."

"But whatever they enact[109] must be performed by their subjects and is justice?"

"Of course."

"Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage."

"What's that you're saying?"[110] he replied.

"What you yourself are saying,[111] I think. Let us consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that admitted?"

"I think it was," he replied.

"Then you will have to think,"[112] I said,

"that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers un-

[107]This profession of ignorance may have been a trait of the real Socrates, but in Plato it is a dramatic device for the evolution of the argument.

[108]The argument turns on the opposition between the real (i.e. ideal) and the mistakenly supposed interest of the rulers. See on 334 C.

[109]Cf. 338 E and *Theaetetus* 177 D.

[110]*Τί λέγεις σύ;* is rude. See Blaydes on Aristophanes *Clouds* 1174. The supspicion that he is being refuted makes Thrasymachus rude again. But Cf. *Euthydemus* 290 E.

[111]Cf. Berkeley, *Divine Visual Language*, 13: "The conclusions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own concessions." See on 334 D, *Alc. I.* 112-113. On a misunderstanding of this passage and 344 E, Herbert Spencer (*Data of Ethics*, 19) bases the statement that Plato (and Aristotle), like Hobbes, made state enactments the source of right and wrong.

[112]Socrates is himself a little rude.

wittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapient[113] Thrasymachus, that it is just to do the very opposite[114] of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior are commanded to perform."

"Yes, by Zeus, Socrates," said Polemarchus,

"nothing could be more conclusive."

"Of course," said Cleitophon, breaking in,

"if you are his witness."[115]

"What need is there of a witness?" Polemarchus said.

"Thrasymachus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is evil for themselves and yet says that it is just for the subjects to do this."

"That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus laid it down that it is just to obey the orders[116] of the rulers."

"Yes, Cleitophon, but he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just. And after these two assumptions he again admitted that the stronger sometimes bid the inferior and their subjects do what is to the disadvantage of the rulers. And from these admissions the just would no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary."

"O well," said Cleitophon,

"by the advantage of the superior he meant what the superior supposed to be for his advantage. This was what the inferior had to do, and that this is the just was his position."

"That isn't what he said," replied Polemarchus.

"Never mind, Polemarchus," said I,

"but if that is Thrasymachus's present meaning, let us take it from him[117] in that sense. So tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you intended to say, that the just is the advantage of the superior as it

[113] Cf. *Gorgias* 495 D.

[114] Cf. *Laches* 215 E, *Phaedo* 62 E.

[115] It is familiar Socratic doctrine that the only witness needed in argument is the admission of your opponent. Cf. *Gorgias* 472 A-B.

[116] *τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν* is a term of praise for obedience to lawful authority, and of disdain for a people or state that takes orders from another. Cleitophon does not apprehend the argument and, thinking only of the last clause, reaffirms the definition in the form "it is just to do what rulers bid." Polemarchus retorts: "And (I was right), for he (also) . . ."

[117] Socrates always allows his interlocutors to amend their statements. Cf. *Gorgias* 491 B, 499 B, *Protagoras* 349 C, Xenophon *Memorabilia* iv. 2. 18.

appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are we to say this was your meaning?"

"Not in the least," he said.[118]

"Do you suppose that I call one who is in error a superior when he errs?"

"I certainly did suppose that you meant that," I replied,

"when you agreed that rulers are not infallible but sometimes make mistakes."

"That is because you argue like a pettifogger, Socrates. Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say literally—we say that the physician[119] erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision,[120] no craftsman errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred."

"It is in this loose way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you a little while ago. But the most precise statement is that other, that the ruler in so far forth as ruler does not err, and not erring he enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, even as I meant from the start, I say the just is to do what is for the advantage of the stronger."

"So then, Thrasymachus," said I,

"my manner of argument seems to you pettifogging?"

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[118]Thrasymachus rejects the aid of an interpretation which Socrates would apply not only to the politician's miscalculation but to his total misapprehension of his true ideal interests. He resorts to the subtlety that the ruler *qua* ruler is infallible, which Socrates meets by the fair retort that the ruler *qua* ruler, the artist *qua* artist has no "sinister" or selfish interest but cares only for the work. If we are to substitute an abstraction or an ideal for the concrete man we must do so consistently. Cf. modern debates about the "economic man."

[119]For the idea cf. Rousseau's *Émile*, i.: "On me dira . . . que les fautes sont du médecin, mais que la médicine en elle-même est infaillible. A al bonne heure; mais qu'elle vienne donc sans le médecin." Lucian, *De Parasito* 54, parodies this reasoning.

[120]For the invidious associations of *ἀκριβολογία* (1) in money dealings, (2) in argument, cf. Aristotle *Met.* 995 a 11, *Cratylus* 415 A, Lysias vii. 12, Antiphon B 3, Demosthenes. xxiii. 148, Timon in Diogenes Laertius ii. 19.

"It does," he said.

"You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question?"

"I don't think it, I know it," he said,

"and you won't make anything by it, for you won't get the better of me by stealth and , failing stealth, you are not of the force[121] to beat me in debate."

"Bless your soul," said I,

"I wouldn't even attempt such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you mean the so-called ruler[122] or that ruler in the precise sense of whom you were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior it will be just for the inferior to act?"

"I mean the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word," he said.

"Now bring on against this your cavils and your shyster's tricks if you are able. I ask no quarter. But you'll find yourself unable."

"Why, do you suppose," I said,

"that I am so mad to try to try to beard a lion[123] and try the pettifogger on Thrasymachus?"

"You did try it just now," he said,

"paltry fellow though you be."[124]

"Something too much[125] of this sort of thing," said I.

"But tell me, your physician in the precise sense of whom you were just now speaking, is he a moneymaker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick? And remember to speak of the physician who is really such."

"A healer of the sick," he replied.

"And what of the lot—the pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor?"

"A ruler of sailors."

"We don't, I fancy, have to take into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he is called a pilot but in respect of

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[121] Cf. 365 D.

[122] i.e., the one who in vulgar parlance is so; cf. *τῷ ῥήματι*, *Plat. Rep. 340d.*

[123] A rare but obvious proverb. Cf. Schol. *ad loc.* and Aristides, *Orat. Plat.* ii. p. 143.

[124] *καὶ ταῦτα* = *idque*, normally precedes (cf. 404 C, 419 E, etc.). But Thrasymachus is angry and the whole phrase is short. Commentators on Aristophanes *Wasps* 1184, *Frogs* 704, and *Acharn.* 168 allow this position. See my note in A.J.P. vol. xvi. p. 234. Others: "though you failed in that too."

[125] Cf. 541 B, *Euthyphro* 11 E, *Charmides* 153 D.

his art and his ruling of the sailors."

"True," he said.

"Then for each of them[126] is there not a something that is for his advantage?"

"Quite so."

"And is it not also true," said I,

"that the art naturally exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage?"

"Yes, for this."

"Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage than to be perfect as possible[127]?"

"What do you mean by that question?"

"Just as if," I said,

"you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, "By all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which the art was devised." Do you think that would be a correct answer, or not?"

"Correct," he said.

"But how about this? Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence—as the eyes of vision, the ears of hearing, and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and provide what is advantageous for these very ends—does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on ad infinitum, or will the art look out for its own advantage? Or is it a fact that it needs

[126]Plato, like Herodotus and most idiomatic and elliptical writers, is content if his antecedent can be fairly inferred from the context. Cf. 330 C *τοῦτο*, 373 C, 396 B, 598 C *τεχνῶν*, *Protagoras* 327 C.

[127]Pater, *Plato and Platonism*, p. 242, fancifully cites this for "art for art's sake." See Zeller, p. 605. Thrasymachus does not understand what is meant by saying that the art (= the artist *qua* artist) has no interest save the perfection of its (his) own function. Socrates explains that the body by its very nature needs art to remedy its defects (Herodotus i. 32, *Lysis* 217 B). But the nature of art is fulfilled in its service, and it has no other ends to be accomplished by another art and so on *ad infinitum*. It is idle to cavil and emend the text, because of the shift from the statement (341 D) that art has no interest save its perfection, to the statement that it needs nothing except to be itself (342 A-B). The art and the artist *qua* artist are ideals whose being by hypothesis is their perfection.

neither itself nor another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that precise way of speaking. Is it so or not?"

"It appears to be so," he said.

"Then medicine," said I,

"does not consider the advantage of medicine but of the body?"

"Yes."

"Nor horsemanship of horsemanship but of horses, nor does any other art look out for itself—for it has no need—but for that of which it is the art."

"So it seems," he replied.

"But surely,[128] Thrasymachus, the arts do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts." He conceded this but it went very hard.

"Then no art considers or enjoins[129] the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker which is ruled by it." This too he was finally brought to admit though he tried to contest it. But when he had agreed—

"Can we deny, then," said I,

"that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, "precisely" speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a moneymaker. Did we agree on that?" He assented.

"And so the "precise" pilot is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor?" That was admitted.

"Then that sort of a pilot and ruler will not consider and enjoin the advantage of the pilot but that of the sailor whose ruler he is." He

[128]The next step is the identification of (true) politics with the disinterested arts which also rule and are the stronger. Cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* iii. 9. 11. γε emphasizes the argumentative implication of ἄρχουσι to which Thrasymachus assents reluctantly; and Socrates develops and repeats the thought for half a page. Art is virtually science, as contrasted with empiric rule of thumb, and Thrasymachus's infallible rulers are of course scientific. "Ruler" is added lest we forget the analogy between political rule and that of the arts. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle *Politics* 244, *Laws* 875 C.

[129]It is not content with theoretic knowledge, but like other arts gives orders to achieve results. Cf. *Politicus* 260 A, C.

assented reluctantly.

"Then," said I,

"Thrasymachus, neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does."

When we had come to this point in the discussion and it was apparent to everybody that his formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus, instead of replying,[130] said,

"Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?"

"What do you mean?" said I.

"Why didn't you answer me instead of asking such a question?"

"Because," he said,

"she lets her little "snotty" run about drivelling[131] and doesn't wipe your face clean, though you need it badly, if she can't get you to know[132] the difference between the shepherd and the sheep."

"And what, pray, makes you think that?" said I.

"Because you think that the shepherds and the neat-herds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers,[133] differ at all in their thoughts of the

[130]Thrasymachus first vents his irritation by calling Socrates a snivelling innocent, and then, like Protagoras (*Protagoras* 334), when pressed by Socrates' dialectic makes a speech. He abandons the abstract (ideal) ruler, whom he assumed to be infallible and Socrates proved to be disinterested, for the actual ruler or shepherd of the people, who tends the flock only that he might shear it. All political experience and the career of successful tyrants, whom all men count happy, he thinks confirms this view, which is that of Callicles in the *Gorgias*. Justice is another's good which only the naive and "innocent" pursue. It is better to inflict than to suffer wrong. The main problem of the *Republic* is clearly indicated, but we are not yet ready to debate it seriously.

[131]*κορυζῶντα* L. and S., also *s. v. κόυζα*. Lucian, *Lexiphanes* 18, treats the expression as an affectation, but elsewhere employs it. The philosophers used this and similar terms (1) of stupidity, (2) as a type of the minor ills of the flesh. Horace, *Satire* i. 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30 "ἀλλ' αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσι".

[132]Literally, if you don't know for her. For the ethical dative cf. Shakespeare *Taming of the Shrew*, I. ii. 8 "Knock *me* here soundly." Not to know the shepherd from the sheep seems to be proverbial. "Shepherd of the people," like "survival of the fittest," may be used to prove anything in ethics and politics. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle *Politics* p. 431, Xenophon *Memorabilia* iii. 2. 1, Suetonius *Vit. Tib.* 32, and my note in *Class. Phil* . vol. i. p. 298.

[133]Thrasymachus's real rulers are the bosses and tyrants. Socrates' true rulers are the true kings of the Stoics and Ruskin, the true shepherds of Ruskin and Milton.

governed from a man's attitude towards his sheep[134] or that they think of anything else night and day than the sources of their own profit. And you are so far out[135] concerning the just and justice and the unjust and injustice that you don't know that justice and the just are literally[136] the other fellow's good[137]—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves; while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just, and they being thus ruled do what is for his advantage who is the stronger and make him happy in serving him, but themselves by no manner of means. And you must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way: that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he always has the worst of it. Then again, in their relations with the state, if there are direct taxes or contributions to be paid, the just man contributes more from an equal estate and the other less, and when there is a distribution the one gains much and the other nothing. And so when each holds office, apart from any other loss the just man must count on his own affairs[138] falling into disorder through neglect, while because of

[134]Cf. Aristophanes *Clouds* 1203 "πρόβατ' ἄλλως", Herrick, "Kings ought to shear, not skin their sheep."

[135]This (quite possible) sense rather than the ironical, so far advanced, better accords with *ἀγνοεῖς* and with the direct brutality of Thrasymachus.

[136]*τῷ ὄντι* like *ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς*, etc., marks the application (often ironical or emphatic) of an image or familiar proverbial or technical expression or etymology. Cf. 443 D, 442 A, 419 A, 432 A, *Laches* 187 B, *Philebus* 64 E. Similarly *ἐτήτυμον* of a proverb, Archil. fr. 35 (87). The origin of the usage appears in Aristophanes *Birds* 507 "τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἐκεῖν ἦν τοὔπος ἀληθῶς", etc. Cf. *Anth. Pal.* v. 6. 3. With *εὐηθικῶν*, however, *ὡς ἀληθῶς* does not verify the etymology but ironically emphasizes the contradiction between the etymology and the conventional meaning, "simple", which Thrasymachus thinks truly fits those to whom Socrates would apply the full etymological meaning "of good character". Cf. 348 C, 400 E, *Laws* 679 C, Thucydides iii. 83. Cf. in English the connexion of "silly" with "selig", and in Italian, Leopardi's bitter comment on "dabbenaggine" (*Pensieri* xxvi.).

[137]Justice not being primarily a self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another's good. Cf. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1130 a 3; 1134 b 5. Thrasymachus ironically accepts the formula, adding the cynical or pessimistic comment, "but one's own harm," for which see 392 B, Euripides *Heracleid.* 1-5, and Isocrates' protest (viii. 32). Bion (Diogenes Laertius iv. 7. 48) wittily defined beauty as "the other fellow's good"; which recalls Woodrow Wilson's favourite limerick, and the definition of business as "l'argent des autres."

[138]For the idea that the just ruler neglects his own business and gains no compen-

his justice makes no profit from the state, and thereto he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man all the opposite advantages accrue."
"I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of, the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop.[139] For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely; for temple-robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves the appellations of those who commit these partial forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious names they are pronounced happy and blessed[140] not only by their fellow-citizens but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice.[141] For it is not the fear of doing[142] but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and a more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits man's self and is for his advantage." After this Thrasymachus was minded to depart when like a bathman[143] he had poured his speech in a sudden

sating "graft" cf. the story of Deioces in Herodotus i. 97, Democ. fr. 253 Diels, *Laches* 180 B, Isocrates xii. 145, Aristotle *Pol.* v. 8. 15-20. For office as a means of helping friends and harming enemies cf. *Meno* 71 E, Lysias ix. 14, and the anecdote of Themistocles (Plutarch, *Praecept. reipub. ger.* 13) cited by Goodwin (*Political Justice*) in the form: "God forbid that I should sit upon a bench of justice where my friends found no more favour than my enemies." Democr. (fr. 266 Diels) adds that the just ruler on laying down his office is exposed to the revenge of wrongdoers with whom he has dealt severely.

[139]The order of the words dramatically expressses Thrasymachus's excitement and the sweeping success of the tyrant.

[140]The European estimate of Louis Napoleon before 1870 is a good illustration. Cf. Theopompus on Philip, Polybius viii. 11. Euripides' *Bellerophon* (fr. 288) uses the happiness of the tyrant as an argument against the moral government of the world.

[141]Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1130 b 15 uses the expression in a different sense.

[142]The main issue of the *Republic.* Cf. 360 D, 358 E and *Gorgias* 469 B.

flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent and said,

"I am surprised at you, Thrasymachus; after hurling[144] such a doctrine at us, can it be that you propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it is a small matter[145] that you are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while?"

"Well, do I deny it?"[146] said Thrasymachus.

"You seem to," said I,

"or else[147] to care nothing for us and so feel no concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know."

"Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also: it will be no bad investment[148] for you—any benefit that you bestow on such company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitable[149] than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will.[150] But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence,[151] all the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice. Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised

[143]Cf. Theophrastus, *Char.* xv. 19 (Jebb), Tucker, *Life in Ancient Athens*, p. 134. For the metaphor cf. 536 B, *Lysis* 204 D, Aristophanes *Wasps* 483. "Sudden", lit. all at once.

[144]Cf. Euripides *Alcestis* 680 "οὐ βαλὼν οὕτως ἅπει".

[145]Socrates reminds us that a serious moral issue is involved in all this word-play. So 352 D, *Gorgias* 492 C, 500 C, *Laches* 185 A. Cf. 377 B, 578 C, 608 B.

[146]Plainly a protesting question, "Why, do I think otherwise?" Cf. 339 D.

[147]For the impossibility of J. and C.'s "or rather" see my note in A.J.P. vol. xiii. p. 234.

[148]*κείσεται* of an investment perhaps. Cf. Plautus, *Rudens* 939 "bonis quod bene fit, haud perit."

[149]Isocrates viii. 31 and elsewhere seems to be copying Plato's idea that injustice can never be profitable in the higher sense of the word. Cf. also the proof in the *Hipparchus* that all true *κέρδος* is *ἀγαθόν*.

[150]Plato neglects for the present the refinement that the unjust man does not do what he really wishes, since all desire the good. Cf. 438 A, 577 D, and *Gorgias* 467 B.

[151]Cf. 365 D.

in preferring justice to injustice."

"And how am I to persuade you?"[152] he said.

"If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ram[153] it into your head?"

"Heaven forbid!" I said,

"don't do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it,[154] or if you shift your ground change openly and don't try to deceive us. But, as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—let us return to the previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd not with regard to what is best for the sheep but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherd[155] surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are entirely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd's art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule[156] in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulers[157]—willingly hold office and rule?"

"I don't think," he said,

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[152]Thrasymachus has stated his doctrine. Like Dr. Johnson he cannot supply brains to understand it. Cf. *Gorgias* 489 C, 499 B, *Meno* 75 D.

[153]The language is idiomatic, and the metaphor of a nurse feeding a baby, Aristophanes *Eccl.* 716, is rude. Cf. Shakespeare, "He crams these words into my ears against the stomach of my sense."

[154]Cf. Socrates' complaint of Callicles' shifts, *Gorgias* 499 B-C, but Cf. 334 E, 340 B-C.

[155]The art = the ideal abstract artist. See on 342 A-C. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1098 a 8 ff. says that the function of a harper and that of a good harper are generically the same. Cf. *Crito* 48 A.

[156]Aristotle's despotic rule over slaves would seem to be an exception (Newman, Introduction Aristotle *Politics* p. 245.). But that too should be for the good of the slave; *infra* 590 D.

[157]See on 343 B, Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1102 a 8. The new point that good rulers are reluctant to take office is discussed to 347 E, and recalled later, 520 D. See Newman, l.c. pp. 244-245, Dio Cass. xxxvi. 27. 1.

"I know right well they do."

"But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule? For tell me this: we ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from others because its power or function is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don't answer counter to your real belief.[158] "

"Well, yes," he said,

"that is what renders it different."

"And does not each art also yield us benefit[159] that is peculiar to itself and not general,[160] as for example medicine health, the pilot's art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly?"

"Assuredly."

"And does not the wage-earner's art yield wage? For that is its function. Would you identify medicine and the pilot's art? Or if you please to discriminate "precisely" as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you?"

"Of course not," he said.

"Neither, I take it, do you call wage-earning medicine if a man earning wages is in health."

" Surely not."

"But what of this? Do you call medicine wage-earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages?"

"No," he said.

"And did we not agree that the benefit derived from each art is peculiar to it?"

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[158]Cf. *Gorgias* 495 A. But elsewhere Socrates admits that the "argument" may be discussed regardless of the belief of the respondent (349 A). Cf. Thompson on *Meno* 83 D, Campbell on *Soph.* 246 D.

[159]As each art has a specific function, so it renders a specific service and aims at a specific good. This idea and the examples of the physician and the pilot are commonplaces in Plato and Aristotle.

[160]Hence, as argued below, from this abstract point of view wage-earning, which is common to many arts, cannot be the specific service of any of them, but must pertain to the special art *μισθωτική*. This refinement is justified by Thrasymachus' original abstraction of the infallible craftsman as such. It also has this much moral truth, that the good workman, as Ruskin says, rarely thinks first of his pay, and that the knack of getting well paid does not always go with the ability to do the work well. See Aristotle on *χρηματιστική*, *Politics* i. 3 (1253 b 14).

"So be it," he said.

"Any common or general benefit that all craftsmen receive, then, they obviously derive from their common use of some further identical thing."

"It seems so," he said.

"And we say that the benefit of earning wages accrues to the craftsmen from their further exercise of the wage-earning art." He assented reluctantly.

"Then the benefit, the receiving of wages does not accrue to each from his own art. But if we are to consider it "precisely" medicine produces health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft?"

"Apparently not," he said.

"Does he then bestow no benefit either when he works for nothing?"

"I'll say he does."

"Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage the stronger?"

"That was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people's troubles[161] in hand to straighten them out, but everybody expects pay for that, because he who is to exercise the art rightly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. That is the reason, it seems, why pay[162] must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in form of money or honor or a penalty if they refuse."

"What do you mean by that, Socrates?" said Glaucon.

"The two wages I recognize, but the penalty you speak of and described as a form of wage I don't understand.[163]"

"Then," said I,

"you don't understand the wages of the best men for the sake of

[161] *κακά* = troubles, miseres, 517 D. For the thought cf. 343 E, 345 E, *Xen. Mem. 2.1.8*, *Hdt. 1.97.*

[162] Cf. 345 E, *Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1134b 6.*

[163] Plato habitually explains metaphors, abstractions, and complicated defintions in this dramatic fashion. Cf. 352 E, 377 A, 413 A, 429 C, 438 B, 510 B.

which the finest spirits hold office and rule when they consent to do so. Don't you know that to be covetous of honor and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach?"

"I do," he said.

"Well, then," said I,

"that is why the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honor. They do not wish to collect pay openly for their service of rule and be styled hirelings nor to take it by stealth from their office and be called thieves, nor yet for the sake of honor, for they are not covetous of honor. So there must be imposed some compulsion and penalty to constrain them to rule if they are to consent to hold office. That is perhaps why to seek office oneself and not await compulsion is thought disgraceful. But the chief penalty is to be governed by someone worse[164] if a man will not himself hold office and rule. It is from fear of this, as it appears to me, that the better sort hold office when they do, and then they go to it not in the expectation of enjoyment nor as to a good thing,[165] but as to a necessary evil and because they are unable to turn it over to better men than themselves or to their like. For we may venture to say that, if there should be a city of good men[166] only, immunity from office-holding would be as eagerly contended for as office is now,[167] and there it would be made plain that in very truth the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled; so that every man of understanding would rather choose to be benefited by another than to be bothered with benefiting him. This point then I by no means concede to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the superior. But that we will reserve for another occasion.[168] A far weightier matter seems to me

[164]Cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1318 b 36. In a good democracy the better classes will be content, for they will not be ruled by worse men. Cf. Cicero, *Ad Att.* ii. 9 "male vehi malo alio gubernante quam tam ingratis vectoribus bene gubernare"; Democr. fr. 49 D.: "It is hard to be ruled by a worse man"; Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, 77.

[165]The good and the necessary is a favorite Platonic antithesis, but the necessary is often the *condicio sine qua non* of the good. Cf. 358 C, 493 C, 540 B, *Laws* 628 C-D, 858 A. Aristotle took over the idea, *Met.* 1072 b 12.

[166]This suggests an ideal state, but not more strongly than *Meno* 100 A, 89 B.

[167]The paradox suggests Spencer's altruistic competition and Archibald Marshall's Upsidonia. Cf. 521 A, 586 C, Isocrates vii. 24, xii. 145; Mill, *On Representative Government*, p. 56: "The good despot . . . can hardly be imagined as conseting to undertake it unless as a refuge from intolerable evils;" *ibid.* p. 200: "Until mankind in general are of opinion with Plato that the proper person to be entrusted with power is the person most unwilling to accept it."

[168]*εἰσαῦθις* lays the matter on the table. Cf. 430 C. The suggestiveness of Thrasymachus' defintion is exhausted, and Socrates turns to the larger question and main

Thrasymachus's present statement, his assertion that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. Which now do you choose, Glaucon?" said I,

"and which seems to you to be the truer statement?"

"That the life of the just man is more profitable, I say," he replied. "Did you hear," said I,

"all the goods that Thrasymachus just now enumerated for the life of the unjust man?"

"I heard," he said,

"but I am not convinced."

"Do you wish us then to try to persuade him, supposing we can find a way, that what he says is not true?"

"Of course I wish it," he said.

"If then we oppose[169] him in a set speech enumerating in turn the advantages of being just and he replies and we rejoin, we shall have to count up and measure the goods listed in the respective speeches and we shall forthwith be in need of judges to decide between us. But if, as in the preceding discussion, we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry, we shall be ourselves both judges and pleaders."

"Quite so," he said.

"Which method do you like best?" said I.

"This one," he said.

"Come then, Thrasymachus," I said,

"go back to the beginning and answer us. You affirm that perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice that is complete."

"I affirm it," he said,

"and have told you my reasons."

"Tell me then how you would express yourself on this point about them. You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice?"

"Of course."

"Justice the virtue and injustice the vice?"

"It is likely,[170] you innocent, when I say that injustice pays and

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theme of the *Republic* raised by the contention that the unjust life is happier and more profitable than the just.

[169]This is done in 358 D ff. It is the favorite Greek method of balancing pros and cons in set speeches and antithetic enumerations. Cf. Herodotus viii. 83, the διαλέξεις (Diels, *Vorsokratiker* ii. pp. 334-345), the choice of Heracles (Xenophon *Memorabilia* ii. 1), and the set speeches in Euripides. With this method the short question and answer of the Socratic dialectic is often contrasted. Cf. *Protagoras* 329 A, 334-335, *Gorgias* 461-462, also *Gorgias* 471 E, *Cratylus* 437 D, *Theaetetus* 171 A.

justice doesn't pay."

"But what then, pray?"

"The opposite," he replied.

"What! justice vice?"

"No, but a most noble simplicity[171] or goodness of heart."

"Then do you call injustice badness of heart?"

"No, but goodness of judgement."

"Do you also, Thrasymachus, regard the unjust as intelligent and good?"

"Yes, if they are capable of complete injustice," he said,

"and are able to subject to themselves cities and tribes of men. But you probably suppose that I mean those who take purses. There is profit to be sure even in that sort of thing," he said,

"if it goes undetected. But such things are not worth taking into the account, but only what I just described."

"I am not unaware of your meaning in that," I said;

"but this is what surprised me,[172] that you should range injustice under the head of virtue and wisdom, and justice in the opposite class."

"Well, I do so class them," he said.

"That," said I,

"is a stiffer proposition,[173] my friend, and if you are going as far as that it is hard to know what to answer."

"For if your position were that injustice is profitable yet you conceded it to be vicious and disgraceful as some other[174] disputants do, there would be a chance for an argument on conventional principles. But, as

[170]Thrasymachus's "Umwertung aller Werte" reverses the normal application of the words, as Callicles does in *Gorgias* 491 E.

[171]Thrasymachus recoils from the extreme position. Socrates' inference from the etymology of *εὐήθεια* (cf. 343 C) is repudiated. Injustice is not turpitude (bad character) but—discretion. *εὐβουλία* in a higher sense is what Protagoras teaches (*Protagoras* 318 E) and in the highest sense is the wisdom of Plato's guardians (428 B).

[172]Socrates understands the theory, and the distinction between wholesale injustice and the petty profits that are not worth mentioning, but is startled by the paradox that injustice will then fall in the category of virtue and wisdom. Thrasymachus affirms the paradox and is brought to self-contradiction by a subtle argument (349-350 C) which may pass as a dramatic illustration of the game of question and answer. Cf. Introduction p. x.

[173]*ἤδη* marks the advance from the affirmation that injustice is profitable to the point of asserting that it is a virtue. This is a "stiffer proposition," i.e. harder to refute, or possibly more stubborn.

[174]e.g. Polus in *Gorgias* 474 ff., 482 D-E. Cf. Isocrates *De Pace* 31. Thrasymachus is too wary to separate the *κακόν* and the *αἰσχρόν* and expose himself to a refutation based on conventional usage. Cf. *Laws* 627 D, *Politicus* 306 A, *Laws* 662 A.

it is, you obviously are going to affirm that it is honorable and strong and you will attach to it all the other qualities that we were assigning to the just, since you don't shrink from putting it in the category of virtue and wisdom."

"You are a most veritable prophet," he replied.

"Well," said I,

"I mustn't flinch from following out the logic of the inquiry, so long as I conceive you to be saying what you think.[175] For now, Thrasymachus, I absolutely believe that you are not "mocking" us but telling us your real opinions about the truth.[176]"

"What difference does it make to you," he said,

"whether I believe it or not?"

"Why don't you test the argument?"

"No difference," said I,

"but here is something I want you to tell me in addition to what you have said. Do you think the just man would want to overreach[177] or exceed another just man?"

"By no means," he said;

"otherwise he would not be the delightful simpleton that he is."

"And would he exceed or overreach or go beyond the just action?"

"Not that either," he replied.

"But how would he treat the unjust man—would he deem it proper and just to outdo, overreach, or go beyond him or would he not?"

"He would," he said,

"but he wouldn't be able to."

"That is not my question," I said,

"but whether it is not the fact that the just man does not claim and wish to outdo the just man but only the unjust?"

"That is the case," he replied.

"How about the unjust then? Does he claim to overreach and outdo the just man and the just action?"

"Of course," he said,

"since he claims to overreach and get the better of everything."

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[175] Cf. on 346 A.

[176] *περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας* suggests the dogmatic titles of sophistic and pre-Socratic books. Cf. Antiphon, p. 553 Diels, Campbell on *Theaetetus* 161 C, and Aristotle *Met. passim.*

[177] In pursuance of the analogy between the virtues and the arts the moral idea *πλεονεξία* (overreaching, getting more than your share; see on 359 C) is generalized to include doing more than or differently from. English can hardly reproduce this. Jowett's Shakespearian quotation (*King John* IV. ii. 28), "When workmen strive to do better than well,They do confound their skill in covetousness," though apt, only illustrates the thought in part.

"Then the unjust man will overreach and outdo also both the unjust man and the unjust action, and all his endeavor will be to get the most in everything for himself."

"That is so."

"Let us put it in this way," I said;

"the just man does not seek to take advantage of his like but of his unlike, but the unjust man of both."

"Admirably put," he said.

"But the unjust man is intelligent and good and the just man neither."

"That, too, is right," he said.

"Is it not also true," I said,

"that the unjust man is like the intelligent and good and the just man is not?"

"Of course," he said,

"being such he will be like to such and the other not."

"Excellent. Then each is such[178] as that to which he is like."

"What else do you suppose?" he said.

"Very well, Thrasymachus, but do you recognize that one man is a musician[179] and another unmusical?"

"I do."

"Which is the intelligent and which the unintelligent?"

"The musician, I presume, is the intelligent and the unmusical the unintelligent."

"And is he not good in the things in which he is intelligent[180] and bad in the things in which he is unintelligent?"

"Yes."

"And the same of the physician?"

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[178]The assumption that a thing is what it is like is put as an inference from Thrasymachus's ready admission that the unjust man is wise and good and is like the wise and good. Jevons says in *Substitution of Similars*; "Whatever is true of a thing is true of its like." But practical logic requires the qualification "in respect of their likeness." Socrates, however, argues that since the good man is like the good craftsman in not overreaching, and the good craftsman is good, therefore the just man is good. The conclusion is sound, and the analogy may have a basis of psychological truth; but the argument is a verbal fallacy.

[179]Cf. 608 E, *Gorgias* 463 E, *Protagoras* 332 A, 358 D, *Phaedo* 103 C, *Soph.* 226 B, *Philebus* 34 E, *Meno* 75 D, 88 A, *Alc. I.* 128 B, *Cratylus* 385 B. The formula, which is merely used to obtain formal recognition of a term or idea required in the argument, readily lends itself to modern parody. Socrates seems to have gone far afield. Thrasymachus answers quite confidently, *ἔγωγε*, but in *δήπου* there is a hint of bewilderment as to the object of it all.

[180]Familiar Socratic doctrine. Cf. *Laches* 194 D, *Lysis* 210 D, *Gorgias* 504 D.

"The same."

"Do you think then, my friend, that any musician in the tuning of a lyre would want to overreach[181] another musician in the tightening and relaxing of the strings or would claim and think fit to exceed or outdo him?"

"I do not."

"But would the the unmusical man?"

"Of necessity," he said.

"And how about the medical man? In prescribing food and drink would he want to outdo the medical man or the medical procedure?"

"Surely not."

"But he would the unmedical man?"

"Yes."

"Consider then with regard to all[182] forms of knowledge and ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose to do or say other or more than what another who knows would do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in the same action."

"Why, perhaps it must be so," he said,

"in such cases."

"But what of the ignorant man—of him who does not know? Would he not overreach or outdo equally the knower and the ignorant?"

"It may be."

"But the one who knows is wise?"

"I'll say so."

"And the wise is good?"

"I'll say so."

"Then he who is good and wise will not wish to overreach his like but his unlike and opposite."

"It seems so," he said.

"But the bad man and the ignoramus will overreach both like and unlike?"

"So it appears."

"And does not our unjust man, Thrasymachus, overreach both unlike and like? Did you not say that?"

"I did," he replied.

"But the just man will not overreach his like but only his unlike?"

"Yes."

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[181] *πλεονεκτεῖν* is here a virtual synonym of *πλέον ἔχειν*. The two terms help the double meaning. Cf. *Laws* 691 A *πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν νόμων*.

[182] Generalizing from the inductive instances.

"Then the just man is like the wise and good, and the unjust is like the bad and the ignoramus."

"It seems likely."

"But furthermore we agreed that such is each as that to which he is like."

"Yes, we did."

"Then the just man has turned out[183] on our hands to be good and wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant." Thrasymachus made all these admissions not as I now lightly narrate them, but with much baulking and reluctance[184] and prodigious sweating, it being summer, and it was then I beheld what I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing.[185] But when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance,

"Good," said I,

"let this be taken as established.[186] But we were also affirming that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don't you remember, Thrasymachus?"

"I remember," he said;

"but I don't agree with what you are now saying either and I have an answer to it, but if I were to attempt to state it, I know very well that you would say that I was delivering a harangue.[187] Either then allow me to speak at such length as I desire,[188] or, if you prefer to ask questions, go on questioning and I, as we do for old wives[189] telling their tales, will say "Very good" and will nod assent and dissent."

"No, no," said I,

"not counter to your own belief."

"Yes, to please you," he said,

"since you don't allow me freedom of speech. And yet what more do you want?"

"Nothing, indeed," said I;

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[183] Cf. 334 A.

[184] Cf. *Protagoras* 333 B.

[185] Cf. the blush of the sophist in *Euthydemus* 297 A.

[186] The main paradox of Thrasymachus is refuted. It will be easy to transfer the other laudatory epithets *ἰσχυρόν*, etc., from injustice back to justice. Thrasymachus at first refuses to share in the discussion but finally nods an ironical assent to everything that Socrates says. So Callicles in *Gorgias* 510 A.

[187] This is really a reminiscence of such passages as *Theaetetus* 162 D, *Protagoras* 336 B, *Gorgias* 482 C, 494 D, 513 A ff., 519 D. The only justification for it in the preceding conversation is 348 A-B.

[188] So Polus in *Gorgias* 527 A.

[189] Cf. *Gorgias* 527 A.

"but if this is what you propose to do, do it and I will ask the questions."

"Ask on, then."

"This, then, is the question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in sequence. What is the nature of injustice as compared with justice? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. But now," I said,

"if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now fail to recognize that—but what I want is not quite so simple[190] as that. I wish, Thrasymachus, to consider it in some such fashion as this. A city, you would say, may be unjust and try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection."

"Certainly," he said;

"and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete."

"I understand," I said,

"that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this, whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice."

"If,[191] " he replied,

"what you were just now saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice; if it is as I said, with injustice."

"Admirable, Thrasymachus," I said;

"you not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers."

"I am trying to please you," he replied.

"Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this: do you think that a city,[192] an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any

[190]Cf. 331 C, 386 B. Instead of the simple or absolute argument that justice, since it is wisdom and virtue, must be stronger, etc., then injustice, Socrates wishes to bring out the deeper thought that the unjust city or man is strong not because but in spite of his injustice and by virtue of some saving residue of justice.

[191]Thrasymachus can foresee the implications of either theory.

[192]For the thought cf. Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, 114: "Joint aggressions upon men outside the society cannot prosper if there are many aggressions of man on man within the society;" Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, Chapter. VIII. 31: "It (the loyalty of a thief to his gang) is rather a spurious or class morality," etc.; Carlyle: "Neither James Boswell's good book, nor any other good thing . . . is or can be performed by any man in virtue of his badness, but always solely in spite thereof." Proclus, *In Rempub.*

other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another?"

"Certainly not," said he.

"But if they didn't, wouldn't they be more likely to?"

"Assuredly."

"For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so?"

"So be it," he replied,

"not to differ from you."

"That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable of effective action in common?"

"By all means."

"Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just?"

"They will," he said.

"And then will you tell me that if injustice arises in one[193] it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it?"

"Have it that it keeps it," he said.

"And is it not apparent that its force is such that wherever it is found in city, family, camp, or in anything else it first renders the thing incapable of cooperation with itself owing to faction and difference, and secondly an enemy to itself[194] and to its opposite in every case,

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Kroll i. 20 expands this idea. Dante (*Convivio* I. xii.) attributes to the Philosopher in the fifth of the ethics the saying that even robbers and plunderers love justice. Locke (*Human Understanding* i. 3) denies that this proves the principles of justice innate: "They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities," etc. Cf. further Isocrates xii. 226 on the Spartans, and Plato *Protagoras* 322 B, on the inconveniences of injustice in the state of nature, *ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους*.

[193]The specific function must operate universally in bond or free, in many, two, or one. The application to the individual reminds us of the main argument of the *Republic*. Cf. 369 A, 433 D, 441 C. For the argument many, few or two, one, Cf. *Laws* 626 C.

[194]Plato paradoxically treats the state as one organism and the individual as many warring members (cf. Introduction p. xxxv). Hence, justice in one, and being a friend to oneself are more than metaphors for him. Cf. 621 C, 416 C, 428 D, *Laws* 626 E, 693 B, *Epistles* vii. 332 D, Antiphon 556.45 Diels "*ὁμονοεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτόν*". Aritotle, *Eth. Nic.* v. 11, inquires whether a man can wrong himself, and Chrysippus (Plutarch, *Stoic. Repug.* xvi.) pronounces the expression absurd.

the just? Isn't that so?"

"By all means."

"Then in the individual too, I presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature to produce. It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an enemy to himself and to the just. Is it not so?"

"Yes."

"But, my friend, the gods too[195] are just."

"Have it that they are," he said.

"So to the gods also, it seems, the unjust man will be hateful, but the just man dear."

"Revel in your discourse," he said,

"without fear, for I shall not oppose you, so as not to offend your partisans here."

"Fill up the measure of my feast,[196] then, and complete it for me," I said,

"by continuing to answer as you have been doing. Now that the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action and the unjust incapable of any common action, and that if we ever say that any men who are unjust have vigorously combined to put something over, our statement is not altogether true, for they would not have kept their hands from one another if they had been thoroughly unjust, but it is obvious that there was in them some justice which prevented them from wronging at the same time one another too as well as those whom they attacked; and by dint of this they accomplished whatever they did and set out to do injustice only half corrupted[197] by injustice, since utter rascals completely unjust are completely incapable of effective action—all this I understand to be the truth, and not what you originally laid

[195]This is the conventional climax of the plea for any moral ideal. So Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1179 a 24, proves that the *σοφός* being likest God is *θεοφιλέστατος*. Cf. Democ. fr. 217 D. "μοῦνοι θεοφιλέες ὅσοις ἐχθρὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν"; 382 E, 612 E, *Philebus* 39 E, *Laws* 716 D. The "enlightened" Thrasymachus is disgusted at this dragging in of the gods. Cf. *Theaetetus* 162 D "θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες". He is reported as saying (Diels p. 544.40) that the gods regard not human affairs, else they would not have overlooked the greatest of goods, justice, which men plainly do not use.

[196]*ἑστιάσεως* keeps up the image of the feast of reason. Cf. 354 A-B, *Lysis* 211 C, *Gorgias* 522 A, *Phaedrus* 227 B, and *Tim.* 17 A, from which perhaps it becomes a commonplace in Dante and the Middle Ages.

[197]For the idea cf. the argument in *Protagoras* 327 C-D, that Socrates would yearn for the wickedness of Athens if he found himself among wild men who knew no justice at all.

down. But whether it is also true[198] that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier, which is the question we afterwards proposed for examination, is what we now have to consider. It appears even now that they are, I think, from what has already been said. But all the same we must examine it more carefully.[199] For it is no ordinary[200] matter that we are discussing, but the right conduct of life."

"Proceed with your inquiry," he said.

"I proceed," said I.

"Tell me then—would you say that a horse has a specific work[201] or function?"

"I would."

"Would you be willing to define the work of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do only with it or best with it?"

"I don't understand," he replied.

"Well, take it this way: is there anything else with which you can see except the eyes?"

"Certainly not."

"Again, could you hear with anything but ears?"

"By no means."

"Would you not rightly say that these are the functions of these (organs)?"

"By all means."

"Once more, you could use a dirk to trim vine branches and a knife and many other instruments."

"Certainly."

"But nothing so well, I take it, as a pruning-knife fashioned for this purpose."

"That is true."

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[198] The main ethical question of the *Republic*, suggested in 347 E, now recurs.

[199] Similarly 578 C. What has been said implies that injustice is the corruption and disease of the soul (see on 445 A-B). But Socrates wishes to make further use of the argument from *ἔργον* or specific function.

[200] Cf. on 344 D, *ibid*, pp. 71 f.

[201] See on 335 D, and Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* i. 7. 14. The virtue or excellence of a thing is the right performance of its specific function. See Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, i. p. 301, Newman, Introduction Aristotle *Politics* p. 48. The following argument is in a sense a fallacy, since it relies on the double meaning of life, physical and moral (cf. 445 B and *Cratylus* 399 D) and on the ambiguity of *εὖ πράττειν*, fare well and do well. The Aristotelian commentator, Alexander, animadverts on the fallacy. For *ἔργον* cf. further Epictet. *Dis.* i. 4. 11, Max. Tyr. *Dis.* ii. 4, Musonius *apud* Stobaeus 117. 8, Thompson on *Meno* 90 E, Plato, *Laws* 896 D, *Phaedrus* 246 B.

"Must we not then assume this to be the work or function of that?"

"We must."

"You will now, then, I fancy, better apprehend the meaning of my question when I asked whether that is not the work of a thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform."

"Well," he said,

"I do understand, and agree that the work of anything is that."

"Very good," said I.

"Do you not also think that there is a specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a specific work or function is appointed? Let us return to the same examples. The eyes we say have a function?"

"They have."

"Is there also a virtue of the eyes?"

"There is."

"And was there not a function of the ears?"

"Yes."

"And so also a virtue?"

"Also a virtue."

"And what of all other things? Is the case not the same?"

"The same."

"Take note now. Could the eyes possibly fulfil their function well if they lacked their own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect?"

"How could they?" he said;

"for I presume you meant blindness instead of vision."

"Whatever," said I,

"the excellence may be. For I have not yet come[202] to that question, but am only asking whether whatever operates will not do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its own defect."

"That much," he said,

"you may affirm to be true."

"Then the ears, too, if deprived of their own virtue will do their work ill?"

"Assuredly."

"And do we then apply the same principle to all things?"

"I think so."

"Then next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you couldn't accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example,

[202]Platonic dialectic asks and affirms only so much as is needed for the present purpose.

management, rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work?"

"Nothing else."

"And again life? Shall we say that too is the function of the soul?"

"Most certainly," he said.

"And do we not also say that there is an excellence virtue of the soul?"

"We do."

"Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if deprived of its own virtue, or is this impossible?"

"It is impossible."

"Of necessity, then, a bad soul will govern and manage things badly while the good soul will in all these things do well.[203] "

"Of necessity."

"And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice?"

"Yes, we did."

"The just soul and the just man then will live well and the unjust ill?"

"So it appears," he said,

"by your reasoning."

"But furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not the contrary."

"Of course."

"Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable."

"So be it," he said.

"But it surely does not pay to be miserable, but to be happy."

"Of course not."

"Never, then, most worshipful Thrasymachus, can injustice be more profitable than justice."

"Let this complete your entertainment, Socrates, at the festival of Bendis."

"A feast furnished by you, Thrasymachus," I said,

"now that you have become gentle with me and are no longer angry.[204] I have not dined well, however— by my own fault, not yours.

[203]For the equivocation Cf. *Charmides* 172 A, *Gorgias* 507 C, Xenophon *Memorabilia* iii. 9. 14, Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1098 b 21, Newman, Introduction Aristotle *Politics* p. 401, Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (English ed.), ii. p. 70. It does not seriously affect the validity of the argument, for it is used only as a rhetorical confirmation of the implication that *κακῶς ἄρχειν*, etc. = misery and the reverse of happiness.

But just as gluttons[205] snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first object of our inquiry—what justice is—let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other topic. So that for me the present outcome of the discussion[206] is that I know nothing.[207] For if I don't know what the just is,[208] I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy."

[204]For similar irony cf. *Gorgias* 489 D, *Euthydemus* 304 C.

[205]Similarly Holmes (*Poet at the Breakfast Table*, p. 108) of the poet: "He takes a bite out of the sunny side of this and the other, and ever stimulated and never satisfied," etc. Cf. Lucian, *Demosth. Encom.* 18, Julian *Orat.* ii. p. 69 c, Polyb. iii. 57. 7.

[206]Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, i. p. 4, n. 1, argues that *διαλόγου* here means inquiry (*Erorterung*), not the dialogue with Thrasymachus.

[207]For the profession of ignorance at the close of a Socratic dialogue Cf. *Charmides* 175 A-B, *Lysis* 222 D-E, *Protagoras* 361 A-B, Xenophon *Memorabilia* iv. 2. 39. Cf. also Introduction p. x.

[208]Knowledge of the essence or definition must precede discussion of qualities and relations. Cf *Meno* 71 B, 86 D-E, *Laches* 190 B, *Gorgias* 448 E.

Book 2

When I had said this I supposed that I was done with the subject, but it all turned out to be only a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always an intrepid enterprising spirit in everything, would not on this occasion acquiesce in Thrasymachus's abandonment[209] of his case, but said,

"Socrates, is it your desire to seem to have persuaded us or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be just than unjust?"

"Really," I said,

"if the choice rested with me."

"Well, then, you are not doing what you wish. For tell me: do you agree that there is a kind of good[210] which we would choose to possess, not from desire for its after effects, but welcoming it for its own sake? As, for example, joy and such pleasures are harmless[211] and nothing results from them afterwards save to have and to hold the enjoyment."

"I recognise that kind," said I.

"And again a kind that we love both for its own sake and for its

[209] So in *Philebus* 11 C, Philebus cries off or throws up the sponge in the argument.

[210] Aristotle borrows this classification from Plato (*Topics* 118 b 20-22), but liking to differ from his teacher, says in one place that the good which is desired solely for itself is the highest. The Stoics apply the classification to "preferables" (Diogenes Laertius vii. 107). Cf. Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* i. 11. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes goods of the soul, of the body, and of possessions (*Laws* 697 B, 727-729) or as the first Alcibiades puts it (131) the self, the things of the self, and other things.

[211] Plato here speaks of harmless pleasures, from the point of view of common sense and prudential morality. Cf. *Tim.* 59 D "ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονήν", Milton's "Mirth that after no repenting draws." But the *Republic* (583 D) like the *Gorgias* (493 E-494 C) knows the more technical distinction of the *Philebus* (42 C ff., 53 C ff.) between pure pleasures and impure, which are conditioned by desire and pain.

consequences,[212] such as understanding,[213] sight, and health?[214] For these presume we welcome for both reasons."

"Yes," I said.

"And can you discern a third form of good under which falls exercise and being healed when sick and the art of healing and the making of money generally? For of them we would say that they are laborious and painful yet beneficial, and for their own sake we would not accept them, but only for the rewards and other benefits that accrue from them."

"Why yes," I said,

"I must admit this third class also. But what of it?"

"In which of these classes do you place justice?" he said.

"In my opinion," I said,

"it belongs in the fairest class, that which a man who is to be happy must love both for its own sake and for the results."

"Yet the multitude," he said,

"do not think so, but that it belongs to the toilsome class of things that must be practised for the sake of rewards and repute due to opinion but that in itself is to be shunned as an affliction."

"I am aware," said I,

"that that is the general opinion and Thrasymachus has for some time been disparaging it as such and praising injustice. But I, it seems, am somewhat slow to learn."

"Come now," he said,

"hear what I too have to say and see if you agree with me. For Thrasymachus seems to me to have given up to you too soon, as if he were a serpent[215] that you had charmed, but I am not yet satisfied with the proof that has been offered about justice and injustice. For what I desire is to hear what each of them is and what potency and effect it has in and of itself dwelling in the soul,[216] but to dismiss their rewards and consequences. This, then, is what I propose to do, with your concurrence. I will renew the argument of Thrasymachus and will

[212]Isocrates i. 47 has this distinction, as well as Aristotle.

[213]Some philosophers, as Aristippus (Diogenes Laertius x. 1. 138), said that intelligence is a good only for its consequences, but the opening sentences of Aritotle's *Metaphysics* treat all forms of knowledge as goods in themselves.

[214]Plutarch (1040 C) says that Chrysippus censured Plato for recognizing health as a good, but elsewhere Plato explicitly says that even health is to be disregarded when the true interests of the soul require it.

[215]For Plato's fondness for the idea of κηλεῖν cf. *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, note 500.

[216]Cf. 366 E.

first state what men say is the nature and origin of justice; secondly, that all who practise it do so reluctantly, regarding it as something necessary[217] and not as a good; and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds for thus acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just man—as they say; though I, Socrates, don't believe it. Yet I am disconcerted when my ears are dinned by the arguments of Thrasymachus and innumerable others.[218] But the case for justice, to prove that it is better than injustice, I have never yet heard stated by any as I desire to hear it. What I desire is to hear an encomium on justice in and by itself. And I think I am most likely to get that from you. For which reason I will lay myself out in praise of the life of injustice, and in so speaking will give you an example of the manner in which I desire to hear from you in turn the dispraise of injustice and the praise of justice. Consider whether my proposal pleases you."

"Nothing could please me more," said I;

"for on what subject would a man of sense rather delight to hold and hear discourse again and again?"

"That is excellent," he said;

"and now listen to what I said would be the first topic—the nature and origin of justice."

"By nature,[219] they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong. So that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the power to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and that this is the beginning of legislation and covenants between men, and that they name the commandment

[217] Cf. 347 C-D.

[218] Cf. *Philebus* 66 E. Plato affirms that the immoralism of Thrasymachus and Callicles was widespread in Greece. Cf. Introduction x-xi, and *Gorgias* 511 B, *Protagoras* 333 C, *Euthydemus* 279 B, and my paper on the interpretation of the *Timaeus*, A.J.P. vol. ix. pp. 403-404.

[219] Glaucon employs the antithesis between nature and law and the theory of an original social contract to expound the doctrine of Thrasymachus and Callicles in the *Gorgias*. His statement is more systematic than theirs, but the principle is the same; for, though Callicles does not explicitly speak of a social contract, he implies that conventional justice is an agreement of the weak devised to hold the strong in awe. (*Gorgias* 492 C), and Glaucon here affirms that no relally strong man would enter into any such agreement. The social contract without the immoral application is also suggested in *Protagoras* 322 B. Cf. also *Crito* 50 C, f.

of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential nature of justice—a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to get one's revenge. Justice, they tell us, being mid-way between the two, is accepted and approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honored in the lack of vigor to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality "a man" would never make a compact with anybody either to wrong nor to be wronged; for he would be mad. The nature, then, of justice is this and such as this, Socrates, and such are the conditions in which it originates, according to the theory. But as for the second point, that those who practise it do so unwillingly and from want of power to commit injustice—we shall be most likely to apprehend that if we entertain some such supposition as this in thought: if we grant to each, the just and the unjust, licence and power to do whatever he pleases, and then accompany them in imagination and see whither his desire will conduct each. We should then catch the just man in the very act of resorting to the same conduct as the unjust man because of the self-advantage which every creature by its nature pursues as a good, while by the convention of law[220] it is forcibly diverted to paying honor to "equality."[221] The licence that I mean would be most nearly such as would result from supposing them to have the power which men say once came to the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian.[222] They relate that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler at that time of Lydia, and that after a great deluge of rain and an earthquake the ground opened and a chasm appeared in the place where he was pasturing; and they say that he saw and wondered and went down into the chasm; and the story goes that he beheld other

[220]The antithesis of *φύσις* and *νόμος*, nature and law, custom or convention, is a commonplace of both Greek rhetoric and Greek ethics. Cf. the Chicago dissertation of John Walter Beardslee, *The Use of* φύσις *in Fifth Century Greek Literature*, ch. x. p. 68. Cf. Herodotus iii. 38, Pindar, quoted by Plato, *Gorgias* 484 B, *Laws* 690 B, 715 A; Euripides or Critias, Frag. of Sisyphus, Aristophanes *Birds* 755 ff., Plato *Protagoras* 337 D, *Gorgias* 483 E, *Laws* 889 C and 890 D. It was misused by ancient as it is by modern radicals. Cf. my interpretation of the *Timaeus*, A.J.P. vol. ix. p. 405. The ingenuity of modern philologians has tried to classify the Greek sophists as distinctly partisans of *νόμος* or *φύσις*. It cannot be done. Cf. my unsigned review of Alfred Benn in the *New York Nation*, July 20, 1899, p. 57.

[221]Cf. *Gorgias* 508 A.

[222]So manuscripts and Proclus. There are many emendations which the curious will find in Adam's first appendix to the book. Herodotus i. 8-13 tells a similar but not identical story of Gyges himself, in which the magic ring and many other points of Plato's tale are lacking. On the whole legend cf. the study of Kirby Flower Smith, A.J.P. vol. xxiii. pp. 261-282, 361-387, and Frazer's *Paus.* iii. p. 417.

marvels there and a hollow bronze horse with little doors, and that he peeped in and saw a corpse within, as it seemed, of more than mortal stature, and that there was nothing else but a gold ring on its hand, which he took off and went forth. And when the shepherds held their customary assembly to make their monthly report to the king about the flocks, he also attended wearing the ring."

"So as he sat there it chanced that he turned the collet of the ring towards himself, towards the inner part of his hand, and when this took place they say that he became invisible[223] to those who sat by him and they spoke of him as absent and that he was amazed, and again fumbling with the ring turned the collet outwards and so became visible. On noting this he experimented with the ring to see if it possessed this virtue, and he found the result to be that when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, and when outwards visible; and becoming aware of this, he immediately managed things so that he became one of the messengers who went up to the king, and on coming there he seduced the king's wife and with her aid set upon the king and slew him and possessed his kingdom. If now there should be two such rings, and the just man should put on one and the unjust the other, no one could be found, it would seem, of such adamantine[224] temper as to persevere in justice and endure to refrain his hands from the possessions of others and not touch them, though he might with impunity take what he wished even from the marketplace, and enter into houses and lie with whom he pleased, and slay and loose from bonds whomsoever he would, and in all other things conduct himself among mankind as the equal of a god.[225] And in so acting he would do no differently from the other man, but both would pursue the same course. And yet this is a great proof, one might argue, that no one is just of his own will but only from constraint, in the belief that justice is not his personal good, inasmuch as every man, when he supposes himself to have the power to do wrong, does wrong. For that there is far more profit for him personally in injustice than in justice is what every man believes, and believes truly, as the proponent of this theory will maintain. For if anyone who had got such a licence within his grasp

[223] Mr. H. G. Wells' *The Invisible Man* rests on a similar fancy. Cf. also the lawless fancies of Aristophanes *Birds* 785 ff.

[224] The word is used of the firmness of moral faith in *Gorgias* 509 A and *Republic* 618 E.

[225] *ἰσόθεος*. The word is a leit-motif anticipating Plato's rebuke of the tragedians for their praises of the tyraant. Cf. 568 A-B. It does not, as Adam suggests, foreshadow Plato's attack on the popular theology.

should refuse to do any wrong or lay his hands on others' possessions, he would be regarded as most pitiable[226] and a great fool by all who took note of it,[227] though they would praise him[228] before one another's faces, deceiving one another because of their fear of suffering injustice. So much for this point. But to come now to the decision[229] between our two kinds of life, if we separate the most completely just and the most completely unjust man, we shall be able to decide rightly, but if not, not. How, then, is this separation to be made? Thus: we must subtract nothing of his injustice from the unjust man or of his justice from the just, but assume the perfection of each in his own mode of conduct."

"In the first place, the unjust man must act as clever craftsmen do: a first-rate pilot or physician, for example, feels the difference between impossibilities[230] and possibilities in his art and attempts the one and lets the others go; and then, too, if he does happen to trip, he is equal to correcting his error. Similarly, the unjust man who attempts injustice rightly must be supposed to escape detection if he is to be altogether unjust, and we must regard the man who is caught as a bungler.[231] For the height of injustice[232] is to seem just without being so. To the perfectly unjust man, then, we must assign perfect injustice and withhold nothing of it, but we must allow him, while committing the greatest wrongs, to have secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice; and if he does happen to trip,[233] we must concede to him the power to correct his mistakes by his ability to speak persuasively if any of his misdeeds come to light, and when force is needed, to employ force by reason of his manly spirit and vigor and his provision of friends and money; and when we have set up an unjust man of this character, our theory must set the just man at his side—a simple and noble man, who, in the phrase of Aeschylus, does not wish to seem but be good. Then we must deprive him of the seeming.[234] For if he

[226]Cf. 344 A, *Gorgias* 492 B.

[227]*αἰσθανομένοις* suggests men of discernment who are not taken in by phrases, the knowing ones. Cf. *Protagoras* 317 A, and Aristophanes *Clouds* 1241 "τοῖς εἰδόσιν".

[228]Cf. *Gorgias* 483 B, 492 A, *Protagoras* 327 B, Aristotle *Rhet.* ii. 23.

[229]Cf. 580 B-C, *Philebus* 27 C.

[230]Cf. Quint. iv. 5. 17 "recte enim Graeci praecipiunt non tentanda quae effici omnino non possint."

[231]Cf. Emerson, *Eloquence*: "Yet any swindlers we have known are novices and bunglers. . . . A greater power of face would accomplish anything and with the rest of the takings take away the bad name."

[232]Cf, Cicero *De offic.* i. 13.

[233]Cf. Thucydides vii. 24 on the miscalculation of the shrewd Chians.

is going to be thought just he will have honors and gifts because of that esteem. We cannot be sure in that case whether he is just for justice's sake or for the sake of the gifts and the honors. So we must strip him bare of everything but justice and make his state the opposite of his imagined counterpart.[235] Though doing no wrong he must have the repute of the greatest injustice, so that he may be put to the test as regards justice through not softening because of ill repute and the consequences thereof. But let him hold on his course unchangeable even unto death, seeming all his life to be unjust though being just, that so, both men attaining to the limit, the one of injustice, the other of justice, we may pass judgement which of the two is the happier."

"Bless me, my dear Glaucon," said I,

"how strenuously you polish off each of your two men for the competition for the prize as if it were a statue.[236]"

"To the best of my ability," he replied,

"and if such is the nature of the two, it becomes an easy matter, I fancy, to unfold the tale of the sort of life that awaits each. We must tell it, then; and even if my language is somewhat rude and brutal,[237] you must not suppose, Socrates, that it is I who speak thus, but those who commend injustice above justice."

"What they will say is this: that such being his disposition the just man will have to endure the lash, the rack, chains, the branding-iron in his eyes, and finally, after every extremity of suffering, he will be crucified,[238] and so will learn his lesson that not to be but to seem just is what we ought to desire. And the saying of Aeschylus[239] was, it seems, far more correctly applicable to the unjust man. For it is literally true, they will say, that the unjust man, as pursuing what clings closely to reality, to truth, and not regulating his life by opinion, desires not to seem but to be unjust," Exploiting the deep furrows of his wit " " From which there grows the fruit of counsels shrewd," *Aesch. Seven 592-594* first office and rule in the state because of his reputation for justice, then a wife from any family he chooses, and the giving of his children in marriage to whomsoever he pleases, dealings and partnerships with

[234] As Aristotle sententiously says, *ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο* (*Rhet.* 1365 b 1, *Topics* iii. 3. 14).

[235] For the thought cf. Euripides *Helen* 270-271.

[236] Cf. 540 C.

[237] Cf. 613 E, *Gorgias* 486 C, 509 A, *Apology* 32 D. The Greeks were sensitive to rude or boastful speech.

[238] Or strictly impaled. Cf. Cicero *De Rep.* iii. 27. Writers on Plato and Christianity have often compared the fate of Plato's just man with the crucifixion.

[239] *Aesch. Seven 592-594*

whom he will, and in all these transactions advantage and profit for himself because he has no squeamishness about committing injustice; and so they say that if he enters into lawsuits, public or private, he wins and gets the better of his opponents, and, getting the better,[240] is rich and benefits his friends and harms his enemies[241]; and he performs sacrifices and dedicates votive offerings to the gods adequately and magnificently,[242] and he serves and pays court[243] to men whom he favors and to the gods far better than the just man, so that he may reasonably expect the favor of heaven[244] also to fall rather to him than to the just. So much better they say, Socrates, is the life that is prepared for the unjust man from gods and men than that which awaits the just." When Glaucon had thus spoken, I had a mind to make some reply thereto, but his brother Adeimantus said,

"You surely don't suppose, Socrates, that the statement of the case is complete?"

"Why, what else?" I said.

"The very most essential point," said he,

"has not been mentioned."

"Then," said I,

"as the proverb has it, "Let a brother help a man"[245]—and so, if Glaucon omits any word or deed, do you come to his aid. Though for my part what he has already said is quite enough to overthrow me and incapacitate me for coming to the rescue of justice."

"Nonsense," he said,

"but listen to this further point. We must set forth the reasoning and the language of the opposite party, of those who commend justice and dispraise injustice, if what I conceive to be Glaucon's meaning is to be made more clear."

"Fathers, when they address exhortations to their sons, and all those who have others in their charge,[246] urge the necessity of being just,

[240] Cf. on 343 D, 349 B.

[241] Cf. 332 D.

[242] *μεγαλοπρεπῶς*. Usually a word of ironical connotation on Plato.

[243] Cf. *Euthyphro* 12 E ff. and 331 B, "θεῷ θυσίας", where the respectable morality of the good Cephalus is virtually identical with this commercial view of religion.

[244] Cf. 352 B and 613 A-B.

[245] "ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη". The rhythm perhaps indicates a proverb of which the scholiast found the source in *Odyssey* xvi. 97.

[246] Who, in Quaker language, have a concern for, who have charge of souls. Cf. the admonitions of the father of Horace, *Satire* i. 4. 105 ff., *Protagoras* 325 D, Xenophon *Cyr.* i. 5. 9, Isocrates iii. 2, Terence *Adelphi* 414 f., Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, i. p. 187, and the letters of Lord Chesterfield, *passim*, as well as Plato himself, *Laws* 662

not by praising justice itself, but the good repute with mankind that accrues from it, the object that they hold before us being that by seeming to be just the man may get from the reputation office and alliances and all the good things that Glaucon just now enumerated as coming to the unjust man from his good name. But those people draw out still further this topic of reputation. For, throwing in good standing with the gods, they have no lack of blessings to describe, which they affirm the gods give to pious men, even as the worthy Hesiod and Homer declare, the one that the gods make the oaks bear for the just: "Acorns on topmost branches and swarms of bees on their mid-trunks," and he tells how the "Flocks of the fleece-bearing sheep are laden and weighted with soft wool," *Hes. WD 232ff.* and of many other blessings akin to these; and similarly the other poet: " Even as when a good king, who rules in the fear of the high gods, Upholds justice and right, and the black earth yields him her foison, " " Barley and wheat, and his trees are laden and weighted with fair fruits, Increase comes to his flocks and the ocean is teeming with fishes. " *Hom. Od. 19.109* And Musaeus and his son[247] have[248] a more excellent song[249] than these of the blessings that the gods bestow on the righteous. For they conduct them to the house of Hades in their tale and arrange a symposium of the saints,[250] where, reclined on couches crowned with wreaths, they entertain the time henceforth with wine, as if the fairest meed of virtue were an everlasting drunk. And others extend still further the rewards of virtue from the gods. For they say that the children's children[251] of the pious and oath-keeping man and his race thereafter never fail. Such and such-like are their praises of justice. But the impious and the unjust they bury in mud[252] in the house of Hades and compel them to fetch water in a sieve,[253] and, while they still live, they bring them into evil repute, and all the sufferings that Glaucon enumerated

E.

[247] Cf. Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, iv. p. 83. The son is possibly Eumolpus.

[248] For the thought of the following cf. Emerson, *Compensation*: "He (the preacher) assumed that judgement is not executed in this world; that the wicked are successful; that the good are miserable; and then urged from reason and scripture a compensation to be made to both parties in the next life. No offence appeared to be taken by the congregation at this doctrine."

[249] *νεανικώτερα* is in Plato often humorous and depreciative. Cf. 563 E *νεανική*.

[250] *συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων*. Jowett's notion that this is a jingle is due to the English pronunciation of Greek.

[251] Kern, *ibid.*, quotes Servius *ad* Virgil, *Aeneid* iii. 98 "et nati natorum" and opines that Homer took *Iliad* xx. 308 from Orpheus.

[252] Cf. Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* i. pp. 56-57, 533 D, *Phaedo* 69 C, commentators on Aristophanes *Frogs* 146.

as befalling just men who are thought to be unjust, these they recite about the unjust, but they have nothing else to say.[254] Such is the praise and the censure of the just and of the unjust."

"Consider further, Socrates, another kind of language about justice and injustice employed by both laymen and poets. All with one accord reiterate that soberness and righteousness are fair and honorable, to be sure, but unpleasant and laborious, while licentiousness and injustice are pleasant and easy to win and are only in opinion and by convention disgraceful. They say that injustice pays better than justice, for the most part, and they do not scruple to felicitate bad men who are rich or have other kinds of power to do them honor in public and private, and to dishonor and disregard those who are in any way weak or poor, even while admitting that they are better men than the others. But the strangest of all these speeches are the things they say about the gods[255] and virtue, how so it is that the gods themselves assign to many good men misfortunes and an evil life but to their opposites a contrary lot; and begging priests[256] and soothsayers go to rich men's doors and make them believe that they by means of sacrifices and incantations have accumulated a treasure of power from the gods[257] that can expiate and cure with pleasurable festivals any misdeed of a man or his ancestors, and that if a man wishes to harm an enemy, at slight cost he will be enabled to injure just and unjust alike, since they are masters of spells and enchantments[258] that constrain the gods to serve their end. And for all these sayings they cite the poets as witnesses, with regard to the ease and plentifulness of vice, quoting: "Evil-doing in plenty a man shall find for the seeking;" "Smooth is the

[253]Cf. my note on Horace, *Odes* iii. 11. 22, and, with an allegorical application, *Gorgias* 493 B.

[254]Plato teaches elsewhere that the real punishment of sin is to be cut off from communion with the good. *Theaetetus* 176 D-E, *Laws* 728 B, 367 A

[255]The gnomic poets complain that bad men prosper for a time, but they have faith in the late punishment of the wicked and the final triumph of justice.

[256]There is a striking analogy between Plato's language here and the description by Protestant historians of the sale of indulgences by Tetzel in Germany. Rich men's doors is proverbial. Cf. 489 B.

[257]Cf. Mill, "Utility of Religion," *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 90: "All positive religions aid this self-delusion. Bad religions teach that divine vengeance may be bought off by offerings or personal abasement." Plato, *Laws* 885 D, anticipates Mill. With the whole passage compare the scenes at the founding of Cloudcuckootown, Aristophanes *Birds* 960-990, and more seriously the medieval doctrine of the "treasure of the church" and the Hindu *tapas*.

[258]In *Laws* 933 D both are used of the victim with ἐπῳδαῖς, which primarily applies to the god. Cf. Lucan, *Phars.* vi. 492 and 527.

way and it lies near at hand and is easy to enter; But on the pathway of virtue the gods put sweat from the first step, " *Hes. WD 287-289*and a certain long and uphill road. And others cite Homer as a witness to the beguiling of gods by men, since he too said:" The gods themselves are moved by prayers, And men by sacrifice and soothing vows, " " And incense and libation turn their wills Praying, whenever they have sinned and made transgression. " *Hom. Il. 9.497*"

"And they produce a bushel[259] of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sport[260] for the living, and that there are also special rites for the defunct, which they call functions, that deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice. What, Socrates, do we suppose is the effect of all such sayings about the esteem in which men and gods hold virtue and vice upon the souls that hear them, the souls of young men who are quick-witted and capable of flitting, as it were, from one expression of opinion to another and inferring from them all the character and the path whereby a man would lead the best life? Such a youth[261] would most likely put to himself the question Pindar asks, "Is it by justice or by crooked deceit that I the higher tower shall scale and so live my life out in fenced and guarded security?" *Pindar, Fr.* The consequences of my being just are, unless I likewise seem so, not assets,[262] they say, but liabilities, labor and total loss; but if I am unjust and have procured myself a reputation for justice a godlike life is promised. Then since it is "the seeming" *Simonides, Fr. 76 Bergk*, and Eur. Orest. 236 as the wise men show me, that "masters the reality" and is lord of happiness, to this I must

[259] *ὅμαδον*, lit. noise, hubbub, babel, here contemptuous. There is no need of the emendation *ὀπιθόν*. Cf. 387 A, and Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, p. 82; cf. John Morley, *Lit. Studies*, p. 184, "A bushel of books."

[260] Cf. *Laws* 819 B.

[261] Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 25: "His (Plato's) imagination was beset by the picture of some brilliant young Alcibiades standing at the crossways of life and debating in his mind whether the best chance for happiness lay in accepting the conventional moral law that serves to police the vulgar or in giving rein to the instincts and appetites of his own stronger nature. To confute the one, to convince the other, became to him the main problem of moral philosophy." Cf. Introduction x-xi; also *The Idea of Good in Plato's* Republic, p. 214.

[262] *φανερὰ ζημία* is familiar and slightly humorous. Cf. Starkie on *Aristoph. Ach. 737.*

devote myself without reserve. For a front and a show[263] I must draw about myself a shadow-line of virtue, but trail behind me the fox of most sage Archilochus,[264] shifty and bent on gain. Nay, 'tis objected, it is not easy for a wrong-doer always to lie hid.[265] Neither is any other big thing facile, we shall reply. But all the same if we expect to be happy, we must pursue the path to which the footprints of our arguments point. For with a view to lying hid we will organize societies and political clubs,[266] and there are teachers of cajolery[267] who impart the arts of the popular assembly and the court-room. So that, partly by persuasion, partly by force, we shall contrive to overreach with impunity. But against the gods, it may be said, neither secrecy nor force can avail. Well, if there are no gods, or they do not concern themselves with the doings of men, neither need we concern ourselves with eluding their observation.[268] If they do exist and pay heed, we know and hear of them only from such discourses and from the poets who have described their pedigrees. But these same authorities tell us that the gods are capable of being persuaded and swerved from their course by "sacrifice and soothing vows" and dedications. We must believe them in both or neither."

"And if we are to believe them, the thing to do is to commit injustice and offer sacrifice from fruits of our wrongdoing.[269] For if we are just, we shall, it is true, be unscathed by the gods, but we shall be putting away from us the profits of injustice; but if we are unjust, we shall win those profits, and, by the importunity of our prayers, when we transgress and sin, we shall persuade them and escape scot-free. Yes, it will be objected, but we shall be brought to judgement in the world below for our unjust deeds here, we or our children's children. "Nay, my dear sir," our calculating friend[270] will say, "here again the rites

[263] A Pindaric mixture of metaphors beginning with a portico and garb, continuing with the illusory perspective of scene-painting, and concluding with the craftly fox trailed behind.

[264] Cf. Fr. 86-89 Bergk, and Dio Chrysost. *Or.* 55. 285 R. *κεπδαλέαν* is a standing epithet of Reynard. Cf. Gildersleeve on Pindar *Pyth.* ii. 78.

[265] Cf. my review of Jebb's *Bacchylides, Class. Phil.*, 1907, vol. ii. p. 235.

[266] Cf. George Miller Calhoun, *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*, University of Chicago Dissertation, 1911.

[267] Lit. persuasion. Cf. the defintion of rhetoric, *Gorgias* 453 A.

[268] For the thought compare Tennyson, *Lucretius*: "But he that holdsThe gods are careless, wherefore need he careGreatly for them?" Cf. also Euripides *I.A.* 1034-1035, *Anth. Pal.* x. 34.

[269] Cf. Verres' distribution of his three years' spoliation of Sicily, Cicero *In C. Verrem actio prima* 14 (40), and Plato *Laws* 906 C-D, Lysias xxvii. 6.

for the dead[271] have much efficacy, and the absolving divinities, as the greatest cities declare, and the sons of gods, who became the poets and prophets[272] of the gods, and who reveal that this is the truth." On what further ground, then, could we prefer justice to supreme injustice? If we combine this with a counterfeit decorum, we shall prosper to our heart's desire, with gods and men in life and death, as the words of the multitude and of men of the highest authority declare. In consequence, then, of all that has been said, what possibility is there, Socrates, that any man who has the power of any resources of mind, money, body, or family should consent to honor justice and not rather laugh[273] when he hears her praised? In sooth, if anyone is able to show the falsity of these arguments, and has come to know with sufficient assurance that justice is best, he feels much indulgence for the unjust, and is not angry with them, but is aware that except a man by inborn divinity of his nature disdains injustice, or, having won to knowledge, refrains from it, no one else is willingly just, but that it is from lack of manly spirit or from old age or some other weakness[274] that men dispraise injustice, lacking the power to practise it. The fact is patent. For no sooner does such one come into the power than he works injustice to the extent of his ability. And the sole cause of all this is the fact that was the starting-point of this entire plea of my friend here and of myself to you, Socrates, pointing out how strange it is that of all you self-styled advocates of justice, from the heroes of old whose discourses survive to the men of the present day, not one has ever censured injustice or commended justice otherwise than in respect of the repute, the honors, and the gifts that accrue from each. But what each one of them is in itself, by its own inherent force, when it is within the soul of the possessor and escapes the eyes of both gods and men, no one has ever adequately set forth in poetry or prose—the proof that the one is the greatest of all evils that the soul contains within itself, while justice is the greatest good."

" For if you had all spoken in this way from the beginning and from our youth up had sought to convince us, we should not now be guarding against one another's injustice, but each would be his own best guardian, for fear lest by working injustice he should dwell in commu-

[270] His morality is the hedonistic calculus of the *Protagoras* or the commercial religion of "other-wordliness."

[271] For these *τελεταί* cf. 365 A.

[272] Or rather "mouthpieces."

[273] Aristophanes *Clouds* 1241.

[274] Cf. *Gorgias* 492 A.

nion with the greatest of evils.[275] This, Socrates, and perhaps even more than this, Thrasymachus and haply another might say in pleas for and against justice and injustice, inverting their true potencies, as I believe, grossly. But I— for I have no reason to hide anything from you—am laying myself out to the utmost on the theory, because I wish to hear its refutation from you. Do not merely show us by argument that justice is superior to injustice, but make clear to us what each in and of itself does to its possessor, whereby the one is evil and the other good. But do away with the repute of both, as Glaucon urged. For, unless you take away from either the true repute and attach to each the false, we shall say that it is not justice that you are praising but the semblance, nor injustice that you censure, but the seeming, and that you really are exhorting us to be unjust but conceal it, and that you are at one with Thrasymachus in the opinion that justice is other man's good,[276] the advantage of the other, and that injustice is advantageous and profitible to oneself but disadvantageous to the inferior. Since, then, you have admitted that justice belongs to the class of those highest goods which are desirable both for their consequences and still more for their own sake, as sight, hearing, intelligence, yes and health too, and all other goods that are productive[277] by their very nature and not by opinion, this is what I would have you praise about justice—the benefit which it and the harm which injustice inherently works upon its possessor. But the rewards and the honors that depend on opinion, leave to others to praise. For while I would listen to others who thus commended justice and disparaged injustice, bestowing their praise and their blame on the reputation and the rewards of either, I could not accept that sort of thing from you unless you say I must, because you have passed your entire life[278] in the consideration of this very matter. Do not then, I repeat, merely prove to us in argument the superiority of justice to injustice, but show us what it is that each inherently does to its possessor—whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and men—whereby the one is good and the other evil." While I had always admired the natural parts of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I was especially pleased by their words on this occasion, and said:

"" It was excellently spoken of you, sons of the man we know, " [279]

[275] Cf. 363 E.

[276] Cf. 343 C.

[277] Adam's note on *γόνιμα*: i.q. *γνήσια* is, I think, wrong.

[278] Cf. 506 C.

[279] Cf. my note in *Class. Phil.* 1917, vol. xii. p. 436. It does not refer to Thrasymachus facetiously as Adam fancies, but is an honorific expression borrowed

in the beginning of the elegy which the admirer[280] of Glaucon wrote when you distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara [281]—"Sons of Ariston,[282] whose race from a glorious sire is god-like." This, my friends, I think, was well said. For there must indeed be a touch of the god-like in your disposition if you are not convinced that injustice is preferable to justice though you can plead its case in such fashion. And I believe that you are really not convinced. I infer this from your general character since from your words alone I should have distrusted you. But the more I trust you the more I am at a loss what to make of the matter. I do not know how I can come to the rescue. For I doubt my ability by reason that you have not accepted the arguments whereby I thought I proved against Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice. Nor yet again do I know how I can refuse to come to the rescue. For I fear lest it be actually impious to stand idly by when justice is reviled and be faint-hearted and not defend her so long as one has breath and can utter his voice. The best thing, then, is to aid her as best I can." Glaucon, then, and the rest besought me by all means to come to the rescue and not to drop the argument but to pursue to the end the investigation as to the nature of each and the truth about their respective advantages. I said then as I thought:

"The inquiry we are undertaking is no easy one but calls for keen vision, as it seems to me. So, since we are not clever persons, I think we should employ the method of search that we should use if we, with not very keen vision, were bidden to read small letters from a distance, and then someone had observed that these same letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface. We should have accounted it a godsend, I fancy, to be allowed to read those letters first, and examine the smaller, if they are the same."

"Quite so," said Adeimantus;

"but what analogy to do you detect in the inquiry about justice?"

"I will tell you," I said:

"there is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also of an entire city."

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from the Pythagoreans.

[280]Possibly Critias.

[281]Probably the battle of 409 B.C., reported in Diodor. Sic. xiii. 65. Cf. Introduction p. viii.

[282]The implied pun on the name is made explicit in 580 C-D. Some have held that Glaucon and Adeimantus were uncles of Plato, but Zeller decides for the usual view that they wre brothers. Cf. *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1, 4th ed. 1889, p. 392, and *Abhandl. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1873, Hist.-Phil Kl. pp. 86 ff.

"Assuredly," said he.

"Is not the city larger[283] than the man?"

"It is larger," he said.

"Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend. If it please you, then, let us first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less."

"I think that is a good suggestion," he said.

"If, then," said I,

"our argument should observe the origin[284] of a state, we should see also the origin of justice and injustice in it."

"It may be," said he.

"And if this is done, we may expect to find more easily what we are seeking?"

"Much more."

"Shall we try it, then, and go through with it? I fancy it is no slight task. Reflect, then."

"We have reflected,[285]" said Adeimantus;

"proceed and don't refuse."

"The origin of the city, then," said I,

"in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our own needs,[286] but each of us lacks many things. Do you think any other principle establishes the state?"

"No other," said he.

"As a result of this, then, one man calling in another for one service and another for another, we, being in need of many things, gather many into one place of abode as associates and helpers, and to this dwelling together we give the name city or state, do we not?"

"By all means."

"And between one man and another there is an interchange of giving, if it so happens, and taking, because each supposes this to be better for himself."

"Certainly."

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[283]So Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* i. 2. 8 (1094 b 10).

[284]Lit., coming into being. Cf. Introduction p. xiv. So Aristotle *Politics* i. 1, but iv. 4 he criticizes Plato.

[285]"C'est tout reflechi."

[286]Often imitated, as e.g. Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* i. 10: "Forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with a competent store of things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire . . . therefore to supply these defects . . . we are naturally inclined to seek communion and fellowship with others; this was the cause of men uniting themselves at first in civil societies."

"Come, then, let us create a city from the beginning, in our theory. Its real creator, as it appears, will be our needs."

"Obviously."

"Now the first and chief of our needs is the provision of food for existence and life."[287]

"Assuredly."

"The second is housing and the third is raiment and that sort of thing."

"That is so."

"Tell me, then," said I,

"how our city will suffice for the provision of all these things. Will there not be a farmer for one, and a builder, and then again a weaver? And shall we add thereto a cobbler and some other purveyor for the needs of body?"

"Certainly."

"The indispensable minimum of a city, then, would consist of four or five men."

"Apparently."

"What of this, then? Shall each of these contribute his work for the common use of all? I mean shall the farmer, who is one, provide food for four and spend fourfold time and toil on the production of food and share it with the others, or shall he take no thought for them and provide a fourth portion of the food for himself alone in a quarter of the time and employ the other three-quarters, the one in the provision of a house, the other of a garment, the other of shoes, and not have the bother of associating with other people, but, himself for himself, mind his own affairs?"[288] And Adeimantus said,

"But, perhaps, Socrates, the former way is easier."

"It would not, by Zeus, be at all strange," said I;

"for now that you have mentioned it, it occurs to me myself that, to begin with, our several natures are not all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for another. Don't you think so?"

"I do."

[287] Aristotle says that the city comes into being for the sake of life, but exists for the sake of the good life, which, of course, is also Plato's view of the true *raison d'etre* of the state. Cf. *Laws* 828 D and *Crito* 48 B.

[288] It is characteristic of Plato's drama of ideas to give this kind of rhetorical advantage to the expression of the view that he intends to reject. In what follows Plato anticipates the advantages of the division of labor as set forth in Adam Smith, with the characteristic exception of its stimulus to new inventions. Cf. Introduction xv.

"Again, would one man do better working at many tasks or one at one?"

"One at one," he said.

"And, furthermore, this, I fancy, is obvious—that if one lets slip the right season, the favorable moment in any task, the work is spoiled."

"Obvious."

"That, I take it, is because the business will not wait upon the leisure of the workman, but the workman must attend to it as his main affair, and not as a by-work."

"He must indeed."

"The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the right moment, and at leisure from other occupations."

"By all means."

"Then, Adeimantus, we need more than four citizens for the provision of the things we have mentioned. For the farmer, it appears, will not make his own plough if it is to be a good one, nor his hoe, nor his other agricultural implements, nor will the builder, who also needs many; and similarly the weaver and cobbler."

"True."

"Carpenters, then, and smiths and many similar craftsmen, associating themselves with our hamlet, will enlarge it considerably."

"Certainly."

"Yet it still wouldn't be very large even if we should add to them neat-herds and shepherds and other herders, so that the farmers might have cattle for ploughing,[289] and the builders oxen to use with the farmers for transportation, and the weavers and cobblers hides and fleeces for their use."

"It wouldn't be a small city, either, if it had all these."

"But further," said I,

"it is practically impossible to establish the city in a region where it will not need imports."

"It is."

"There will be a further need, then, of those who will bring in from some other city what it requires."

"There will."

"And again, if our servitor goes forth empty-handed, not taking with him any of the things needed by those from whom they procure what

[289]Butcher's meat and pork appear first in the luxurious city, 373 C. We cannot infer that Plato was a vegetarian.

they themselves require, he will come back with empty hands, will he not?"

"I think so."

"Then their home production must not merely suffice for themselves but in quality and quantity meet the needs of those of whom they have need."

"It must."

"So our city will require more farmers and other craftsmen."

"Yes, more."

"And also of other ministrants who are to export and import the merchandise. These are traders, are they not?"

"Yes."

"We shall also need traders, then."

"Assuredly."

"And if the trading is carried on by sea, we shall need quite a number of others who are expert in maritime business."

"Quite a number."

"But again, within the city itself how will they share with one another the products of their labor? This was the very purpose of our association and establishment of a state."

"Obviously," he said,

"by buying and selling."

"A market-place, then, and money as a token[290] for the purpose of exchange will be the result of this."

"By all means."

"If, then, the farmer or any other craftsman taking his products to the market-place does not arrive at the same time with those who desire to exchange with him, is he to sit idle in the market-place and lose time from his own work?"

"By no means," he said,

"but there are men who see this need and appoint themselves for this service—in well-conducted cities they are generally those who are weakest[291] in body and those who are useless for any other task. They must wait there in the agora and exchange money for goods with those who wish to sell, and goods for money with as many as desire to buy."

"This need, then," said I,

"creates the class of shopkeepers in our city. Or is not shopkeepers

[290] Aristotle adds that the medium of exchange must of itself have value (*Politics* 1257 a 36).

[291] Similarly in *Laws* 918-920.

the name we give to those who, planted in the agora, serve us in buying and selling, while we call those who roam from city to city merchants?"

"Certainly."

"And there are, furthermore, I believe, other servitors who in the things of the mind are not altogether worthy of our fellowship, but whose strength of body is sufficient for toil; so they, selling the use of this strength and calling the price wages, are designated, I believe, wage-earners, are they not?"

"Certainly."

"Wage-earners, then, it seems, are the complement that helps to fill up the state."[292]

"I think so."

"Has our city, then, Adeimantus, reached its full growth and is it complete?"

"Perhaps."

"Where, then, can justice and injustice be found in it? And along with which of the constituents that we have considered does it come into the state?"

"I cannot conceive, Socrates," he said,

"unless it be in some need that those very constituents have of one another."

"Perhaps that is a good suggestion," said I;

"we must examine it and not hold back. First of all, then, let us consider what will be the manner of life of men thus provided. Will they not make bread and wine and garments and shoes? And they will build themselves houses and carry on their work in summer for the most part unclad and unshod and in winter clothed and shod sufficiently? And for their nourishment they will provide meal from their barley and flour from their wheat, and kneading and cooking these they will serve noble cakes and loaves on some arrangement of reeds or clean leaves, and, reclined on rustic beds strewn with bryony and myrtle, they will feast with their children, drinking of their wine thereto, garlanded and singing hymns to the gods in pleasant fellowship, not begetting offspring beyond their means lest they fall into poverty or war?" Here Glaucon broke in:

"No relishes[293] apparently," he said,

[292] Aristotle (*Politics* 1254 b 18) says that those, the use of whose bodies is the best they have to offer, are by nature slaves. Cf *Jesus of Sirach* xxxviii. 36 "ἄνευ αὐτῶν οὐκ οἰκισθήσεται πόλις". So Carlyle, and Shakespeare on Caliban: "We cannot miss him" (*Tempest*, I. ii).

[293] *ὄψον* is anything eaten with bread, usually meat or fish, as Glaucon means; but

"for the men you describe as feasting."

"True" said I;

"I forgot that they will also have relishes—salt, of course, and olives and cheese and onions and greens, the sort of things they boil in the country, they will boil up together. But for dessert we will serve them figs and chickpeas and beans, and they will toast myrtle-berries and acorns before the fire, washing them down with moderate potations and so, living in peace and health, they will probably die in old age and hand on a like life to their offspring." And he said,

"If you were founding a city of pigs,[294] Socrates, what other fodder than this would you provide?"

"Why, what would you have, Glaucon?" said I.

"What is customary," he replied;

"They must recline on couches, I presume, if they are not to be uncomfortable, and dine from tables and have made dishes and sweetmeats such as are now in use."

"Good," said I,

"I understand. It is not merely the origin of a city, it seems, that we are considering but the origin of a luxurious city. Perhaps that isn't such a bad suggestion, either. For by observation of such a city it may be we could discern the origin of justice and injustice in states. The true state I believe to be the one we have described—the healthy state, as it were. But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a fevered state, there is nothing to hinder."

" For there are some, it appears, who will not be contented with this sort of fare or with this way of life; but couches will have to be added thereto and tables and other furniture, yes, and relishes and myrrh and incense and girls[295] and cakes—all sorts of all of them. And the requirements we first mentioned, houses and garments and shoes, will no longer be confined to necessities,[296] but we must set painting to work

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Socrates gives it a different sense.

[294]Cf. Introduction p. xiv. By the mouth of the fine gentleman, Glaucon, Plato expresses with humorous exaggeration his own recognition of the inadequacy for ethical and social philosophy of his idyllic ideal. Cf. Mandeville, Preface to *Fable of the Bees*: "A golden age must be as free/ For acorns as for honesty."

[295]On flute-girls as the accompaniment of a banquet Cf. *Symposium* 176 E, Aristophanes *Ach.* 1090-1092, Catullus 13. 4. But apart from this, the sudden mention of an incongruous item in a list is a device of Aristophanic humor which even the philosophic Emerson did not disdain: "The love of little maids and berries."

[296]*τὰ ἀναγκαῖα* predicatively, "in the measure prescribed by necessity." Cf. 369 D "the indispensable minimum of a city." The historical order is: (1) arts of necessity, (2) arts of pleasure and luxury, (3) disinterested science. Cf. *Critias* 110 A, Aristotle

and embroidery, and procure gold and ivory and similar adornments, must we not?"

"Yes," he said.

"Then we shall have to enlarge the city again. For that healthy state is no longer sufficient, but we must proceed to swell out its bulk and fill it up with a multitude of things that exceed the requirements of necessity in states, as, for example, the entire class of huntsmen, and the imitators,[297] many of them occupied with figures and colors and many with music—the poets and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, chorus-dancers, contractors[298]—and the manufacturers of all kinds of articles, especially those that have to do with women's adornment. And so we shall also want more servitors. Don't you think that we shall need tutors, nurses wet[299] and dry, beauty-shop ladies, barbers[300] and yet again cooks and chefs? And we shall have need, further, of swineherds; there were none of these creatures[301] in our former city, for we had no need of them, but in this city there will be this further need; and we shall also require other cattle in great numbers if they are to be eaten, shall we not?"

"Yes."

"Doctors, too, are something whose services[302] we shall be much more likely to require if we live thus than as before?"

"Much."

"And the territory, I presume, that was then sufficient to feed the then population, from being adequate will become too small. Is that so or not?"

"It is."

"Then we shall have to cut out a cantle[303] of our neighbor's land if we are to have enough for pasture and ploughing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon themselves to the unlimited[304] acquisition of

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Met. 981 b 20.

[297] *θηρευταί* and *μιμηταί* are generalized Platonic categories, including much not ordinarily signified by the words. For a list of such Platonic generalizations Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, note 500.

[298] Contractors generally, and especially theatrical managers.

[299] The mothers of the idyllic state nursed their own children, but in the ideal state the wives of the guardians are relieved of this burden by special provision. Cf. 460 D.

[300] The rhetoricians of the empire liked to repeat that no barber was known at Rome in the first 200 or 300 years of the city.

[301] Illogical idiom referring to the swine. Cf. 598 C.

[302] *χρείαις*: Greek idiom could use either singular or plural. Cf. 410 A; *Phaedo* 87 C; *Laws* 630 E. The plural here avoids hiatus.

[303] Cf. Isocrates iii. 34.

wealth, disregarding the limit set by our necessary wants."

"Inevitably, Socrates."

"We shall go to war[305] as the next step, Glaucon—or what will happen?"

"What you say," he said.

"And we are not yet to speak," said I,

"of any evil or good effect of war, but only to affirm that we have further[306] discovered the origin of war, namely, from those things from which[307] the greatest disasters, public and private, come to states when they come."

"Certainly."

"Then, my friend, we must still further enlarge our city by no small increment, but by a whole army, that will march forth and fight it out with assailants in defence of all our wealth and the luxuries we have just described."

"How so?" he said;

"are the citizens themselves[308] not sufficient for it?"

"Not if you," said I,

"and we all were right in the admission we made when we were molding our city. We surely agreed, if you remember, that it is impossible for one man to do the work of many arts well."

"True," he said.

"Well, then," said I,

"don't you think that the business of fighting is an art and a pro-

[304]Cf. 591 D. Natural desires are limited. Luxury and unnatural forms of wealth are limitless, as the Greek moralists repeat from Solon down.

[305]The unnecessary desires are the ultimate causes of wars. *Phaedo* 66 C. The simple life once abandoned, war is inevitable. "My lord," said St. Francis to the Bishop of Assisi, "if we possessed property we should have need of arms for its defense" (Sabatier, p. 81). Similarly that very dissimilar thinker, Mandeville. Cf. on 372 C. Plato recognizes the struggle for existence (Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, 6), and the "bellum omnium contra omnes," *Laws* 625 E. Cf. Sidgwick, *Method of Ethics*, i, 2: "The Republic of Plato seems in many respects divergent from the reality. And yet he contemplates war as a permanent, unalterable fact to be provided for in the ideal state." Spencer on the contrary contemplates a completely evolved society in which the ethics of militarism will disappear.

[306]i.e. as well as the genesis of society. 369 B.

[307]*ἐξ ὧν*: i.e. *ἐκ τούτων ἐξ ὧν*, namely the appetites and the love of money.

[308]Cf. 567 E *τί δέ; αὐτόθεν*. In the fourth century "it was found that amateur soldiers could not compete with professionals, and war became a trade" (Butcher, *Demosthenes* p. 17). Plato arrives at the same result by his principle "one man one task" (370 A-B). He is not here "making citizens synonymous with soldiers" nor "laconizing" as Adam says.

fession?"

"It is indeed," he said.

"Should our concern be greater, then, for the cobbler's art than for the art of war?"

"By no means."

"Can we suppose,[309] then, that while we were at pains to prevent the cobbler from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end that[310] we might have the cobbler's business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every one man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted and at which he was to work all his days, at leisure[311] from other pursuits and not letting slip the right moments for doing the work well, and that yet we are in doubt whether the right accomplishment of the business of war is not of supreme moment? Is it so easy[312] that a man who is cultivating the soil will be at the same time a soldier and one who is practising cobbling or any other trade, though no man in the world could make himself a competent expert at draughts or the dice who did not practise that and nothing else from childhood[313] but treated it as an occasional business? And are we to believe that a man who takes in hand a shield or any other instrument of war springs up on that very day a competent combatant in heavy armor or in any other form of warfare—though no other tool will make a man be an artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor will it be of any service to those who have neither acquired the science[314] of it nor sufficiently practised themselves in its use?"

"Great indeed," he said,

"would be the value of tools in that case.[315]"

"Then," said I,

"in the same degree that the task of our guardians[316] is the greatest of all, it would require more leisure than any other business and the greatest science and training."

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[309]For the thought of this "a fortiori" or "ex contrario" argument cf. 421 A.

[310]*ἵνα δή* ironical.

[311]Cf. 370 B-C.

[312]The ironical argument *ex contrario* is continued with fresh illustrations to the end of the chapter.

[313]Cf. on 467 A.

[314]For the three requisites, science, practice, and natural ability Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, note 596, and my paper on *Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη*, *Tr. A. Ph. A.* vol. xl., 1910.

[315]Cf. Thucydides ii. 40.

[316]First mention. Cf. 428 D note, 414 B.

"I think so," said he.

"Does it not also require a nature adapted to that very pursuit?"

"Of course."

"It becomes our task, then, it seems, if we are able, to select which and what kind of natures are suited for the guardianship of a state."

"Yes, ours."

"Upon my word," said I,

"it is no light task that we have taken upon ourselves. But we must not faint so far as our strength allows."

"No, we mustn't."

"Do you think," said I,

"that there is any difference between the nature of a well-bred hound for this watch-dog's work and of a well-born lad?"

"What point have you in mind?"

"I mean that each of them must be keen of perception, quick in pursuit of what it has apprehended,[317] and strong too if it has to fight it out with its captive."

"Why, yes," said he,

"there is need of all these qualities."

"And it must, further, be brave[318] if it is to fight well."

"Of course."

"And will a creature be ready to be brave that is not high-spirited, whether horse or dog or anything else? Have you never observed what an irresistible and invincible thing is spirit,[319] the presence of which makes every soul in the face of everything fearless and unconquerable?"

"I have."

"The physical qualities of the guardian, then, are obvious."

"Yes."

"And also those of his soul, namely that he must be of high spirit."

"Yes, this too."

"How then, Glaucon," said I,

"will they escape being savage to one another[320] and to the other citizens if this is to be their nature?"

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[317] *αἰσθανόμενον*: present. There is no pause between perception and pursuit.

[318] In common parlance. Philosophically speaking, no brute is brave. *Laches* 196 D, 430 B.

[319] Anger (or the heart's desire?) buys its will at the price of life, as Heracleitus says (fr. 105 Bywater). Cf. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1105 a 9, 1116 b 23.

[320] Cf. Spencer, *Psychology* 511: "Men cannot be kept unsympathetic towards external enemies without being kept unsympathetic towards internal enemies." For what follows cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* i. 44 R., Julian, *Or.* ii. 86 D.

"Not easily, by Zeus," said he.

"And yet we must have them gentle to their friends and harsh to their enemies; otherwise they will not await their destruction at the hands of others, but will be first themselves in bringing it about."

"True," he said.

"What, then, are we to do?" said I.

"Where shall we discover a disposition that is at once gentle and great-spirited? For there appears to be an opposition[321] between the spirited type and the gentle nature."

"There does."

"But yet if one lacks either of these qualities, a good guardian he never can be. But these requirements resemble impossibilities, and so the result is that a good guardian is impossible."

"It seems likely," he said. And I was at a standstill, and after reconsidering what we had been saying, I said,

"We deserve to be at a loss, my friend, for we have lost sight of the comparison that we set before ourselves.[322]"

"What do you mean?"

"We failed to note that there are after all such natures as we thought impossible, endowed with these opposite qualities."

"Where?"

"It may be observed in other animals, but especially in that which we likened to the guardian. You surely have observed in well-bred hounds that their natural disposition is to be most gentle to their familiars and those whom they recognize, but the contrary to those whom they do not know."

"I am aware of that."

"The thing is possible, then," said I,

"and it is not an unnatural requirement that we are looking for in our guardian."

"It seems not."

"And does it seem to you that our guardian-to-be will also need, in addition to the being high-spirited, the further quality of having the love of wisdom in his nature?"

"How so?" he said;

"I don't apprehend your meaning."

"This too," said I,

[321]The contrast of the strenuous and gentle temperamnets is a chief point in Platonic ethics and education. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 59, 70, 481.

[322]Plato never really deduces his argument from the imagery which he uses to illustrate it.

"is something that you will discover in dogs and which is worth our wonder in the creature."

"What?"

"That the sight of an unknown person angers him before he has suffered any injury, but an acquaintance he will fawn upon though he has never received any kindness from him. Have you never marvelled at that?"

"I never paid any attention to the matter before now, but that he acts in some such way is obvious."

"But surely that is an exquisite trait of his nature and one that shows a true love of wisdom.[323]"

"In what respect, pray?"

"In respect," said I,

"that he distinguishes a friendly from a hostile aspect by nothing save his apprehension of the one and his failure to recognize the other. How, I ask you,[324] can the love of learning be denied to a creature whose criterion of the friendly and the alien is intelligence and ignorance?"

"It certainly cannot," he said.

"But you will admit," said I,

"that the love of learning and the love of wisdom are the same?"

"The same," he said.

"Then may we not confidently lay it down in the case of man too, that if he is to be in some sort gentle to friends and familiars he must be by nature a lover of wisdom and of learning?"

"Let us so assume," he replied.

"The love of wisdom, then, and high spirit and quickness and strength will be combined for us in the nature of him who is to be a good and true guardian of the state."

"By all means," he said.

"Such, then," I said,

"would be the basis[325] of his character. But the rearing of these men and their education, how shall we manage that? And will the con-

[323] *φιλόσοφον*: etymologically here, as *ὡς ἀληθῶς* indicates. "Your dog now is your only philosopher," says Plato, not more seriously than Rabelais (Prologue): "Mais vistes vous oncques chien rencontrant quelque os medullaire: c'est comme dit Platon, lib. ii. de Rep., la beste du monde plus philosophe." Cf. Huxley, *Hume* , p. 104: "The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will let a well-dressed man pass him without opposition. Has he not a "general idea" of rags and dirt associated with the idea of aversion?" Dummler and others assume that Plato is satirizing the Cynics, but who were the Cynics in 380-370 B.C.?

[324] *καίτοι πῶς*: humorous oratorical appeal. Cf. 360 C *καίτοι*.

[325] Cf. 343 E. *ὑπάρχοι* marks the basis of nature as opposed to teaching.

sideration of this topic advance us in any way towards discerning what is the object of our entire inquiry—the origin of justice and injustice in a state—our aim must be to omit nothing of a sufficient discussion, and yet not to draw it out to tiresome length?" And Glaucon's brother replied,

"Certainly, I expect that this inquiry will bring us nearer to that end."

"Certainly, then, my dear Adeimantus," said I,

"we must not abandon it even if it prove to be rather long."

"No, we must not."

"Come, then, just as if we were telling stories or fables[326] and had ample leisure,[327] let us educate these men in our discourse."

"So we must."

"What, then, is our education?[328] Or is it hard to find a better than that which long time has discovered?[329] Which is, I suppose, gymnastics for the body[330] and for the soul music."

"It is."

"And shall we not begin education in music earlier than in gymnastics?"

"Of course."

"And under music you include tales, do you not?"

"I do."

"And tales are of two species, the one true and the other false[331]?"

"Yes."

"And education must make use of both, but first of the false?"

"I don't understand your meaning."

"Don't you understand," I said,

"that we begin by telling children fables, and the fable is, taken as a whole, false, but there is truth in it also? And we make use of fable

[326]Cf. Introduction pp. xxi-xxii, and *Phaedrus* 276 E.

[327]Plato likes to contrast the leisure of philosophy with the hurry of business and law. Cf. *Theaetetus* 172 C-D.

[328]For the abrupt question cf. 360 E. Plato here prescribes for all the guardians, or military class, the normal Greek education in music and gymnastics, purged of what he considers its errors. A higher philosophic education will prepare a selected few for the office of guardians *par excellence* or rulers. Quite unwarranted is the supposition that the higher education was not in Plato's mind when he described the lower. Cf. 412 A, 429 D-430 C, 497 C-D, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 650.

[329]For this conservative argument Cf. *Politicus* 300 B, *Laws* 844 A.

[330]Qualified in 410 C. μουσική is playing the lyre, music, poetry, letters, culture, philosophy, according to context.

[331]A slight paradox to surprise attention.

with children before gymnastics."

"That is so."

"That, then, is what I meant by saying that we must take up music before gymnastics."

"You were right," he said.

"Do you not know, then, that the beginning in every task is the chief thing,[332] especially for any creature that is young and tender[333]? For it is then that it is best molded and takes the impression[334] that one wishes to stamp upon it."

"Quite so."

"Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer[335] our children to listen to any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up?"

"By no manner of means will we allow it."

"We must begin, then, it seems, by a censorship over our storymakers, and what they do well we must pass and what not, reject. And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories far rather than their bodies by their hands. But most of the stories they now tell we must reject."

"What sort of stories?" he said.

"The example of the greater stories," I said,

"will show us the lesser also. For surely the pattern must be the same and the greater and the less must have a like tendency. Don't you think so?"

"I do," he said;

"but I don't apprehend which you mean by the greater, either."

"Those," I said,

"that Hesiod[336] and Homer and the other poets related. These, methinks, composed false stories which they told and still tell to mankind."

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[332] Cf. *Laws* 753 E, 765 E, Antiphon, fr. 134 Blass.

[333] Cf. *Laws* 664 B, and Shelley's "Specious names,Learned in soft childhood's unsuspecting hour," perhaps derived from the educational philosophy of Rousseau.

[334] The image became a commonplace. Cf. *Theaetetus* 191 D, Horace *Epistles* ii. 32. 8, the Stoic *τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ*, and Byron's "Wax to receive and marble to retain."

[335] Cf. the censorship proposed in *Laws* 656 C. Plato's criticism of the mythology is anticipated in part by Euripides, Xenophanes, Heracleitus, and Pythagoras. Cf. Decharme, *Euripides and the Spirit of his Dramas*, translated by James Loeb, chap. ii. Many of the Christian Fathers repeated his criticism almost verbatim.

[336] *Theogony* 154-181.

"Of what sort?" he said;

"and what in them do you find fault?"

"With that," I said,

"which one ought first and chiefly to blame, especially if the lie is not a pretty one."

"What is that?"

"When anyone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, like a painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models."

"It is certainly right to condemn things like that," he said;

"but just what do we mean and what particular things?"

"There is, first of all," I said,

"the greatest lie about the things of greatest concernment, which was no pretty invention of him who told how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did to Cronos, and how Cronos in turn took his revenge; and then there are the doings and sufferings of Cronos at the hands of his son. Even if they were true I should not think that they ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless young persons. But the best way would be to bury them in silence, and if there were some necessity[337] for relating them, that only a very small audience should be admitted under pledge of secrecy and after sacrificing, not a pig,[338] but some huge and unprocurable victim, to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales."

"Why, yes," said he,

"such stories are hard sayings."

"Yes, and they are not to be told, Adeimantus, in our city, nor is it to be said in the hearing of a young man, that in doing the utmost wrong he would do nothing to surprise anybody, nor again in punishing his father's[339] wrong-doings to the limit, but would only be following the example of the first and greatest of the gods.[340]"

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[337]Conservative feeling or caution prevents Plato from proscribing absolutely what may be a necccessary part of traditional or mystical religion.

[338]The ordinary sacrifice at the Eleusinian mysteries. Cf. Aristophanes *Acharn.* 747, *Peace* 374-375; Walter Pater, *Demeter and the Pig.*

[339]Plato does not sympathize with the Samuel Butlers of his day.

[340]The argument, whether used in jest or earnest, was a commonplace. Cf. Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, i. 137, *Laws* 941 B, Aeschylus *Eumenides* 640-641, Terence *Eunuchus* 590 "At quem deum! . . . ego homuncio hoc non facerem." The Neoplatonists met the criticism of Plato and the Christian Fathers by allegorizing or refining away the immoral parts of the mythology, but St. Augustine cleverly retorts (*De Civ. Dei*, ii. 7): "Omnes enim . . . cultores talium deorum . . . magis intuentur quid Iupiter fecerit quam quid docuerit Plato."

"No, by heaven," said he,

"I do not myself think that they are fit to be told."

"Neither must we admit at all," said I,

"that gods war with gods[341] and plot against one another and contend—for it is not true either— if we wish our future guardians to deem nothing more shameful than lightly to fall out with one another; still less must we make battles of gods and giants the subject for them of stories and embroideries,[342] and other enmities many and manifold of gods and heroes toward their kith and kin. But if there is any likelihood of our persuading them that no citizen ever quarrelled with his fellow-citizen and that the very idea of it is an impiety, that is the sort of thing that ought rather to be said by their elders, men and women, to children from the beginning and as they grow older, and we must compel the poets to keep close to this in their compositions. But Hera's fetterings[343] by her son and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus by his father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and the battles of the gods[344] in Homer's verse are things that we must not admit into our city either wrought in allegory[345] or without allegory. For the young are not able to distinguish what is and what is not allegory, but whatever opinions are taken into the mind at that age are wont to prove indelible and unalterable. For which reason, maybe, we should do our utmost that the first stories that they hear should be so composed as to bring the fairest lessons of virtue to their ears."

"Yes, that is reasonable," he said;

"but if again someone should ask us to be specific and say what these compositions may be and what are the tales, what could we name?"

And I replied,

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[341] Cf. the protest in the *Euthyphro* 6 B, beautifully translated by Ruskin, *Aratra Pentelici* 107: "And think you that there is verily war with each other among the gods? And dreadful enmities and battles, such as the poets have told, and such as our painters set forth in graven sculpture to adorn all our sacred rites and holy places. Yes, and in the great Panathenaia themselves the Peplus full of such wild picturing, is carried up into the Acropolis—shall we say that these things are true, oh Euthyphron, right-minded friend?"

[342] On the Panathenaic *πέπλος* of Athena.

[343] The title of a play by Epicharmus. The hurling of Hephaestus, *Iliad* i. 586-594.

[344] *Iliad* xx. 1-74; xxi. 385-513.

[345] *ὑπόνοια*: the older word for allegory; Plutarch, *De Aud. Poet.* 19 E. For the allegorical interpretation of Homer in Plato's time cf. Jebb, *Homer*, p. 89, and Mrs. Anne Bates Hersman's Chicago Dissertation: *Studies in Greek Allegorical Interpretation.*

"Adeimantus, we are not poets,[346] you and I at present, but founders of a state. And to founders it pertains to know the patterns on which poets must compose their fables and from which their poems must not be allowed to deviate; but the founders are not required themselves to compose fables."

"Right," he said;

"but this very thing—the patterns or norms of right speech about the gods, what would they be?"

"Something like this," I said.

"The true quality of God we must always surely attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse."

"We must."

"And is not God of course[347] good in reality and always to be spoken of[348] as such?"

"Certainly."

"But further, no good thing is harmful, is it?"

"I think not."

"Can what is not harmful harm?"

"By no means."

"Can that which does not harm do any evil?"

"Not that either."

"But that which does no evil would not be cause of any evil either?"

"How could it?"

"Once more, is the good beneficent?"

"Yes."

"It is the cause, then, of welfare?"

"Yes."

"Then the good is not the cause of all things, but of things that are well it the cause—of things that are ill it is blameless."

"Entirely so," he said.

"Neither, then, could God," said I,

"since he is good, be, as the multitude say, the cause of all things, but for mankind he is the cause of few things, but of many things not

[346]The poet, like the rhetorician (*Politicus* 304 D), is a ministerial agent of the royal or political art. So virtually Aristotle, *Politics* 1336 b.

[347]The γε implies that God is good *ex vi termini*.

[348]It is charcteristic of Plato to distinguish the fact and the desirability of proclaiming it. The argument proceeds by the minute links which tempt to parody. Below τὸ ἀγαθόν, followed by οὐδ' ἄρα . . . ὁ θεός, is in itself a refutation of the ontological identification in Plato of God and the Idea of Good. But the essential goodness of God is a commonplace of liberal and philosophical theology, from the Stoics to Whittier's hymn, "The Eternal Goodness."

the cause.[349] For good things are far fewer[350] with us than evil, and for the good we must assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other things and not in God."

"What you say seems to me most true," he replied.

"Then," said I,

"we must not accept from Homer or any other poet the folly of such error as this about the gods when he says" Two urns stand on the floor of the palace of Zeus and are filled with Dooms he allots, one of blessings, the other of gifts that are evil, " *Hom. Il. 24.527-8* and to whomsoever Zeus gives of both commingled—" Now upon evil he chances and now again good is his portion, " *Hom. Il. 24.530* but the man for whom he does not blend the lots, but to whom he gives unmixed evil—" Hunger devouring drives him, a wanderer over the wide world, " *Hom. Il. 24.532* nor will we tolerate the saying that " Zeus is dispenser alike of good and of evil to mortals." [351]"

"But as to the violation of the oaths[352] and the truce by Pandarus, if anyone affirms it to have been brought about by the action of Athena and Zeus, we will not approve, nor that the strife and contention[353] of the gods was the doing of Themis and Zeus; nor again must we permit our youth to hear what Aeschylus says—" A god implants the guilty cause in men When he would utterly destroy a house," *Aesch.* [354] but if any poets compose a "Sorrows of Niobe," the poem that contains these iambics, or a tale of the Pelopidae or of Troy, or anything else of the kind, we must either forbid them to say that these woes are the work of God, or they must devise some such interpretation as we now require, and must declare that what God did was righteous and good,

[349] Anticipates the proclamation of the prophet in the final myth, 617 E: "αἰτία ἑλομένου · θεὸς ἀναίτιος". The idea, elaborated in Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus, may be traced back to the speech of the Homeric Zeus in *Odyssey* i. 33 "ἐξ ἡμεῶν γάπ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι". St. Thomas distinguishes: "Deus est auctor mali quod est poena, non autem mali quod est culpa."

[350] A pessimistic commoplace more emphasized in the *Laws* than in the *Republic*. Cf. *Laws* 896 E, where the Manichean hypothesis of an evil world-soul is suggested.

[351] The line is not found in Homer, nor does Plato explicitly say that it is. Zeus is dispenser of war in *Hom. Il. 4.84*.

[352] *Iliad* 4.69 ff.

[353] *ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν* is used in *Menexenus* 237 C of the contest of the gods for Attica. Here it is generally taken of the Theomachy, *Iliad* xx. 1074, which begins with the summons of the gods to a council by Themis at the command of Zeus. It has also been understood, rather improbably, of the judgement of Paris.

[354] For the idea, "quem deus vult perdere dementat prius," cf. Theognis 405, Schmidt, *Ethik d. Griechen*, i. pp. 235 and 247, and Jebb on Sophocles *Antigone* 620-624.

and they were benefited[355] by their chastisement. But that they were miserable who paid the penalty, and that the doer of this was God, is a thing that the poet must not be suffered to say; if on the other hand he should say that for needing chastisement the wicked were miserable and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by God, that we must allow. But as to saying that God, who is good, becomes the cause of evil to anyone, we must contend in every way that neither should anyone assert this in his own city if it is to be well governed, nor anyone hear it, neither younger nor older, neither telling a story in meter or without meter; for neither would the saying of such things, if they are said, be holy, nor would they be profitable to us or concordant with themselves."

"I cast my vote with yours for this law," he said,

"and am well pleased with it."

"This, then," said I,

"will be one of the laws and patterns concerning the gods[356] to which speakers and poets will be required to conform, that God is not the cause of all things, but only of the good."

"And an entirely satisfactory one," he said.

"And what of this, the second. Do you think that God is a wizard and capable of manifesting himself by design, now in one aspect, now in another, at one time[357] himself changing and altering his shape in many transformations and at another deceiving us and causing us to believe such things about him; or that he is simple and less likely than anything else to depart from his own form?"

"I cannot say offhand," he replied.

"But what of this: If anything went out from[358] its own form, would it not be displaced and changed, either by itself or by something else?"

"Necessarily."

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[355]Plato's doctrine that punishment is remedial must apply to punishments inflicted by the gods. Cf. *Protagoras* 324 B, *Gorgias* 478 E, 480 A, 505 B, 525 B, 590 A-B. Yet there are some incurables. Cf. 615 E.

[356]Minucius Felix says of Plato's theology, *Octav.* chap. xix: "Platoni apertior de deo et rebus ipsis et nominibus oratio est et quae tota esset caelestis nisi persuasionis civilis nonnunquam admixtione sordesceret."

[357]The two methods, (1) self-transformation, and (2) production of illusions in our minds, answer broadly to the two methods of deception distinguished in the *Sophist* 236 C.

[358]Cf. *Tim.* 50 B, *Cratylus* 439 E. Aristotle, *H. A.* i. 1. 32, applies it to biology: "τὸ γενναῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως". Plato's proof from the idea of perfection that God is changeless has little in common with the Eleatic argument that pure being cannot change.

"Is it not true that to be altered and moved[359] by something else happens least to things that are in the best condition, "
"as, for example, a body by food and drink and toil, and plants[360] by the heat of the sun and winds and similar influences—is it not true that the healthiest and strongest is least altered?"

"Certainly."

"And is it not the soul that is bravest and most intelligent, that would be least disturbed[361] and altered by any external affection?"

"Yes."

"And, again, it is surely true of all composite implements, edifices, and habiliments, by parity of reasoning, that those which are well made and in good condition are least liable to be changed by time and other influences."

"That is so."

"It is universally[362] true, then, that that which is in the best state by nature or art or both admits least alteration by something else."

"So it seems."

"But God, surely, and everything that belongs to God is in every way in the best possible state."

"Of course."

"From this point of view, then, it would be least of all likely that there would be many forms in God."

"Least indeed."

"But would he transform and alter himself?"

"Obviously," he said,

"if he is altered."

"Then does he change himself for the better and to something fairer, or for the worse[363] and to something uglier than himself?"

"It must necessarily," said he,

"be for the worse if he is changed. For we surely will not say that God is deficient in either beauty or excellence."

"Most rightly spoken," said I.

"And if that were his condition, do you think, Adeimantus, that

[359] The *Theaetetus* explicitly distinguishes two kinds of motion, qualitative change and motion proper (181 C-D), but the distinction is in Plato's mind here and in *Cratylus* 439 E.

[360] Cf. *Laws* 765 E.

[361] *ταράξειε* suggests the *ἀταραξία* of the sage in the later schools.

[362] *πᾶν δή* generalizes from the preceding exhaustive enumeration of cases. Cf. 382 E, *Parmenides* 139 A.

[363] So Aristotle *Met.* 1074 b 26.

any one god or man would of his own will worsen himself in any way?"

"Impossible," he replied.

"It is impossible then," said I,

"even for a god to wish to alter himself, but, as it appears, each of them being the fairest and best possible abides[364] for ever simply in his own form."

"An absolutely necessary conclusion to my thinking."

"No poet then," I said,

"my good friend, must be allowed to tell us that " The gods, in the likeness of strangers, Many disguises assume as they visit the cities of mortals." *Hom. Od. 17.485-486* [365] Nor must anyone tell falsehoods about Proteus[366] and Thetis, nor in any tragedy or in other poems bring in Hera disguised as a priestess collecting alms" for the life-giving sons of Inachus, the Argive stream. " *Aesch.* [367] And many similar falsehoods they must not tell. Nor again must mothers under the influence of such poets terrify their children[368] with harmful tales, how that there are certain gods whose apparitions haunt the night in the likeness of many strangers from all manner of lands, lest while they speak evil of the gods they at the same time make cowards of children."

"They must not," he said.

"But," said I,

"may we suppose that while the gods themselves are incapable of change they cause us to fancy that they appear in many shapes deceiving and practising magic upon us?"

"Perhaps," said he.

"Consider," said I;

"would a god wish to deceive, or lie, by presenting in either word or action what is only appearance?"

"I don't know," said he.

"Don't you know," said I,

"that the veritable lie, if the expression is permissible, is a thing that all gods and men abhor?"

"What do you mean?" he said.

"This," said I,

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[364]Cf. *Tim.* 42 E *ἔμενεν*, which suggested the Neoplatonic and Miltonic paradox that the divine abides even when it goes forth.

[365]*Od.* xvii. 485-486, quoted again in *Sophist* 216 B-C. Cf. *Tim.* 41 A.

[366]Cf. *Odyssey* iv. 456-8. Thetis transformed herself to avoid the wooing of Peleus. Cf. Pindar, *Nem.* 4

[367]From the *Ξαντρίαι* of Aeschylus.

[368]Rousseau also deprecates this.

"that falsehood in the most vital part of themselves, and about their most vital concerns, is something that no one willingly accepts, but it is there above all that everyone fears it."

"I don't understand yet either."

"That is because you suspect me of some grand meaning," I said;

"but what I mean is, that deception in the soul about realities, to have been deceived and to be blindly ignorant and to have and hold the falsehood there, is what all men would least of all accept, and it is in that case that they loathe it most of all."

"Quite so," he said.

"But surely it would be most wholly right, as I was just now saying, to describe this as in very truth falsehood—ignorance namely in the soul of the man deceived. For the falsehood in words is a copy[369] of the affection in the soul, an after-rising image of it and not an altogether unmixed falsehood. Is not that so?"

"By all means."

"Essential falsehood, then, is hated not only by gods but by men."

"I agree."

"But what of the falsehood in words, when and for whom is it serviceable so as not to merit abhorrence? Will it not be against enemies? And when any of those whom we call friends owing to madness or folly attempts to do some wrong, does it not then become useful to avert the evil—as a medicine? And also in the fables of which we were just now speaking owing to our ignorance of the truth about antiquity, we liken the false to the true as far as we may and so make it edifying.[370]"

"We most certainly do," he said.

"Tell me, then, on which of these grounds falsehood would be serviceable to God. Would he because of his ignorance of antiquity make false likenesses of it?"

"An absurd supposition, that," he said.

"Then there is no lying poet in God."

"I think not."

"Well then, would it be through fear of his enemies that he would

[369] Cf. Aristotle *De Interp.* 1. 12 "ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα". Cf. also *Cratylus* 428 D, 535 E, *Laws*730 C, Bacon, *Of Truth*: "But it is not the lie that passes through the mind but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it that doth the hurt."

[370] Cf. *Phaedrus* 245 A "μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει", Isocrates xii. 149 and Livy's Preface. For *χρήσιμον* Cf. *Politicus* 274 E. We must not infer that Plato is trying to sophisticate away the moral virtue of truth-telling.

lie?"

"Far from it."

"Would it be because of the folly or madness of his friends?"

"Nay, no fool or madman is a friend of God."

"Then there is no motive for God to deceive."

"None."

"From every point of view[371] the divine and the divinity are free from falsehood."

"By all means."

"Then God is altogether simple and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by visions or words or the sending of signs in waking or in dreams."

"I myself think so," he said,

"when I hear you say it."

"You concur then," I said,

"this as our second norm or canon for speech and poetry about the gods,—that they are neither wizards in shape-shifting nor do they mislead us by falsehoods in words or deed?"

"I concur."

"Then, though there are many other things that we praise in Homer, this we will not applaud, the sending of the dream by Zeus[372] to Agamemnon, nor shall we approve of Aeschylus when his Thetis[373] avers that Apollo singing at her wedding, "foretold the happy fortunes of her issue" *Hom. Il. 2.1* — "Their days prolonged, from pain and sickness free, And rounding out the tale of heaven's blessings, Raised the proud paean, making glad my heart. And I believed that Phoebus' mouth divine, Filled with the breath of prophecy, could not lie. But he himself, the singer, himself who sat At meat with us, himself who promised all, Is now himself the slayer of my son. " *Aesch. Frag. 350* When anyone says that sort of thing about the gods, we shall be wroth with him, we will refuse him a chorus, neither will we allow teachers to use him for the education of the young if our guardians are to be god-fearing men and god-like in so far as that is possible for humanity."

"By all means," he said,

"I accept these norms and would use them as canons and laws."

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[371] Generalizing from the exhaustive classification that precedes.

[372] *Hom. Il. 2.1-34.* This apparent attribution of falsehood to Zeus was an "Homeric problem" which some solved by a change of accent from *δίδομεν* to *διδόμεν*. Cf. Aristotle *Poetics* 1462 a 22.

[373] Cf. Aeschylus *Frag.* 350. Possibly from the *Ὅπλων κπίσις*.

Book 3

"Concerning the gods then," said I,

"this is the sort of thing that we must allow or not allow them to hear from childhood up, if they are to honor the gods[374] and their fathers and mothers, and not to hold their friendship with one another in light esteem."

"That was our view and I believe it right."

"What then of this? If they are to be brave, must we not extend our prescription to include also the sayings that will make them least likely to fear death? Or do you suppose that anyone could ever become brave who had that dread in his heart?"

"No indeed, I do not," he replied.

"And again if he believes in the reality of the underworld and its terrors,[375] do you think that any man will be fearless of death and in battle will prefer death to defeat and slavery?"

"By no means."

"Then it seems we must exercise supervision[376] also, in the matter of such tales as these, over those who undertake to supply them and request them not to dispraise in this undiscriminating fashion the life in Hades but rather praise it, since what they now tell us is neither true nor edifying to men who are destined to be warriors."

"Yes, we must," he said.

"Then," said I,

[374] We may, if we choose, see here a reference to the virtue of piety, which some critics fancifully suppose was eliminated by the *Euthyphro*. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, note 58.

[375] For the idea that death is no evil Cf. *Apology*, *in fine*, *Laws* 727 D, 828 D, and 881 A, where, however, the fear of hell is approved as a deterrent.

[376] Cf. 377 B.

"beginning with this verse we will expunge everything of the same kind: "Liefer were I in the fields up above to be serf to another Tiller of some poor plot which yields him a scanty subsistence, Than to be ruler and king over all the dead who have perished," *Aesch. Frag. 350* [377] and this: "Lest unto men and immortals the homes of the dead be uncovered Horrible, noisome, dank, that the gods too hold in abhorrence, " *Hom. Il. 20.64* [378] and: "Ah me! so it is true that e'en in the dwellings of Hades Spirit there is and wraith, but within there is no understanding," *Hom. Il. 10.495* [379] and this: "Sole to have wisdom and wit, but the others are shadowy phantoms," *Hom. Il. 23.103* [380] and: " Forth from his limbs unwilling his spirit flitted to Hades, Wailing its doom and its lustihood lost and the May of its manhood," *Hom. Il. 16.856* [381]"

" and:" Under the earth like a vapor vanished the gibbering soul, " *Hom. Il. 23.100* and: " Even as bats in the hollow of some mysterious grotto Fly with a flittermouse shriek when one of them falls from the cluster Whereby they hold to the rock and are clinging the one to the other, Flitted their gibbering ghosts. " *Hom. Od. 24.6-10* [382] We will beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we cancel those and all similar passages, not that they are not poetic and pleasing[383] to most hearers, but because the more poetic they are the less are they suited to the ears of boys and men who are destined to be free and to be more afraid of slavery than of death."

"By all means."

"Then we must further taboo in these matters the entire vocabulary of terror and fear, Cocytus[384] named of lamentation loud, abhorred Styx, the flood of deadly hate, the people of the infernal pit and of the charnel-house, and all other terms of this type, whose very names

[377]Spoken by Achilles when Odysseus sought to console him for his death. Lucian, *Dialog. Mort* . 18, develops the idea. Proclus comments on it for a page.

[378]δείσας μὴ precedes.

[379]The exclamation and inference (ῥά) of Achilles when the shade of Patroclus eludes his embrace in the dream. The text is endlessly quoted by writers on religious origins and dream and ghost theories of the origin of the belief in the soul.

[380]Said of the prophet Teiresias. The preceding line is, "Unto him even in death was it granted by Persephoneia." The line is quoted also in *Meno* 100 A.

[381]Said of the death of Patroclus, and Hector, *Hom. Il. 22.382*; imitated in the last line of the *Aeneid* "Vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras." Cf. Bacchyl. v. 153-4: "πύματον δὲ πνέων δάκρυσα τλάμων ἀγλαὰν ἥβαν προλείπων".

[382]Said of the souls of the suitors slain by Odysseus. Cf. Tennyson, *Oenone*: "Thin as the bat-like shrillings of the dead."

[383]Cf. *Theaetetus* 177 C *οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν.*

[384]Milton's words, which I have borrowed, are the best expression of Plato's thought.

send a shudder[385] through all the hearers every year. And they may be excellent for other purposes,[386] but we are in fear for our guardians lest the habit of such thrills make them more sensitive[387] and soft than we would have them."

"And we are right in so fearing."

"We must remove those things then?"

"Yes."

"And the opposite type to them is what we must require in speech and in verse?"

"Obviously."

"And shall we also do away with the wailings and lamentations of men of repute?"

"That necessarily follows," he said,

"from the other."

"Consider," said I,

"whether we shall be right in thus getting rid of them or not. What we affirm is that a good man[388] will not think that for a good man, whose friend he also is, death is a terrible thing."

"Yes, we say that."

"Then it would not be for his friend's[389] sake as if he had suffered something dreadful that he would make lament."

"Certainly not."

"But we also say this, that such a one is most of all men sufficient unto himself[390] for a good life and is distinguished from other men in having least need of anybody else."

"True," he replied.

"Least of all then to him is it a terrible thing to lose son[391] or

[385] *φρίττειν* and *φρίκη* are often used of the thrill or terror of tragedy. Cf. Sophocles *Electra* 1402, *O.T.* 1306, Aeschylus *Prometheus Bound* 540.

[386] Some say, to frighten the wicked, but more probably for their aesthetic effect. Cf. 390 A "εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν παρέχεται", *Laws* 886 C.

[387] *θερμότεροι* contains a playful suggestion of the fever following the chill; Cf. *Phaedrus* 251 A. With *μαλακώτεροι* the image passes into that of softened metal; cf. 411 B, *Laws* 666 B-C, 671 B.

[388] That only the good can be truly friends was a favorite doctrine of the ancient moralists. Cf. *Lysis* 214 C, Xenophon *Memorabilia* ii. 6. 9, 20.

[389] Cf. *Phaedo* 117 C "I wept for myself, for surely not for him."

[390] *αὐτάρκης* is the equivalent of *ἱκανὸς αὑτῷ* in *Lysis* 215 A. For the idea cf. *Menexenus* 247 E. Self-sufficiency is the mark of a good man, of God, of the universe (*Timaeus* 33 D), of happiness in Aristotle, and of the Stoic sage.

[391] Cf. the anecdotes of Pericles and Xenophon and the comment of Pater on Marcus Aurelius in *Marius the Epicurean.* Plato qualifies the Stoic extreme in 603 E. The Platonic ideal is *μετριοπάθεια*, the Stoic *ἀπάθεια*,

brother or his wealth or anything of the sort."

"Least of all."

"Then he makes the least lament and bears it most moderately when any such misfortune overtakes him."

"Certainly."

"Then we should be right in doing away with the lamentations of men of note and in attributing them to women,[392] and not to the most worthy of them either, and to inferior men, in that those whom we say we are breeding for the guardianship of the land may disdain to act like these."

"We should be right," said he.

"Again then we shall request Homer and the other poets not to portray Achilles, the son of a goddess, as," Lying now on his side, and then again on his back, And again on his face," *Hom. Il. 24.10-12* [393] and then rising up and "Drifting distraught on the shore of the waste unharvested ocean," *Hom. Il. 24.10-12* [394] nor ""clutching with both hands the sooty dust and strewing it over his head,"" [395] nor as weeping and lamenting in the measure and manner attributed to him by the poet; nor yet Priam,[396] near kinsman of the gods, making supplication and rolling in the dung, " Calling aloud unto each, by name to each man appealing. " *Hom. Il. 22.414-415* And yet more than this shall we beg of them at least not to describe the gods as lamenting and crying, " Ah, woe is me, woeful mother who bore to my sorrow the bravest, " *Hom. Il. 18.54* [397] and if they will so picture the gods at least not to have the effrontery to present so unlikely a likeness[398] of the supreme god as to make him say:" Out on it, dear to my heart is the man whose pursuit around Troy-town I must behold with my eyes while my spirit is grieving within me, " *Hom. Il. 22.168* [399] and: "Ah, woe is me! of all men to me is Sarpedon the dearest," "Fated to fall by the hands of Patroclus, Menoitius' offspring." *Hom. Il. 16.433-434* [400] For if, dear

[392]Cf. *Plat. Rep. 398e.*

[393]The descripition of Achilles mourning for Patroclus, *Hom. Il. 24.10-12.* Cf. *Juv. 3.279-280*: "Noctem patitur lugentis amicum Pelidae, cubat in faciem mox deinde supinus."

[394]Our text of Homer reads "δινεύεσκ' ἀλύων παρὰ θίν' ἀλός, οὐδέ μιν ἠώς". Plato's text may be intentional burlesque or it may be corrupt.

[395]When he heard of Patroclus's death.

[396]*Hom. Il. 22.414-415.*

[397]Thetis.

[398]Cf. 377 E.

[399]Zeus of Hector.

[400]Cf. Virgil's imitation, *Aeneid* 10.465 ff., Cicero, *De Div.* ii. ch. 10.

Adeimantus, our young men should seriously incline to listen to such tales and not laugh at them as unworthy utterances, still less surely would any man be to think such conduct unworthy of himself and to rebuke himself if it occurred to him to do or say anything of that kind, but without shame or restraint full many a dirge for trifles would he chant [401] and many a lament."

"You say most truly," he replied.

"But that must not be, as our reasoning but now showed us, in which we must put our trust until someone convinces with a better reason."

"No, it must not be."

"Again, they must not be prone to laughter.[402] For ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughter his condition provokes a violent reaction.[403]"

"I think so," he said.

"Then if anyone represents men of worth as overpowered by laughter we must accept it, much less if gods."

"Much indeed," he replied.

"Then we must not accept from Homer such sayings as these either about the gods:" Quenchless then was the laughter[404] that rose from the blessed immortals When they beheld Hephaestus officiously puffing and panting." *Hom. Il. 1.599-600* — we must not accept it on your view."

"If it pleases you to call it mine,[405]" he said;

"at any rate we must not accept it."

"But further we must surely prize truth most highly. For if we were

[401] I have imitated the suggestion of rhythm in the original which with its Ionic dative is perhaps a latent quotation from tragedy. Cf. Chairemon, "οὐδεὶς ἐπὶ σμικροῖσι λυπεῖται σοφός", N fr. 37.

[402] The ancients generally thought violent laughter undignified. Cf. Isocrates *Demon.* 15, Plato *Laws* 732 C, 935 B, Epictetus *Encheirid.* xxxiii. 4, Dio Chrys. *Or.* 33. 703 R. Diogenes Laertius iii. 26, reports that Plato never laughed excessively in his youth. Aristotle's great-souled man would presumably have eschewed laughter (*Eth.* iv. 8, *Rhet.* 1389 b 10), as Lord Chesterfield advises his son to do.

[403] In 563 E Plato generalizes this psychological principle.

[404] This laughter of the Homeric gods has been endlessly commented upon. Hegel allegorizes it. Mrs. Browning ("Aurora Leigh") says: "And all true poets laugh unquenchably Like Shakespeare and the gods." Proclus, In Rempub. i. 127 Kroll says that it is an expression of the abundance of divine energy. It is a commonplace that the primitive sense of humor of the Homeric gods laughs at the personal deformity of Hephaestus, but they really laugh at his officiousness and the contrast he presents to Hebe. Cf. my note in *Class. Phil* . xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223.

[405] Cf. on 334 D.

right in what we were just saying and falsehood is in very deed useless to gods, but to men useful as a remedy or form of medicine,[406] it is obvious that such a thing must be assigned to physicians and laymen should have nothing to do with it."

"Obviously," he replied.

"The rulers then of the city may, if anybody, fitly lie on account of enemies or citizens for the benefit[407] of the state; no others may have anything to do with it, but for a layman to lie to rulers of that kind we shall affirm to be as great a sin, nay a greater, than it is for a patient not to tell physician or an athlete his trainer the truth about his bodily condition, or for a man to deceive the pilot about the ship and the sailors as to the real condition of himself or a fellow-sailor, and how they fare."

"Most true," he replied.

"If then the ruler catches anybody else in the city lying, any of the craftsmen " Whether a prophet or healer of sickness or joiner of timbers," *Hom. Od. 17.383-384* he will chastise him for introducing a practice as subversive[408] and destructive of a state as it is of a ship."

"He will," he said,

"if deed follows upon word.[409]"

"Again, will our lads not need the virtue of self-control?"

"Of course."

"And for the multitude[410] are not the main points of self-control these—to be obedient to their rulers and themselves to be rulers[411] over the bodily appetites and pleasures of food, drink, and the rest?"

"I think so."

"Then, I take it, we will think well said such sayings as that of Homer's Diomede:" Friend, sit down and be silent and hark to the word of my bidding, " *Hom. Il. 4.412* [412] and what follows:" Breathing high

[406]Cf. 382 D.

[407]Cf. 334 B, 459 D. A cynic might compare Cleon's plea in Aristophanes *Knights* 1226 "ἐγὼ δ' ἔκλεπτον ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ γε τῇ πόλει". Cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* ii. 6. 37, Bolingbroke, *Letters to Pope* , p. 172.

[408]The word is chosen to fit both the ship and the state. Cf. 422 E, 442 B; and Alcaeus *apud* Aristophanes *Wasps* 1235, Euripides *Phoen.* 888, Aeschines iii. 158, Epictetus iii. 7. 20.

[409]That is, probably, if our Utopia is realized. Cf. 452 A "εἰ πράξεται ἢ λέγεται". Cf. the imitation in *Epistles* 357 A "εἴπερ ἔργα ἐπὶ νῷ ἐγίγνετο".

[410]For the mass of men, as distinguished from the higher philosophical virtue. Often misunderstood. For the meanings of *σωγροσύνη* cf. my review of Jowett's *Plato*, A.J.P. vol. xiii. (1892) p. 361. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 15 and n. 77.

[411]In *Gorgias* 491 D-E, Callicles does not understand what Socrates means by a similar expression.

spirit the Greeks marched silently fearing their captains, " *Hom. Il. 3.8* [413] and all similar passages."

"Yes, well said."

"But what of this sort of thing? " Heavy with wine with the eyes of a dog and the heart of a fleet deer," *Hom. Il. 1.225* [414] and the lines that follow,[415] are these well—and other impertinences[416] in prose or verse of private citizens to their rulers?"

"They are not well."

"They certainly are not suitable for youth to hear for the inculcation of self-control. But if from another point of view they yield some pleasure we must not be surprised, or what is your view of it?"

"This," he said.

"Again, to represent the wisest man as saying that this seems to him the fairest thing in the world, "When the bounteous tables are standing Laden with bread and with meat and the cupbearer ladles the sweet wine Out of the mixer and bears it and empties it into the beakers. " *Hom. Od. 9.8-10* [417]—do you think the hearing of that sort of thing will conduce to a young man's temperance or self-control? or this:" Hunger is the most piteous death that a mortal may suffer." *Hom. Od. 12.342* [418] Or to hear how Zeus[419] lightly forgot all the designs which he devised, watching while the other gods slept, because of the excitement of his passions, and was so overcome by the sight of Hera that he is not even willing to go to their chamber, but wants to lie with her there on the ground and says that he is possessed by a fiercer desire than when they first consorted with one another, "Deceiving their dear parents." *Hom. Il. 14.296* Nor will it profit them to hear of Hephaestus's fettering Ares and Aphrodite[420] for a like motive."

"No, by Zeus," he said,

"I don't think it will."

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[412] Diomede to Sthenelos.

[413] In our Homer this is Hom. Il. 3.8 and *σιγῇ κτλ.* 4.431. See Howes in *Harvard Studies*, vi. pp. 153-237.

[414] Achilles to the commander-in-chief, Agamemon. Several lines of insult follow.

[415] Cf. *Philebus* 42 C.

[416] Cf. *Gorgias* 482 C.

[417] Odysseus in *Od.* ix. 8-10. For *παραπλεῖαι* the Homeric text has "παρὰ δὲ πλήθωσι". Plato's treatment of the quotation is hardly fair to Homer. Aristotle, *Politics* 1338 a 28, cites it more fairly to illustrate the use of music for entertainment (*διαγωγή*). The passage, however, was liable to abuse. See the use made of it by Lucian, *Parasite* 10.

[418] *Hom. Od. 12.342.*

[419] *Hom. Il. 14.294-341.*

[420] *Odyssey* viii. 266 ff.

"But any words or deeds of endurance in the face of all odds[421] attributed to famous men are suitable for our youth to see represented and to hear, such as:" He smote his breast and chided thus his heart, "Endure, my heart, for worse hast thou endured."" *Hom. Od. 20.17-18* [422]"

"By all means," he said.

"It is certain that we cannot allow our men to be acceptors of bribes or greedy for gain."

"By no means."

"Then they must not chant: "Gifts move the gods and gifts persuade dread kings." *unknown* [423] Nor should we approve Achilles' attendant Phoenix[424] as speaking fairly when he counselled him if he received gifts for it to defend the Achaeans, but without gifts not to lay aside his wrath;"

"nor shall we think it proper nor admit that Achilles[425] himself was so greedy as to accept gifts from Agamemnon and again to give up a dead body after receiving payment[426] but otherwise to refuse."

"It is not right," he said,

"to commend such conduct."

"But, for Homer's sake," said I,

"I hesitate to say that it is positively impious[427] to affirm such things of Achilles and to believe them when told by others; or again to believe that he said to Apollo " Me thou hast baulked, Far-darter, the most pernicious of all gods, Mightily would I requite thee if only my hands had the power. " *Hom. Il. 22.15* [428] And how he was disobedient to the river,[429] who was a god and was ready to fight with him, and again that he said of the locks of his hair, consecrated to her river Spercheius: "This let me give to take with him my hair to the hero, Patroclus," *Hom. Il. 23.151* [430] who was a dead body, and that

[421]May include on Platonic principles the temptations of pleasure. Cf. *Laws* 191 D-E.

[422]Quoted also in *Phaedo* 94 D-E.

[423]Suidas *s. v.* δῶρα says that some attributed the line to Hesiod. Cf. Euripides *Medea* 964, Ovid, *Ars Am.* iii. 653, Otto, *Sprichw. d. Röm.* 233.

[424]See his speech, *Iliad* ix. 515 ff.

[425]Cf. *Iliad* xix. 278 ff. But Achilles in Homer is indifferent to the gifts.

[426] *Iliad* xxiv. 502, 555, 594. But in 560 he does not explicitly mention the ransom.

[427]Cf. 368 B.

[428]Professor Wilamowitz uses ὀλοώτατε to prove that Apollo was a god of destruction. But Menelaus says the same of Zeus in *Iliad* iii. 365. Cf. *Class. Phil* . vol. iv. (1909) p. 329.

[429]Scamander. Il. 21. 130-132.

he did so we must believe. And again the trailings[431] of Hector's body round the grave of Patroclus and the slaughter[432] of the living captives upon his pyre, all these we will affirm to be lies, nor will we suffer our youth to believe that Achilles, the son of a goddess and of Peleus the most chaste[433] of men, grandson[434] of Zeus, and himself bred under the care of the most sage Cheiron, was of so perturbed a spirit as to be affected with two contradictory maladies, the greed that becomes no free man and at the same time overweening arrogance towards gods and men."

"You are right," he said.

"Neither, then," said I,

"must we believe this or suffer it to be said, that Theseus, the son of Poseidon, and Peirithous, the son of Zeus, attempted such dreadful rapes,[435] nor that any other child of a god and hero would have brought himself to accomplish the terrible and impious deeds that they now falsely relate of him. But we must constrain the poets either to deny that these are their deeds or that they are the children of gods, but not to make both statements or attempt to persuade our youth that the gods are the begetters of evil, and that heroes are no better than men. For, as we were saying, such utterances are both impious and false. For we proved, I take it, that for evil to arise from gods is an impossibility."

"Certainly."

"And they are furthermore harmful to those that hear them. For every man will be very lenient with his own misdeeds if he is convinced that such are and were the actions of "The near-sown seed of gods, Close kin to Zeus, for whom on Ida's top Ancestral altars flame to highest heaven, Nor in their life-blood fails[436] the fire divine." *Aesch.*

[430]Cf. Proclus, p. 146 Kroll. Plato exaggerates to make his case. The locks were vowed to Spercheius on the condition of Achilles' return. In their context the words are innocent enough.

[431]*Iliad* xxiv. 14 ff.

[432]*Iliad* xxiii. 175-176.

[433]Proverbially. Cf. Pindar *Nem.* iv. 56, v. 26, Aristophanes *Clouds* 1063, and my note on Horace iii. 7. 17.

[434]Zeus, Aeacus, Peleus. For the education of Achilles by Cheiron Cf. *Iliad* xi. 832, Pindar *Nem.* iii., Euripides, *I. A.* 926-927, Plato, *Hippias Minor* 371 D.

[435]Theseus was assisted by Perithous in the rape of Helen and joined Perithous in the attempt to abduct Persephone. Theseus was the theme of epics and of lost plays by Sophocles and Euripides.

[436]Plato was probably thinking of this passage when he wrote the last paragraph of the *Critias*.

Niobe Fr."

"For which cause we must put down such fables, lest they breed in our youth great laxity[437] in turpitude."

"Most assuredly."

"What type of discourse remains for our definition of our prescriptions and proscriptions?"

"We have declared the right way of speaking about gods and daemons and heroes and that other world."

"We have."

"Speech, then, about men would be the remainder."

"Obviously."

"It is impossible for us, my friend, to place this here.[438]"

"Why?"

"Because I presume we are going to say that so it is that both poets and writers of prose speak wrongly about men in matters of greatest moment, saying that there are many examples of men who, though unjust, are happy, and of just men who are wretched, and that there is profit in injustice if it be concealed, and that justice is the other man's good and your own loss; and I presume that we shall forbid them to say this sort of thing and command them to sing and fable the opposite. Don't you think so?"

"Nay, I well know it," he said.

"Then, if you admit that I am right, I will say that you have conceded the original point of our inquiry?"

"Rightly apprehended," he said.

"Then, as regards men that speech must be of this kind, that is a point that we will agree upon when we have discovered the nature of justice and the proof that it is profitable to its possessor whether he does or does not appear to be just."

"Most true," he replied.

"So this concludes the topic of tales.[439] That of diction, I take it, is to be considered next. So we shall have completely examined both the matter and the manner of speech." And Adeimantus said,

"I don't understand what you mean by this."

"Well," said I,

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[437]Cf. my note in *Class. Phil* . vol. xii. (1910) p. 308.

[438]Or possibly "determine this at present." The prohibition which it would beg the question to place here is made explicit in *Laws* 660 E. Cf. *Laws* 899 D, and 364 B.

[439]*λόγων* here practically means the matter, and *λέξεως*, which became a technical term for diction, the manner, as Socrates explains when Adeimantus fails to understand.

"we must have you understand. Perhaps you will be more likely to apprehend it thus. Is not everything that is said by fabulists or poets a narration of past, present, or future things?"

"What else could it be?" he said.

"Do not they proceed[440] either by pure narration or by a narrative that is effected through imitation,[441] or by both?"

"This too," he said,

"I still need to have made plainer."

"I seem to be a ridiculous and obscure teacher,[442]" I said;

"so like men who are unable to express themselves I won't try to speak in wholes[443] and universals but will separate off a particular part and by the example of that try to show you my meaning."

"Tell me. Do you know the first lines if the *Iliad* in which the poet says that Chryses implored Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that the king was angry and that Chryses, failing of his request, imprecated curses on the Achaeans in his prayers to the god?"

"I do."

"You know then that as far as these verses," And prayed unto all the Achaeans, Chiefly to Atreus' sons, twin leaders who marshalled the people, " *Hom. Il. 1.15* the poet himself is the speaker and does not even attempt to suggest to us that anyone but himself is speaking. But what follows he delivers as if he were himself Chryses and tries as far as may be to make us feel that not Homer is the speaker, but the priest, an old man. And in this manner he has carried in nearly all the rest of his narration about affairs in Ilion, all that happened in Ithaca, and the entire *Odyssey*."

"Quite so," he said.

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[440] Cf. Aristotle *Poetics* 1449 b 27.

[441] All art is essentially imitation for Plato and Aristotle. But imitation means for them not only the portrayal or description of visible and tangible things, but more especially the expression of a mood or feeling, hence the (to a modern) paradox that music is the most imitative of the arts. But Plato here complicates the matter further by sometimes using imitation in the narrower sense of dramatic dialogue as opposed to narration. An attentive reader will easily observe these distinctions. Aristotle's *Poetics* makes much use of the ideas and the terminology of the following pages.

[442] Socratic urbanity professes that the speaker, not the hearer, is at fault. Cf. *Protagoras* 340 E, *Philebus* 23 D.

[443] Plato and Aristotle often contrast the universal and the particular as whole and part. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 52. Though a good style is concrete, it is a mark of linguistic helplessness not to be able to state an idea in general terms. Cf. Locke, *Human Understanding*, ii. 10. 27: "This man is hindered in his discourse for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them."

"Now, it is narration, is it not, both when he presents the several speeches and the matter between the speeches?"

"Of course."

"But when he delivers a speech as if he were someone else, shall we not say that he then assimilates thereby his own diction is far as possible to that of the person whom he announces as about to speak?"

"We shall obviously."

"And is not likening one's self to another speech or bodily bearing an imitation of him to whom one likens one's self?"

"Surely."

"In such case then it appears he and the other poets effect their narration through imitation."

"Certainly."

"But if the poet should conceal himself nowhere, then his entire poetizing and narration would have been accomplished without imitation.[444] And lest you may say again that you don't understand, I will explain to you how this would be done. If Homer, after telling us that Chryses came with the ransom of his daughter and as a suppliant of the Achaeans but chiefly of the kings, had gone on speaking not as if made or being Chryses[445] but still as Homer, you are aware that it would not be imitation but narration, pure and simple. It would have been somewhat in this wise. I will state it without meter for I am not a poet:[446] the priest came and prayed that to them the gods should grant to take Troy and come safely home, but that they should accept the ransom and release his daughter, out of reverence for the god;" "and when he had thus spoken the others were of reverent mind and approved, but Agamemnon was angry and bade him depart and not come again lest the scepter and the fillets of the god should not avail him. And ere his daughter should be released, he said, she would grow old in Argos with himself, and he ordered him to be off and not vex him if he wished to get home safe. And the old man on hearing this was frightened and departed in silence, and having gone apart from the camp he prayed at length to Apollo, invoking the appellations of the god, and reminding him of and asking requital for any of his gifts that

[444] In the narrower sense.

[445] Cf. Hazlitt, *Antony and Cleopatra* : "Shakespeare does not stand reasoning on what his characters would do or say, but at once becomes them and speaks and acts for them."

[446] From here to 394 B, Plato gives a prose paraphrase of *Iliad* i. 12-42. Roger Ascham in his *Schoolmaster* quotes it as a perfect example of the best form of exercise for learning a language.

had found favor whether in the building of temples or the sacrifice of victims. In return for these things he prayed that the Achaeans should suffer for his tears by the god's shafts. It is in this way, my dear fellow," I said,

"that without imitation simple narration results."

"I understand," he said.

"Understand then," said I,

"that the opposite of this arises when one removes the words of the poet between and leaves the alternation of speeches."

"This too I understand," he said,

"—it is what happens in tragedy."

"You have conceived me most rightly," I said,

"and now I think I can make plain to you what I was unable to before, that there is one kind of poetry and tale-telling which works wholly through imitation, as you remarked, tragedy and comedy; and another which employs the recital of the poet himself, best exemplified, I presume, in the dithyramb[447]; and there is again that which employs both, in epic poetry and in many other places, if you apprehend me."

"I understand now," he said,

"what you then meant."

"Recall then also the preceding statement that we were done with the "what" of speech and still had to consider the 'how.'"

"I remember."

"What I meant then was just this, that we must reach a decision whether we are to suffer our poets to narrate as imitators or in part as imitators and in part not, and what sort of things in each case, or not allow them to imitate[448] at all."

"I divine," he said,

"that you are considering whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy into our city or not."

"Perhaps," said I,

"and perhaps even more than that.[449] For I certainly do not yet know myself, but whithersoever the wind, as it were, of the argument

[447]The dithyramb was technically a poem in honor of Bacchus. For its more or less conjectural history cf. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy, and Comedy.* Here, however, it is used broadly to designate the type of elaborate Greek lyric which like the odes of Pindar and Bacchylides narrates a myth or legend with little if any dialogue.

[448]Again in the special limited sense.

[449]This seems to imply that Plato already had in mind the extension of the discussion in the tenth book to the whole question of the moral effect of poetry and art.

blows,[450] there lies our course."

"Well said," he replied.

"This then, Adeimantus, is the point we must keep in view, do we wish our guardians to be good mimics or not? Or is this also a consequence of what we said before, that each one could practise well only one pursuit and not many, but if he attempted the latter, dabbling in many things, he would fail of distinction in all?"

"Of course it is."

"And does not the same rule hold for imitation, that the same man is not able to imitate many things well as he can one?"

"No, he is not."

"Still less, then, will he be able to combine the practice of any worthy pursuit with the imitation of many things and the quality of a mimic; since, unless I mistake, the same men cannot practise well at once even the two forms of imitation that appear most nearly akin, as the writing of tragedy and comedy[451]? Did you not just now call these two imitations?"

"I did, and you are right in saying that the same men are not able to succeed in both, nor yet to be at once good rhapsodists[452] and actors."

"True."

"But neither can the same men be actors for tragedies and comedies[453]—and all these are imitations, are they not?"

"Yes, imitations."

"And to still smaller coinage[454] than this, in my opinion, Adeimantus, proceeds the fractioning of human faculty, so as to be incapable of imitating many things or of doing the things themselves of which the imitations are likenesses."

"Most true," he replied.

"If, then, we are to maintain our original principle, that our

[450]Cf. *Theaetetus* 172 D. But it is very naive to suppose that the sequence of Plato's argument is not carefully planned in his own mind. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 5.

[451]At the close of the *Symposium* Socrates constrains Agathon and Aristophanes to admit that one who has the science (τέχνη) of writing tragedy will also be able to write comedy. There is for Plato no contradiction, since poetry is for him not a science or art, but an inspiration.

[452]The rhapsode Ion is a Homeric specialist who cannot interpret other poets. Cf. *Ion* 533 C.

[453]Cf. *Classical Review*, vol. xiv. (1900), pp. 201 ff.

[454]Cf. *Laws* 846 E, Montaigne, "Nostre suffisance est detaillée à menues pièces," Pope, *Essay on Criticism*, 60: "One science only will one genius fit, So vast is art, so narrow human wit."

guardians, released from all other crafts, are to be expert craftsmen of civic liberty,[455] and pursue nothing else that does not conduce to this, it would not be fitting for these to do nor yet to imitate anything else. But if they imitate they should from childhood up[456] imitate what is appropriate to them[457]—men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things of that kind; but things unbecoming the free man they should neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from the imitation they imbibe the reality.[458] Or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into habits and (second) nature[459] in the body, the speech, and the thought?"

"Yes, indeed," said he.

"We will not then allow our charges, whom we expect to prove good men, being men, to play the parts of women and imitate a woman young or old wrangling with her husband, defying heaven, loudly boasting, fortunate in her own conceit, or involved in misfortune and possessed by grief and lamentation—still less a woman that is sick, in love, or in labor."

"Most certainly not," he replied.

"Nor may they imitate slaves, female and male, doing the offices of slaves."

"No, not that either."

"Nor yet, as it seems, bad men who are cowards and who do the opposite of the things we just now spoke of, reviling and lampooning one another, speaking foul words in their cups or when sober and in other ways sinning against themselves and others in word and deed after the fashion of such men. And I take it they must not form the habit of likening themselves to madmen either in words nor yet in deeds. For while knowledge they must have[460] both of mad and bad men and women, they must do and imitate nothing of this kind."

"Most true," he said.

"What of this?" I said,

"—are they to imitate smiths and other craftsmen or the rowers of

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[455] Cf. the fine passage in *Laws* 817 B "ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν τραγωδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταί", [Pindar] *apud* Plut. 807 C "δημιουργὸς εὐνομίας καὶ δίκης".

[456] Cf. 386 A.

[457] i.e., *δημιουργοῖς ἐλευθερίας*

[458] Cf. 606 B, *Laws* 656 B, 669 B-C, and Burke, *Sublime and Beautiful* iv. 4, anticipating James, *Psychology* ii. pp. 449, 451, and anticipated by Shakespeare's (*Cor.* III. ii. 123) "By my body's action teach my mind A most inherent baseness."

[459] Cf. my paper on *Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη*, T.A.P.A. vol. xl. (1910) pp. 185 ff.

[460] Cf. *Laws* 816 D-E.

triremes and those who call the time to them or other things connected therewith?"

"How could they," he said,

"since it will be forbidden them even to pay any attention to such things?"

"Well, then, neighing horses[461] and lowing bulls, and the noise of rivers and the roar of the sea and the thunder and everything of that kind—will they imitate these?"

"Nay, they have been forbidden," he said,

"to be mad or liken themselves to madmen."

"If, then, I understand your meaning," said I,

"there is a form of diction and narrative in which the really good and true man would narrate anything that he had to say, and another form unlike this to which the man of the opposite birth and breeding would cleave and which he would tell his story."

"What are these forms?" he said.

"A man of the right sort, I think, when he comes in the course of his narrative to some word or act of a good man will be willing to impersonate the other in reporting it, and will feel no shame at that kind of mimicry, by preference imitating the good man when he acts steadfastly and sensibly, and less and more reluctantly when he is upset by sickness or love or drunkenness or any other mishap. But when he comes to someone unworthy of himself, he will not wish to liken himself in earnest to one who is inferior,[462] except in the few cases where he is doing something good, but will be embarrassed both because he is unpractised in the mimicry of such characters, and also because he shrinks in distaste from molding and fitting himself the types of baser things. His mind disdains them, unless it be for jest.[463]"

"Naturally," he said.

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[461]For this rejection of violent realism Cf. *Laws* 669 C-D. Plato describes exactly what Verhaeren's admirers approve: "often in his rhythm can be heard the beat of hammers, the hard, edged, regular whizzing of wheels, the whirring of looms, the hissing of locomotives; often the wild, restless tumult of the streets, the humming and rumbling of dense masses of people." (Stefan Zweig). So another modern critic celebrates "the cry of a baby in a Strauss symphony, the sneers and snarls of his critics in his *Helden Leben*, the contortions of the Dragon in Wagner's *Siegfried* ."

[462]Chaucer drew from a misapplication of *Timaeus* 29 B or Boethius the opposite moral: "Who shall telle a tale after a man, He most reherse, as neighe as ever he can, Everich word, if it be in his charge, All speke he never so rudely and so large; [...] Eke Plato sayeth, who so can him rede, The words most ben cosin to the dede."

[463]Plato, like Howells and some other modern novelists, would have thought somewhat gross comedy less harmful than the tragedy or romance that insidiously instils false ideals.

"Then the narrative that he will employ will be the kind that we just now illustrated by the verses of Homer, and his diction will be one that partakes of both, of imitation and simple narration, but there will be a small portion of imitation in a long discourse—or is there nothing in what I say?"

"Yes, indeed,[464]" he said,

"that is the type and pattern of such a speaker."

"Then," said I,

"the other kind speaker, the more debased he is the less will he shrink from imitating anything and everything. He will think nothing unworthy of himself, so that he will attempt, seriously and in the presence of many,[465] to imitate all things, including those we just now mentioned—claps of thunder, and the noise of wind and hail and axles and pulleys, and the notes of trumpets and flutes and pan-pipes, and the sounds of all instruments, and the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds; and so his style will depend wholly on imitation in voice and gesture, or will contain but a little of pure narration."

"That too follows of necessity," he said.

"These, then," said I,

"were the two types of diction of which I was aking."

"There are those two," he replied.

"Now does not one of the two involve slight variations,[466] and if we assign a suitable pitch and rhythm to the diction, is not the result that the right speaker speaks almost on the same note and in one cadence—for the changes are slight— and similarly in a rhythm of nearly the same kind?"

"Quite so."

"But what of the other type? Does it not require the opposite, every kind of pitch and all rhythms, if it too is to have appropriate expression, since it involves manifold forms of variation?"

"Emphatically so."

"And do all poets and speakers hit upon one type or the other of diction or some blend which they combine of both?"

"They must," he said.

"What, then," said I,

"are we to do? Shall we admit all of these into the city, or one of

[464]The respondent plays on the double meaning of *οὐδὲν λέγεις* and replies, "Yes indeed you do say something, namely the type and pattern," etc.

[465]Cf. *Gorgias* 487 B, *Euthydemus* 305 B, *Protagoras* 323 B.

[466]Besides its suggestion of change and reaction the word is technical in music for the transition from one harmony to another.

the unmixed types, or the mixed type?"

"If my vote prevails," he said,

"the unmixed imitator of the good."

"Nay, but the mixed type also is pleasing, Adeimantus, and far most pleasing to boys and their tutors and the great mob is the opposite of your choice."

"Most pleasing it is."

"But perhaps," said I,

"you would affirm it to be ill-suited to our polity, because there is no twofold or manifold man[467] among us, since every man does one thing."

"It is not suited."

"And is this not the reason why such a city is the only one in which we shall find the cobbler a cobbler and not a pilot in addition to his cobbling, and the farmer a farmer and not a judge added to his farming, and the soldier a soldier and not a money-maker in addition to his soldiery, and so of all the rest?"

"True," he said.[468]

"If a man, then, it seems, who was capable by his cunning of assuming every kind of shape and imitating all things should arrive in our city, bringing with himself[469] the poems which he wished to exhibit, we should fall down and worship him as a holy and wondrous and delightful creature, but should say to him that there is no man of that kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for such a man to arise among us, and we should send him away to another city, after pouring myrrh down over his head and crowning him with fillets of wool, but we ourselves, for our souls' good, should continue to employ the more austere[470] and less delightful poet and tale-teller, who would imitate the diction of the good man and would tell his tale in the patterns which we prescribed in the beginning,[471] when we set out to educate our soldiers."

"We certainly should do that if it rested with us."

"And now, my friend," said I,

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[467]The reverse of the Periclean ideal. Cf. Thucydides ii. 41.

[468]The famous banishment of Homer, regarded as the prototype of the tragedian. Cf. 568 A-C, 595 B, 605 C, 607 D, *Laws* 656 C, 817 B

[469]Greek idiom achieves an effect impossible to English here, by the shift from the co-ordination of *ποιήματα* with *αὐτός* to the treatmnt of it as the object of *ἐπιδείξασθαι* and the possible double use of the latter as middle with *αὐτός* and transitive with *ποιήματα*. Cf. for a less striking example 427 D, *Phaedrus* 250 B-C.

[470]Cf. from a different point of view Arnold's *The Austerity of Poetry*.

[471]Cf. 379 A ff.

"we may say that we have completely finished the part of music that concerns speeches and tales. For we have set forth what is to be said and how it is to be said."

"I think so too," he replied.

"After this, then," said I,

"comes the manner of song and tunes?"

"Obviously."

"And having gone thus far, could not everybody discover what we must say of their character in order to conform to what has already been said?"

"I am afraid that "everybody" does not include me," laughed Glaucon[472];

"I cannot sufficiently divine off-hand what we ought to say, though I have a suspicion."

"You certainly, I presume," said I,

"have sufficient a understanding of this—that the song[473] is composed of three things, the words, the tune, and the rhythm?"

"Yes," said he,

"that much."

"And so far as it is words, it surely in no manner differs from words not sung in the requirement of conformity to the patterns and manner that we have prescribed?"

"True," he said.

"And again, the music and the rhythm must follow the speech.[474]"

"Of course."

"But we said we did not require dirges and lamentations in words."

"We do not."

"What, then, are the dirge-like modes of music? Tell me, for you are a musician."

"The mixed Lydian,[475]" he said,

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[472]He laughs at his own mild joke, which Professor Wilamowitz (*Platon* ii. p. 192) does not understand. Cf. *Laws* 859 E, *Hippias Major* 293 A "ἦ οὐχ εἷς τῶν ἁπάντων καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ἦν"; and in a recent novel, ""I am afraid everybody does not include me," she smiled."

[473]The complete song includes words, rhythms, and "harmony," that is, a pitch system of high and low notes. Harmony is also used technically of the peculiar Greek system of scales or modes. Cf. Monro, *Modes of Ancient Greek Music*.

[474]The poets at first composed their own music to fit the words. When, with the further development of music, there arose the practice of distorting the words, as in a mere libretto, it provoked a storm of protest from conservatives in aesthetics and morals.

[475]The modes of Greek music are known to the English reader only from Milton's

"and the tense or higher Lydian, and similar modes."

"These, then," said I,

"we must do away with. For they are useless even to women[476] who are to make the best of themselves, let alone to men."

"Assuredly."

"But again, drunkenness is a thing most unbefitting guardians, and so is softness and sloth."

"Yes."

"What, then, are the soft and convivial modes?"

"There are certain Ionian and also Lydian modes that are called lax."

"Will you make any use of them for warriors?"

"None at all," he said;

"but it would seem that you have left the Dorian and the Phrygian."

"I don't know[477] the musical modes," I said,

"but leave us that mode[478] that would fittingly imitate the utterances and the accents of a brave man who is engaged in warfare or in any enforced business, and who, when he has failed, either meeting wounds or death or having fallen into some other mishap, in all these conditions confronts fortune with steadfast endurance and repels her strokes. And another for such a man engaged in works of peace, not enforced but voluntary,[479] either trying to persuade somebody of something and imploring him—whether it be a god, through prayer, or a man, by teaching and admonition—or contrariwise yielding himself to

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allusions, his "Lap me in soft Lydian airs" and, *P. L.* i. 549 f., his "Anon they move in perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood Of flutes and soft recorders; such as rasied To highth of noblest temper heroes old." The adaptation of particualr modes, harmonies, or scales to the expression of particular feelings is something that we are obliged to accept on faith. Plato's statements here were challenged by some later critics, but the majority believed that there was a connection between modes of music and modes of feeling, as Ruskin and many others have in our day. The hard-headed Epicureans and sceptics denied it, as well as the moral significance of music generally.

[476] Cf. 387 E.

[477] Plato, like a lawyer or popular essayist, affects ignorance of the technical details; or perhaps rather he wishes to disengage his main principle from the specialists' controversy about particular modes of music and their names.

[478] ἐκείνην may mean, but does not say, Dorian, which the *Laches* (188 D) pronounces the only true Greek harmony. This long anacoluthic sentence sums up the whole matter with impressive repetition and explicit enumeration of all types of conduct in peace and war, and implied reference to Plato's doctrine of the two fundamental temperaments, the swift and the slow, the energetic and the mild. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 59, 70, 481.

[479] Cf. *Laws* 814 E.

another who petitioning or teaching him or trying to change his opinions, and in consequence faring according to his wish, and not bearing himself arrogantly, but in all this acting modestly and moderately and acquiescing in the outcome. Leave us these two modes—the forced and the voluntary—that will best imitate the utterances of men failing or succeeding, the temperate, the brave—leave us these."

"Well," said he,

"you are asking me to leave none other than those I just spoke of."

"Then," said I,

"we shall not need in our songs and airs instruments of many strings or whose compass includes all the harmonies."

"Not in my opinion," said he.

"Then we shall not maintain makers of triangles and harps and all other many stringed and poly-harmonic[480] instruments."

"Apparently not."

"Well, will you admit to the city flute-makers and flute-players? Or is not the flute the most "many-stringed" of instruments and do not the pan-harmonics[481] themselves imitate it?"

"Clearly," he said.

"You have left," said I,

"the lyre and the cither. These are useful[482] in the city, and in the fields the shepherds would have a little piccolo to pipe on.[483]"

"So our argument indicates," he said.

"We are not innovating, my friend, in preferring Apollo and the instruments of Apollo to Marsyas and his instruments."

"No, by heaven!" he said,

"I think not."

"And by the dog,[484]" said I,

"we have all unawares purged the city which a little while ago we said was wanton.[485]"

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[480]Metaphorically. The "many-toned instrumentation of the flutes," as Pindar calls it, *Ol.* vii. 12, can vie with the most complex and many-stringed lyre of musical innovation.

[481]Cf. 404 D, the only other occurrence of the word in Plato.

[482]Cf. my note on *Timaeus* 47 C, in A.J.P. vol. x. p. 61.

[483]Ancient critics noted this sentence as an adaptation of sound to sense. Cf. Demetr. *Περὶ ἑρμ.* 185. The sigmas and iotas may be fancied to suggest the whistling notes of the syrinx. So Lucretius v. 1385 "tibia quas fundit digitis pulsata canentum." Cf. on Catullus 61. 13 "voce carmina tinnula."

[484]The so-called Rhadamanthine oath to avoid taking the names of the gods in vain. Cf. 592 A, *Apology* 21 E, Blaydes on Aristophanes *Wasps* 83.

[485]Cf. 372 E. Dummler, *Proleg.* p. 62, strangely affirms that this is an express

"In that we show our good sense," he said.

"Come then, let us complete the purification."

"For upon harmonies would follow the consideration of rhythms: we must not pursue complexity nor great variety in the basic movements,[486] but must observe what are the rhythms of a life that is orderly and brave, and after observing them require the foot and the air to conform to that kind of man's speech and not the speech to the foot and the tune. What those rhythms would be, it is for you to tell us as you did the musical modes."

"Nay, in faith," he said,

"I cannot tell. For that there are some three forms[487] from which the feet are combined, just as there are four[488] in the notes of the voice whence come all harmonies, is a thing that I have observed and could tell. But which are imitations of which sort of life, I am unable to say.[489]"

"Well," said I,

"on this point we will take counsel with Damon,[490] too, as to which are the feet appropriate to illiberality, and insolence or madness or other evils, and what rhythms we must leave for their opposites; and I believe I have heard him obscurely speaking[491] of a foot that he called the enoplios, a composite foot, and a dactyl and an heroic[492] foot, which he arranged, I know not how, to be equal up and down[493]

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retraction of the *ἀληθινὴ πόλις*. This is to misapprehend Plato's method. He starts with the indispensable minimum of a simple society, develops it by Herbert Spencer's multiplication of effects into an ordinary Greek city, then reforms it by a reform of education and finally transforms it into his ideal state by the rule of the philosopher kings. Cf. Introduction p. xiv.

[486]Practically the feet.

[487]According to the ancient musicians these are the equal as e.g. in dactyls (–⏑⏑), spondees (—) and anapests (⏑⏑–), where the foot divides into two equal quantities; the 3/2 ratio, as in the so-called cretic (⏑–⏑); the 2/1 as in the iamb (⏑–) and trochee (–⏑). Cf. Aristid. Quint. i. pp. 34-35.

[488]Possibly the four notes of the tetrachord, but there is no agreement among experts. Cf. Monro, *Modes of Ancient Greek Music*.

[489]Modern psychologists are still debating the question.

[490]The Platonic Socrates frequently refers to Damon as his musical expert. Cf. *Laches* 200 B, 424 C, *Alc. I.* 118 C.

[491]There is a hint of satire in this disclaimer of expert knowledge. Cf. 399 A. There is no agreement among modern experts with regard to the precise form of the so-called enoplios. Cf. my review of Herkenrath's "Der Enoplios," *Class. Phil* . vol. iii. p. 360, Goodell, *Chapters on Greek Metric*, pp. 185 and 189, Blaydes on Aristophanes *Nubes* 651.

[492]Possibly foot, possibly rhythm. *δάκτυλον* seems to mean the foot, while *ἡρῷος* is the measure based on dactyls but admitting spondees.

in the interchange of long and short,[494] and unless I am mistaken he used the term iambic, and there was another foot that he called the trochaic, and he added the quantities long and short. And in some of these, I believe, he censured and commended the tempo of the foot no less than the rhythm itself, or else some combination of the two; I can't say. But, as I said, let this matter be postponed for Damon's consideration. For to determine the truth of these would require no little discourse. Do you think otherwise?"

"No, by heaven, I do not."

"But this you are able to determine—that seemliness and unseemliness are attendant upon the good rhythm and the bad."

"Of course."

"And, further,[495] that good rhythm and bad rhythm accompany, the one fair diction, assimilating itself thereto, and the other the opposite, and so of the apt and the unapt, if, as we were just now saying, the rhythm and harmony follow the words and not the words these."

"They certainly must follow the speech," he said.

"And what of the manner of the diction, and the speech?" said I.

"Do they not follow and conform to the disposition of the soul?"

"Of course."

"And all the rest to the diction?"

"Yes."

"Good speech, then, good accord, and good grace, and good rhythm wait upon good disposition, not that weakness of head which we euphemistically style goodness of heart, but the truly good and fair disposition of the character and the mind.[496]"

"By all means," he said.

"And must not our youth pursue these everywhere[497] if they are to do what it is truly theirs to do[498]?"

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[493] *ἄνω καὶ κάτω* is an untranslatable gibe meaning literally and technically the upper and lower half of the foot, the arsis and thesis, but idiomatically meaning topsy-turvy. There is a similar play on the idiom in *Philebus* 43 A and 43 B.

[494] Literally becoming or issuing in long and short, long, that is, when a spondee is used, short when a dactyl.

[495] Plato, as often, employs the forms of an argument proceeding by minute links to accumulate synonyms in illustration of a moral or aesthetic analogy. He is working up to the Wordsworthian thought that order, harmony, and beauty in nature and art are akin to these qualities in the soul.

[496] Plato recurs to the etymological meaning of *εὐήθεια*. Cf. on 343 C.

[497] The Ruskinian and Wordsworthian generalization is extended from music to all the fine arts, including, by the way, architecture (*οἰκοδομία*), which Butcher (*Aristotle's Theory of Poetry*, p. 138) says is ignored by Plato and Aristotle.

"They must indeed."

"And there is surely much of these qualities in painting and in all similar craftsmanship[499]—weaving is full of them and embroidery and architecture and likewise the manufacture of household furnishings and thereto the natural bodies of animals and plants as well. For in all these there is grace or gracelessness. And gracelessness and evil rhythm and disharmony are akin to evil speaking and the evil temper but the opposites are the symbols and the kin of the opposites, the sober and good disposition."

"Entirely so," he said.

"Is it, then, only the poets that we must supervise and compel to embody in their poems the semblance of the good character or else not write poetry among us, or must we keep watch over the other craftsmen, and forbid them to represent the evil disposition, the licentious, the illiberal, the graceless, either in the likeness of living creatures or in buildings or in any other product of their art, on penalty, if unable to obey, of being forbidden to practise their art among us, that our guardians may not be bred among symbols of evil, as it were in a pasturage of poisonous herbs, lest grazing freely and cropping from many such day by day they little by little and all unawares accumulate and build up a huge mass of evil in their own souls. But we must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature are capable of following the trail of true beauty and grace, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from all things about them, whence the influence that emanates from works of beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings from wholesome places health, and so from earliest childhood insensibly guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason."

"Yes," he said,

"that would be far the best education for them."

"And is it not for this reason, Glaucon," said I,

"that education in music is most sovereign,[500] because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul

[498]Their special task is to cultivate true *εὐήθεια* in their souls. For *τὸ αὑτῶν πράττειν* here Cf. 443 C-D.

[499]The following page is Plato's most eloquent statement of Wordsworth's, Ruskin's, and Tennyson's gospel of beauty for the education of the young. He repeats it in *Laws* 668 B. Cf. my paper on *Some Ideals of Education in Plato's* Republic*, Educational Bi-monthly*, vol. ii. (1907-1908) pp. 215 ff.

[500]Schopenhauer, following Plato, adds the further metaphysical reason that while the other arts imitate the external manifestations of the universal Will, music represents the Will itself.

and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the contrary?"

"And further, because omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and so, feeling distaste[501] rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good. The ugly he would rightly disapprove of and hate while still young and yet unable to apprehend the reason, but when reason came[502] the man thus nurtured would be the first to give her welcome, for by this affinity he would know her."

"I certainly think," he said,

"that such is the cause of education in music."

"It is, then," said I,

"as it was when we learned our letters and felt that we knew them sufficiently only when the separate letters did not elude us, appearing as few elements in all the combinations that convey them, and when we did not disregard them in small things or great[503] and think it unnecessary to recognize them, but were eager to distinguish them everywhere, in the belief that we should never be literate and letter-perfect till we could do this."

"True."

"And is it not also true that if there are any likenesses[504] of let-

[501] Cf. 362 B, 366 C, 388 A, 391 E, and Ruskin's paradox that taste is the only morality.

[502] Cf. *Laws* 653 B-C, where Plato defines education by this principle. Aristotle virtually accepts it (*Ethics* ii. 3. 2). The Stoics somewhat pedantically laid it down that reason entered into the youth at the age of fourteen.

[503] Plato often employs letters or elements (*στοιχεῖα*) to illustrate the acquisition of knowledge (*Theaetetus* 206 A), the relation of elements to compounds, the principles of classification (*Philebus* 18 C, *Cratylus* 393 D), and the theory of ideas (*Politicus* 278 A. Cf. Isocrates xiii. 13, Xenophon *Memorabilia* iv. 4. 7, Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, ii. pp. 23 f., 348 f., Cicero *De or.* ii. 130).

[504] It is of course possible to contrast images with the things themselves, and to speak of forms or species without explicit allusion to the metaphysical doctrine of ideas. But on the other hand there is not the slightest reason to assume that the doctrine and its terminology were not familiar to Plato at the time when this part of the *Republic* was written. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 31 ff., 35. Statistics of the use of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* (Peiper's *Ontologica Platonica*, Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. pp. 249-253), whatever their philological interest, contribute nothing to the interpretation of Plato's thought. Cf. my *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*, pp. 1, 30, and *Class Phil* . vol. vi. pp. 363-364. There is for common sense no contradiction or problem in the fact that Plato here says that we cannot be true "musicians" till we recognize both the forms and all copies of, or approximations to, them in art or

ters reflected in water or mirrors, we shall never know them until we know the originals, but such knowledge belongs to the same art and discipline[505]?"

"By all means."

"Then, by heaven, am I not right in saying that by the same token we shall never be true musicians, either— neither we nor the guardians that we have undertaken to educate—until we are able to recognize the forms of soberness, courage, liberality,[506] and high-mindedness and all their kindred and their opposites, too, in all the combinations that contain and convey them, and to apprehend them and their images wherever found, disregarding them neither in trifles nor in great things, but believing the knowledge of them to belong to the same art and discipline?"

"The conclusion is inevitable," he said.

"Then," said I,

"when there is a coincidence[507] of a beautiful disposition in the soul and corresponding and harmonious beauties of the same type in the bodily form—is not this the fairest spectacle for one who is capable of its contemplation[508]?"

"Far the fairest."

"And surely the fairest is the most lovable."

"Of course."

"The true musician, then, would love by preference persons of this sort; but if there were disharmony he would not love this."

"No," he said,

"not if there was a defect in the soul; but if it were in the body he would bear with it and still be willing to bestow his love."

"I understand," I said,

"that you have or have had favorites of this sort and I grant your

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nature, while in Book X (601) he argues that the poet and artist copy not the idea but its copy in the material world.

[505]Plato, like all intellectuals, habitually assumes that knowledge of principles helps practice. Cf. *Phaedrus* 259 E, 262 B, and 484 D, 520 C, 540 A.

[506]Liberality and high-mindedness, or rather, perhaps, magnificence, are among the virtues defined in Aristotle's list (*Eth. Nic.* 1107 b 17), but are not among the four cardinal virtues which the *Republic* will use in Book IV. in the comparison of the indivdual with the state.

[507]*Symposium* 209 B *τὸ συναμφότερον*, 210 C, Wilamowitz, vol. ii. p. 192.

[508]Music and beauty lead to the philosophy of love, more fully set forth in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, and here dismissed in a page. Plato's practical conclusion here may be summed up in the Virgilian line (*Aeneid* v. 344): "Gratior et pulchro veniens in corpore virtus."

distinction. But tell me this—can there be any communion between soberness and extravagant pleasure[509]?"

"How could there be," he said,

"since such pleasure puts a man beside himself no less than pain?"

"Or between it and virtue generally?"

"By no means."

"But is there between pleasure and insolence and licence?"

"Most assuredly."

"Do you know of greater or keener pleasure than that associated with Aphrodite?"

"I don't," he said,

"nor yet of any more insane."

"But is not the right love a sober and harmonious love of the orderly and the beautiful?"

"It is indeed," said he.

"Then nothing of madness, nothing akin to licence, must be allowed to come nigh the right love?"

"No."

"Then this kind of pleasure may not come nigh, nor may lover and beloved who rightly love and are loved have anything to do with it?"

"No, by heaven, Socrates," he said,

"it must not come nigh them."

"Thus, then, as it seems, you will lay down the law in the city that we are founding, that the lover may kiss[510] and pass the time with and touch the beloved as a father would a son, for honorable ends, if he persuade him. But otherwise he must so associate with the objects of his care that there should never be any suspicion of anything further, on penalty of being stigmatized for want of taste and true musical culture."

"Even so," he said.

"Do you not agree, then, that our discourse on music has come to an end? It has certainly made a fitting end, for surely the end and consummation of culture be love of the beautiful."

"I concur," he said.

"After music our youth are to be educated by gymnastics?"

"Certainly."

"In this too they must be carefully trained from boyhood through life, and the way of it is this, I believe; but consider it yourself too.

[509]Extravagant pleasure is akin to madness. Cf. *Philebus* 47 A-C, *Phaedo* 83 C-D.

[510]Cf. 468 B-C.

For I, for my part, do not believe that a sound body by its excellence makes the soul good, but on the contrary that a good soul by its virtue renders the body the best that is possible.[511] What is your opinion?"

"I think so too."

"Then if we should sufficiently train the mind and turn over to it the minutiae of the care of the body, and content ourselves with merely indicating the norms or patterns, not to make a long story of it, we should acting rightly?"

"By all means."

"From intoxication[512] we said that they must abstain. For a guardian is surely the last person in the world to whom it is allowable to get drunk and not know where on earth he is."

"Yes," he said,

"it would absurd that a guardian[513] should need a guard."

"What next about their food? These men are athletes in the greatest of contests,[514] are they not?"

"Yes."

"Is, then, the bodily habit of the athletes we see about us suitable for such?"

"Perhaps."

"Nay," said I,

"that is a drowsy habit and precarious for health. Don't you observe that they sleep away their lives,[515] and that if they depart ever so little from their prescribed regimen these athletes are liable to great and violent diseases?"

"I do."

"Then," said I,

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[511]The dependence of body on soul, whether in a mystical, a moral, or a medical sense, is a favorite doctrine of Plato and the Platonists. Cf. *Charmides* 156-157, Spenser, *An Hymn in Honour of Beauty*: "For of the soul the body form doth take, For soul is form, and doth the body make," and Shelley, *The Sensitive Plant*: "A lady, the wonder of her kind, Whose form was upborne by a lovely mind, Which dilating had moulded her mien and her motion Like a sea-flower unfolded beneath the ocean." Cf. also Democr. fr. B. 187 Diels.

[512]Cf. 398 E. There is no contradiction between this and the half-serious proposal of the *Laws* to use supervised drinking-bouts as a safe test of character (*Laws* 641).

[513]*γε* emphasizes what follows from the very meaning of the word. Cf. 379 B, 389 B, 435 A.

[514]Cf. 543 B, 621 D, *Laches* 182 A, *Laws* 830 A, Demosthenes xxv. 97 "ἀθληταὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων".

[515]Cf. *Ἐράσται* 132 C *καθεύδων πάντα τὸν βίον*. Xenophanes, Euripides, Aristotle, and the medical writers, like Plato, protest against the exaggerated honor paid to athletes and the heavy sluggishness induced by overfeeeding and overtraining.

"we need some more ingenious form of training for our athletes of war, since these must be as it were sleepless hounds, and have the keenest possible perceptions of sight and hearing, and in their campaigns undergo many changes[516] in their drinking water, their food, and in exposure to the heat of the sun and to storms,[517] without disturbance of their health."

"I think so."

"Would not, then, the best gymnastics be akin to the music that we were just now describing?"

"What do you mean?"

"It would be a simple and flexible[518] gymnastic, and especially so in the training for war."

"In what way?"

"One could learn that," said I,

"even from Homer.[519] For you are aware that in the banqueting of the heroes on campaign he does not feast them on fish,[520] nor on boiled meat, but only on roast, which is what soldiers could most easily procure. For everywhere, one may say, it is of easier provision to use the bare fire than to convey pots and pans[521] along."

"Indeed it is."

"Neither, as I believe, does Homer ever make mention of sweet meats. Is not that something which all men in training understand—that if one is to keep his body in good condition he must abstain from such things altogether?"

"They are right," he said,

"in that they know it and do abstain."

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[516] *Laws* 797 D. Cf. 380 E. Aristotle's comment on *μεταβολή*, *Eth. Nic.* 1154 b 28 ff., is curiously reminiscent of Plato, including the phrase *ἁπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής*.

[517] Perhaps in the context cold.

[518] Literally equitable, if we translate *ἐπιεικής* by its later meaning, that is, not over-precise or rigid in conformity to rule. Adam is mistaken in saying that *ἐπιεικής* is practically synonymous with *ἀγαθή*. It sometimes is, but not here. Cf. Plutarch, *De san.* 13 *ἀκριβὴς . . . καὶ δι' ὄνυχος*.

[519] So *Laws* 706 D. The *καί* is perhaps merely idiomatic in quotation.

[520] Homer's ignoring of fish diet, except in stress of starvation, has been much and idly discussed both in antiquity and by modern scholars. Modern pseudo-science has even inferred from this passage that Plato placed a "taboo" on fish, though they are at the sea-side on the Hellespont, which Homer calls "fish-teeming," *Iliad* ix. 360.

[521] Cf. Green, *History of English People*, Book II. chap. ii., an old description of the Scotch army: "They have therefore no occasion for pots and pans, for they dress the flesh of the cattle in their skins after they have flayed them," etc. But cf. Athenaeus, i. 8-9 (vol. i. p. 36 L.C.L.), Diogenes Laertius viii. 13 "ὥστε εὐπορίστους αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὰς τροφάς".

"Then, my friend, if you think this is the right way, you apparently do not approve of a Syracusan table[522] and Sicilian variety of made dishes."

"I think not."

"You would frown, then, on a little Corinthian maid as the *chère amie* of men who were to keep themselves fit?"

"Most certainly."

"And also on the seeming delights of Attic pastry?"

"Inevitably."

"In general, I take it, if we likened that kind of food and regimen to music and song expressed in the pan-harmonic mode and in every variety of rhythm it would be a fair comparison."

"Quite so."

"And here variety engendered licentiousness, did it not, but here disease? While simplicity in music begets sobriety in the souls, and in gymnastic training it begets health in bodies."

"Most true," he said.

"And when licentiousness and disease multiply in a city, are not many courts of law and dispensaries opened, and the arts of chicane[523] and medicine give themselves airs when even free men in great numbers take them very seriously?"

"How can they help it?" he said.

"Will you be able to find a surer proof of an evil and shameful state of education in a city than the necessity of first-rate physicians and judges, not only for the base and mechanical, but for those who claim to have been bred in the fashion of free men? Do you not think it disgraceful and a notable mark of bad breeding to have to make use of a justice imported from others, who thus become your masters and judges, from lack of such qualities in yourself[524]?"

"The most shameful thing in the world."

"Is it?" said I,

"or is this still more shameful[525]—when a man only wears out the better part of his days in the courts of law as defendant or accuser,

[522]Proverbial, like the "Corinthian maid" and the "Attic pastry." Cf. Otto, *Sprichw. d. Rom.* p. 321, Newman, Introduction to Aristotle's *Politics*, p. 302. Cf. also *Phaedrus* 240 B.

[523]δικανική: more contemptuous than δικαστική.

[524]I have given the sense. The contruction is debated accordingly as we read ἀπορία or ἀπορίᾳ. Cf. *Phaedrus* 239 D, of the use of cosmetics, χήτει οἰκείων. The καί with ἀπορίᾳ is awkward or expresses the carelessness of conversation.

[525]Plato likes to emphasize by pointing to a lower depth or a higher height beyond the superlative.

but from the lack of all true sense of values[526] is led to plume himself on this very thing, as being a smart fellow to "put over" an unjust act and cunningly to try every dodge and practice,[527] every evasion, and wriggle[528] out of every hold in defeating justice, and that too for trifles and worthless things, because he does not know how much nobler and better it is to arrange his life so as to have no need[529] of a nodding juryman?"

"That is," said he,

"still more shameful than the other."

"And to require medicine," said I,

"not merely for wounds or the incidence of some seasonal maladies, but, because of sloth and such a regimen as we described, to fill one's body up with winds and humors like a marsh and compel the ingenious sons of Aesculapius to invent for diseases such names as fluxes and flatulences—don't you think that disgraceful?[530]"

"Those surely are," he said,

"new-fangled and monstrous strange names of diseases."

"There was nothing of the kind, I fancy," said I,

"in the days of Aesculapius. I infer this from the fact that at Troy his sons did not find fault with the damsel who gave to the wounded Eurypylus[531] to drink a posset of Pramnian wine plentifully sprinkled with barley and gratings of cheese, inflammatory ingredients of a surety, nor did they censure Patroclus, who was in charge of the case."

"It was indeed," said he,

"a strange potion for a man in that condition."

"Not strange," said I,

"if you reflect that the former Asclepiads made no use of our modern

[526]There is no exact English equivalent for *ἀπειροκαλία*, the insensitiveness to the *καλόν* of the banausic, the *nouveau riche* and the Philistine.

[527]The phrasing of this passage recalls passages of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, and the description of the pettifogging lawyer and politician in the *Theaetetus* 172 E. Cf. 519, also *Euthydemus* 302 B, and Porphyry, *De abstinentia*, i. 34. The metaphors are partly from wrestling.

[528]Cf. Blaydes on Aristophanes *Knights* 263.

[529]Cf. *Gorgias* 507 D, Thucydides iii. 82, Isocrates *Antidosis* 238, Antiphanes, fr. 288 Kock "ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν οὐδενὸς δεῖται νόμου".

[530]Plato ridicules the unsavory metaphors required to describe the effects of auto-intoxication. There is a similar bit of somewhat heavier satire in Spencer's *Social Statics*, 1868, p. 32: "Carbuncled noses, cadaverous faces, foetid breaths, and plethoric bodies meet us at every turn; and our condolences are prepetually asked for headaches, flatulences, nightmare, heartburn, and endless other dyspeptic symptoms."

[531]Plato is probably quoting from memory. In our text, *Iliad* xi. 624, Hecamede gives the draught to Machaon and Nestor as the *Ion* (538 B) correctly states.

coddling[532] medication of diseases before the time of Herodicus. But Herodicus[533] was a trainer and became a valetudinarian, and blended gymnastics and medicine, for the torment first and chiefly of himself and then of many successors."

"How so?" he said.

"By lingering out his death," said I;

"for living in perpetual observance of his malady, which was incurable, he was not able to effect a cure, but lived through his days unfit for the business of life, suffering the tortures of the damned if he departed a whit from his fixed regimen, and struggling against death by reason of his science he won the prize of a doting old age.[534]"

"A noble prize[535] indeed for his science," he said.

"The appropriate one," said I,

"for a man who did not know that it was not from ignorance or inacquaintance with this type of medicine that Aesculapius did not discover it to his descendants, but because he knew that for all well-governed peoples there is a work assigned to each man in the city which he must perform, and no one has leisure to be sick[536] and doctor himself all his days. And this we absurdly enough perceive in the case of a craftsman, but don't see in the case of the rich and so-called fortunate."

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[532]This coddling treatment of disease, which Plato affects to reprobate here, he recommends from the point of view of science in the *Timaeus* (89 C): "διὸ παιδαγωγεῖν δεῖ διαίταις", etc. Cf. Euripides *Orestes* 883; and even in the *Republic* 459 C.

[533]Cf. *Protagoras* 316 E, *Phaedrus* 227 D. To be distinguished from his namesake, the brother of Gorgias in *Gorgias* 448 B. Cf. Cope on Aristotle *Rhet.* i. 5, Wilamowitz-Kiessling, *Phil. Unt.* xv. p. 220, Juthner, *Philostratus uber Gymnastik*, p. 10.

[534]Cf. Macaulay on Mitford's *History of Greece*: "It (oligarchical government) has a sort of valetudinarian longevity; it lives in the balance of Sanctorius; it takes no exercise; it exposes itself to no accident; it is seized with a hypochondriac alarm at every new sensation; it trembles at every breath; it lets blood for every inflammation; and this, without ever enjoying a day of health or pleasure, drags out its existence to a doting and debilitated old age." That Macaulay here is consciously paraphrasing Plato is apparent from his unfair use of the Platonic passage in his essay on Bacon. Cf. further Euripides *Supp.* 1109-1113; Seneca on early medicine, *Epistles* xv. 3 (95) 14 ff., overdoes both Spencer and Macaulay. Cf. Rousseau, *Emile*, Book I.: "Je ne sais point apprendre à vivre à qui ne songe qu'à s'empêcher de mourir;" La Rochefoucauld (*Max.* 282): "C'est une ennuyeuse maladie que de conserver sa santé par un trop grand régime."

[535]The pun *γήρας* and *γέρας* is hardly translatable. Cf. Pherecydes *apud* Diogenes Laertius i. 119 "χθονίῃ δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζὰς γῆν γέρας διδοῖ" (vol. i. p. 124 L.C.L.). For the ironical use of *καλόν* cf. Euripides *Cyclops* 551, Sappho, fr. 53 (58).

[536]Cf. Plutarch, *De sanitate tuenda* 23, Sophocles, fr. 88. 11 (?), Lucian, *Nigrinus* 22, differently; Hotspur's, "Zounds! how has he the leisure to be sick?"

"How so?" he said.

"A carpenter," said I,

"when he is sick expects his physician to give him a drug which will operate as an emetic on the disease, or to get rid of it by purging[537] or the use of cautery or the knife. But if anyone prescribes for him a long course of treatment with swathings[538] about the head and their accompaniments, he hastily says that he has no leisure to be sick and that such a life of preoccupation with his illess and neglect of the work that lies before him isn't worth living. And thereupon he bids farewell to that kind of physician, enters upon his customary way of life, regains his health, and lives attending to his affairs—or, if his body is not equal to strain, he dies and is freed from all his troubles.[539]"

"For such a man," he said,

"that appears to be the right use of medicine."

"And is not the reason," I said,

"that he had a task and that life wasn't worth acceptance on condition of not doing his work?"

"Obviously," he said.

"But the rich man, we say, has no such appointed task, the necessity of abstaining from which renders life intolerable."

"I haven't heard of any."

"Why, haven't you heard that saying of Phocylides,[540] that after a man has "made his pile" he ought to practice virtue?"

"Before, too, I fancy," he said.

"Let us not quarrel with him on that point," I said,

"but inform ourselves whether this virtue is something for the rich man to practise, and life is intolerable if he does not, or whether we are to suppose that while valetudinarianism is a hindrance to single-minded attention to carpentry and the other arts, it is no obstacle to the fulfilment of Phocylides' exhortation."

"Yes, indeed," he said,

"this excessive care for the body that goes beyond simple gymnastics[541] is the greatest of all obstacles. For it is troublesome in household

[537]For *ἢ κάτω* cf. Chaucer, "Ne upward purgative ne downward laxative."

[538]Cf. Blaydes on Aristophanes *Acharnians* 439.

[539]This alone marks the humor of the whole passage, which Macaulay's *Essay on Bacon* seems to miss. Cf. Aristophanes *Acharnians* 757;*Apology* 41 D.

[540]The line of Phocylides is toyed with merely to vary the expression of the thought. Bergk restores it *δίζησθαι βιοτήν, ἀρετὴν δ' ὅταν ἦ βίος ἤδη*, which is Horace's (*Epistles* i. 1. 53 f.): "Quaerenda pecunia primum est; Virtus post nummos!"

[541]In the *Gorgias* (464 B) *ἰατρική* is recognized as co-ordinate in the care of the

affairs and military service and sedentary offices in the city."

"And, chief of all, it puts difficulties in the way of any kind of instruction, thinking, or private meditation, forever imagining headaches[542] and dizziness and attributing their origin to philosophy. So that wherever this kind of virtue is practiced[543] and tested it is in every way a hindrance.[544] For it makes the man always fancy himself sick and never cease from anguishing about his body."

"Naturally," he said.

"Then, shall we not say that it was because Asclepius knew this—that for those who were by nature and course of life sound of body but had some localized disease, that for such, I say, and for this habit he revealed the art of medicine, and, driving out their disease by drugs and surgery, prescribed for them their customary regimen in order not to interfere with their civic duties, but that, when bodies were diseased inwardly and throughout, he did not attempt by diet and by gradual evacuations and infusions to prolong a wretched existence for the man and have him beget in all likelihood similar wretched offspring? But if a man was incapable of living in the established round[545] and order of life, he did not think it worth while to treat him, since such a fellow is of no use either to himself or to the state."

"A most politic Asclepius you're telling us of,[546]" he said.

"Obviously," said I,

"that was his character. And his sons too, don't you in see that at Troy they approved themselves good fighting-men and practised medicine as I described it? Don't you remember[547] that in the case of

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body with *γυμναστική*. Here, whatever goes beyond the training and care that will preserve the health of a normal body is austerely rejected. Cf. 410 B.

[542]As Macaulay, *Essay on Bacon,* puts it: "That a valetudinarian . . . who enjoyed a hearty laugh over the Queen of Navarre's tales should be treated as a *caput lupinum* because he could not read the *Timaeus* without a headache, was a notion which the humane spirit of the English schools of wisdom altogether rejected." For the thought cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* iii. 12. 6-7.

[543]Literally virtue is practiced in this way. Cf. 503 D for a similar contrast between mental and other labors. And for the meaning of virtue cf. the Elizabethan: "Virtue is ever sowing of her seeds."

[544]There is a suggestion of Stoic terminology in Plato's use of *ἐμπόδιος* and similar words. Cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* i. 2. 4. On the whole passage cf. again Macaulay's *Essay on Bacon*, Maximus of Tyre (Duebn.) 10, and the diatribe on modern medicine and valetudinarianism in Edward Carpenter's *Civilization, Its Cause and Cure.*

[545]Cf. Thucydides i. 130.

[546]There is a touch of comedy in the Greek. Cf. Eupolis, fr. 94 Kock "ταχὺν λέγεις μέν".

[547]Cf. the Homeric *ἦ οὐ μέμνῃ;*

Menelaus too from the wound that Pandarus inflicted "They sucked the blood, and soothing simples sprinkled?" *Hom. Il. 4.218* [548] But what he was to eat or drink thereafter they no more prescribed than for Eurypylus, taking it for granted that the remedies sufficed to heal men who before their wounds were healthy and temperate in diet even if they did happen for the nonce to drink a posset; but they thought that the life of a man constitutionally sickly and intemperate was of no use to himself or others, and that the art of medicine should not be for such nor should they be given treatment even if they were richer than Midas.[549]"

"Very ingenious fellows," he said,

"you make out these sons of Asclepius to be."

"'Tis fitting," said I;

"and yet in disregard of our principles the tragedians and Pindar[550] affirm that Asclepius, though he was the son of Apollo, was bribed by gold to heal a man already at the point of death, and that for this cause he was struck by the lightning. But we in accordance with the aforesaid principles[551] refuse to believe both statements, but if he was the son of a god he was not avaricious, we will insist, and if he was greedy of gain he was not the son of a god."

"That much," said he,

"is most certainly true. But what have you to say to this, Socrates, must we not have good physicians in our city? And they would be the most likely to be good who had treated the greatest number of healthy and diseased men, and so good judges would be those who had associated with all sorts and conditions of men."

"Most assuredly I want them good," I said;

"but do you know whom I regard as such?"

"I'll know if you tell,[552]" he said.

"Well, I will try," said I.

"You, however, have put unlike cases in one question."

"How so?" said he.

"Physicians, it is true," I said,

"would prove most skilled if, from childhood up, in addition to learning the principles of the art they had familiarized themselves with the

[548] Plato is quoting loosely or adapting *Hom. Il. 4.218.* "αἷμ' ἐκμυζήσας ἐπ' ἄρ' ἤπια φάρμακα εἰδὼς πάσσε" is said of Machaon, not of Menelaus.

[549] Proverbial and suggests Tyrtaeus. Cf. *Laws* 660 E.

[550] Cf. Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1022 ff., Euripides *Alcestis* 3-4, Pindar, *Pyth.* iii. 53.

[551] Cf. 379 ff., also 365 E.

[552] Slight colloquial jest. Cf. Aristophanes *Eq.* 1158, *Pax* 1061.

greatest possible number of the most sickly bodies, and if they themselves had suffered all diseases and were not of very healthy constitution. For you see they do not treat the body by the body.[553] If they did, it would not be allowable for their bodies to be or to have been in evil condition. But they treat the body with the mind—and it is not competent for a mind that is or has been evil to treat anything well."

"Right," he said.

"But a judge, mark you, my friend, rules soul with soul and it is not allowable for a soul to have been bred from youth up among evil souls and to have grown familiar with them, and itself to have run the gauntlet of every kind of wrong-doing and injustice so as quickly to infer from itself the misdeeds of others as it might diseases in the body, but it must have been inexperienced in evil natures and uncontaminated by them while young, if it is to be truly fair and good and judge soundly of justice. For which cause the better sort seem to be simple-minded in youth and are easily deceived by the wicked, since they do not have within themselves patterns answering to the affections of the bad."

"That is indeed their experience," he said.

"Therefore it is," said I,

"that the good judge must not be a youth but an old man, a late learner[554] of the nature of injustice, one who has not become aware of it as a property in his own soul, but one who has through the long years trained himself to understand it as an alien thing in alien souls, and to discern how great an evil it is by the instrument of mere knowledge and not by experience of his own."

"That at any rate," he said,

"appears to be the noblest kind of judge."

"And what is more, a good one," I said,

"which was the gist of your question. For he who has a good soul is good. But that cunning fellow quick to suspect evil,[555] and who has himself done many unjust acts and who thinks himself a smart trickster, when he associates with his like does appear to be clever, being on his guard and fixing his eyes on the patterns within himself.

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[553] Cf. *Gorgias* 465 C-D.

[554] *ὀψιμαθῆ*: here in a favorable sense, but usually an untranslatable Greek word for a type portrayed in a charater of Theophrastus.

[555] For this type of character cf. Thucydides iii. 83, and my comments in T.A.P.A. vol. xxiv. p. 79. Cf. Burke, *Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol*: "They who raise suspicions on the good on account of the behavior of ill men, are of the party of the latter;" Stobaeus ii. p. 46 "Βίας ἔφη, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ εὐαπάτητοι", Menander, fr. 845 Kock "χρηστοῦ παρ' ἀνδρὸς μηδὲν ὑπονόει κακόν".

But when the time comes for him to mingle with the good and his elders, then on the contrary he appears stupid. He is unseasonably distrustful and he cannot recognize a sound character because he has no such pattern in himself. But since he more often meets with the bad than the good, he seems to himself and to others to be rather wise than foolish."

"That is quite true," he said.

"Well then," said I,

"such a one must not be our ideal of the good and wise judge but the former. For while badness could never come to know both virtue and itself, native virtue through education will at last acquire the science both of itself and badness.[556] This one, then, as I think, is the man who proves to be wise and not the bad man.[557]"

"And I concur," he said.

"Then will you not establish by law in your city such an art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with this kind of justice? And these arts will care for the bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly well born, but of those who are not, such as are defective in body they will suffer to die and those who are evil-natured and incurable[558] in soul they will themselves[559] put to death."

"This certainly," he said,

"has been shown to be the best thing for the sufferers themselves and for the state."

"And so your youths," said I,

"employing that simple music which we said engendered sobriety will, it is clear, guard themselves against falling into the need of the justice of the court-room."

"Yes," he said.

"And will not our musician, pursuing the same trail in his use of gymnastics, if he please, get to have no need of medicine save when indispensable[560]?"

"I think so."

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[556] Cf. George Eliot, *Adam Bede*, chap. xiv.: "It is our habit to say that while the lower nature can never understand the higher, the higher nature commands a complete view of the lower. But I think the higher nature has to learn this comprehension by a good deal of hard experience."

[557] Cf. *Theaetetus* 176 D "It is far best not to concede to the unjust that they are *clever* knaves, for they glory in the taunt." Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 21.

[558] Only the incurable suffer a purely exemplary and deterrent punishment in this world or the next. Cf. 615 E, *Protagoras* 325 A, *Gorgias* 525 C, *Phaedo* 113 E.

[559] *ultro*, as opposed to *ἑάσουσιν*.

[560] Cf. 405 C. Plato always allows for the limitation of the ideal by necessity.

"And even the exercises and toils of gymnastics he will undertake with a view to the spirited part of his nature[561] to arouse that rather than for mere strength, unlike ordinary athletes, who treat[562] diet and exercise only as a means to muscle."

"Nothing could be truer," he said.

"Then may we not say, Glaucon," said I,

"that those who established[563] an education in music and gymnastics had not the purpose in view that some attribute to them in so instituting, namely to treat the body by one and the soul by the other?"

"But what?" he said.

"It seems likely," I said,

"that they ordained both chiefly for the soul's sake."

"How so?"

"Have you not observed," said I,

"the effect on the disposition of the mind itself[564] of lifelong devotion to gymnastics with total neglect of music? Or the disposition of those of the opposite habit?"

"In what respect do you mean?" he said.

"In respect of savagery and hardness or, on the other hand, of softness and gentleness?"

"I have observed," he said,

"that the devotees of unmitigated gymnastics turn out more brutal than they should be and those of music softer than is good for them."

"And surely," said I,

"this savagery is a quality derived from the high-spirited element in our nature, which, if rightly trained, becomes brave, but if overstrained, would naturally become hard and harsh."

"I think so," he said.

"And again, is not the gentleness a quality which the philosophic nature would yield? This if relaxed too far would be softer than is

[561]The welfare of the soul is always the prime object for Plato. (Cf. 591 C) But he cannot always delay to correct ordinary speech in this sense. The correction of 376 E here is of course not a change of opinion, and it is no more a criticism of Isocrates, *Antidosis* 180-185, than it is of Gorgias 464 B, or *Soph.* 228 E, or *Republic* 521 E.

[562]*μεταχειρίζονται*: this reading of Galen is more idiomatic than the MS. *μεταχειριεῖται*. Where English says "he is not covetous of honor as other men are," Greek says "he (is) not as other men are covetous of honor."

[563]Plato half seriously attributes his own purposes to the founders. Cf. 405-406 on medicine and *Philebus* 16 C on dialectics.

[564]For the thought cf. Euripides *Suppl.* 882 f. and Polybius's account of the effect of the neglect of music on the Arcadians (iv. 20).

desirable but if rightly trained gentle and orderly?"

"That is so."

"But our requirement, we say,[565] is that the guardians should possess both natures."

"It is."

"And must they not be harmoniously adjusted to one another?"

"Of course."

"And the soul of the man thus attuned is sober and brave?"

"Certainly."

"And that of the ill adjusted is cowardiy and rude?"

"It surely is."

"Now when a man abandons himself to music to play[566] upon him and pour[567] into his soul as it were through the funnel of his ears those sweet, soft, and dirge-like airs of which we were just now[568] speaking, and gives his entire time to the warblings and blandishments of song, the first result is that the principle of high spirit, if he had it, is softened like iron[569] and is made useful instead of useless and brittle. But when he continues[570] the practice without remission and is spellbound, the effect begins to be that he melts and liquefies[571] till he completely dissolves away his spirit, cuts out as it were the very sinews of his soul and makes of himself a "feeble warrior."[572]"

"Assuredly," he said.

"And if," said I,

"he has to begin with a spiritless[573] nature he reaches this result

[565]Cf. 375 C. With Plato's doctrine of the two temperaments cf. the distinction of quick-wits and hard-wits in Ascham's *Schoolmaster*. Ascham is thinking of Plato, for he says: "Galen saith much music marreth men's manners; and Plato hath a notable place of the same thing in his book *De rep.*, well marked also and excellently translated by Tully himself."

[566]Cf. 561 C.

[567]Demetrius, *Περὶ Ἑρμ.* 51, quotes this and the following sentence as an example of the more vivid expression following the less vivid. For the image cf. Blaydes on Aristophanes *Thesm.* 18, Aeschylus *Choeph.* 451, Shakespeare, *Cymbeline*III. ii. 59 "Love's counsellor should fill the bores of hearing."

[568]Cf. 398 D-E, where the *θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι* are rejected altogether, while here they are used to illustrate the softening effect of music on a hard temperament. It is misspent ingenuity to harp on such "contradictions."

[569]For images drawn from the tempering of metals cf. Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 612 and Jebb on Sophocles *Ajax* 650.

[570]Cf. *Theaetetus* 165 E "ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς", and Blaydes on Aristophanes *Peace* 1121.

[571]Cf. Tennyson's "Molten down in mere uxoriousness" (*Geraint and Enid*).

[572]A familiar Homeric reminiscence (*Iliad* xvii. 588) quoted also in *Symposium* 174 C. Cf. Froissart's *un mol chevalier*.

quickly, but if high-spirited, by weakening the spirit he makes it unstable, quickly irritated by slight stimuli, and as quickly quelled. The outcome is that such men are choleric and irascible instead of high-spirited, and are peevish and discontented."

"Precisely so."

"On the other hand, if a man toils hard at gymnastics and eats right lustily and holds no truck with music and philosophy, does he not at first get very fit and full of pride and high spirit and become more brave and bold than he was?"

"He does indeed."

"But what if he does nothing but this and has no contact with the Muse in any way, is not the result that even if there was some principle of the love of knowledge in his soul, since it tastes of no instruction nor of any inquiry and does not participate in any discussion or any other form of culture, it becomes feeble, deaf, and blind, because it is not aroused or fed nor are its perceptions purified and quickened?"

"That is so," he said.

"And so such a man, I take it, becomes a misologist[574] and stranger to the Muses. He no longer makes any use of persuasion by speech but achieves all his ends like a beast by violence and savagery, and in his brute ignorance and ineptitude lives a life of disharmony and gracelessness."

"That is entirely true," he said.

"For these two, then, it seems there are two arts which I would say some god gave to mankind, music and gymnastics for the service of the high-spirited principle and the love of knowledge in them—not for the soul and the body except incidentally, but for the harmonious adjustment of these two principles by the proper degree of tension and relaxation of each."

"Yes, so it appears," he said.

"Then he who best blends gymnastics with music and applies them most suitably to the soul is the man whom we should most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and harmonious musician, far rather than the one who brings the strings into unison with one another.[575]"

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[573]Etymologically *ἄθυμος* = deficient in *θυμός*.

[574]A hater of rational discussion, as explained in *Laches* 188 C, and the beautiful passage in the *Phaedo* 89 D ff. Cf. Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 14. 6 "Igitur nobis providendum est ne odio identidem sermonum laboremus." John Morley describes obscurantists as "sombre hierophants of misology."

[575]For virtue as "music" Cf. *Phaedo*61 A, *Laches* 188 D, and Iago's "There is a daily music in his life." The "perfect musician" is the professor of the royal art of *Politicus*

"That seems likely, Socrates," he said.

"And shall we not also need in our city, Glaucon, a permanent overseer[576] of this kind if its constitution is to be preserved?"

"We most certainly shall."

"Such would be the outlines of their education and breeding. For why[577] should one recite the list of the dances of such citizens, their hunts and chases with hounds, their athletic contests and races? It is pretty plain that they must conform to these principles and there is no longer any difficulty in discovering them."

"There is, it may be, no difficulty," he said.

"Very well," said I;

"what, then, have we next to determine? Is it not which ones among them[578] shall be the rulers and the ruled?"

"Certainly."

"That the rulers must be the elder and the ruled the younger is obvious."

"It is."

"And that the rulers must be their best?"

"This too."

"And do not the best of the farmers prove the best farmers?"

"Yes."

"And in this case, since we want them to be the best of the guardians, must they not be the best guardians, the most regardful of the state?"

"Yes."

"They must then to begin with be intelligent in such matters and capable, and furthermore careful[579] of the interests of the state?"

"That is so."

"But one would be most likely to be careful of that which he loved."

306-308 ff. which harmonizes the two temperaments, not merely by education, but by elminating extremes through judicious marriages.

[576]This "epistates" is not the director of education of *Laws* 765 D ff., though of course he or it will control education. It is rather an anticipation of the philosophic rulers, as appears from 497 C-D, and corresponds to the nocturnal council of *Laws* 950 B ff. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 86, note 650.

[577]*γάρ* explains *τύποι*, or outlines. Both in the *Republic* and the *Laws*Plato frequently states that many details must be left to subsequent legislation. Cf. *Republic* 379 A, 400 B-C, 403 D-E, 425 A-E, *Laws* 770 B, 772 A-B, 785 A, 788 A-B, 807 E, 828 B, 846 C, 855 D, 876 D-E, 957 A, 968 C.

[578]*αὐτῶν τούτων* marks a class within a class. Cf. *Class. Phil* . vol. vii. (1912) p. 485. 535 A refers back to this passage.

[579]The argument proceeds by minute links. Cf. on 338 D.

"Necessarily."

"And again, one would be most likely to love that whose interests he supposed to coincide with his own, and thought that when it prospered, he too would prosper and if not, the contrary."

"So it is," he said.

"Then we must pick out from the other guardians such men as to our observation appear most inclined through the entire course of their lives to be zealous to do what they think for the interest of the state, and who would be least likely to consent to do the opposite."

"That would be a suitable choice," he said.

"I think, then, we shall have to observe them at every period of life, to see if they are conservators and guardians of this conviction in their minds and never by sorcery nor by force can be brought to expel[580] from their souls unawares this conviction that they must do what is best for the state."

"What do you mean by the "expelling"?" he said.

"I will tell you," said I;

"it seems to me that the exit of a belief from the mind is either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary is the departure of the false belief from one who learns better, involuntary that of every true belief."

"The voluntary," he said,

"I understand, but I need instruction about the involuntary."

"How now," said I,

"don't you agree with me in thinking that men are unwillingly deprived of good things but willingly of evil? Or is it not an evil to be deceived in respect of the truth and a good to possess truth? And don't you think that to opine the things that are is to possess the truth?"

"Why, yes," said he,

"you are right, and I agree that men are unwillingly deprived of true opinions.[581]"

"And doesn't this happen to them by theft, by the spells of sorcery or by force?"

"I don't understand now either," he said.

"I must be talking in high tragic style,[582]" I said;

"by those who have their opinions stolen from them I mean those

[580]Cf. *Crito* 46 B, Xenophon *Memorabilia* iii. 12. 7.

[581]Cf. on 382 A and *Sophist.* 228 C, Marcus Aurelius vii. 63.

[582]The preceding metaphors are in the high-flown, obscure style of tragedy. Cf. Thompson on *Meno* 76 E, *Cratylus* 418 D, Aristophanes *Frogs*, *passim*, Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 146.

who are over-persuaded and those who forget, because in the one case time, in the other argument strips them unawares of their beliefs. Now I presume you understand, do you not?"

"Yes."

"Well, then, by those who are constrained or forced I mean those whom some pain or suffering compels[583] to change their minds."

"That too I understand and you are right."

"And the victims of sorcery[584] I am sure you too would say are they who alter their opinions under the spell of pleasure or terrified by some fear."

"Yes," he said:

"everything that deceives appears to cast a spell upon the mind."

"Well then, as I was just saying, we must look for those who are the best guardians of the indwelling conviction that what they have to do is what they at any time believe to be best for the state. Then we must observe them from childhood up and propose them tasks in which one would be most likely to forget this principle or be deceived, and he whose memory is sure and who cannot be beguiled we must accept and the other kind we must cross off from our list. Is not that so?"

"Yes."

"And again we must subject them to toils and pains and competitions in which we have to watch for the same traits."

"Right," he said.

"Then," said I,

"must we not institute a third kind of competitive test with regard to sorcery and observe them in that? Just as men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if they are liable to take fright, so we must bring these lads while young into fears and again pass them into pleasures, testing them much more carefully than men do gold in the fire, to see if the man remains immune to such witchcraft and preserves his composure throughout, a good guardian of himself and the culture which he has received, maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all those conditions, and the character that would make him most useful to himself and to the state."

"And he who as boy, lad, and man endures the test and issues from it unspoiled we must establish as ruler over our city and its guardian,

[583]Cf. Dionysius *ὁ μεταθέμενος*, who went over from the Stoics to the Cyrenaics because of the pain in his eyes, Diogenes Laertius vii. 166.

[584]Cf. 584 A *γοητεία*.

and bestow rewards upon him in life, and in death the allotment of the supreme honors of burial-rites and other memorials. But the man of the other type we must reject. Such," said I,

"appears to me, Glaucon, the general notion of our selection and appointment of rulers and guardians as sketched in outline, but not drawn out in detail."

"I too," he said,

"think much the same."

"Then would it not truly be most proper to designate these as guardians in the full sense of the word, watchers against foemen without and friends within, so that the latter shall not wish and the former shall not be able to work harm, but to name those youths whom we were calling guardians just now, helpers and aids for the decrees of the rulers?"

"I think so," he replied.

"How, then," said I,

"might we contrive[585] one of those opportune falsehoods[586] of which we were just now[587] speaking, so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible the rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city?"

"What kind of a fiction do you mean?" said he.

"Nothing unprecedented," said I,

"but a sort of Phoenician tale,[588] something that has happened ere now in many parts of the world, as the poets aver and have induced men to believe, but that has not happened and perhaps would not be likely to happen in our day[589] and demanding no little persuasion to make it believable."

"You act like one who shrinks from telling his thought," he said.

"You will think that I have right good reason[590] for shrinking when

[585]The concept *μηχανή* or ingenious device employed by a superior intelligence to circumvent necessity or play providence with the vulgar holds a prominent place in Plato's physics, and is for Rousseau-minded readers one of the dangerous features of his political and educational philosophy. Cf. 415 C, *Laws* 664 A, 752 C, 769 E, 798 B, 640 B.

[586]Cf. 389 B.

[587]389 B f.

[588]As was the Cadmus legend of the men who sprang from the dragon's teeth, which the Greeks believed *οὕτως ἀπίθανον ὄν*, *Laws* 663 E. Pater, who translates the passage (*Plato and Platonism*, p. 223), fancifully suggests that it is a "miners' story." Others read into it an allusion to Egyptian castes. The proverb "ψεῦσμα Φοινικικόν" (Strabo 259 B) probably goes back to the Phoenician tales of the *Odyssey*.

[589]Plato never attempts a Voltairian polemic against the general faith in the supernatural, which he is willing to utilize for ethical ends, but he never himself affirms *le surnaturel particulier*.

I have told," I said.

"Say on," said he,

"and don't be afraid."

"Very well, I will. And yet I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the city, that in good sooth[591] all our training and educating of them were things that they imagined and that happened to them as it were in a dream; but that in reality at that time they were down within the earth being molded and fostered themselves while their weapons and the rest of their equipment were being fashioned. And when they were quite finished the earth as being their mother[592] delivered them, and now as if their land were their mother and their nurse they ought to take thought for her and defend her against any attack and regard the other citizens as their brothers and children of the self-same earth."

"It is not for nothing,[593]" he said,

"that you were so bashful about coming out with your lie."

"It was quite natural that I should be," I said;

"but all the same hear the rest of the story. While all of you in the city are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet God in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold in their generation,[594] for which reason they are the most precious—but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen. And as you are all akin, though for the most part you will breed after your kinds,[595] it

[590] *καὶ μάλ'* here as often adds a touch of humorous colloquial emphasis, which our conception of the dignity of Plato does not allow a translator to reproduce.

[591] Perhaps that so it is that would be better. *ὡς ἄρα* as often disclaims responsibility for the tale. Plato's fancy of men reared beneath the earth is the basis of Bulwer-Lytton's Utopia, *The Coming Race*, as his use of the ring of Gyges (359 D-360 B) is of H. G. Wells' *Invisible Man.*

[592] The symbolism expresses the Athenian boast of autochthony and Plato's patriotic application of it, *Menexenus* 237 E-238 A. Cf. Burgess, *Epideictic Literature, University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. iii. pp. 153-154; *Timaeus* 24 C-D, Aeschylus *Septem* 17, Lucretius ii. 641 f., and Swineburne, *Erechtheus*: "All races but one are as aliens engrafted or sown,Strange children and changelings, but we, O our mother, thine own."

[593] *οὐκ ἐτός* is comic. Cf. 568 A, and Blaydes on Aristophanes *Acharnians* 411.

[594] Cf. 468 E, 547 A, and "already" *Cratylus* 394 D, 398 A. Hesiod's four metals, *Works and Days* 109-201, symbolize four succcessive ages. Plato's myth cannot of course be interpreted literally or made to express the whole of his apparently undemocratic theory, of which the biologist Huxley in his essay on Administrative Nihilism says: "The lapse of more than 2000 years has not weakened the force of these wise words."

may sometimes happen that a golden father would beget a silver son and that a golden offspring would come from a silver sire and that the rest would in like manner be born of one another. So that the first and chief injunction that the god lays upon the rulers is that of nothing else[596] are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of these metals in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out[597] among the artisans or the farmers. And again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his composition they shall honor such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to the assistanceship, alleging that there is an oracle[598] that the state shall then be overthrown when the man of iron or brass is its guardian. Do you see any way of getting them to believe this tale?"

"No, not these themselves," he said,

"but I do, their sons and successors and the rest of mankind who come after.[599]"

"Well," said I,

"even that would have a good effect making them more inclined to care for the state and one another. For I think I apprehend your meaning. XXII. And this shall fall out as tradition[600] guides."

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[595]The four classes are not castes, but are species which will generally breed true. Cf. *Cratylus* 393 B, 394 A.

[596]The phrasing of this injunction recalls Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*, *in fine*: "I'll fear no other thing So sore as keeping safe Nerissa's ring." The securing of disinterested capacity in the rulers is the *pons asinorum* of political theory. Plato constructs his whole state for this end. Cf. Introduction p. xv. Aristotle, *Politics* 1262 b 27, raises the obvious objection that the transference from class to class will not be an easy matter. But Plato here and in 423 D-E is merely stating emphatically the postulates of an ideal state. He admits that even if established it will some time break down, and that the causes of its failure will lie beyond human ken, and can only be expressed in symbol. See on 546-547.

[597]The summary in *Timaeus* 19 A varies somewhat from this. Plato does not stress the details. Cf. Introduction p. viii.

[598]Plato's oracle aptly copies the ambiguity of the bronze men's answer to Psammetik (Herodotus ii. 152), and admits of both a moral and a literal physical interpretation, like the "lame reign" against which Sparta was warned. Cf. Xenophon *Hellenica* iii. 3. 3.

[599]Plato repeats the thought that since the mass of men can be brought to believe anything by repetition, myths framed for edification are a useful instrument of education and government. Cf. *Laws* 663 E-664 A.

[600]*φήμη*, not any particular oracular utterance, but popular belief from mouth to mouth.

"But let us arm these sons of earth and conduct them under the leadership of their rulers. And when they have arrived they must look out for the fairest site in the city for their encampment,[601] a position from which they could best hold down rebellion against the laws from within and repel aggression from without as of a wolf against the fold. And after they have encamped and sacrificed to the proper gods[602] they must make their lairs, must they not?"

"Yes," he said.

"And these must be of a character keep out the cold in winter and be sufficient in summer?"

"Of course. For I presume you are speaking of their houses."

"Yes," said I,

"the houses of soldiers[603] not of money-makers."

"What distinction do you intend by that?" he said.

"I will try to tell you," I said.

"It is surely the most monstrous and shameful thing in the world for shepherds to breed the dogs who are to help them with their flocks in such wise and of such a nature that from indiscipline or hunger or some other evil condition the dogs themselves shall attack the sheep and injure them and be likened to wolves[604] instead of dogs."

"A terrible thing, indeed," he said.

"Must we not then guard by every means in our power against our helpers treating the citizens in any such way and, because they are the stronger, converting themselves from benign assistants into savage masters?"

"We must," he said.

"And would they not have been provided with the chief safeguard if their education has really been a good one?"

"But it surely has," he said.

"That," said I,

"dear Glaucon, we may not properly affirm,[605] but what we were

[601] The Platonic guardians, like the ruling class at Sparta, will live the life of a camp. Cf. *Laws* 666 E, Isocrates *Archedamus*.

[602] Partly from caution, partly from genuine religious feeling, Plato leaves all the details of the cult to Delphi. Cf. 427 B.

[603] For the limiting $\gamma\epsilon$ cf. 430 E.

[604] Aristotle's objection (*Politics* 1264 a 24) that the Platonic state will break up into two hostile camps, is plagiarized in expression from Plato's similar censure of existing Greek cities (422 E) and assumes that the enforced disinterestedness, the higher education, and other precautions of the Platonic Republic will not suffice to conjure away the danger to which Plato first calls attention.

[605] This is not so much a reservation in reference to the higher education as a charac-

just now saying we may, that they must have the right education, whatever it is, if they are to have what will do most to make them gentle to one another and to their charges."

"That is right," he said.

"In addition, moreover, to such an education a thoughtful man would affirm that their houses and the possessions provided for them ought to be such as not to interfere with the best performance of their own work as guardians and not to incite them to wrong the other citizens."

"He will rightly affirm that."

"Consider then," said I,

"whether, if that is to be their character, their habitations and ways of life must not be something after this fashion. In the first place, none must possess any private property[606] save the indispensable. Secondly, none must have any habitation or treasure-house which is not open for all to enter at will. Their food, in such quantities as are needful for athletes of war[607] sober and brave, they must receive as an agreed[608] stipend[609] from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship, so measured that there shall be neither superfluity at the end of the year nor any lack.[610] And resorting to a common mess[611] like soldiers on campaign they will live together."

"Gold and silver, we will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold, since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied. But for these only of all the dwellers in the city it is not lawful to handle gold and silver and to touch them nor yet to come under the same roof[612] with them, nor

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teristic refusal of Plato to dogmatize. Cf. *Meno* 86 B and my paper *Recent Platonism in England,* A.J.P. vol. ix. pp. 7-8.

[606]Plato's communism is primarily a device to secure disinterestedness in the ruling class, though he sometimes treats it as a counsel of perfection for all men and states. Cf. Introduction p. xv note a.

[607]Cf. 403 E.

[608]Cf. 551 B, *Meno* 91 B, Thucydides i. 108, G.M.T. 837.

[609]They are worthy of their hire. Cf. on 347 A. It is a strange misapprehension to speak of Plato as careless of the welfare of the masses. His aristocracy is one of social service, not of selfish enjoyment of wealth and power.

[610]This is precisely Aristophanes' distinction between beggary and honorable poverty, *Plutus* 552-553.

[611]As at Sparta. Cf. 458 C, Newman, Introduction to Aristotle's *Politics*, p. 334.

to hang them as ornaments on their limbs nor to drink from silver and gold. So living they would save themselves and save their city.[613] But whenever they shall acquire for themselves land of their own and houses and coin, they will be house-holders and farmers instead of guardians, and will be transformed from the helpers of their fellow citizens to their enemies and masters,[614] and so in hating and being hated,[615] plotting and being plotted against they will pass their days fearing far more and rather[616] the townsmen within than the foemen without—and then even then laying the course[617] of near shipwreck for themselves and the state. For all these reasons," said I,

"let us declare that such must be the provision for our guardians in lodging and other respects and so legislate. Shall we not?"

"By all means," said Glaucon.

[612] As if the accursed and tainted metal were a polluted murderer or temple-robber. Cf. my note on Horace, *Odes* iii. 2. 27 "sub isdem trabibus," Antiphon v. 11.

[613] Cf. 621 B-C, and *Laws* 692 A.

[614] δεσπόται. Cf. *Menexenus* 238 E.

[615] Cf. *Laws* 697 D in a passage of similar import, "μισοῦντες μισοῦνται".

[616] *more and rather*: so 396 D, 551 B.

[617] The image is that of a ship nearing the fatal reef. Cf. Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 562. The sentiment and the heightened rhetorical tone of the whole passage recalls the last page of the *Critias*, with Ruskin's translation and comment in *A Crown of Wild Olive*.

Book 4

And Adeimantus broke in and said,

"What will be your defence, Socrates, if anyone objects that you are not making these men very happy,[618] and that through their own fault? For the city really belongs to them and yet they get no enjoyment out of it as ordinary men do by owning lands and building fine big houses and providing them with suitable furniture and winning the favor of the gods by private sacrifices[619] and entertaining guests and enjoying too those possessions which you just now spoke of, gold and silver and all that is customary for those who are expecting to be happy?"

"But they seem, one might say, to be established in idleness in the city, exactly like hired mercenaries, with nothing to do but keep guard."

"Yes," said I,

"and what is more, they serve for board-wages and do not even

[618] Adeimantus's criticism is made from the point of view of a Thrasymachus (343 A, 345 B) or a Callicles (*Gorgias* 492 B-C or of Solon's critics (cf. my note on Solon's Trochaics to Phokos, *Class. Phil* . vol. vi. pp. 216 ff.). The captious objection is repeated by Aristotle, *Politics* 1264 b 15 ff., though he later (1325 a 9-10) himself uses Plato's answer to it, and by moderns, as Herbert Spencer, Grote, Newman to some extent (Introduction to Aristotle's *Politics*, p. 69.), and Zeller (*Aristotle*, ii. p. 224) who has the audacity to say that "Plato demanded the abolition of *all* private possession and the suppression of *all* individual interests *because it is only in the Idea or Universal that he acknowledges any title to true reality.*" Leslie Stephen does not diverge so far from Plato when he says (*Science of Ethics*, p. 397): "The virtuous men may be the very salt of the earth, and yet the discharge of a function socially necessary may involve their own misery." By the happiness of the whole Plato obviously maens not an abstraction but the concrete whole of which Leslie Stephen is thinking. But from a higher point of view Plato eloquently argues (465 B-C) that duty fulfilled will yield truer happiness to the guardians than seeking their own advantage in the lower sense of the word.

[619] Cf. 362 C, and *Laws* 909 D ff. where they are forbidden.

receive pay in addition to their food as others do,[620] so that they will not even be able to take a journey[621] on their own account, if they wish to, or make presents to their mistresses, or spend money in other directions according to their desires like the men who are thought to be happy. These and many similar counts of the indictment you are omitting."

"Well," said he,

"assume these counts too.[622]"

"What then will be our apology you ask?"

"Yes."

"By following the same path I think we shall find what to reply. For we shall say that while it would not surprise us if these men thus living prove to be the most happy, yet the object on which we fixed our eyes in the establishment of our state was not the exceptional happiness of any one class but the greatest possible happiness of the city as a whole. For we thought[623] that in a state so constituted we should be most likely to discover justice as we should injustice in the worst governed state, and that when we had made these out we could pass judgement on the issue of our long inquiry. Our first task then, we take it, is to mold the model of a happy state—we are not isolating[624] a small class in it and postulating their happiness, but that of the city as a whole. But the opposite type of state we will consider presently.[625] It is as if we were coloring a statue and someone approached and censured us, saying that we did not apply the most beautiful pigments to the most beautiful parts of the image, since the eyes,[626] which are the most beautiful part, have not been painted with purple but with black— we should think it a reasonable justification to reply, "Don't expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine that they will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts. But observe whether by assigning what is

[620]Other men, ordinary men. Cf. 543 B *ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι*, which disposes of other interpretations and misunderstandings.

[621]This is, for other reasons, one of the deprivations of a tyrant (579 B). The *Laws* strictly limits travel (949 E). Here Plato is speaking from the point of view of the ordinary citizen.

[622]The Platonic Socrates always states the adverse case strongly (Introduction p. xi), and observes the rule: "Would you adopt a strong logical attitudeAlways allow your opponent full latitude."

[623]Cf. 369 A.

[624]*ἀπολαβόντες*, separating off, abstracting, may be used absolutely as in *Gorgias* 495 E, or with any object as 392 E.

[625]That is 449 A and books VIII. and IX. The degenerate types of state are four, but the extreme opposite of the good state, the tyranny, is one.

[626]So *Hippias Major* 290 B.

proper to each we render the whole beautiful.[627]" And so in the present case you must not require us to attach to the guardians a happiness that will make them anything but guardians. For in like manner we could[628] clothe the farmers in robes of state and deck them with gold and bid them cultivate the soil at their pleasure, and we could make the potters recline on couches from left to right[629] before the fire drinking toasts and feasting with their wheel alongside to potter with when they are so disposed, and we can make all the others happy in the same fashion, so that thus the entire city may be happy."

"But urge us not to this, since, if we yield, the farmer will not be a farmer nor the potter a potter, nor will any other of the types that constitute state keep its form. However, for the others it matters less. For cobblers[630] who deteriorate and are spoiled and pretend to be the workmen that they are not are no great danger to a state. But guardians of laws and of the city who are not what they pretend to be, but only seem, destroy utterly, I would have you note, the entire state, and on the other hand, they alone are decisive of its good government and happiness. If then we are forming true guardians and keepers of our liberties, men least likely to harm the commonwealth, but the proponent of the other ideal is thinking of farmers and "happy" feasters as it were in a festival and not in a civic community, he would have something else in mind[631] than a state. Consider, then, whether our aim in establishing the guardians is the greatest possible happiness among them or whether that is something we must look to see develop in the

[627]For this principle of aesthetics Cf. *Phaedrus* 264 C, Aristotle *Poetics* 1450 b 1-2.

[628]We know how to. For the satire of the Socialist millenium which follows cf. Introduction p. xxix, and Ruskin, *Fors Clavigera.* Plato may have been thinking of the scene on the shield of Achilles, *Iliad* xviii. 541-560.

[629]i.e. so that the guest on the right hand occupied a lower place and the wine circulated in the same direction. Many write *ἐπὶ δεξιά*, but A *ἐπιδέξια*. "Forever, 'tis a single word. Our rude forefathers thought it two."

[630]Note the "ab urbe condita" construction. For the thought cf. 374 B. Zeller and many who follow him are not justified in inferring that Plato would not educate the masses. (Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle's *Politics*, i. p. 160.) It might as well be argued that the high schools of the United States are not intended for the masses because some people sometimes emphasize their function of "fitting for college." In the *Republic* Plato describes secondary education as a preparation for the higher training. The secondary education of the entire citizenry in the *Laws* marks no change of opinion (*Laws* 818 ff.). Cf. Introduction p. xxxiii.

[631]The expression is loose, but the meaning is plain. The principle "one man, one task" makes the guardians real guardians. The assumption that their happiness is the end is incompatible with the very idea of a state. Cf. Introduction pp. xxix f. *ἑστιάτορας* recalls *μέλλοντα ἑστιάσεσθαι*345 C, but we are expected to think also of the farmers of 420 E.

city as a whole, but these helpers and guardians are to be constrained and persuaded to do what will make them the best craftsmen in their own work, and similarly all the rest. And so, as the entire city develops and is ordered well, each class is to be left, to the share of happiness that its nature comports."

"Well," he said,

"I think you are right."

"And will you then," I said,

"also think me reasonable in another point akin to this?"

"What pray?"

"Consider whether these are the causes that corrupt other[632] craftsmen too so as positively to spoil them.[633]"

"What causes?"

"Wealth and poverty,"[634] said I.

"How so?"

"Thus! do you think a potter who grew rich would any longer be willing to give his mind to his craft?"

"By no means," said he.

"But will he become more idle and negligent than he was?"

"Far more."

"Then he becomes a worse potter?"

"Far worse too."

"And yet again, if from poverty he is unable to provide himself with tools and other requirements of his art, the work that he turns out will be worse, and he will also make inferior workmen of his sons or any others whom he teaches."

"Of course."

"From both causes, then, poverty and wealth, the products of the arts deteriorate, and so do the artisans?"

"So it appears."

"Here, then, is a second group of things it seems that our guardians must guard against and do all in their power to keep from slipping into the city without their knowledge."

"What are they?"

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[632] The guardians are *δημιουργοὶ ἐλευθερίας* (395 C).

[633] *ὥστε καὶ κακούς*, I think, means so that they become actually bad, not "so that they also become bad." Cf. *Lysis* 217 B.

[634] For the dangers of wealth cf. 550, 553 D, 555 B, 556 A, 562, *Laws* 831 C, 919 B, and for the praises of poverty cf. Aristophanes *Plutus* 510-591, Lucian, *Nigrinus* 12, Euripides fr. 55 N., Stobaeus, *Flor.* 94 (Meineke iii. 198), *Class. Phil* . vol. xxii. pp. 235-236.

"Wealth and poverty," said I,

"since the one brings luxury, idleness and innovation, and the other illiberality and the evil of bad workmanship in addition to innovation."

"Assuredly," he said;

"yet here is a point for your consideration, Socrates, how our city, possessing no wealth, will be able to wage war, especially if compelled to fight a large and wealthy state."

"Obviously," said I,

"it would be rather difficult to fight one such, but easier to fight two.[635]"

"What did you mean by that?" he said.

"Tell me first," I said,

"whether, if they have to fight, they will not be fighting as athletes of war[636] against men of wealth?"

"Yes, that is true," he said.

"Answer me then, Adeimantus. Do you not think that one boxer perfectly trained in the art could easily fight two fat rich men who knew nothing of it?"

"Not at the same time perhaps," said he.

"Not even," said I,

"if he were allowed to retreat[637] and then turn and strike the one who came up first, and if he repeated the procedure many times under a burning and stifling sun? Would not such a fighter down even a number of such opponents?"

"Doubtless," he said;

"it wouldn't be surprising if he did."

"Well, don't you think that the rich have more of the skill and practice[638] of boxing than of the art of war?"

"I do," he said.

"It will be easy, then, for our athletes in all probability to fight with double and triple their number."

"I shall have to concede the point," he said,

"for I believe you are right."

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[635]Apparent paradox to stimulate attention. Cf. 377 A, 334 A, 382 A, 414 B-C, 544 C, *Laws* 919 B. For images from boxing cf. Aristotle *Met.* 985 a 14, and Demosthenes' statement (*Philip.* i. 40-41) that the Athenians fight Philip as the barbarians box. The Greeks felt that "lesser breeds without the law" were inferior in this manly art of self-defense. Cf. the amusing description of the boxing of Orestes and Plylades by the *ἄγγελος* in Euripides *I. T.* 1366 ff.

[636]Cf. 416 E, 403 E.

[637]Cf. Herodotus iv. 111.

[638]Two elements of the triad *φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη.* Cf. 374 D.

"Well then, if they send an embassy to the other city and say what is in fact true[639]: "We make no use of gold and silver nor is it lawful for us but it is for you: do you then join us in the war and keep the spoils of the enemy,"[640]—do you suppose any who heard such a proposal would choose to fight against hard and wiry hounds rather than with the aid of the hounds against fat and tender sheep?"

"I think not."

"Yet consider whether the accumulation of all the wealth of other cities in one does not involve danger for the state that has no wealth."

"What happy innocence," said I,

"to suppose that you can properly use the name city of any other than the one we are constructing."

"Why, what should we say?" he said.

"A greater predication," said I,

"must be applied to the others. For they are each one of them many cities, not a city, as it goes in the game.[641]"

"There are two at the least at enmity with one another, the city of the rich and the city of the poor,[642] and in each of these there are many. If you deal with them as one you will altogether miss the mark, but if you treat them as a multiplicity by offering to the one faction the property, the power, the very persons of the other, you will continue always to have few enemies and many allies. And so long as your city is governed soberly in the order just laid down, it will be the greatest of cities. I do not mean greatest in repute, but in reality, even though it have only a thousand[643] defenders. For a city of this size that is really one[644]

[639]Cf. Herodotus vii. 233 "τὸν ἀληθέστατον τῶν λόγων", Catullus x. 9 "id quod erat."

[640]The style is of intentional Spartan curtness.

[641]As they say in the game or in the jest. The general meaning is plain. We do not know enough about the game called *πόλεις* (cf. scholiast, Suidas, Hesychius, and Photius) to be more specific. Cf. for conjectures and deatils Adam's note, and for the phrase Thompson on *Meno* 77 A.

[642]Cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1316 b 7 and 1264 a 25.

[643]Aristotle, *Politics* 1261 b 38, takes this as the actual number of the military class. Sparta, according to Xenephon, *Rep. Lac.* 1. 1, was "τῶν ὀλιγανθρωποτάτων πόλεων", yet one of the strongest. Cf. also Aristotle *Politics* 1270 a 14 f. In the *Laws*Plato proposes the number 5040 which Aristotle thinks too large, *Politics* 1265 a 15.

[644]Commentators, I think, miss the subtlety of this sentence; *μίαν* means truly one as below in D, and its antithesis is not so much *πολλάς* as *δοκούσας* which means primarily the appearance of unity, and only secondarily refers to *μεγάλην*. *καί* then is rather and than "even". "So large a city that is really one you will not easily find, but the semblance (of one big city) you will find in cities many and many times the size of this." Cf. also 462 A-B, and my paper *Plato's* Laws *and the Unity of Plato's*

you will not easily discover either among Greeks or barbarians—but of those that seem so you will find many and many times the size of this. Or do you think otherwise?"

"No, indeed I don't," said he.

"Would not this, then, be the best rule and measure for our governors of the proper size of the city and of the territory that they should mark off for a city of that size and seek no more?"

"What is the measure?"

"I think," said I,

"that they should let it grow so long as in its growth it consents[645] to remain a unity, but no further."

"Excellent," he said.

"Then is not this still another injunction that we should lay upon our guardians, to keep guard in every way that the city shall not be too small, nor great only in seeming, but that it shall be a sufficient city and one?"

"That behest will perhaps be an easy[646] one for them," he said.

"And still easier,[647] haply," I said,

"is this that we mentioned before[648] when we said that if a degenerate offspring was born to the guardians he must be sent away to the other classes, and likewise if a superior to the others he must be enrolled among the guardians; and the purport of all this was[649] that the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity.[650]"

"Why yes," he said,

"this is even more trifling than that."

"These are not, my good Adeimantus, as one might suppose, nu-

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Thought, Class. Phil . 1914, p. 358. For Aristotle's comment Cf. *Politics* 1261 a 15.

[645]The Greek idea of government required that the citizens know one another. They would not have called Babylon, London, or Chicago cities. Cf. Introduction p. xxviii, Fowler, *Greek City State*, *passim*, Newman, Aristotle *Politics* vol. i. Introduction pp. 314-315, and Isocrates' complaint that Athens was too large, *Antidosis* 171-172.

[646]Ironical, of course.

[647]Ironical, of course.

[648]Cf. on 415 B.

[649]The special precept with regard to the guardians was significant of the universal principle, "one man, one task." Cf. 443 C, 370 B-C (note), 394 E, 374 A-D, *Laws* 846 D-847 B.

[650]It is a natural growth, not an artificial contrivance. For Aristotle's criticism cf. *Politics* 1261 A.

merous and difficult injunctions that we are imposing upon them, but they are all easy, provided they guard, as the saying is, the one great thing[651]—or instead of great let us call it sufficient.[652]"

"What is that?" he said.

"Their education and nurture," I replied.

"For if a right education[653] makes of them reasonable men they will easily discover everything of this kind—and other principles that we now pass over, as that the possession of wives and marriage, and the procreation of children and all that sort of thing should be made as far as possible the proverbial goods of friends that are common.[654]"

"Yes, that would be the best way," he said.

"And, moreover," said I,

"the state, if it once starts[655] well, proceeds as it were in a cycle[656] of growth. I mean that a sound nurture and education if kept up creates good natures in the state, and sound natures in turn receiving an education of this sort develop into better men than their predecessors both for other purposes and for the production of offspring as among animals also.[657]"

"It is probable," he said.

"To put it briefly, then," said I,

"it is to this that the overseers of our state must cleave and be

[651]The proverbial one great thing (one thing needful). The proverb perhaps is: "πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα" (Suidas). Cf. Archil. fr. 61 "ἓν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα", *Politicus* 297 A *μέχριπερ ἂν ἓν μέγα φυλάττωσι.*

[652]*μέγα* has the unfavorable associations of *ἔπος μέγα*, and *ἱκανόν*, adequate, is characteristically preferred by Plato.

[653]Cf. on 416 E. Plato of course has in mind the education already described and the higher education of books VI. and VII.

[654]The indirect introduction of the proverb is characteristic of Plato's style. Cf. on 449 C, where the paradox thus lightly introduced is taken up for serious discussion. Quite fantastic is the hypothesis on which much ink has been wasted, that the *Ecclesiazusae* of Aristophanes was suggested by this sentence and is answered by the fifth book. Cf. introduction pp. xxv and xxxiv. It ought not to be necessary to repeat that Plato's communism applies only to the guardians, and that its main purpose is to enforce their disinterestedness. Cf. Introduction pp. xv and note a, xxxiv, xlii, xliv, and *Plato's* Laws *and the Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 358. Aristotle's criticism is that the possessions of friends ought to be common in use but not in ownership. Cf. *Politics* 1263 a 30, and Euripides *Andromache* 376-377.

[655]Cf. *Politcus* 305 D *τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ ὁρμήν.*

[656]No concrete metaphor of wheel, hook or circle seems to be intended, but only the cycle of cumulative effect of education on nature and nature on education, described in what follows. See the evidence collected in my note, *Class. Phil.* vol. v. pp. 505-507.

[657]Cf. 459 A.

watchful against its insensible corruption. They must throughout be watchful against innovations in music and gymnastics counter to the established order, and to the best of their power guard against them, fearing when anyone says that" That song is most regarded among men Which hovers newest on the singer's lips, " *Hom. Od. 1.351* [658] lest haply[659] it be supposed that the poet means not new songs but a new way of song[660] and is commending this. But we must not praise that sort of thing nor conceive it to be the poet's meaning. For a change to a new type of music is something to beware of as a hazard of all our fortunes. For the modes of music[661] are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental political and social conventions, as Damon affirms and as I am convinced.[662]"

"Set me too down in the number of the convinced," said Adeimantus.

"It is here, then," I said,

"in music, as it seems, that our guardians must build their guard-house[663] and post of watch."

"It is certain," he said,

"that this is the kind of lawlessness[664] that easily insinuates[665] itself unobserved."

"Yes," said I,

"because it is supposed to be only a form of play[666] and to work no harm."

"Nor does it work any," he said,

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[658]Our text has *ἐπικλείους'* and *ἀκουόντεσσι*. For the variant cf. Howes in *Harvard Studies*, vi. p. 205. For the commonplace that new songs are best cf. Pindar, *Ol.* 9. 52.

[659]Cf. Stallbaum on *Phaedrus* 238 D-E, Forman, *Plato Selections*, p. 457.

[660]The meaning of the similar phrase in Pindar, *Ol.* iii. 4 is different.

[661]*μουσικῆς τρόποι* need not be so technical as it is in later Greek writers on music, who, however, were greatly influenced by Plato. For the ethical and social power of music cf. Introduction p. xiv note c, and 401 D-404 A, also *Laws* 700 D-E, 701 A.

[662]Cf. *Protagoras* 316 A, Julian 150 B.

[663]The etymological force of the word makes the metaphor less harsh than the English translation guard-house. Cf. *Laws* 962 C, where Bury renders safeguard. Cf. Pindar's *ἀκόνας λιγυρᾶς*, the sharpening thing, that is, the whetstone, *Ol.* vi. 82.

[664]*παρανομία* besides its moral meaning (537 E) suggests lawless innovation in music, from association with the musical sense of *νόμος*. Cf. *Chicago Studies in Class. Phil.* i. p. 22 n. 4.

[665]So Aristotle *Politics* 1307 b 33.

[666]Cf. the warning aagainst innovation in children's games, *Laws* 797 A-B. But music is *παιδεία* as well as *παιδιά*. Cf. Aristotle's three uses of music, for play, education, and the entertainment of leisure (*Politics* 1339 a 16).

"except that by gradual infiltration it softly overflows[667] upon the characters and pursuits of men and from these issues forth grown greater to attack their business dealings, and from these relations it proceeds against the laws and the constitution with wanton licence, Socrates, till finally it overthrows[668] all things public and private."

"Well," said I,

"are these things so?"

"I think so," he said.

"Then, as we were saying[669] in the beginning, our youth must join in a more law-abiding play, since, if play grows lawless and the children likewise, it is impossible that they should grow up to be men of serious temper and lawful spirit."

"Of course," he said.

"And so we may reason that when children in their earliest play are imbued with the spirit of law and order through their music, the opposite of the former supposition happens—this spirit waits upon them in all things and fosters their growth, and restores and sets up again whatever was overthrown in the other[670] type of state."

"True, indeed," he said.

"Then such men rediscover for themselves those seemingly trifling conventions which their predecessors abolished altogether."

"Of what sort?"

"Such things as the becoming silence[671] of the young in the presence of their elders; the giving place to them and rising up before them, and dutiful service of parents, and the cut of the hair[672] and the garments and the fashion of the foot-gear, and in general the deportment of the body and everything of the kind. Don't you think so?"

"I do."

"Yet to enact them into laws would, I think, be silly.[673] For such

[667] Cf. Demosthenes xix. 228. The image is that of a stream overflowing and spreading. Cf. Euripides fr. 499 N. and Cicero's use of *serpit*, *Cat.* iv. 3, and *passim.*

[668] Cf. on 389 D.

[669] The reference is to the general tenor of what precedes.

[670] *πρότερον* is an unconscious lapse from the construction of an ideal state to the reformation of a degenerate Athens. Cf. Isocrates *Areopagiticus* 41 ff., and *Laws* 876 B-C, 948 C-D.

[671] For these traits of old-fashioned decorum and modesty cf. Aristophanes *Clouds* 961-1023, Blaydes on 991, Herodotus ii. 80, Isocrates *Areopagiticus* 48-49.

[672] Cf. Starkie on Aristophanes *Wasps* 1069.

[673] Cf. on 412 B, Isocrates *Areopagiticus* 41, and *Laws* 788 B, where the further, still pertinent consideration is added that the multiplication of minor enactments tends to bring fundamental laws into contempt. Cf. *Plato's* Laws *and the Unity of Plato's*

laws are not obeyed nor would they last, being enacted only in words and on paper."

"How could they?"

"At any rate, Adeimantus," I said,

"the direction of the education from whence one starts is likely to determine the quality of what follows. Does not like ever summon like?"

"Surely."

"And the final[674] outcome, I presume, we would say is one complete and vigorous product of good or the reverse."

"Of course," said he.

"For my part, then," I said,

"for these reasons I would not go on to try to legislate on such matters.[675]"

"With good reason," said he.

"But what, in heaven's name," said I,

"about business matters, the deals[676] that men make with one another in the agora— and, if you please, contracts with workmen[677] and actions for foul language[678] and assault, the filing of declarations,[679] the impanelling of juries, the payment and exaction of any dues that may be needful in markets or harbors and in general market, police or harbor regulations and the like, can we bring[680] ourselves to legislate about these?"

"Nay, 'twould not be fitting," he said,

"to dictate to good and honorable men.[681] For most of the enact-

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Thought, p. 353, n. 2.

[674]Cf. 401 C, Demosthenes *Olynth.* iii. 33 "τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα".

[675]*τὰ τοιαῦτα* is slightly contemptuous. Specific commercial, industrial and criminal legislation was not compatible with the plan of the *Republic*, and so Plato omits it here. Much of it is given in the *Laws*, but even there details are left to the citizens and their rulers. Cf. on 412 B.

[676]Cf. *Laws* 922 A, Aristotle *Politics* 1263 b 21. All legal relations of contract, impied contract and tort.

[677]In *Laws* 920 D Plato allows a *δίκη ἀτελοῦς ὁμολογίας* against workmen or contractors who break or fail to complete contracts.

[678]Cf. *Laws* 935 C.There was no *λοιδορίας δίκη* under that name at Athens, but certain words were actionable, *ἀπόρρητα* and there was a *δίκη κακηγορίας*.

[679]Plato shows his contempt for the subject by this confused enumeration, passing without warning from contracts and torts to procedure and then to taxes, market, harbor and police regulations.

[680]*τολμήσομεν* is both venture and deign.

[681]Cf. Isocrates *Panegyr.* 78 "ὅτι τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν δεήσει πολλῶν γραμμάτων".

ments that are needed about these things they will easily, I presume, discover."

"Yes, my friend, provided God grants them the preservation of the principles of law that we have already discussed."

"Failing that," said he,

"they will pass their lives multiplying such petty laws and amending them in the expectation of attaining what is best."

"You mean," said I,

"that the life of such citizens will resemble that of men who are sick, yet from intemperance are unwilling to abandon[682] their unwholesome regimen."

"By all means."

"And truly," said I,

"these latter go on in a most charming[683] fashion. For with all their doctoring they accomplish nothing except to complicate and augment their maladies. And[684] they are always hoping that some one will recommend a panacea that will restore their health."

"A perfect description," he said,

"of the state of such invalids."

"And isn't this a charming trait in them, that they hate most in all the world him who tells them the truth that until a man stops drinking and gorging and wenching and idling, neither drugs[685] nor cautery nor the knife, no, nor spells nor periapts[686] will be of any avail?"

"Not altogether charming," he said,

"for there is no grace or charm in being angry[687] with him who

[682]Cf. Emerson, *Experience*: "They wish to be saved from the mischiefs of their vices but not from their vices. Charity would be wasted on this poor waiting on the symptoms. A wise and hardy physician will say, "Come out of that" as the first condition of advice."

[683]Ironical. Quite fanciful is Dümmler's supposition (*Kleine Schriften*, i, p. 99) that this passage was meant as destructive criticism of Isocrates *Panegyricus* and that *Antidosis* 62 is a reply. Plato is obviously thinking of practical politicians rather than of Isocrates.

[684] *πλήν γε* etc., is loosely elliptical, but emendations are superfluous.

[685]For the list cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* iii. 50-54. *οὐδ' αὖ* emphasizes the transition to superstitious remedies in which Plato doesn't really believe. Cf. his rationalizing interpretations of *ἐπῳδαί*, *Charmides* 157 A, *Theaetetus* 149 C. *Laws* 933 A-B is to be interpreted in the spirit of the observation in Selden's *Table Talk*: "The law against witches does not prove that there be any but it punishes the malice," etc. [Demosthenes] xxv. 80 is sceptical.

[686]Cf. any lexicon, Shakespeare *1 Henry VI.* v. iii. 2 "Now help, ye charming spells and periapts," and Plutarch's story of the women who hung them on Pericles' neck on his death-bed.

speaks well."

"You do not seem to be an admirer[688] of such people," said I.

"No, by heaven, I am not."

"Neither then, if an entire city,[689] as we were just now saying, acts in this way, will it have your approval, or don't you think that the way of such invalids is precisely that of those cities which being badly governed forewarn their citizens not to meddle[690] with the general constitution of the state, denouncing death to whosoever attempts that—while whoever most agreeably serves[691] them governed as they are and who curries favor with them by fawning upon them and anticipating their desires and by his cleverness in gratifying them, him they will account the good man, the man wise in worthwhile things,[692] the man they will delight to honor?"

"Yes," he said,

"I think their conduct is identical, and I don't approve it in the very least."

"And what again of those who are willing and eager to serve[693] such states? Don't you admire their valiance and light-hearted irresponsibility[694]?"

"I do," he said,

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[687]Cf. 480 A, 354 A.

[688]The noun is more forcible than the verb would be. Cf. *Protagoras* 309 A *ἐπαινέτης*.

[689]We return from the illustration to its application to the state.

[690]Cf. 497 B, Aristotle *Politics* 1301 b 11. Cf. the obvious imitation in the (probably spurious) *Epistle* vii. 330 E. For the thought, from the point of view of an enemy of democracy, cf. the statement in [Xenophon] *Rep. Ath.* 3. 9, that the faults of Athens cannot be corrected while she remains a democracy. The Athenians naturally guarded their constitution and viewed with equal suspicion the idealistic reformer and the oligarchical reactionary.

[691]Cf. , p. 65 note d, and *Laws* 923 B. The phraseology here recalls *Gorgias* 517 B, Aristophanes *Knights* 46-63. Cf. *Plato's* Laws *and the Unity of Plato's Thought, Class Phil.* vol. ix. (Oct. 1914) p. 363, n. 3.

[692]Almost technical. Cf. 538 B.

[693]Here serve, not "flatter."

[694]This word *εὐχέρεια* is often misunderstood by lexicons and commentators. It is of course not "dexterity" (L. and S.) nor yet probably "complaisance," nor yet "humanitas" or "Gutmütigkeit" as Adam and Schneider think. It expresses rather the light-heartedness with which such politicians rush in where wiser men fear to tread, which is akin to the lightness with which men plunge into crime. Cf. *Laws* 690 D *τῶν ἐπὶ νόμων θέσιν ἰόντων ῥᾳδίως* and 969 *ἀνδρειότατος*. Plato's political physician makes "come out of that" a precondition of his treatment. Cf. *Laws* 736-737, *Politicus* 299 A-B, 501 A, 540 E, *Epistle* vii. 330 C-D, and the story in Aelian. V.H. ii. 42. of Plato's refusal to legislate for the Arcadians because they would not accept an equalization of property.

"except those who are actually deluded and suppose themselves to be in truth statesmen[695] because they are praised by the many."

"What do you mean? Can't you make allowances[696] for the men? Do you think it possible for a man who does not know how to measure when a multitude of others equally ignorant assure him that he is four cubits tall not to suppose this to be the fact about himself?"

"Why no,[697]" he said,

"I don't think that."

"Then don't be harsh with them. For surely such fellows are the most charming spectacle in the world when they enact and amend such laws as we just now described and are perpetually expecting to find a way of putting an end to frauds in business and in the other matters of which I was speaking because they can't see that they are in very truth[698] trying to cut off a Hydra's head."

"Indeed," he said,

"that is exactly what they are doing."

"I, then," said I,

"should not have supposed[699] that the true lawgiver ought to work out matters of that kind[700] in the laws and the constitution either of an ill-governed or a well-governed state—in the one because they are useless and accomplish nothing, in the other because some of them anybody could discover and others will result spontaneously from the pursuits already described."

"What part of legislation, then," he said,

"is still left for us?" And I replied,

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[695] Cf. *Euthyphro* 2 C-D, *Gorgias* 513 B, *Politicus* 275 C and 292 D.

[696] Plato often condescendingly and half ironically pardons psychologically inevitable errors. Cf. 366 C, *Phaedrus* 269 B, *Euthydemus* 306 C.

[697] For *οὐκ αὖ* cf. 393 D, 442 A, *Theaetetus* 161 A, *Class. Phil.* vol. xxiii. pp. 285-287. *ἔγωγε* above concurs with *ἄγασαι*, ignoring the irony. *πλήν γε* etc. marks dissent on one point. This dissent is challenged, and is withdrawn by *οὐκ αὖ . . . τοῦτο γε* (*οἶμαι*).

[698] *τῷ ὄντι* points the application of the proverbial *ὕδραν τέμνειν*, which appears in this now trite metaphorical use for the first time here and in *Euthydemus* 297 C. Cf. my note on Horace iv. 4. 61. For the thought cf. Isocrates vii. 40, Macrob. *Sat.* ii. 13 "leges bonae ex malis moribus procreantur," Arcesilaus *apud* Stobaeus *Flor.* xliii. 981 *οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὅπου νόμοι πλεῖστοι ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀδικίαν εἶναι μεγίστην*, Theophrastus *apud* Stobaeus *Flor.* xxxvii. 21 *ὀλήγων οἱ ἀγαθοὶ νόμων δέονται.*

[699] Ironically, "I should not have supposed, but for the practice of our politicians."

[700] *εἶδος νόμων πέρι* is here a mere periphrasis, though the true classification of laws was a topic of the day. Cf. *Laws* 630 E, Aristotle *Politics* 1267 b 37. Plato is not always careful to mark the distinction between the legislation which he rejects altogether and that which he leaves to the discretion of the citizens.

"For us nothing, but for the Apollo of Delphi, the chief, the fairest and the first of enactments."

"What are they?" he said.

"The founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond[701] to keep them gracious. For of such matters we neither know anything nor in the founding of our city if we are wise shall we entrust them to any other or make use of any other interpreter[702] than the God of our fathers.[703] For this God surely is in such matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of their fathers who from his seat in the middle and at the very navel[704] of the earth delivers his interpretation."

"Excellently said," he replied;

"and that is what we must do."

"At last, then, son of Ariston," said I,

"your city[705] may be considered as established. The next thing is to procure a sufficient light somewhere and to look yourself,[706] and call in the aid of your brother and of Polemarchus and the rest, if we may in any wise discover where justice and injustice[707] should be in

[701] *ἐκεῖ*=in the other world. So often.

[702] For the exegete as a special religious functionary at Athens. cf. L. and S. *s. v.* and *Laws* 759 C-D. Apollo in a higher sense is the interpreter of religion for all mankind. He is technically *πατρῷος* at Athens (*Euthydemus* 302 D) but he is *πάτριος* for all Greeks and all men. Plato does not, as Thümser says (p. 301), confuse the Dorian and the Ionian Apollo, but rises above the distinction.

[703] Plato prudently or piously leaves the deatils of ceremonial and institutional religion to Delphi. Cf. 540 B-C, *Laws* 759 C, 738 B-C, 828 A, 856 E, 865 B, 914 A, 947 D.

[704] This "navel" stone, supposed to mark the center of the earth, has now been found. Cf. Poulsen's *Delphi* , pp. 19, 29, 157, and Frazer on Pausanias x. 16.

[705] Not the *ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις* of 369 E, nor the *φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις* of 372 E, but the purified city of 399 E has now been established and described. The search for justice that follows formulates for the first time the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues and defines each provisionally and sufficiently for the present purpose, and solves the problems dramatically presented in the minor dialogues, *Charmides, Laches*, etc. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 15-18, nn. 81-102, and the introduction to the second volume of this translation.

[706] *αὐτός τε καί*: cf. 398 A.

[707] See on 369 A. Matter-of-fact critics may object that there is no injustice in the perfectly good state. But we know the bad best by the canon of the good. Cf. on 409 A-B. The knowledge of opposites is the same. Injustice can be defined only in relation to its opposite (444 A-B), and in the final argument the most unjust man and state are set up as the extreme antitypes of the ideal (571-580). By the perfect state Plato does not mean a state in which no individual retains any human imperfections. It is idle then to speak of "difficulties" or "contradictions" or changes of plan in the

it, wherein they differ from one another and which of the two he must have who is to be happy, alike[708] whether his condition is known or not known to all gods and men."

"Nonsense," said Glaucon,

"you[709] promised that you would carry on the search yourself, admitting that it would be impious[710] for you not to come to the aid of justice by every means in your power."

"A true reminder," I said,

"and I must do so, but you also must lend a hand."

"Well," he said,

"we will."

"I expect then," said I,

"that we shall find it in this way. I think our city, if it has been rightly founded is good in the full sense of the word.[711]"

"Necessarily," he said.

"Clearly, then, it will be wise, brave, sober, and just."

"Clearly."

"Then if we find any of these qualities in it, the remainder[712] will be that which we have not found?"

"Surely."

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composition of the *Republic*.

[708]For ἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τε cf. 367 E.

[709]Cf. 331 E. Emphatic as in 449 D-450 A, *Phaedo* 95 A, and *Alc. I.* 135 D.

[710]Cf. 368 B-C.

[711]Cf. 434 E, 449 A. This in a sense begs the original question in controversy with Thrasymachus, by the assumption that justice and the other moral virtues are goods. Cf. *Gorgias* 507 C. See *The Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, p. 205. For the cardinal virtues cf. Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, i. p. 304, Pearson, *Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, pp. 173 f., and commentators on Pindar, *Nem.* iii. 74, which seems to refer to four periods of human life, and Xenophon *Memorabilia* iii. 9. 1-5, and iv. 6. 1-12. Plato recognizes other virtues even in the *Republic* (402 C ἐλευθεριότης and μεγαλοπρέπεια. Cf. 536 A), and would have been as ready to admit that the number four was a part of his literary machinery as Ruskin was to confess the arbitrariness of his Seven Lamps of Architecture.

[712]It is pedantry to identify this with Mill's method of residues and then comment on the primitive naïveté of such an application of logic to ethics. One might as well speak of Andocides' employment of the method (*De myst.* 109) or of its use by Gorgias in the disjunctive dilemma of the Palamedes 11 and *passim*, or say that the dog of the anecdote employs it when he sniffs up one trail and immediately runs up the other. Plato obviously employs it merely as a literary device for the presentation of his material under the figure of a search. He, "in the infancy of philosophy," is quite as well aware as his censors can be in the senility of criticism that he is not proving anything by this method, but merely setting forth what he has assumed for other reasons.

"Take the case of any four other things. If we were looking for any one of them in anything and recognized the object of our search first, that would have been enough for us, but if we had recognized the other three first, that in itself would have made known to us the thing we were seeking. For plainly there was nothing left for it to be but the remainder."

"Right," he said.

"And so, since these are four, we must conduct the search in the same way."

"Clearly."

"And, moreover, the first thing that I think I clearly see therein is the wisdom,[713] and there is something odd about that, it appears."

"What?" said he.

"Wise in very deed I think the city that we have described is, for it is well counselled, is it not?"

"Yes."

"And surely this very thing, good counsel,[714] is a form of wisdom. For it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men counsel well."

"Obviously."

"But there are many and manifold knowledges or sciences in the city."

"Of course."

"Is it then owing to the science of her carpenters that a city is to be called wise and well advised?"

"By no means for that, but rather mistress of the arts of building."

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[713] *σοφία* is wisdom *par excellence.* Aristotle, *Met.* i., traces the history of the idea from Homer to its identification in Aristotle's mind with first philosophy for metaphysics. For Plato, the moralist, it is virtue and the fear of the Lord; for his political theory it is the "political or royal art" which the dramatic dialogues fail to distinguish from the special sciences and arts. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 17, n. 97, *Protagoras* 319 A, *Euthydemus* 282 E, 291 C, *Gorgias* 501 A-B, etc. In the unreformed Greek state its counterfeit counterpart is the art of the politician. In the *Republic* its reality will be found in the selected guardians who are to receive the higher education, and who alone will apprehend the idea of the good, which is not mentioned here simply because Plato, not Krohn, is writing the *Republic.*

[714] Protagoras, like Isocrates, professed to teach *εὐβουλία* (*Protagoras* 318 E), which Socrates identifies at once with the political art. Plato would accept Protagoras's discrimination of this for the special arts (*ibid.* 318 ff.), but he does not believe that such as Protagoras can teach it. His political art is a very different thing from Protagoras's *εὐβουλία* and is apprehended by a very different education from that offered by Protagoras. Cf. *Plato's* Laws *and the Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 348, n. 5, *Euthydemus* 291 B-C, *Charmides* 170 B, *Protagoras* 319 A, *Gorgias* 501 A-B, 503 D, *Politicus* 289 C, 293 D, 309 C.

"Then a city is not to be styled wise because of the deliberations[715] of the science of wooden utensils for their best production?"

"No, I grant you."

"Is it, then, because of that of brass implements or any other of that kind?"

"None whatsoever," he said.

"Nor yet because of the science of the production of crops from the soil, but the name it takes from that is agricultural."

"I think so."

"Then," said I,

"is there any science in the city just founded by us residing in any of its citizens which does not take counsel about some particular thing in the city but about the city as a whole and the betterment of its relations with itself[716] and other states?"

"Why, there is."

"What is it," said I,

"and in whom is it found?"

"It is the science of guardianship or government and it is to be found in those rulers to whom we just now gave the name of guardians in the full sense of the word."

"And what term then do you apply to the city because of this knowledge?"

"Well advised," he said,

"and truly wise."

"Which class, then," said I,

"do you suppose will be the more numerous in our city, the smiths or these true guardians?"

"The smiths, by far," he said.

"And would not these rulers be the smallest of all the groups of those who possess special knowledge and receive distinctive appellations[717]?"

"By far."

"Then it is by virtue of its smallest class and minutest part of itself, and the wisdom that resides therein, in the part which takes the lead and rules, that a city established on principles of nature would be wise as a whole. And as it appears these are by nature the fewest, the class

[715] *βουλευομένη*: Heindorf's *βουλευομένην* is perhaps supported by *ᾗ . . . βουλεύεται* below, but in view of Plato's colloquial anacoluthic style is unnecessary.

[716] Cf. on 416 C.

[717] Cf. *Protagoras* 311 E "τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιὸν καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου ποιητήν".

to which it pertains to partake of the knowledge which alone of all forms of knowledge deserves the name of wisdom."

"Most true," he said.

"This one of our four, then, we have, I know not how, discovered, the thing itself and its place in the state."

"I certainly think," said he,

"that it has been discovered sufficiently."

"But again there is no difficulty in seeing bravery itself and the part of the city in which it resides for which the city is called brave.[718]"

"How so?"

"Who," said I,

"in calling a city cowardly or brave would fix his eyes on any other part of it than that which defends it and wages war in its behalf?"

"No one at all," he said.

"For the reason, I take it," said I,

"that the cowardice or the bravery[719] of the other inhabitants does not determine for it the one quality or the other.[720]"

"It does not."

"Bravery too, then, belongs to a city by virtue of a part of itself owing to its possession in that part of a quality that under all conditions will preserve the conviction that things to be feared are precisely those which and such as the lawgiver[721] inculcated in their education. Is not that what you call bravery?"

"I don't altogether understand[722] what you said," he replied;

"but say it again."

"A kind of conservation," I said,

"is what I mean by bravery."

"What sort of a conservation[723]?"

"The conservation of the conviction which the law has created by education about fearful things—what and what sort of things are to be feared. And by the phrase "under all conditions[724]" I mean that

[718] *τοιαύτη* such, that is, brave. The courage of a state, *qua* such, also resides in a small class, the warriors.

[719] *ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες*: the *ab urbe condita* construction. Cf. 421 A.

[720] *τοίαν . . . ἢ τοίαν*: cf. 437 E, *Phaedrus* 271 D, *Laws* 721 B.

[721] Cf. 442 C, Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1129 b 19 "προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν".

[722] Cf. on 347 A.

[723] *σωτηρίαν* is the genus; *Philebus* 34 A, *Def. Plat.* 412 A-B. Hence *ποίαν* as often in the minor dialogues sometimes with a play on its idiomatic, contemptuous meaning. Cf. *Laches* 194 D.

[724] In the *Laches* 191 D-E, and the *Laws* 633 D also, Plato generalizes courage to

the brave man preserves it both in pain and pleasures and in desires and fears and does not expel[725] it from his soul. And I may illustrate it by a similitude[726] if you please."

"I do."

"You are aware that dyers when they wish to dye wool so as to hold the purple hue begin by selecting from the many colors there be the one nature of the white and then give it a careful preparatory treatment so that it will take the hue in the best way, and after the treatment,[727] then and then only, dip it in the dye. And things that are dyed by this process become fast-colored[728] and washing either with or without lyes cannot take away the sheen of their hues. But otherwise you know what happens to them, whether[729] anyone dips other colors or even these without the preparatory treatment."

"I know," he said,

"that they present a ridiculous and washed-out appearance."

"By this analogy, then," said I,

"you must conceive what we too to the best of our ability were doing when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music[730] and exercises of the body. The sole aim of our contrivance was that they should be convinced and receive our laws like a dye as it were, so that their belief and faith might be[731] fast-colored both about the things that are to be feared and all other things because of the fitness of their nature and nurture, and that so their dyes might not be washed out by those lyes that have such dread[732] power to scour our faiths away,

include resistance to the lure of pleasure.

[725]Cf. 412 E.

[726]The moral training of the guardians is likened to the dyeing of selected white wools with fast colors. Cf. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1105 a 2, Marc. Aurel. iii. 4. 3 "δικαιοσύνῃ βεβαμμένον εἰς βάθος", Sir Thomas Browne, *Christian Morals*, i. 9 "Be what thou virtuously art, and let not the ocean wash away thy tincture." The idea that the underlying subsatnce must be of neutral quality may have been suggested to Plato by Anaxagoras. It occurs in the *Timaeus* 50 D-E, whence it passed to Aristotle's psychology and Lucretius. Cf. my paper on *Plato, Epicurus, and Lucretius, Harvard Studies*, vol. xii. p. 204.

[727]For the technique cf. Blummer, *Technologie*, vol. i. pp. 227 ff. The *θεράπευσις* seems to be virtually identical with the *προπαρασκευή*, so that the aorist seems appropriate, unless with Adam's earlier edition we transpose it immediately before *οὕτω δή*.

[728]For *δευσοποιός* cf. L. and S., and Nauck, *Ἀδέσποτα* 441 "τοῖς δευσοποιοῖς φαρμάκοις ξανθίζεται".

[729]The two points of precaution are (1) to select white wool, not *ἄλλα χρώματα*, (2) to prepare by treatment even this.

[730]Cf. 522 A, *Philebus* 17 B.

[731]*γήγνοιτο* is process; *ἐκπλύναι* (aorist) is a single event (*μή*).

pleasure more potent than any detergent or abstergent to accomplish this, and pain and fear and desire more sure than any lye. This power in the soul, then, this unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief[733] about things to be and not to be feared is what I call and would assume to be courage, unless you have something different to say."

"No, nothing," said he;

"for I presume that you consider mere right opinion about the same matters not produced by education, that which may manifest itself in a beast or a slave,[734] to have little or nothing to do with law[735] and that you would call it by another name than courage."

"That is most true," said I.

"Well then," he said,

"I accept this as bravery."

"Do so," said I,

"and you will be right with the reservation[736] that it is the courage of a citizen. Some other time,[737] if it please you, we will discuss it more fully. At present we were not seeking this but justice; and for the purpose of that inquiry I believe we have done enough."

"You are quite right," he said.

"Two things still remain," said I,

"to make out in our city, soberness[738] and the object of the whole inquiry, justice."

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[732] *δεινά*: it is not fanciful to feel the unity of Plato's imagination as well as of his thought in the recurrence of this word in the *δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα* of the mortal soul in *Timaeus* 69 C.

[733] Cf. *Protagoras* 360 C-D, *Laws* 632 C, Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1116 b 24. Strictly speaking, Plato would recognize four grades, (1) philosophic bravery, (2) the bravery of the *ἐπίκουροι* here defined, (3) casual civic bravery in ordinary states, (4) animal instinct, which hardly deserves the name. Cf. *Laches* 196 E, Mill, *Nature*, p. 47 "Consistent courage is always the effect of cultivation," etc., *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 46 and 77.

[734] *Phaedo* 69 B.

[735] *νόμιμον* of the Mss. yields quite as good a meaning as Stobaeus's *μόνιμον*. The virtuous habit that is inculcated by law is more abiding than accidental virtue.

[736] *γε* marks a reservation as 415 E "στρατιωτικάς γε", *Politicus* 30 E, *Laws* 710 A "τὴν δημώδη γε". Plotinus, unlike some modern commentators, perceived this. Cf. *Enn.* i. 2. 3. In *Phaedo* 82 A "πολιτικήν" is used disparagingly of ordinary bourgeois virtue. In Xenophon *Rep. Lac.* 10. 7 and Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* iii. 8. 1 (1116 a 17) there is no disparagement. The word is often used of citizen soldiery as opposed to professional mercenaries.

[737] This dismissal of the subject is sometimes fancifully taken as a promise of the *Laches*. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 77 and 603.

[738] Matthew Arnold's word. But cf. on 398 D and 430 E — "sobriety," "temperance," "Besonnenheit."

"Quite so."

"If there were only some way to discover justice so that we need not further concern ourselves about soberness."

"Well, I, for my part," he said,

"neither know of any such way nor would I wish justice to be discovered first if that means that we are not to go on to the consideration of soberness. But if you desire to please me, consider this before that."

"It would certainly be very wrong[739] of me not to desire it," said I.

"Go on with the inquiry then," he said.

"I must go on," I replied,

"and viewed from here it bears more likeness to a kind of concord and harmony than the other virtues did."

"How so?"

"Soberness is a kind of beautiful order[740] and a continence of certain pleasures and appetites, as they say, using the phrase "master of himself" I know not how; and there are other similar expressions that as it were point us to the same trail. Is that not so?"

"Most certainly."

"Now the phrase "master of himself" is an absurdity, is it not? For he who is master of himself would also be subject to himself, and he who is subject to himself would be master. For the same person is spoken of in all these expressions."

"Of course."

"But," said I,

"the intended meaning of this way of speaking appears to me to be that the soul of a man within him has a better part and a worse part, and the expression self-mastery means the control of the worse by the naturally better part. It is, at any rate, a term of praise. But when, because of bad breeding or some association,[741] the better part, which is the smaller, is dominated by the multitude[742] of the worse, I think

[739] *εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ* is idiomatic, I ought to. Cf. 608 D, 612, *Menexenus* 236 B.

[740] Cf. *Gorgias* 506 E ff. *σωφροσύνη* and *σωφρονεῖν* sometimes mean etymologically of sound mind or level head, with or without ethical suggestion, according to the standpoint of the spaeker. Cf. *Protagoras* 333 B-C. Its two chief meanings in Greek usage are given in 389 D-E: subordination to due authority, and control of appetite, both raised to higher significance in Plato's definition. As in the case of bravery, Plato distinguishes the temperamental, the bourgeois, the disciplined, and the philosophical virtue. But he affects to feel something paradoxical in the very idea of self-control, as perhaps there is. Cf. *Laws* 626 E ff., 863 D, A.J.P. vol. xiii. pp. 361 f., *Unity of Plato's Thought*, nn. 77 and 78.

[741] Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 A.

[742] Cf. 442 A, *Laws* 689 A-B. The expression is intended to remind us of the paral-

that our speech censures this as a reproach,[743] and calls the man in this plight unselfcontrolled and licentious."

"That seems likely," he said.

"Turn your eyes now upon our new city," said I,

"and you will find one of these conditions existent in it. For you will say that it is justly spoken of as master of itself if that in which[744] the superior rules the inferior is to be called sober and self-mastered."

"I do turn my eyes upon it," he said,

"and it is as you say."

"And again, the mob of motley[745] appetites and pleasures and pains one would find chiefly in children[746] and women and slaves and in the base rabble of those who are freemen in name.[747]"

"By all means."

"But the simple and moderate appetites which with the aid of reason and right opinion are guided by consideration you will find in few and those the best born and best educated."

"True," he said.

"And do you not find this too in your city and a domination there of the desires in the multitude and the rabble by the desires and the wisdom that dwell in the minority of the better?"

"I do," he said.

"If, then, there is any city that deserves to be described as master of its pleasures and desires and self-mastered, this one merits that designation."

"Most assuredly," he said.

"And is it not also to be called sober[748] in all these respects?"

"Indeed it is," he said.

"And yet again, if there is any city in which the rulers and the ruled are of one mind as to who ought to rule, that condition will be found

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lelism between man and state. See Introduction.

[743] Cf. *Symposium* 189 E.

[744] Cf. 441 D, 443 B, 573 D.

[745] *παντοδαπός* is disparaging in Plato.

[746] *παισί*: so Wolf, for Ms. *πᾶσι*, a frequent error. Cf. 494 B. Plato, like Shakespeare's Rosalind, brackets boys and women as creatures who have for every passion something and for no passion truly anything.

[747] Cf. on 336 A. The ordinary man who is passion's slave is not truly free. The Stoics and Cynics preached many sermons on this text. See Persius, *Sat.* v. 73. and 124, Epictetus *Diss* . iv. 1, Xenophon *Memorabilia* iv. 5. 4, Xenophon *Oecon.* 1. 22-23.

[748] Plato is again proceeding by seemingly minute verbal links. Cf. 354 A, 379 B, 412 D. *καὶ μήν* introduces a further verification of the definition.

in this. Don't you think so?"

"I most emphatically do," he said.

"In which class of the citizens, then, will you say that the virtue of soberness has its seat when this is their condition? In the rulers or in the ruled?"

"In both, I suppose,[749]" he said.

"Do you see then," said I,

"that our intuition was not a bad one just now that discerned a likeness between soberness and a kind of harmony[750]?"

"Why so?"

"Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts respectively made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally through the entire gamut[751] throughout, bringing about[752] the unison in the same chant of the strongest, the weakest and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if you please,[753] in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any similar criterion. So that we should be quite right in affirming this unanimity[754] to be soberness, the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual.[755]"

"I entirely concur," he said.

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[749] *που* marks the slight hesitation at the deviation from the symmetry of the scheme which would lead us to expect, as Aristotle and others have taken it, that *σωφροσύνη* is the distinctive virtue of the lowest class. It is so practically for the lower sense of *σωφροσύνη*, but in the higher sense of the willingness of each to fulfil his function in due subordination to the whole, it is common to all classes.

[750] Cf. 430 E. Aristotle gives this as an example of (faulty) defintion by metaphor (*Topics* iv. 3. 5).

[751] *δι' ὅλης*: sc. *τῆς πόλεως*, but as *ἀτεχνῶς* shows (Cf. on 419 E) it already suggets the musical metaphor of the entire octave *διὰ πασῶν*.

[752] The word order of the following is noteworthy. The translation gives the meaning. *ταὐτόν*, the object of *συνᾴδοντας*, is, by a trait of style that grows more frequent in the *Laws* and was imitated by Cicero, so placed as to break the monotony of the accusative terminations.

[753] For the comparison the kind of superiority is indifferent. See Thompson on *Meno* 71 E and compare the enumeration of claims to power in the *Laws*, "ἀξιώματα . . . τοῦ ἀρχεῖν", *Laws* 690 A ff. and 434 B.

[754] The final statement of the definition, which, however, has little significance for Plato's thought, when isolated from its explanatory context. Cf. *Def. Plat.* 413 E, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 15. f., n. 82. Quite idle is the discussion whether *σωφροσύνη* is otiose, and whether it can be absolutely distinguished from *δικαιοσύνη*. They are sufficiently distinguished for Plato's purpose in the imagery and analogies of the *Republic*.

[755] Cf. on 351 E.

"Very well," said I.

"We have made out these three forms in our city to the best of our present judgement.[756] What can be the remaining form that[757] would give the city still another virtue? For it is obvious that the remainder is justice."

"Obvious."

"Now then,[758] Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmen[759] to surround the covert and keep close watch that justice may not slip through and get away from us and vanish from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabouts. Keep your eyes open then and do your best to descry it. You may see it before I do and point it out to me."

"Would that I could," he said;

"but I think rather that if you find in me one who can follow you and discern what you point out to him you will be making a very fair[760] use of me."

"Pray[761] for success then," said I,

"and follow along with me."

"That I will do, only lead on," he said.

"And truly," said I,

"it appears to be an inaccessible place, lying in deep shadows."

"It certainly is a dark covert, not easy to beat up."

"But all the same on we must go."

"Yes, on." And I caught view and gave a hulloa and said,

"Glaucon, I think we have found its trail and I don't believe it will get away from us."

"I am glad to hear that," said he.

"Truly," said I,

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[756]Cf. Demosthenes 18 and 430 E "ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν". Plato's definitions and analyses are never presented as final. They are always sufficient for the purpose in hand. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 13, nn. 63-67 and 519.

[757]*δι' ὅ*: cf. my paper on the Origin of the Syllogism, *Class. Phil* . vol. xix. pp. 7 ff. This is an example of the terminology of the theory of ideas "already" in the first four books. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 35, n. 238, p. 38.

[758]*νῦν δή*: i.e. *νῦν ἤδη*.

[759]Cf. *Soph.* 235 B, *Euthydemus* 290 B-C, *Phaedo* 66 C, *Laws* 654 E, *Parmenides* 128 C, *Lysis* 218 C, Thompson on *Meno* 96 E, Huxley, *Hume* , p. 139 "There cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy." Cf. also Hardy's "He never could beat the covert of conversation without starting the game." The elaboration of the image here is partly to mark the importance of *δικαιοσύνη* and partly to relieve the monotony of continuous argument.

[760]It is not necessary, though plausible, to emend *μετρίως* to *μετρίῳ*. The latter is slightly more idiomatical. Cf. Terence's "benigno me utetur patre."

[761]Prayer is the proper preface of any act. Cf. *Timaeus* 27 C, *Laws* 712 B.

"we were slackers[762] indeed."

"How so?"

"Why, all the time, bless your heart, the thing apparently was tumbling about our feet[763] from the start and yet we couldn't see it, but were most ludicrous, like people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands.[764] So we did not turn our eyes upon it, but looked off into the distance, which perhaps was the reason it escaped us."

"What do you mean?" he said.

"This," I replied,

"that it seems to me that though we were speaking of it and hearing about it all the time we did not understand ourselves[765] or realize that we were speaking of it in a sense."

"That is a tedious prologue," he said,

"for an eager listener."

"Listen then," said I,

"and learn if there is anything in what I say. For what we laid down in the beginning as a universal requirement when we were founding our city, this I think, or[766] some form of this, is justice. And what we did lay down, and often said, you recall, was that each one man must perform one social service in the state for which his nature is best adapted."

"Yes, we said that."

"And again that to do one's own business and not to be a busybody is justice, is a saying that we have heard from many and have often repeated ourselves.[767]"

"We have."

"This, then," I said,

"my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice,[768] this principle of doing one's own business. Do you know whence I infer

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[762] *τὸ πάθος*: for the periphrasis cf. 376 A.

[763] Cf. *Theaetetus* 201 A.

[764] A homely figure such as Dante and Tennyson sometimes use.

[765] This sounds like Hegel but is not Hegelian thought.

[766] Cf. on 344 E. Justice is a species falling under the vague genus *τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν*, which Critias in the *Charmides* proposed as a definition of *σωφροσύνη* (*Charmides* 161 B), but failed to sustain owing to his inability to distinguish the various possible meanings of the phrase. In the *Republic* too we have hitherto failed to "learn from ourselves" its true meaning, till now when Socrates begins to perceive that if taken in the higher sense of spiritual division of labor in the soul and in the state, it is the long-sought justice. Cf. 433 B-D, 443 C-D.

[767] This need not refer to any specific passage in the dialogues. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 236. A Greek could at any time say that minding one's own business and not being a busybody is *σῶφρον* or *δίκαιον* or both.

this?"

"No, but tell me," he said.

"I think that this is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness, courage, and intelligence, a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body politic and which when they have sprung up preserves them as long as it is present. And I hardly need to remind you that[769] we said that justice would be the residue after we had found the other three."

"That is an unavoidable conclusion," he said.

"But moreover," said I,

"if we were required to decide what it is whose indwelling presence will contribute most to making our city good, it would be a difficult decision whether it was the unanimity of rulers and ruled or the conservation in the minds of the soldiers of the convictions produced by law as to what things are or are not to be feared, or the watchful intelligence that resides in the guardians, or whether this is the chief cause of its goodness, the principle embodied in child, woman, slave, free, artisan, ruler, and ruled, that each performed his one task as one man and was not a versatile busybody."

"Hard to decide indeed," he said.

"A thing, then, that in its contribution to the excellence of a state vies with and rivals its wisdom, its soberness, its bravery, is this principle of everyone in it doing his own task."

"It is indeed," he said.

"And is not justice the name you would have to give[770] to the principle that rivals these as conducing to the virtue of state?"

"By all means."

"Consider it in this wise too[771] if so you will be convinced. Will you not assign the conduct of lawsuits in your state to the rulers?"

"Of course."

"Will not this be the chief aim of their decisions, that no one shall

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[768] *τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον*: as in the translation, not "justice seems somehow to be proving to be this." Cf. 432 E, 516 C, *Lysis* 217 E, *Laws* 910 B, 495 A, 596 D, Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, 830. Yet, Cf. *Politicus* 291 D.

[769] *καίτοι*: cf. on 360 C and 376 B. Here it points out the significance of *τὸ ὑπόλοιπον* if true, while *ἀλλὰ μέντοι* introduces the considerations that prove it true.

[770] *γε* argues from the very meaning of *ἐνάμιλλον*. Cf. 379 B.

[771] So *Phaedo* 79 E "ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε". It introduces a further confirmation. The mere judicial and conventional conception of justice can be brought under the formula in a fashion (*πῃ*), for legal justice "est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens." Cf. 331 E and Aristotle *Rhet.* 1366 b 9 "ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστα ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος".

have what belongs to others[772] or be deprived of his own? Nothing else but this."

"On the assumption that this is just?"

"Yes."

"From this point of view too, then, the having[773] and doing of one's own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice."

"That is so."

"Consider now[774] whether you agree with me. A carpenter undertaking to do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter or their interchange of one another's tools or honors or even the attempt of the same man to do both—the confounding of all other functions would not, think you, greatly injure a state, would it?"

"Not much," he said.

"But when I fancy one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of money-maker tempted and incited by wealth or command of votes or bodily strength or some similar advantage tries to enter into the class of the soldiers or one of the soldiers into the class of counsellors and guardians, for which he is not fitted, and these interchange their tools and their honors or when the same man undertakes all these functions at once, then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution and meddlesomeness is the ruin of a state."

"By all means."

"The interference with one another's business, then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one for the other is the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly[775] works it harm."

"Precisely so."

"And the thing that works the greatest harm to one's own state, will you not pronounce to be injustice?"

"Of course."

"This, then, is injustice."

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[772] *τἀλλότρια*: the article is normal; Stallb. on *Phaedrus* 230 A. For the ambiguity of *τἀλλότρια* cf. 443 D. So *οἰκείου* is one's own in either literal or the ideal sense of the Stoics and Emerson, and *ἑαυτοῦ* is similarly ambiguous. Cf. on 443 D.

[773] *ἕξις* is still fluid in Plato and has not yet taken the technical Aristotelian meaning of habit or state.

[774] A further confirmation. For what follows cf. 421 A.

[775] *μάλιστα* with *κακουργία*.

"Again,[776] let us put it in this way. The proper functioning[777] of the money-making class, the helpers and the guardians, each doing its own work in the state, being the reverse of that[778] just described, would be justice and would render the city just."

"I think the case is thus and no otherwise," said he.

"Let us not yet affirm it quite fixedly,[779]" I said,

"but if this form[780] when applied to the individual man, accepted there also as a definition of justice, we will then concede the point—for what else will there be to say? But if not, then we will look for something else. But now let us work out the inquiry in which[781] we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there,[782] we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in the good[783] city it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well."

"But if something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return again to the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by side[784] and rubbing them against one another,

[776] *πάλιν*, again, here means conversely. Cf. 425 A. The definition is repeated in terms of the three citizen classes to prepare the way for testing it in relation to the individual soul, which, if the analogy is to hold, must possess three corresponding faculties or parts. The order of words in this and many Platonic sentences is justified by the psychological "investigation," which showed that when the question "which do you like best, apples, pears, or cherries?" was presented in the form "apples, pears, cherries, which do you like best?" the reaction time was appreciably shortened.

[777] *οἰκειοπραγία*: this coinage is explained by the genitive absolute. Proclus (Kroll i. p. 207) substitutes *αὐτοπραγία*. So *Def. Plat.* 411 E.

[778] *ἐκείνου*: cf. "ἐκείνοις", 425 A.

[779] *παγίως*: cf. 479 C, Aristotle *Met.* 1062 b 15.

[780] The doctrine of the transcendental ideas was undoubtedly familiar to Plato at this time. Cf. on 402 B, and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 31, n. 194, p. 35. But we need not evoke the theory of *παρουσία* here to account for this slight personification of the form, idea, or definition of justice. Cf. 538 D, and the use of *ἐλθών* in Euripides *Suppl.* 562 and of *ἰόν* in *Philebus* 52 E. Plato, in short, is merely saying vivaciously what Aristotle technically says in the words "δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν", *Eth. Nic.* 1107 a 28.

[781] In 368 E. For the loose internal accusative *ἥν* cf. 443 B, *Laws* 666 B, *Phaedrus* 249 D, *Sophist* 264 B, my paper on Illogical Idiom, T.A.P.A., 1916, vol. xlvii. p. 213, and the school-girl's "This is the play that the reward is offered for the best name suggested for it."

[782] *ἐκεῖ* though redundant need not offend in this intentionally ancoluthic and resumptive sentence. Some inferior Mss. read *ἐκεῖνο*. Burnet's *ᾗ* is impossible.

[783] *ἔν γε τῇ ἀγαθῇ*: cf. on 427 E, and for the force of *γε* cf. 379 B, 403 E.

as it were from the fire-sticks[785] we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth,[786] and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds."

"Well," he said,

"that seems a sound method[787] and that is what we must do."

"Then," said I,

"if you call a thing by the same[788] name whether it is big or little, is it unlike in the way in which it is called the same or like?"

"Like," he said.

"Then a just man too will not differ[789] at all from a just city in respect of the very form of justice, but will be like it."

"Yes, like."

"But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and habits[790] of these three kinds."

"True," he said.

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[784]Cf. *Sophist* 230 B "τιθέασι παρ' ἀλλήλας", Isocrates *Areopagiticus* 79, *Nic.* 17.

[785]Cf. L and S. and Morgan, "De Ignis Eliciendi Modis," *Harvard Studies*, vol. i. pp. 15, 21 ff. and 30; and Damascius (Ruelle, p. 54, line 18) "καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅπερ εξαίφνης ἀνάπτεται φῶς ἀληθείας ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων προστριβομένων".

[786]Cf. *Gorgias* 484 B, *Epistle* vii. 344 B.

[787]Plato often observes that a certain procedure is methodical and we must follow it, or that it is at least methodical or consistent, whatever the results may be.

[788]*ὅ γε ταὐτόν*: there are several reasons for the seeming over-elaboration of the logic in the next few pages. The analogy between the three classes in the state and the tripartite soul is an important point in Plato's ethical theory and an essential feature in the structure of the *Republic*. Very nice distinctions are involved in the attempt to prove the validity of the analogy for the present argument without too flagrant contradiction of the faith elsewhere expressed in the essential unity of the soul. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 42. These distinctions in the infancy of logic Plato is obliged to set forth and explain as he proceeds. Moreover, he is interested in logical method for its own sake (cf.. Introduction p. xiv), and is here stating for the first time important principles of logic afterwards codified in the treatises of Aristotle. *γε* marks the inference from the very meaning of *ταὐτόν*. Cf. on 379 B, 389 B, and *Politicus* 278 E; cf. also *Parmenides* 139 E. The language suggests the theory of ideas. But Plato is not now thinking primarily of that. He is merely repeating in precise logical form the point already made (434 D-E), that the definition of justice in the individual must correspond point for point with that worked out for the state.

[789]Cf. 369 A and *Meno* 72 B. In *Philebus* 12 E-13 C, Plato points out that the generic or specific identity does not exclude specific or sub-specific differences.

[790]*ἕξεις* is here almost the Aristotelian *ἕξις*. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1105 b 20, regards *πάθη, ἕξεις* and *δυνάμεις* as an exhaustive enumeration of mental states. For *δυνάμεις* cf. 477 C, Simplic. *De An.* Hayduck, p. 289 "ἀλλὰ τὰ ὧν πρὸς πρακτικὴν ἐδεῖτο ζωήν, τὰ τρία μόνα παρείληφεν".

"Then, my friend, we shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations."

"Inevitable," he said.

"Goodness gracious," said I,

"here is another trifling[791] inquiry into which we have plunged, the question whether the soul really contains these three forms in itself or not."

"It does not seem to me at all trifling," he said,

"for perhaps, Socrates, the saying is true that 'fine things are difficult.'[792]"

"Apparently," said I;

"and let me tell you, Glaucon, that in my opinion we shall never in the world apprehend this matter[793] from such methods as we are now employing in discussion. For there is another longer and harder way that conducts to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of previous statements and inquiries."

"May we acquiesce in that?" he said.

"I for my part should be quite satisfied with that for the present."

"And I surely should be more than satisfied," I replied.

"Don't you weary then," he said,

"but go on with the inquiry."

"Is it not, then," said I,

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[791] Cf. 423 C.

[792] A proverb often cited by Plato with variations. Cf. 497 D-E.

[793] *τοῦτο* by strict grammatical implication means the problem of the tripartite soul, but the reference to this passage in 504 B shows that it includes the whole question of the definition of the virtues, and so ultimately the whole of ethical and political philosophy. We are there told again that the definitions of the fourth book are sufficient for the purpose, but that complete insight can be attained only by relating them to the idea of the good. That required a longer and more circuitous way of discipline and training. Plato then does not propose the "longer way" as a method of reasoning which he himself employs to correct the approximations of the present discussion. He merely describes it as the higher education which will enable his philosophical rulers to do that. We may then disregard all idle guesses about a "new logic" hinted at in the longer way, and all fantastic hypotheses about the evolution of Plato's thought and the composition of the *Republic* based on supposed contradictions between this passage and the later books. Cf. Introduction p. xvi, "Idea of Good," p. 190, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 16, n. 90; followed by Professor Wilamowitz, ii. p. 218, who, however, does not understand the connection of it all with the idea of good. Plato the logician never commits himself to more than is required by the problem under discussion (cf. on 353 c), and Plato the moralist never admits that the ideal has been adequately expressed, but always points to heights beyond. Cf. 506 E, 533 A, *Phaedo* 85 C, *Ti.* 29 B-C, *Soph.* 254 C.

"impossible for us to avoid admitting[794] this much, that the same forms and qualities are to be found in each one of us that are in the state? They could not get there from any other source."

"It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this quality as the populations of the Thracian and Scythian lands and generally of northern regions; or the quality of love of knowledge, which would chiefly be attributed to[795] the region where we dwell, or the love of money[796] which we might say is not least likely to be found in Phoenicians[797] and the population of Egypt."

"One certainly might," he replied.

"This is the fact then," said I,

"and there is no difficulty in recognizing it."

"Certainly not."

"But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul[798] that we function in each case when we once

[794]Plato takes for granted as obvious the general correspondence which some modern philosophers think it necessary to reaffirm. Cf. Mill, *Logic*, vi. 7. 1 "Human beings in society have no properties, but those which are derived from and may be resolved into the laws and the nature of individual man"; Spencer, *Autobiog.* ii. p. 543 "Society is created by its units. . . . The nature of its organization is determined by the nature of its units." Plato illustrates the commonplace in a slight digression on national characteristics, with a hint of the thought partially anticipated by Hippocrates and now identified with Buckle's name, that they are determined by climate and environment. Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle *Politics* pp. 318-320.

[795]*αἰτιάσαιτο*: this merely varies the idiom *αἰτίαν ἔχειν*, predicate of, say of. Cf. 599 E. It was a common boast of the Athenians that the fine air of Athens produced a corresponding subtlety of wit. Cf. Euripides *Medea* 829-830, Isocrates vii. 74, Roberts, *The Ancient Boeotians*, pp. 59, 76.

[796]*φιλοχρήματον* is a virtual synonym of *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. Cf. 580 E and *Phaedo* 68 C, 82 C.

[797]In *Laws* 747 C, Plato tells that for this or some other cause the mathematical education of the Phoenicians and Egyptians, which he commends, developed in them *πανουργία* rather than *σοφία*.

[798]The questions debated by psychologists from Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 1102 a 31) to the present day is still a matter of rhetoric, poetry, and point of view rather than of strict science. For some purposes we must treat the "faculties" of the mind as distinct entities, for others we must revert to the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Arnold's "Lines on Butler's Sermons" and my remarks in *The Assault on Humanism*. Plato himself is well aware of this, and in different dialogues emphasizes the aspect that suits his purpose. There is no contradiction between this passage and *Phaedo* 68 C,

begin. That is what is really hard to determine properly."

"I think so too," he said.

"Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether they are identical with one another in this way."

"How?"

"It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites[799] in the same respect[800] in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find[801] these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was[802] not the same thing functioning but a plurality."

"Very well."

"Consider, then, what I am saying."

"Say on," he replied.

"Is it possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at rest[803] and in motion?"

"By no means."

"Let us have our understanding still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute. If anyone should say of a man standing still but moving his hands and head that the same man is at the same time at rest and in motion we should not, I take it, regard that as the right way of expressing it, but rather that a part[804] of him is at rest and a part in motion. Is not that so?"

"It is."

"Then if the disputant should carry the jest still further with the

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82 C, and *Republic* x. 611-12. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 42-43.

[799]The first formulation of the law of contradiction. Cf. *Phaedo* 102 E, *Theaetetus* 188 A, *Soph.* 220 B, 602 E. Sophistical objections are anticipated here and below (436 E) by attaching to it nearly all the qualifying distinctions of the categories which Aristotle wearily observes are necessary "πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις" (*De interp.* 17 a 36-37). Cf. *Met.* 1005 b 22 "πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας", and *Rhet.* ii. 24. Plato invokes the principle against Heraclitism and other philosophies of relativity and the sophistries that grew out of them or played with their formulas. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 50 ff., 53, 58, 68. Aristotle follows Plato in this, pronouncing it "πασῶν βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή" (*Met.* 1005 b 18).

[800]*κατὰ ταὐτόν* = in the same part or aspect of itself; *πρὸς ταὐτόν* = in relation to the same (other) thing. Cf. *Sophist* 230 B "ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας".

[801]For this method of reasoning cf. 478 D, 609 B, *Laws* 896 C, *Charmides* 168 B-C, *Gorgias* 496 C, *Philebus* 11 D-E.

[802]*ἦν* = "was all along and is."

[803]The maxim is applied to the antithesis of rest and motion, so prominent in the dialectics of the day. Cf. *Sophist* 249 C-D, *Parmenides* 156 D and *passim.*

[804]Cf. *Theaetetus* 181 E.

subtlety that tops at any rate[805] stand still as a whole at the same time that they are in motion when with the peg fixed in one point they revolve, and that the same is true of any other case of circular motion about the same spot—we should reject the statement on the ground that the repose and the movement in such cases[806] were not in relation to the same parts of the objects, but we would say that there was a straight line and a circumference in them and that in respect of the straight line they are standing still[807] since they do not incline to either side, but in respect of the circumference they move in a circle; but that when as they revolve they incline the perpendicular to right or left or forward or back, then they are in no wise at rest."

"And that would be right," he said.

"No such remarks then will disconcert us or any whit the more make us believe that it is ever possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect and the same relation to suffer, be,[808] or do opposites."

"They will not me, I am sure," said he.

"All the same," said I,

"that we may not be forced to examine at tedious length the entire list of such contentions[809] and convince ourselves that they are false, let us proceed on the hypothesis[810] that this is so, with the understanding that, if it ever appear otherwise, everything that results from the

[805]The argumentative *γε* is controversial. For the illustration of the top cf. Spencer, *First Principle*, 170, who analyzes "certain oscillations described by the expressive though inelegant word "wobbling"" and their final dissipation when the top appears stationary in the *equilibrium mobile*.

[806]The meaning is plain, the alleged rest and motion do not relate to the same parts of the objects. But the syntax of *τὰ τοιαῦτα* is difficult. Obvious remedies are to expunge the words or to read *τῶν τοιούτων*, the cacophony of which in the context Plato perhaps rejected at the cost of leaving his syntax to our conjectures.

[807]Cf. Aristotle *Met.* 1022 a 23 "ἔτι δὲ τὸ καθὸ τὸ κατὰ θέσιν λέγεται, καθὸ ἕστηκεν", etc,

[808]*εἴη*, the reading of most Mss., should stand. It covers the case of contradictory predicates, especially of relation, that do not readily fall under the dichotomy *ποιεῖν πάσχειν*. So *Phaedo* 97 C "ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν".

[809]*ἀμφισβητήσεις* is slightly contemptuous. Cf. Aristotle , *ἐνοχλήσεις*, and *Theaetetus* 158 C "τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλεπόν".

[810]It is almost a Platonic method thus to emphasize the dependence of one conclusion on another already accepted. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 471, *Politicus* 284 D, *Phaedo* 77 A, 92 D, *Timaeus* 51 D, *Parmenides* 149 A. It may be used to cut short discussion (*Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 471) or divert it into another channel. Here, however, he is aware, as Aristotle is, that the maximum of contradiction can be proved only controversially against an adversary who says something. (cf. my *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*, pp. 7-9, Aristotle *Met.* 1012 b 1-10); and so, having sufficiently guarded his meaning, he dismisses the subject with the ironical observation that, if the maxim is ever proved false, he will give up all that he bases on the hypothesis of

assumption shall be invalidated."

"That is what we must do," he said.

"Will you not then," said I,

"set down as opposed to one another assent and dissent, and the endeavor after a thing to the rejection of it, and embracing to repelling—do not these and all things like these belong to the class of opposite actions or passions; it will make no difference which?[811]"

"None," said he,

"but they are opposites."

"What then," said I,

"of thirst and hunger and the appetites generally, and again consenting[812] and willing, would you not put them all somewhere in the classes just described? Will you not say, for example, that the soul of one who desires either strives for that which he desires or draws towards its embrace what it wishes to accrue to it; or again, in so far as it wills that anything be presented to it, nods assent to itself thereon as if someone put the question,[813] striving towards its attainment?"

"I would say so," he said.

"But what of not-willing[814] and not consenting nor yet desiring, shall we not put these under the soul's rejection[815] and repulsion from itself and generally into the opposite class from all the former?"

"Of course."

"This being so, shall we say that the desires constitute a class[816]

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its truth. Cf. *Sophist* 247 E.

[811]Cf. *Gorgias* 496 E, and on 435 D.

[812]*ἐθέλειν* in Plato normally means to be willing, and *βούλεσθαι* to wish or desire. But unlike Prodicus, Plato emphasizes distinctions of synonyms only when relevant to his purpose. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 47 and n. 339, *Philebus* 60 D. *προσάγεσθαι* below relates to *ἐπιθυμία* and *ἐπινεύειν* to *ἐθέλειν . . . βούλεσθαι*.

[813]Cf. Aristotle *De anima* 434 a 9. The Platonic doctrine that opinion,*δόξα*, is discussion of the soul with herself, or the judgement in which such discussion terminates (Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 47) is here applied to the specific case of the practical reason issuing in an affirmation of the will.

[814]*ἀβουλεῖν* recalls the French coinage "nolonté," and the southern mule's "won't-power." Cf. *Epistle* vii. 347 A, Demosthenes *Epistle* ii. 17.

[815]Cf. Aristotle's *ἀνθέλκειν*, *De anima* 433 b 8. "All willing is either pushing or pulling," Jastrow, *Fact and Fable in Psychology*, p. 336. Cf. the argument in Spencer's *First Principles* 80, that the phrase "impelled by desires" is not a metaphor but a physical fact. Plato's generalization of the concepts "attraction" and "repulsion" brings about a curious coincidence with the language of a materialistic, physiological psychology (cf. Lange, *History of Materialism*, *passim*), just as his rejection in the *Timaeus* of attraction and *actio in distans* allies his physics with that of the most consistent materialists.

[816]Cf. on 349 E.

and that the most conspicuous members of that class[817] are what we call thirst and hunger?"

"We shall," said he.

"Is not the one desire of drink, the other of food?"

"Yes."

"Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be of anything more than that of which we say it is a desire in the soul?[818] I mean is thirst thirst for hot drink or cold or much or little or in a word for a draught of any particular quality, or is it the fact that if heat[819] is attached[820] to the thirst it would further render the desire—a desire of cold, and if cold of hot? But if owing to the presence of muchness the thirst is much it would render it a thirst for much and if little for little. But mere thirst will never be desire of anything else than that of which it is its nature to be, mere drink,[821] and so hunger of food."

"That is so," he said;

"each desire in itself is of that thing only of which it is its nature to be. The epithets belong to the quality—such or such.[822]"

"Let no one then,"[823] said I,

"disconcert us when off our guard with the objection that everybody desires not drink but good drink and not food but good food, because (the argument will run[824]) all men desire good, and so, if thirst is desire,

[817] Cf. 412 B and *Class. Phil.* vii. (1912) pp. 485-486.

[818] The argument might proceed with 439 A "τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἡ ψυχή". All that intervenes is a digression on logic, a caveat against possible misunderstandings of the proposition that thirst *qua* thirst is a desire for drink only and unqualifiedly. We are especially warned (438 A) against the misconception that since all men desire the good, thirst must be a desire not for mere drink but for good drink. Cf. the dramatic correction of a misconception, *Phaedo* 79 B, 529 A-B.

[819] In the terminology of the doctrine of ideas the "presence" of cold is the cause of cool, and that of heat, of hot. Cf. "The Origin of the Syllogism," *Class. Phil* . vol. xix. p. 10. But in the concrete instance heat causes the desire of cool and *vice versa.* Cf. *Philebus* 35 A "ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει". If we assume that Plato is here speaking from the point of view of common sense (Cf. *Lysis* 215 E "τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ"), there is no need of Hermann's transposition of *ψυχροῦ* and *θερμοῦ*, even though we do thereby get a more exact symmetry with *πλήθους παρουσίαν . . . τοῦ πολλοῦ* below.

[820] *προσῇ* denotes that the "presence" is an addition. Cf. "προσείη" in *Parmenides* 149 E.

[821] *Philebus* 35 A adds a refinement not needed here, that thirst is, strictly speaking, a desire for repletion by drink.

[822] Cf. 429 B. But (the desires) of such or such a (specific) drink are (due to) that added qualification (of the thirst).

[823] *μήτοι τις*=look you to it that no one, etc.

[824] *ἄρα* marks the rejection of this reasoning. Cf 358 C, 364 E, 381 E, 499 C. Plato

it would be of good drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similarly of other desires."

"Why," he said,

"there perhaps would seem to be something in that objection."

"But I need hardly remind you," said I,

"that of relative terms those that are somehow qualified are related to a qualified correlate, those that are severally just themselves to a correlate that is just itself.[825]"

"I don't understand," he said.

"Don't you understand," said I,

"that the greater[826] is such as to be greater than something?"

"Certainly."

"Is it not than the less?"

"Yes."

"But the much greater than the much less. Is that not so?"

"Yes."

"And may we add the one time greater than the one time less and that which will be greater than that which will be less?"

"Surely."

"And similarly of the more towards the fewer, and the double towards the half and of all like cases, and again of the heavier towards the lighter, the swifter towards the slower, and yet again of the hot towards the cold and all cases of that kind,[827] does not the same hold?"

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of course is not repudiating his doctrine that all men really will the good, but the logic of this passage requires us to treat the desire of good as a distinct qualification of the mere drink.

[825] *ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα* etc.: a palmary example of the concrete simplicity of Greek idiom in the expression of abstract ideas. *ὅσα* etc. (that is, relative terms) divide by partitive apposition into two classes, *τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ*. The meaning is that if one term of the relation is qualified, the other must be, but if one term is without qualification, the other is also taken absolutely. Plato, as usual (Cf. on 347 B), represents the interlocutor as not understandiong the first general abstract statement, which he therefore interprets and repeats. I have varied the translation in the repetition in order to bring out the full meaning, and some of the differences between Greek and English idiom.

[826] The notion of relative terms is familiar. Cf. *Charmides* 167 E, *Theaetetus* 160 A, *Symposium* 199 D-E, *Parmenides* 133 C ff., *Sophist* 255 D, Aristotle *Topics* vi. 4, and *Cat.* v. It is expounded here only to insure the apprehension of the further point that the qualifications of either term of the relation are relative to each other. In the *Politicus* 283 f. Plato adds that the great and small are measured not only in relation to each other, but by absolute standards. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 61, 62, and 531 A.

[827] *καὶ . . . καὶ αὖ . . . καὶ ἔτι γε* etc. mark different classes of relations, magnitudes, precise quantites, the mechanical properties of matter and the physical

"By all means."

"But what of the sciences? Is not the way of it the same? Science which is just that, is of knowledge which is just that, or is of whatsoever[828] we must assume the correlate of science to be. But a particular science of a particular kind is of some particular thing of a particular kind. I mean something like this: As there was a science of making a house it differed from other sciences so as to be named architecture."

"Certainly."

"Was not this by reason of its being of a certain kind[829] such as no other of all the rest?"

"Yes."

"And was it not because it was of something of a certain kind that it itself became a certain kind of science? And similarly of the other arts and sciences?"

"That is so."

"This then," said I,

"if haply you now understand, is what you must say I then meant, by the statement that of all things that are such as to be of something those that are just themselves only are of things just themselves only, but things of a certain kind are of things of a kind. And I don't at all mean[830] that they are of the same kind as the things of which they are, so that we are to suppose that the science of health and disease is a healthy and diseased science and that of evil and good, evil and good. I only mean that as science became the science not of just the thing[831] of which science is but of some particular kind of thing, namely, of

properties.

[828]Plato does not wish to complicate his logic with metaphysics. The objective correlate of *ἐπιστήμη* is a difficult problem. In the highest sense it is the ideas. Cf. *Parmenides* 134 A.But the relativity of *ἐπιστήμη* (Aristotle *Topics* iv. 1. 5) leads to psychological difficulties in *Charmides* 168 and to theological in *Parmenides* 134 C-E, which are waived by this phrase. Sceince in the abstract is of knowledge in the abstract, architectural science is of the specific knowledge called architecture. Cf. *Sophist* 257 C.

[829]Cf. *Philebus* 37 C.

[830]Cf. *Cratylus* 393 B, *Phaedo* 81 D, and for the thought Aristotle *Met.* 1030 b 2 ff. The "added determinants" need not be the same. The study of useful things is not necessarily a useful study, as opponents of the Classics argue. In *Gorgias* 476 B this principle is violated by the wilful fallacy that if to do justice is fine, so must it be to suffer justice, but the motive for this is explained in *Laws* 859-860.

[831]*αὐτοῦ οὗπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν* is here a mere periphrasis for *μαθήματος, αὐτοῦ* expressing the idea abstract, mere, absolute, or *per se*, but *ὅπερ* or *ἥπερ ἐστίν* is often a synonym of *αὐτός* or *αὐτή* in the sense of abstract, absolute, or ideal. Cf. Thompson on *Meno* 71 B, *Sophist* 255 D "τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι".

health and disease, the result[832] was that it itself became some kind of science and this caused it to be no longer called simply science but with the addition of the particular kind, medical science."

"I understand," he said,

"and agree that it is so."

"To return to thirst, then," said I,

"will you not class it with the things[833] that are of something and say that it is what it is[834] in relation to something—and it is, I presume, thirst?"

"I will," said he,

"—namely of drink."

"Then if the drink is of a certain kind, so is the thirst, but thirst that is just thirst is neither of much nor little nor good nor bad, nor in a word of any kind, but just thirst is naturally of just drink only."

"By all means."

"The soul of the thirsty then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and yearns for this and its impulse is towards this."

"Obviously."

"Then if anything draws it back[835] when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which thirsts and drives it like a beast[836] to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with the same

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[832] *δή* marks the application of this digression on relativity, for *δῖψος* is itself a relative term and is what it is in relation to something else, namely drink.

[833] *τῶν τινὸς εἶναι*: if the text is sound, *εἶναι* seems to be taken twice, (1) with *τοῦτο* etc., (2) *τῶν τινός* as predicates. This is perhaps no harsher than *τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι* in Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 788. Cf. Tennyson's "How sweet are the looks that ladies bendOn whom their favors fall," and Pope's "And virgins smiled at what they blushed before." Possibly *θήσεις τῶν τινός* is incomplete in itself (cf. 437 B) and *εἶναι τοῦτο* etc. is a loose epexegesis. The only emendation worth notice is Adam's insertion of *καὶ τινὸς* between *τινὸς* and *εἶναι*, which yields a smooth, but painfully explicit, construction.

[834] Cf. further *Sophist* 255 D, Aristotle *Met.* 1021 a 27. Aristotle *Cat.* v., *Top.* vi. 4. So Plotinus vi. 1. 7 says that relative terms are those whose very being is the relation "καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἀλλήλοις εἶναι".

[835] Cf. on 437 C, Aristotle, *De anima* 433 b 8, *Laws* 644 E, 604 B, *Phaedrus* 238 C. The practical moral truth of this is independent of our metaphysical psychology. Plato means that the something which made King David refuse the draught purchased by the blood of his soldiers and Sir Philip Sidney pass the cup to a wounded comrade is somehow different than the animal instinct which it overpowers. Cf. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1102 b 24, *Laws* 863 E.

[836] Cf. 589, *Epistle* 335 B. Cf. Descartes, *Les Passions de l'âme*, article xlvii: "En quoi consistent les combats qu'on a coutume d'imaginer entre la partie inférieure et la supérieure de l'âme." He says in effect that the soul is a unit and the "lower soul" is the body. Cf. *ibid.* lxviii, where he rejects the "concupiscible" and the "irascible."

part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing."

"We must admit that it does not."

"So I fancy it is not well said of the archer[837] that his hands at the same time thrust away the bow and draw it nigh, but we should rather say that there is one hand that puts it away and another that draws it to."

"By all means," he said.

"Are we to say, then, that some men sometimes though thirsty refuse to drink?"

"We are indeed," he said,

"many and often."

"What then," said I,

"should one affirm about them?"

"Is it not that there is[838] something in the soul that bids them drink and a something that forbids, a different something that masters that which bids?"

"I think so."

"And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such actions arises when it arises from the calculations of reason, but the impulses which draw and drag come through affections[839] and diseases?"

"Apparently."

"Not unreasonably," said I,

"shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rational[840] and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the

[837]Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 68: "Plato . . . delights to prick the bubbles of imagery, rhetoric, and antithesis blown by his predecessors. Heraclitus means well when he says that the one is united by disunion (*Symposium* 187 A) or that the hands at once draw and repel the bow. But the epigram vanishes under logical analysis." For the conceit cf. Samuel Butler's lines: "He that will win his dame must do As love does when he bends his bow, With one hand thrust his lady from And with the other pull her home."

[838]*ἐνεῖναι μὲν . . . ἐνεῖναι δέ*: the slight artificiality of the anaphora matches well with the Gorgian jingle *κελεῦον . . . κωλῦον*. Cf. Iambl. *Protrept.* p. 41 Postelli "ἔστι γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὃ κελεύει καὶ κωλύει".

[839]The "pulls" are distinguished verbally from the passions that are their instruments. *νοσημάτων* suggests the Stoic doctrine that passions are diseases. Cf. Cicero *Tusc.* iii. 4 *perturbationes*, and *passim*, and *Philebus* 45 C.

[840]*λογιστικόν* is one of Plato's many synonyms for the intellectual principle. Cf. 441 C, 571 C, 587 D, 605 B. It emphasizes the moral calculation of consequences, as opposed to blind passion. Cf. *Crito* 46 B (one of the passages which the Christian apologists used to prove that Socrates knew the *λόγος*), *Theaetetus* 186 C "ἀναλογίσματα

flutter[841] and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive—companion[842] of various repletions and pleasures."

"It would not be unreasonable but quite natural," he said,

"for us to think this."

"These two forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as actually existing in the soul. But now the Thumos[843] or principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger, is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one of these?"

"Perhaps," he said,

"with one of these, the appetitive."

"But," I said,

"I once heard a story[844] which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglaion, on his way up from the Peiraeus under the outer side of the northern wall,[845] becoming aware of dead bodies[846] that lay at the place of public execution at the same time felt a desire to see them and a repugnance and aversion, and that for a time he resisted[847] and

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πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν", and *Laws* 644 D. Aristotle *Eth.* 1139 a 12 somewhat differently.

[841] *ἐπτόηται*: almost technical, as in Sappho's ode, for the flutter of desire. *ἀλόγιστον*, though applied here to the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* only, suggests the bipartite division of Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1102 a 28.

[842] So the bad steed which symbolizes the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* in *Phaedrus* 253 E is *ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος*.

[843] We now approach the distinctively Platonic sense of *θυμός* as the power of noble wrath, which, unless perverted by a bad education, is naturally the ally of the reason, though as mere angry passion it might seem to belong to the irrational part of the soul, and so, as Glaucon suggets, be akin to appetite, with which it is associated in the mortal soul of the *Timaeus* 69 D. In *Laws* 731 B-C Plato tells us again that the soul cannot combat injustice without the capacity for righteous indignation. The Stoics affected to deprecate anger always, and the difference remained a theme of controversy between them and the Platonists. Cf. Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, ii. pp. 321 ff., Seneca, *De ira*, i. 9, and *passim*. Moralists are still divided on the point. Cf. Bagehot, *Lord Brougham*: "Another faculty of Brougham . . . is the faculty of easy anger. The supine placidity of civilization is not favorable to animosity [Bacon's word for *θυμός*]." Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, pp. 60 ff. and p. 62, seems to contradict Plato: "The supposed conflict between reason and passion is, as I hold, meaningless if it is taken to imply that the reason is a faculty separate from the emotions," etc. But this is only his metaphysics. On the practical ethical issue he is with Plato.

[844] Socrates has heard and trusts a, to us, obscure anecdote which shows how emotion may act as a distinct principle rebuking the lower appetites or curiosities. Leontius is unknown, except for Bergk's guess identifying him with the Leotrophides of a corrupt fragment of Theopompus Comicus, fr. 1 Kock, p. 739.

[845] He was following the outer side of the north wall up the city. Cf. *Lysis* 203 A, Frazer, *Paus.* ii. 40, Wachsmuth, *Stadt Athen*, i. p. 190.

[846] The corpses were by, near, or with the executioner (*ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀρύγματι*) whether he had thrown them into the pit (*βάραθρον*) or not.

veiled his head, but overpowered in despite of all by his desire, with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses and cried, "There, ye wretches,[848] take your fill of the fine spectacle!""

"I too," he said,

"have heard the story."

"Yet, surely, this anecdote," I said,

"signifies that the principle of anger sometimes fights against desires as an alien thing against an alien."

"Yes, it does," he said.

"And do we not," said I,

"on many other occasions observe when his desires constrain a man contrary to his reason that he reviles himself and is angry with that within which masters him and that as it were in a faction of two parties the high spirit of such a man becomes the ally of his reason? But its[849] making common cause[850] with the desires against the reason when reason whispers low[851] "Thou must not"—that, I think, is a kind of thing you would not affirm ever to have perceived in yourself, nor, I fancy, in anybody else either."

"No, by heaven," he said.

"Again, when a man thinks himself to be in the wrong,[852] is it not true that the nobler he is the less is he capable of anger though suffering hunger and cold[853] and whatsoever else at the hands of him whom he believes to be acting justly therein, and as I say[854] his spirit refuses to be aroused against such a one?"

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[847] Cf. Antiphon fr. 18 Kock "πληγείς, τέως μὲν ἐπεκράτει τῆς συμφορᾶς", etc., and "Maids who shrieked to see the heads Yet shrieking pressed more nigh."

[848] He apostrophizes his eyes, in a different style from Romeo's, "Eyes, look your last."

[849] *αὐτόν*: we shift from the *θυμός* to the man and back again.

[850] *ἀντιπράττειν*: that is, opposite the reason. It may be construed with *δεῖν* or as the verb of *αὐτόν*. There are no real difficulties in the passage, though many have been found. The order of the words and the anacoluthon are intentional and effective. Cf. on 434 C. "οὐκ ἂν . . . ποτέ" is to literal understanding an exaggeration. But Plato is speaking of the normal action of uncorrupted *θυμός*. Plato would not accept the psychology of Euripides' *Medea* (1079-1080): "καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων". Cf. Dr. Loeb's translation of Décharme, p. 340.

[851] *αἱροῦντος*: cf. 604 C, and L. and S. *s. v.* A. II. 5.

[852] So Aristotle *Rhet.* 1380 b 17 "οὐ γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον", and *Eth. Nic.* 1135 b 28 "ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν". This is true only with Plato's reservation *γενναιότερος*. The baser type is angry when in the wrong.

[853] Cf. Demosthenes xv. 10 for the same general idea.

[854] *ὃ λέγω*: idiomatic, as I was saying.

"True," he said.

"But what when a man believes himself to be wronged, does not his spirit in that case[855] seethe and grow fierce (and also because of his suffering hunger, cold and the like) and make itself the ally of what he judges just, and in noble souls[856] it endures and wins the victory and will not let go until either it achieves its purpose, or death ends all, or, as a dog is called back by a shepherd, it is called back by the reason within and calmed."

"Your similitude is perfect," he said,

"and it confirms[857] our former statements that the helpers are as it were dogs subject to the rulers who are as it were the shepherds of the city."

"You apprehend my meaning excellently," said I.

"But do you also take note of this?"

"Of what?"

"That what we now think about the spirited element is just the opposite of our recent surmise. For then we supposed it to be a part of the appetitive, but now, far from that, we say that, in the factions[858] of the soul, it much rather marshals itself on the side of the reason."

"By all means," he said.

"Is it then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the appetitive, or just as in the city there were three existing kinds that composed its structure, the moneymakers, the helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?"

"We have to assume it as a third," he said.

"Yes," said I,

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[855] *ἐν τούτῳ*: possibly "in such an one," preferably "in such a case." *θυμός* is plainly the subject of *ζεῖ*. (Cf. the physiological definition in Aristotle *De anima* 403 a 31 "ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν αἵματος"), and so, strictly speaking, of all the other verbs down to *λήγει*. *καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν . . . πάσχειν* is best taken as a parenthesis giving an additional reason for the anger, besides the sense of injustice.

[856] *τῶν γενναίων*: i.e. the *θυμός* of the noble, repeating *ὅσῳ ἂν γενναιότερος ᾖ* above. The interpretation "does not desist from his noble (acts)" destroys this symmetry and has no warrant in Plato's use of *γενναῖος*. Cf. 375 E, 459 A. The only argument against the view here taken is that "*θυμός* is not the subject of *λήγει*," which it plainly is. The shift from *θυμός* to the man in what follows is no difficulty and is required only by *τελευτήσῃ*, which may well be a gloss. Cf. A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.

[857] *καίτοι γε* calls attention to the confirmation supplied by the image. Cf on 376 B, and my article in *Class. Journ.* vol. iii. p. 29.

[858] Cf. 440 B and *Phaedrus* 237 E.

"provided[859] it shall have been shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the appetitive."

"That is not hard to be shown," he said;

"for that much one can see in children, that they are from their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason, some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the majority quite late."

"Yes, by heaven, excellently said," I replied;

"and further, one could see in animals that what you say is true. And to these instances we may add the testimony of Homer quoted above:" He smote his breast and chided thus his heart. " *Hom. Od. 20.17* For there Homer has clearly represented that in us which has reflected about the better and the worse as rebuking that which feels unreasoning anger as if it were a distinct and different thing."

"You are entirely right," he said.

"Through these waters, then," said I,

"we have with difficulty made our way[860] and we are fairly agreed that the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state and in the soul of each one of us."

"That is so."

"Then does not the necessity of our former postulate immediately follow, that as and whereby[861] the state was wise so and thereby is the individual wise?"

"Surely."

"And so whereby and as the individual is brave, thereby and so is the state brave, and that both should have all the other constituents of virtue in the same way[862]?"

"Necessarily."

"Just too, then, Glaucon, I presume we shall say a man is in the same way in which a city was just."

"That too is quite inevitable."

"But we surely cannot have forgotten this, that the state was just

[859]It still remains to distinguish the *λογιστικόν* from *θυμός*, which is done first by pointing out that young children and animals possess *θυμός* (Cf. *Laws* 963 E, Aristotle *Politics* 1334 b 22 ff.), and by quoting a line of Homer already cited in 390 D, and used in *Phaedo* 94 E, to prove that the soul, regarded there as a unit, is distinct from the passions, there treated as belonging to the body, like the mortal soul of the *Timaeus*. See *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 42-43.

[860]Cf. *Parmenides* 137 A, Pindar, *Ol.* xiii. 114 "ἐχνεῦσαι".

[861]Cf. 435 B.

[862]Cf. *Meno* 73 C, *Hippias Major* 295 D. A virtual synonym for *τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει*, *Meno* 72 E.

by reason of each of the three classes found in it fulfilling its own function."

"I don't think we have forgotten," he said.

"We must remember, then, that each of us also in whom[863] the several parts within him perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair."

"We must indeed remember," he said.

"Does it not belong to the rational part to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and to the principle of high spirit to be subject to this and its ally?"

"Assuredly."

"Then is it not, as we said,[864] the blending of music and gymnastics that will render them concordant, intensifying and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm?"

"Quite so," said he.

"And these two thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase,[865] will preside over the appetitive part which is the mass[866] of the soul in each of us and the most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the body[867] and so waxing big and strong, it may not keep to[868] its own work but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fitting[869] that it should, and so overturn[870] the entire life of all."

"By all means," he said.

"Would not these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from without[871] also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel,[872] the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by

[863] *ὅτου*: cf. 431 B "οὗ", and 573 D "ὧν".

[864] Cf. 411 E, 412 A.

[865] Cf. on 433 B-E, 443 D, and *Charmides* 161 B.

[866] Cf. on 431 A-B, *Laws* 689 A-B.

[867] Strictly speaking, pleasure is in the mind, not in the body. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 330. *καλουμένων* implies the doctrine of the *Gorgias* 493 E, 494 C, *Philebus* 42 C, *Phaedrus* 258 E, and 583 B-584 A, that the pleasures of appetite are not pure or real. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 152. Cf. on *λεγομένων* 431 C.

[868] Cf. on 426 E, 606 B.

[869] *προσῆκον*: sc. *ἐστὶν ἄρχειν*. *γένει*, by affinity, birth or nature. Cf. 444 B. q reads *γενῶν*.

[870] Cf. 389 D.

[871] Cf. 415 E.

its courage executing the ruler's designs?"

"That is so."

"Brave, too, then, I take it, we call each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures[873] the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared."

"Right," he said.

"But wise by that small part that[874] ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possession[875] in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three."

"By all means."

"And again, was he not sober by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it?"

"The virtue of soberness certainly," said he,

"is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an individual."

"But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have so often[876] described."

"That is altogether necessary."

"Well then," said I,

"has our idea of justice in any way lost the edge[877] of its contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed itself to be in the state?"

"I think not," he said.

"We might," I said,

"completely confirm your reply and our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our definition—by applying commonplace and vulgar[878] tests to it."

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[872] Cf. Isocrates xii. 138 "αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ βουλευομένη περὶ ἁπάντων".

[873] Cf. 429 C-D

[874] Cf. Goodwin's *Greek Grammar*, 1027.

[875] *ἔχον*: anacoluthic epexegesis, corresponding to *ὅταν . . . διασώζῃ. αὖ* probably marks the correspondence.

[876] *ᾧ πολλάκις*: that is, by the principle of *τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.*

[877] *ἀπαμβλύνεται*: is the edge or outline of the definition blunted or dimmed when we transfer it to the individual?

[878] The transcendental or philosophical definition is confirmed by vulgar tests. The man who is just in Plato's sense will not steal or betray or fail in ordinary duties. Cf. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1178 b 16 "ἡ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος". . . to say that the gods are *σώφρονες*. Similarly Plato feels that there is a certain vulgarity in applying the cheap

"What are these?"

"For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a deposit[879] of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would be more likely so to act than men of a different kind?"

"No one would," he said.

"And would not he be far removed from sacrilege and theft and betrayal of comrades in private life or of the state in public?"

"He would."

"And, moreover, he would not be in any way faithless either in the keeping of his oaths or in other agreements."

"How could he?"

"Adultery, surely, and neglect of parents and of the due service of the gods would pertain to anyone rather than to such a man."

"To anyone indeed," he said.

"And is not the cause of this to be found in the fact that each of the principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled?"

"Yes, that and nothing else."

"Do you still, then, look for justice to be anything else than this potency which provides men and cities of this sort?"

"No, by heaven," he said,

"I do not."

"Finished, then, is our dream and perfected —the surmise we spoke of,[880] that, by some Providence, at the very beginning of our foundation of the state, we chanced to hit upon the original principle and a sort of type of justice."

"Most assuredly."

"It really was, it seems, Glaucon, which is why it helps,[881] a sort

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tests of prudential morality (Cf. *Phaedo* 68 C-D) to intrinsic virtue. "Be this," is the highest expression of the moral law. "Do this," eventually follows. Cf. Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, pp. 376 and 385, and Emerson, *Self-Reliance*: "But I may also neglect the reflex standard, and absolve me to myself . . . If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day." The Xenophontic Socrates (Xenophon *Memorabilia* iv. 4. 10-11 and iv. 4. 17) relies on these vulgar tests.

[879] Cf. on 332 A and Aristotle *Rhet.* 1383 b 21.

[880] *ὅ*: Cf. on 434 D.

[881] The contemplation of the *εἴδωλον*, image or symbol, leads us to the reality. The reality is always the Platonic Idea. The *εἴδωλον*, in the case of ordinary "things," is the material copy which men mistake for the reality (516 A). In the case of spiritual things

of adumbration of justice, this principle that it is right for the cobbler by nature to cobble and occupy himself with nothing else, and the carpenter to practice carpentry, and similarly all others. But the truth of the matter[882] was, as it seems, that justice is indeed something of this kind, yet not in regard to the doing of one's own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one's self, and the things of one's self—it means that[883] a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own,[884] and having first attained to self-mastery[885] and beautiful order[886] within himself,[887] and having harmonized[888] these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean, and all others there may be between them, and having

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and moral ideas, there is no visible image or symbol (*Politicus* 286 A), but imperfect analogies, popular definitions, suggestive phrases, as *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν*, well-meant laws and institutions serve as the *εἴδωλα* in which the philosophic dialectician may find a reflection of the true idea. Cf. on 520 C, *Sophist* 234 C, *Theaetetus* 150 B.

[882]Cf. *Timaeus* 86 D, *Laws* 731 E, *Apology* 23 A. The reality of justice as distinguished from the *εἴδωλον*, which in this case is merely the *economic* division of labor. Adam errs in thinking that the real justice is justice in the soul, and the *εἴδωλον* is justice in the state. In the state too the division of labor may be taken in the lower or in the higher sense. Cf. on 370 A, Introduction p. xv.

[883]*μὴ ἐάσαντα . . . δόχαν* 444 A: Cf. *Gorgias* 459 C, 462 C. A series of participles in implied indirect discourse expand the meaning of *τὴν ἐντός* (*πρᾶξιν*), and enumerate the conditions precedent (resumed in *οὕτω δή*443 E; Cf. *Protagoras* 325 A) of all action which is to be called just if it tends to preserve this inner harmony of the soul, and the reverse if it tends to dissolve it. The subject of *πράττειν* is anybody or Everyman. For the general type of sentence and the Stoic principle that nothing imports but virtue cf. 591 E and 618 C.

[884]Cf. on 433 E.

[885]Cf. *Gorgias* 491 D where Callicles does not understand.

[886]Cf. *Gorgias* 504.

[887]Cf. 621 C and on 352 A.

[888]The harmony of the three parts of the soul is compared to that of the three fundamental notes or strings in the octave, including any intervening tones, and so by implication any faculties of the soul overlooked in the preceding classification. Cf. Plutarch, *Plat. Quest.* 9. Proclus, p. 230 Kroll. *ὥσπερ* introduces the images, the exact application of which is pointed by *ἀτεχνῶς*. Cf. on 343 C. The scholiast tries to make two octaves (*δὶς διὰ πασῶν*) of it. The technical musical details have at the most an antiquarian interest, and in no way affect the thought, which is that of Shakespeare's "For government, though high and low and lower, Put into parts, doth keep one in concent, Congreeing in a full and natural close Like music." (*Henry V.* I. ii. 179) Cf. Cicero, *De rep.* ii. 42, and Milton (*Reason of Church Government*), "Discipline . . . which with her musical chords preserves and holds all the parts thereof together."

linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit,[889] one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practice if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendance of the body or it may be in political action or private business, in all such doings believing and naming[890] the just and honorable action to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of soul, and wisdom the science that presides over such conduct; and believing and naming the unjust action to be that which ever tends to overthrow this spiritual constitution, and brutish ignorance, to be the opinion[891] that in turn presides[892] over this."

"What you say is entirely true, Socrates."

"Well," said I,

"if we should affirm that we had found the just man and state and what justice really is[893] in them, I think we should not be much mistaken."

"No indeed, we should not," he said.

"Shall we affirm it, then?"

"Let us so affirm."

"So be it, then," said I;

"next after this, I take it, we must consider injustice."

"Obviously."

"Must not this be a kind of civil war[894] of these three principles, their meddlesomeness[895] and interference with one another's functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature is such

[889] Cf. *Epin.* 992 B. The idea was claimed for the Pythagoreans; cf. Zeller I. i. p. 463, Guyau, *Esquisse d'une Morale*, p. 109 "La moralité n'est autre chose que l'unité de l'être." "The key to effective life is unity of life," says another modern rationalist.

[890] *ὀνομάζοντα* betrays a consciousness that the ordinary meaning of words is somewhat forced for edification. Cf. *Laws* 864 A-B and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 9, n. 21. Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 1138 b 6) would regard all this as mere metaphor.

[891] *ἐπιστήμην . . . δόχαν*: a hint of a fundamental distinction, not explicitly mentioned before in the *Republic*. Cf. *Meno* 97 B ff. and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 47-49. It is used here rhetorically to exalt justice and disparage injustice. *ἀμαθία* is a very strong word, possibly used here already in the special Platonic sense: the ignorance that mistakes itself for knowledge. Cf. *Sophist.*

[892] *ἐπιστατοῦσαν*: Isocrates would have used a synonym instead of repeating the word.

[893] Cf. 337 B.

[894] *στάσιν*: cf. 440 E. It is defined in *Sophist* 228 B. Aristotle would again regard this as mere metaphor.

[895] *πολυπραγμοσύνην*:434 B and Isocrates viii. 59.

that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle? Something of this sort, I fancy, is what we shall say, and that the confusion of these principles and their straying from their proper course is injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and brutish ignorance and, in general,[896] all turpitude."

"Precisely this," he replied.

"Then," said I,

"to act unjustly and be unjust and in turn to act justly the meaning of all these terms becomes at once plain and clear, since injustice and justice are so."

"How so?"

"Because," said I,

"these are in the soul what[897] the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body; there is no difference."

"In what respect?" he said.

"Healthful things surely engender health[898] and diseaseful disease."

"Yes."

"Then does not doing just acts engender justice and unjust injustice?"

"Of necessity."

"But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating and being dominated[899] by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature."

"Yes, that is so."

"And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature?"

"Exactly so," he said.

"Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health[900] and beauty

[896] *συλλήβδην*: summing up, as in *Phaedo* 69 B.

[897] *ὡς ἐκεῖνα*: a proportion is thus usually stated in an ancoluthic apposition.

[898] The common-sense point of view, "fit fabricando faber." Cf. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1103 a 32. In *Gorgias* 460 B, Socrates argues the paradox that he who knows justice does it. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 11, n. 42.

[899] Cf. the generalization of *ἔρως* to include medicine and music in *Symposium* 186-187, and *Timaeus* 82 A, *Laws* 906 C, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 500.

[900] The identification of virtue with spiritual health really, as Plato says (445 A), answers the main question of the *Republic*. It is not explicitly used as one of the three final arguments in the ninth book, but is implied in 591 B. It is found "already" in *Crito* 47 D-E. Cf. *Gorgias* 479 B

and good condition of the soul, and vice would be disease,[901] ugliness, and weakness."

"It is so."

"Then is it not also true that beautiful and honorable pursuits tend to the winning of virtue and the ugly to vice?"

"Of necessity."

"And now at last, it seems, it remains for us to consider whether it is profitable to do justice and practice honorable pursuits and be just, whether[902] one is known to be such or not, or whether injustice profits, and to be unjust, if only a man escape punishment and is not bettered by chastisement.[903]"

"Nay, Socrates," he said,

"I think that from this point on our inquiry becomes an absurdity[904]—if, while life is admittedly intolerable with a ruined constitution of body even though accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world, we are yet to be asked to suppose that, when the very nature and constitution of that whereby we live[905] is disordered and corrupted, life is going to be worth living, if a man can only do as he pleases,[906] and pleases to do anything save that which will rid him of evil and injustice and make him possessed of justice and virtue—now that the two have been shown to be as we have described them."

"Yes, it is absurd," said I;

"but nevertheless, now that we have won to this height, we must not grow weary in endeavoring to discover[907] with the utmost possible clearness that these things are so."

"That is the last thing in the world we must do," he said.

"Come up here[908] then," said I,

"that you may see how many are the kinds of evil, I mean those that it is worth while to observe and distinguish.[909]"

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[901] *κακία . . . αἶσχος*: *Sophist* 228 E distinguishes two forms of *κακία · νόσος* or moral evil, and ignorance or *αισχος*. Cf. *Gorgias* 477 B.

[902] *ἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τε*: Cf. 337 C, 367 E, 427 D, 429 E.

[903] Cf. *Gorgias* 512 A-B, and on 380 B.

[904] Cf. on 456 D. On the following *argumentum ex contrario* Cf. on 336 E.

[905] Cf. on 353 D and Aristotle *De anima* 414 a 12 ff. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 41.

[906] Cf. 577 D, *Gorgias* 466 E. If all men desire the good, he who does evil does not do what he really wishes.

[907] *ὅσον . . . κατιδεῖν* is generally taken as epexegetic of *ἐνταῦθα*. It is rather well felt with *οὐ χρὴ ἀποκάμνειν*.

[908] Cf. *Apology* 25 C.

"I am with you," he said;

"only do you say on."

"And truly," said I,

"now that we have come to this height[910] of argument I seem to see as from a point of outlook that there is one form[911] of excellence, and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet that there are some four among them that it is worth while to take note of."

"What do you mean?" he said.

"As many as are the varieties of political constitutions that constitute specific types, so many, it seems likely, are the characters of soul."

"How many, pray?"

"There are five kinds of constitutions," said I,

"and five kinds of soul."

"Tell me what they are," he said.

"I tell you," said I,

"that one way of government would be the constitution that we have just expounded, but the names that might be applied to it are two.[912] If one man of surpassing merit rose among the rulers, it would

[909] *ἆ γε δὴ καὶ ἄξια θέας*: for *καί* Cf. *Sophist* 223 A, 229 D, *Timaeus* 83 C, *Politicus* 285 B, and 544 A, C-D. By the strict theory of ideas any distinction may mark a class, and so constitute an idea. (Cf. *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina*, pp. 22-25.) But Plato's logical practice recognizes that only typical or relevant "Ideas" are worth naming or considering. The *Republic* does not raise the metaphysical question how a true idea is to be distinguished from a part or from a partial or casual concept. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 52-53, n. 381, *Politicus* 263 A-B.

[910] Cf. 588 B, Emerson, *Nominalist and Realist*, ii. p. 256: "We like to come to a height of land and see the landscape, just as we value a general remark in a conversation." Cf. Lowell, *Democracy*, Prose Works, vi. 8: "He who has mounted the tower of Plato to look abroad from it will never hope to climb another with so lofty a vantage of speculation." From this and 517 A-B, the *ἀνάβασις* became a technical or cant term in Neoplatonism.

[911] *ἓν μέν*, etc.: perhaps a faint remembrance of the line *ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί*, quoted by Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1106 b 35. It suggests Plato's principle of the unity of virtue, as *ἄπειρα* below suggests the logical doctrine of the *Philebus* 16 and *Parmenides* 145 A, 158 B-C that the other of the definite idea is the indefinite and infinite.

[912] The true state is that in which knowledge governs. It may be named indifferently monarchy, or aristocracy, according as such knowledge happens to be found in one or more than one. It can never be the possession of many. Cf. 494 A. The inconsistencies which some critics have found between this statement and other parts of the *Republic*, are imaginary. Hitherto the *Republic* has contemplated a plurality of rulers, and such is its scheme to the end. But we are explicitly warned in 540 D and 587 D that this is a matter of indefference. It is idle then to argue with Immisch, Krohn, and others that the passage marks a sudden, violent alteration of the original design.

be denominated royalty; if more than one, aristocracy."

"True," he said.

"Well, then," I said,

"this is one of the forms I have in mind. For neither would a number of such men, nor one if he arose among them, alter to any extent worth mentioning the laws of our city—if he preserved the breeding and the education that we have described."

"It is not likely," he said.

Book 5

"To such a city, then, or constitution I apply the terms good[913] and right—and to the corresponding kind of man; but the others I describe as bad and mistaken, if this one is right, in respect both to the administration of states and to the formation[914] of the character of the individual soul, they falling under four forms of badness."

"What are these," he said. And I was going on[915] to enumerate them in what seemed to me the order of their evolution[916] from one another, when Polemarchus—he sat at some little distance[917] from Adeimantus—stretched forth his hand, and, taking hold of his garment[918] from above by the shoulder, drew the other toward him and, leaning forward himself, spoke a few words in his ear, of which we overheard nothing[919] else save only this,

"Shall we let him off,[920] then," he said,

"or what shall we do?"

"By no means," said Adeimantus, now raising his voice.

"What, pray,"[921] said I,

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[913] Cf. on 427 E, and Newman, Introduction to Aristotle *Politics* p. 14; for *ὀρθή*, normal, see p. 423.

[914] *κατασκευήν*: a highly general word not to be pressed in this periphrasis. Cf. *Gorgias* 455 E, 477 B.

[915] Cf. 562 C, *Theaetetus* 180 C, Stein on Herodotus i. 5. For the transition here to the digression of books V., VI., and VII. cf. Introduction p. xvii, *Phaedo* 84 C. "Digression" need not imply that these books were not a part of the original design.

[916] *μεταβαίνειν*: the word is half technical. Cf. 547 C, 550 D, *Laws* 676 A, 736 D-E, 894 A.

[917] *ἀπωτέρω* absolutely. Cf. Cratinus 229 Kock "ὄνοι κάθηνται τῆς λύρας ἀπωτέρω".

[918] Cf. 327 B.

[919] Cf. 359 E.

[920] Cf. on 327 C.

"is it that you are not letting off?"

"You," said he.

"And for what reason, pray?" said I.

"We think you are a slacker," he said,

"and are trying to cheat[922] us out of a whole division,[923] and that not the least, of the argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it, and expect to "get away with it" by observing thus lightly that, of course, in respect to women and children it is obvious to everybody that the possessions of friends will be in common.[924]"

"Well, isn't that right, Adeimantus?" I said.

"Yes," said he,

"but this word "right,"[925] like other things, requires defining[926] as to the way[927] and manner of such a community. There might be many ways. Don't, then, pass over the one that you[928] have in mind. For we have long been lying in wait for you, expecting that you would say something both of the procreation of children and their bringing up,[929] and would explain the whole matter of the community of women and children of which you speak. We think that the right or wrong management of this makes a great difference, all the difference in the world,[930] in the constitution of a state;"

"so now, since you are beginning on another constitution before sufficiently defining this, we are firmly resolved, as you overheard, not to let you go till you have expounded all this as fully as you did the rest."

"Set me down, too," said Glaucon,

"as voting this ticket.[931]"

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[921]Cf. 337 D, 343 B, 421 C, 612 C, *Laches* 188 E, *Meno* 80 B. There is a play on the double meaning, "What, pray?" and "Why, pray?"

[922]Cf. Sophocles *Trach.* 437.

[923]So Isocrates xv. 74 "ὅλοις εἴδεσι".

[924]Cf. 424 A, *Laws* 739 C. Aristotle says that the possessions of friends should be separate in ownership but common in use, as at Sparta. Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle *Politics* p. 201, Epicurus in Diogenes Laertius x. 11, Aristotle *Politics* 1263 a 30 ff., Euripides *Andromache* 270.

[925]Cf. 459 D, *Laws* 668 D, Aristotle *Politics* 1269 b 13, Shakespeare *Tro. and Cre.* I. i. 23 "But here's yet in the word *hereafter* the kneading, the making of the cake," etc.

[926]Cf. *Laws* 665 B 7.

[927]Cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1264 a 12.

[928]Emphatic. Cf. 427 E.

[929]*γενομένους*: a noun is supplied from the preceding verb. Cf. on 598 C, and on 341 D.

[930]*μέγα . . . καὶ ὅλον*: cf. 469 C, 527 C, *Phaedo* 79 E, *Laws* 779 B, 944 C, *Symposium* 188 D, Demosthenes ii. 22, Aeschylus *Prom.* 961.

"Surely," said Thrasymachus,

"you may consider it a joint resolution of us all, Socrates."

"What a thing you have done," said I,

"in thus challenging[932] me! What a huge debate you have started afresh, as it were, about this polity, in the supposed completion of which I was rejoicing, being only too glad to have it accepted as I then set it forth! You don't realize what a swarm[933] of arguments you are stirring up[934] by this demand, which I foresaw and evaded to save us no end of trouble."

"Well," said Thrasymachus,[935]

"do you suppose this company has come here to prospect for gold[936] and not to listen to discussions?"

"Yes," I said,

"in measure."

"Nay, Socrates," said Glaucon,

"the measure[937] of listening to such discussions is the whole of life for reasonable men. So don't consider us, and do not you yourself grow weary in explaining to us what we ask or, your views as to how this communion of wives and children among our guardians will be managed, and also about the rearing of the children while still young in the interval between[938] birth and formal schooling which is thought to be the most difficult part of education. Try, then, to tell us what must be the manner of it."

"It is not an easy thing to expound, my dear fellow," said I,

"for even more than the provisions that precede it, it raises many doubts. For one might doubt whether what is proposed is possible[939] and, even conceding the possibility,[940] one might still be sceptical

[931]Cf. *Protagoras* 330 C.

[932]Cf. *Theaetetus* 184 C, *Gorgias* 469 C.

[933]For the metaphor cf. Euripides *Bacchae* 710 and "σμῆνος", *Republic* 574 D, *Cratylus* 401 C, *Meno* 72 A.

[934]Cf. *Philebus* 36 D, *Theaetetus* 184 A, *Cratylus* 411 A.

[935]Thrasymachus speaks here for the last time. He is mentioned in 357 A, 358 B-C, 498 C, 545 B, 590 D.

[936]Lit. to smelt ore. The expression was proverbial and was explained by an obscure anecdote. Cf. Leutsch, *Paroemiographi*, ii. pp. 91, 727, and i. p. 464, and commentators on Herodotus iii. 102.

[937]Plato often anticipates and repels the charge of tedious length (see *Politicus* 286 C, *Philebus* 28 D, 36 D). Here the thought takes a different turn (as 504 C). The *δέ γε* implies a slight rebuke (Cf. *Class. Phil* . xiv. pp. 165-174).

[938]So 498 A. Cf. on Aristophanes *Acharnians* 434, and *Laws* 792 A.

[939]Cf. 456 C, Thucydides vi. 98, Introduction xvii.

[940]*εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα*: a common formula for what a disputant can afford to concede.

whether it is best. For which reason one as it were, shrinks from touching on the matter lest the theory be regarded as nothing but a "wish-thought,"[941] my dear friend."

"Do not shrink," he said,

"for your hearers will not be inconsiderate[942] nor distrustful nor hostile." And I said,

"My good fellow, is that remark intended to encourage me?"

"It is," he said.

"Well, then," said I,

"it has just the contrary effect. For, if I were confident that I was speaking with knowledge, it would be an excellent encouragement. For there is both safety and security in speaking the truth with knowledge about our greatest and dearest concerns to those who are both wise and dear."

"But to speak when one doubts himself and is seeking while he talks is a fearful and slippery venture. The fear is not of being laughed at,[943] for that is childish, but, lest, missing the truth, I fall down and drag my friends with me in matters where it most imports not to stumble. So I salute Nemesis,[944] Glaucon, in what I am about to say. For, indeed,[945] I believe that involuntary homicide is a lesser fault than to mislead opinion about the honorable, the good, and the just. This is a risk that it is better to run with enemies[946] than with friends, so that your encouragement is none." And Glaucon, with a laugh, said,

"Nay, Socrates, if any false note in the argument does us any harm, we release you as[947] in a homicide case, and warrant you pure of hand

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Cf. Lysias xiii. 52, xxii. 1, xxii. 10. It occurs six times in the *Charmides*.

[941] Cf. Introduction xxxi-xxxii, 456 C, 499 C, 540 D, *Laws* 736 D, Aristotle *Politics* 1260 b 29, 1265 a 17 "δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχην, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον".

[942] *ἀγνώμονες* = inconsiderate, unreasonable, as Andocides ii. 6 shows.

[943] Cf. on 452 C-D, *Euthydemus* 3 C "To be laughed at is no matter," *Laws* 830 B "τὸν τῶν ἀνοήτων γέλωτα", Euripides fr. 495.

[944] *Ἀδράστειαν*: practically equivalent to Nemesis. Cf. our "knock on wood." Cf. Posnansky in *Breslauer Phil. Abhandl.* v. 2, "Nemesis und Adrasteia": Herodotus i. 35, Aeschylus *Prom.* 936, Euripides *Rhesus* 342, Demosthenes xxv. 37 "καὶ Ἀδράστειαν μὲν ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἐγὼ προσκυνῶ". For the moral earnestness of what follows cf. 336 E, *Gorgias* 458 A, and Joubert *apud* Arnold, *Essays in Crit.* p. 29 "Ignorance . . . is in itself in intellectual matters a crime of the first order."

[945] *γὰρ οὖν*, for in fact, but often with the suggestion that the fact has to be faced, as e.g. in *Timaeus* 47 E, where the point is often missed.

[946] Almost proverbial. Cf. my note on Horace, *Odes* iii. 27. 21. Plato is speaking here from the point of view of the ordinary man, and not from that of his "Sermon on the Mount ethics." Cf. *Philebus* 49 D and *Gorgias* 480 E, where Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, ii. pp. 332 and 350, goes astray. Cf. *Class. Phil* . vol. i. p. 297.

and no deceiver of us. So speak on with confidence."

"Well," said I,

"he who is released in that case is counted pure as the law bids, and, presumably, if there, here too."

"Speak on, then," he said,

"for all this objection."

"We must return then," said I,

"and say now what perhaps ought to have been said in due sequence there. But maybe this way is right, that after the completion of the male drama we should in turn go through with the female,[948] especially since you are so urgent."

"For men, then, born and bred as we described there is in my opinion no other right possession and use of children and women than that which accords with the start we gave them. Our endeavor, I believe, was to establish these men in our discourse as the guardians of a flock[949]?"

"Yes."

"Let us preserve the analogy, then, and assign them a generation and breeding answering to it, and see if it suits us or not."

"In what way?" he said.

"In this. Do we expect the females of watch-dogs to join in guarding what the males guard and to hunt with them and share all their pursuits or do we expect the females to stay indoors as being incapacitated by the bearing and the breeding of the whelps while the males toil and have all the care of the flock?"

"They have all things in common," he replied,

"except that we treat the females as weaker and the males as stronger."

"Is it possible, then," said I,

"to employ any creature for the same ends as another if you do not assign it the same nurture and education?"

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[947] *ὥσπερ* marks the legal metaphor to which *ἐκεῖ* below refers. Cf. *Laws* 869 E, and Euripides *Hippolytus* 1433 and 1448-1450, with Hirzel, *Δίκη* etc. p. 191, n. 1, Demosthenes xxxvii. 58-59. Plato transfers the idea to the other world in *Phaedo* 114 A-B, where the pardon of their victims is required for the release of sinners. The passage is used by the older critics in the comparison of Plato with Christianity.

[948] Sophron's Mimes are said to have been so classified. For *δρᾶμα* cf. also *Theaetetus* 150 A.

[949] For the use of analogies drawn from animals cf. 375-376, 422 D, 466 D, 467 B, 491 D-E, 537 A, 546 A-B, 564 A. Plato is only pretending to deduce his conclusions from his imagery. Aristotle's literal-minded criticism objects that animals have no "economy," *Politics* 1264 b 4-6.

"It is not possible."

"If, then, we are to use the women for the same things as the men, we must also teach them the same things."

"Yes."

"Now music together with gymnastic was the training we gave the men."

"Yes."

"Then we must assign these two arts to the women also and the offices of war and employ them in the same way."

"It would seem likely from what you say," he replied.

"Perhaps, then," said I,

"the contrast with present custom[950] would make much in our proposals look ridiculous if our words[951] are to be realized in fact."

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"What then," said I,

"is the funniest thing you note in them? Is it not obviously the women exercising unclad in the palestra together with the men, not only the young, but even the older, like old men in gymnasiums,[952] when, though wrinkled and unpleasant to look at, they still persist in exercising?"

"Yes, on my word," he replied,

"it would seem ridiculous under present conditions."

"Then," said I,

"since we have set out to speak our minds, we must not fear all the jibes[953] with which the wits would greet so great a revolution, and the sort of things they would say about gymnastics and culture, and most of all about the bearing of arms and the bestriding of horses."

"You're right," he said.

"But since we have begun we must go forward to the rough part

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[950]Reformers always denounce this source of wit while conservative satirists maintain that ridicule is a test of truth. Cf. e.g. >Renan, *Avenir de la Science*, p. 439 "Le premier pas dans la carrière philosophique est de se cuirasser contre le ridicule," and Lucian, *Piscator* 14 "No harm can be done by a joke; that on the contrary, whatever is beautiful shines brighter . . . like gold cleansed," Harmon in Loeb translation, iii. 22. There was a literature for and against custom (sometimes called *συνήθεια*) of which there are echoes in Cicero's use of *consuetudo*, *Acad.* ii. 75, *De off.* i. 148, *De nat. deor.* i. 83.

[951]*ἤ λέγεται*: cf. on 389 D.

[952]Cf. *Theaetetus* 162 B, and the *ὀψιμαθής* or late learner in Theophrastus' *Characters* xxvii. 14 Loeb. Euripides *Andromache* 596 ff. denounces the light attire of Spartan women when exercising.

[953]Cf. Propert. iv. 13 Muller.

of our law,[954] after begging these fellows not to mind their own business[955] but to be serious, and reminding them that it is not long since the Greeks thought it disgraceful and ridiculous, as most of the barbarians[956] do now, for men to be seen naked. And when the practice of athletics began, first with the Cretans and then with the Lacedaemonians, it was open to the wits of that time to make fun of these practices, don't you think so?"

"I do."

"But when, I take it, experience showed that it is better to strip than to veil all things of this sort, then the laughter of the eyes[957] faded away before that which reason revealed to be best, and this made it plain that he talks idly who deems anything else ridiculous but evil, and who tries to raise a laugh by looking to any other pattern of absurdity than that of folly and wrong or sets up any other standard of the beautiful as a mark for his seriousness than the good."

"Most assuredly," said he.

"Then is not the first thing that we have to agree upon with regard to these proposals whether they are possible or not? And we must throw open the debate[958] to anyone who wishes either in jest or earnest to raise the question whether female human nature is capable of sharing with the male all tasks or none at all, or some but not others,[959] and under which of these heads this business of war falls. Would not this be that best beginning which would naturally and proverbially lead to the best end[960]?"

"Far the best," he said.

"Shall we then conduct the debate with ourselves in behalf of those others[961] so that the case of the other side may not be taken defenceless

[954]For a variation of this image cf. 568 D.

[955]Plato plays on his own favorite phrase. The proper business of the wit is to raise a laugh. Cf. *Symposium* 189 B.

[956]Cf. Thucydides i. 6, Herodotus i. 10. Sikes in *Anthropolgy and the Classics* says this was borrowed from Thucydides, whom Wilamowitz says Plato never read. Cf. Dio Chrys. xiii. 226 M. For *ἐξ οὗ* cf. Demosthenes iv. 3, Isocrates v. 47.

[957]Lit. what (seemed) laughable to (in) the eyes.

[958]Cf. 607 D "δοῖμεν . . . λόγον".

[959]Plato as elsewhere asks whether it is true of all, some, or none. So of the commingling of ideas in *Sophist* 251 D. Aristotle (*Politics* 1260 b 38) employs the same would-be exhaustive method.

[960]*ἀρχόμενος . . . τελευτήσειν*: an overlooked reference to a proverb also overlooked by commentators on Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 35. Cf. Pindar, fr. 108 A Loeb, *Laws* 775 E, Sophocles, fr. 831 (Pearson), Antiphon the Sophist, fr. 60 (Diels).

[961]This pleading the opponent's case for him is common in Plato. Cf. especially the plea for Protagoras in *Theaetetus* 166-167.

and go by default[962]?"

"Nothing hinders," he said.

"Shall we say then in their behalf: "There is no need, Socrates and Glaucon, of others disputing against you, for you yourselves at the beginning of the foundation of your city agreed[963] that each one ought to mind as his own business the one thing for which he was fitted by nature?" "We did so agree, I think; certainly!" "Can it be denied then that there is by nature a great difference between men and women?" "Surely there is." "Is it not fitting, then, that a different function should be appointed for each corresponding to this difference of nature?" "Certainly." "How, then, can you deny that you are mistaken and in contradiction with yourselves when you turn around and affirm that the men and the women ought to do the same thing, though their natures are so far apart?" Can you surprise me with an answer to that question?"

"Not easily on this sudden challenge," he replied:

"but I will and do beg you to lend your voice to the plea in our behalf, whatever it may be."

"These and many similar difficulties, Glaucon," said I,

"I foresaw and feared, and so shrank from touching on the law concerning the getting and breeding of women and children."

"It does not seem an easy thing, by heaven," he said,

"no, by heaven."

"No, it is not," said I;

"but the fact is that whether one tumbles into a little diving-pool or plump into the great sea he swims all the same."

"By all means."

"Then we, too, must swim and try to escape out of the sea[964] of argument in the hope that either some dolphin[965] will take us on its back or some other desperate rescue."

"So it seems," he said.

"Come then, consider," said I,

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[962] Apparently a mixture of military and legal phraseology. Cf. "ἐκπέρσῃ" in *Protagoras* 340 A, *Iliad* v. 140 "τὰ δ' ἐρῆμα φοβεῖται", and the legal phrase *ἐρήμην καταδιαιτᾶν* or *οφλεῖν*.

[963] *ὡμολογεῖτε*: cf. 369 E f. For *κατὰ φύσιν* cf. 370 C and 456 C. The apparent emphasis of *φύσις* in this book is of little significance. Cf. *Laws*, *passim*.

[964] Cf. the "πέλαγος τῶν λόγων" *Protagoras* 338 A. Similarly Sidney Smith: "cut his cable, and spread his enormous canvas, and launch into the wide sea of reasoning eloquence."

[965] An allusion to the story of Arion and the dolphin in Herodotus i. 24, as *ὑπολαβεῖν* perhaps proves. For *ἄπορον* cf. 378 A.

"if we can find a way out. We did agree that different natures should have differing pursuits and that the nature of men and women differ. And yet now we affirm that these differing natures should have the same pursuits. That is the indictment."

"It is."

"What a grand[966] thing, Glaucon," said I,

"is the power of the art of contradiction[967]!"

"Why so?"

"Because," said I,

"many appear to me to fall into it even against their wills, and to suppose that they are not wrangling but arguing, owing to their inability to apply the proper divisions and distinctions to the subject under consideration. They pursue purely verbal oppositions, practising eristic, not dialectic on one another."

"Yes, this does happen to many," he said;

"but does this observation apply to us too at present?"

"Absolutely," said I;

"at any rate I am afraid that we are unawares[968] slipping into contentiousness."

"In what way?"

"The principle that natures not the same ought not to share in the same pursuits we are following up most manfully and eristically[969] in the literal and verbal sense but we did not delay to consider at all what particular kind of diversity and identity[970] of nature we had in mind and with reference to what we were trying to define it when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same."

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[966] *γενναία*: often as here ironical in Plato. Cf. *Sophist* 231 B, where interpreters misunderstand it. But the new L. and S. is correct.

[967] *ἀντιλογικῆς*: one of several designations for the eristic which Isocrates maliciously confounds with dialectic while Plato is careful to distinguish them. Cf. E. S. Thompson, *The Meno of Plato* , Excursus V., pp. 272 ff. and the introduction to E.H. Gifford's *Euthydemus*, p. 42. Among the marks of eristic are the pusuit of merely verbal oppositions as here and *Euthydemus* 278 A, 301 B, *Theaetetus* 164 C; the neglect to distinguish and divide, *Philebus* 17 A, *Phaedrus* 265 E, 266 A, B; the failure to distinguish the hypothesis from its consequences, *Phaedo* 101 E, *Parmenides* 135-136.

[968] *ἄκοντες* is almost "unconscious". Cf. *Philebus* 14 C.

[969] Greek style often couples thus two adverbs, the second defining more specifically the first, and, as here and often in Plato and Aristophanes, with humorous or paradoxical effect. Cf. Aristophanes *Knights* 800 "εὖ καὶ μιαρῶς". So Shakespeare "well and chirurgeonly."

[970] Cf. *Sophist* 256 A-B for the relativity of "same" and "other." *Politicus* 292 C describes in different language the correct method.

"No, we didn't consider that," he said.

"Wherefore, by the same token," I said,

"we might ask ourselves whether the natures of bald[971] and long-haired men are the same and not, rather, contrary. And, after agreeing that they were opposed, we might, if the bald cobbled, forbid the long-haired to do so, or vice versa."

"That would be ridiculous," he said.

"Would it be so," said I,

"for any other reason than that we did not then posit likeness and difference of nature in any and every sense, but were paying heed solely to the kind of diversity and homogeneity that was pertinent[972] to the pursuits themselves?"

"We meant, for example, that a man and a woman who have a physician's[973] mind have the same nature. Don't you think so?"

"I do."

"But that a man physician and a man carpenter have different natures?"

"Certainly, I suppose."

"Similarly, then," said I,

"if it appears that the male and the female sex have distinct qualifications for any arts or pursuits, we shall affirm that they ought to be assigned respectively to each. But if it appears that they differ only in just this respect that the female bears and the male begets, we shall say that no proof has yet been produced that the woman differs from the man for our purposes, but we shall continue to think that our guardians and their wives ought to follow the same pursuits."

"And rightly," said he.

"Then, is it not the next thing to bid our opponent tell us precisely for what art or pursuit concerned with the conduct of a state the woman's nature differs from the man's?"

"That would be at any rate fair."

"Perhaps, then, someone else, too, might say what you were saying

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[971] For this humorously trivial illustration cf. Mill, *Rep. Gov.* chap. viii. p. 190: "I have taken no account of difference of sex. I consider it to be as entirely irrelevant to political rights as difference in height, or in the color of the hair;" and Mill's disciple Leslie Stephen, *The English Utilitarians*, i. 291: "We may at least grant that the burden of proof should be upon those who would disfranchise all red-haired men."

[972] Cf. *Laches* 190 D "εἰς ὃ τείνειν δοκεῖ", *Protagoras* 345 B.

[973] Adam makes difficulties, but Cf. *Laws* 963 A "νοῦν . . . κυβερνητικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν καὶ στρατηγικόν". The translation follows Hermann despite the objection that this reading forestalls the next sentence. Cf. Campbell *ad loc.* and Apelt, *Woch. für klass. Phil* ., 1903, p. 344.

a while ago, that it is not easy to find a satisfactory answer on a sudden,[974] but that with time for reflection there is no difficulty."

"He might say that."

"Shall we, then, beg the raiser of such objections to follow us, if we may perhaps prove able to make it plain to him that there is no pursuit connected with the administration of a state that is peculiar to woman?"

"By all means."

"Come then, we shall say to him, answer our question. Was this the basis of your distinction between the man naturally gifted for anything and the one not so gifted—that the one learned easily, the other with difficulty; that the one with slight instruction could discover[975] much for himself in the matter studied, but the other, after much instruction and drill, could not even remember what he had learned; and that the bodily faculties of the one adequately served[976] his mind, while, for the other, the body was a hindrance? Were there any other points than these by which you distinguish the well endowed man in every subject and the poorly endowed?"

"No one," said he,

"will be able to name any others."

"Do you know, then, of anything practised by mankind in which the masculine sex does not surpass the female on all these points?[977] Must we make a long story of it by alleging weaving and the watching of pancakes and the boiling pot, whereon the sex plumes itself and wherein its defeat will expose it to most laughter?"

"You are right," he said,

"that the one sex[978] is far surpassed by the other in everything, one may say. Many women, it is true, are better than many men in many

[974]Plato anticipates the objection that the Socratic dialectic surprises assent. Cf. more fully 487 B, and for a comic version *Hippias Major* 295 A "if I could go off for a little by myself in solitude I would tell you the answer more precisely than precision itself."

[975]Cf. *Politicus* 286 E, where this is said to be the object of teaching.

[976]Cf. *Protagoras* 326 B, *Republic* 498 B, 410 C, Isocrates xv. 180, Xenophon *Memorabilia* ii. 1. 28.

[977]On the alleged superiority of men even in women's occupations cf. the amusing diatribe of the old bachelor in George Eliot's *Adam Bede*, chap. xxi.: "I tell you there isn't a thing under the sun that needs to be done at all but what a man can do better than women, unless it's bearing children, and they do that in a poor makeshift way," and the remarks on women as cooks of the bachelor Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 234. But Xenophon *Memorabilia* iii. 9. 11 takes the ordinary view. On the character of women generally Cf. *Laws* 781 and Aristotle in Zeller trans. ii. 215.

[978]Cf. *Cratylus* 392 C "ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος".

things, but broadly speaking, it is as you say."

"Then there is no pursuit of the administrators of a state that belongs to a woman because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. But the natural capacities are distributed alike among both creatures, and women naturally share in all pursuits and men in all—yet for all the woman is weaker than the man."

"Assuredly."

"Shall we, then, assign them all to men and nothing to women?"

"How could we?"

"We shall rather, I take it, say that one woman has the nature of a physician and another not, and one is by nature musical, and another unmusical?"

"Surely."

"Can we, then, deny that one woman is naturally athletic and warlike and another unwarlike and averse to gymnastics?"

"I think not."

"And again, one a lover, another a hater, of wisdom? And one high-spirited, and the other lacking spirit?"

"That also is true."

"Then it is likewise true that one woman has the qualities of a guardian and another not. Were not these the natural qualities of the men also whom we selected for guardians?"

"They were."

"The women and the men, then, have the same nature in respect to the guardianship of the state, save in so far as the one is weaker, the other stronger."

"Apparently."

"Women of this kind, then, must be selected to cohabit with men of this kind and to serve with them as guardians since they are capable of it and akin by nature."

"By all means."

"And to the same natures must we not assign the same pursuits?"

"The same."

"We come round,[979] then, to our previous statement, and agree that it does not run counter to nature to assign music and gymnastics to the wives of the guardians."

"By all means."

"Our legislation, then, was not impracticable or utopian,[980] since

[979] Cf. *Gorgias* 517 C.

[980] Cf. on 450 D.

the law we proposed accorded with nature. Rather, the other way of doing things, prevalent today, proves, as it seems, unnatural."

"Apparently."

"The object of our inquiry was the possibility and the desirability[981] of what we were proposing."

"It was."

"That it is possible has been admitted."

"Yes."

"The next point to be agreed upon is that it is the best way."

"Obviously."

"For the production of a guardian, then, education will not be one thing for our men and another for our women, especially since the nature which we hand over to it is the same."

"There will be no difference."

"How are you minded, now, in this matter?"

"In what?"

"In the matter of supposing some men to be better and some worse,[982] or do you think them all alike?"

"By no means."

"In the city, then, that we are founding, which do you think will prove the better men, the guardians receiving the education which we have described or the cobblers educated by the art of cobbling[983]?"

"An absurd question," he said.

"I understand," said I;

"and are not these the best of all the citizens?"

"By far."

"And will not these women be the best of all the women?"

"They, too, by far."

"Is there anything better for a state than the generation in it of the best possible women[984] and men?"

"There is not."

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[981] Cf. Introduction p. xvii.

[982] This is only a more complicated case of the point of style noted on 349 D. Cf. *Cratylus* 386 A, *Sophist* 247 A.

[983] Cf. on 421 A. We should not press this incidental phrase to prove that Plato would not educate all the citizens, as he in fact does in the *Laws* and by implication in the *Politicus*.

[984] Cf. Morley, *Voltaire*, p. 103: "It has been rather the fashion to laugh at the Marquise de Châtelet, for no better reason than that she, being a woman, studied Newton. . . . There is probably nothing which would lead to so rapid and marked an improvement in the world as a large increase of the number of women in it with the will and the capacity to master Newton as thoroughly as she did."

"And this, music and gymnastics applied as we described will effect."

"Surely."

"Then the institution we proposed is not only possible but the best for the state."

"That is so."

"The women of the guardians, then, must strip, since they will be clothed with virtue as a garment,[985] and must take their part with the men in war and the other duties of civic guardianship and have no other occupation. But in these very duties lighter tasks must be assigned to the women than to the men because of their weakness as a class. But the man who ridicules unclad women, exercising because it is best that they should, "plucks the unripe[986] fruit" of laughter and does not know, it appears, the end of his laughter nor what he would be at. For the fairest thing that is said or ever will be said is this, that the helpful is fair[987] and the harmful foul."

"Assuredly."

"In this matter, then, of the regulation of women, we may say that we have surmounted one of the waves of our paradox and have not been quite swept[988] away by it in ordaining that our guardians and female guardians must have all pursuits in common, but that in some sort the argument concurs with itself in the assurance that what it proposes is both possible and beneficial."

"It is no slight wave that you are thus escaping."

"You will not think it a great[989] one," I said,

"when you have seen the one that follows."

"Say on then and show me," said he.

"This," said I,

"and all that precedes has for its sequel, in my opinion, the following law."

"What?"

"That these women shall all be common[990] to all the men, and that

[985]Cf. Rousseau, *Lettre à d'Alembert*, "Couvertes de l'honnêteté publique."

[986]Cf. Pindar, fr. 209 Schroeder, "ἀτελῆ σοφίας καρπὸν δρέπειν". Plato varies the quotation to suit his purpose.

[987]This is one of the chief texts for the alleged utilitarianism of Plato, a question too complicated to be settled by anything less than a comparative study of the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Philebus*, *Republic* (IX) and *Laws*. *ὠφέλιμον* suggests "benefit" rather than "utility." Cf. Introduction to second volume of this translation, and on 339 A-B.

[988]Cf. Aeschylus *Septem*, *in fine*.

[989]For this form of exaggeration Cf. on 414 C, 339 B.

[990]On the whole topic cf. Introduction p. xxxiv, Lucian, *Fugitivi* 18 "οὐκ εἰδότες ὅπως ὁ ἱερὸς ἐκεῖνος ἠξίου κοινὰς ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς γυναῖκας", Epictetus fr. 53, p. 21,

none shall cohabit with any privately; and that the children shall be common, and that no parent shall know its own offspring nor any child its parent."

"This is a far bigger paradox than the other, and provokes more distrust as to its possibility and its utility.[991]"

"I presume," said I,

"that there would be no debate about its utility, no denial that the community of women and children would be the greatest good, supposing it possible. But I take it that its possibility or the contrary would be the chief topic of contention."

"Both," he said,

"would be right sharply debated."

"You mean," said I,

"that I have to meet a coalition of arguments. But I expected to escape from one of them, and that if you agreed that the thing was beneficial, it would remain for me to speak only of its feasibility."

"You have not escaped detection," he said,

"in your attempted flight, but you must render an account of both."
"I must pay the penalty," I said,

"yet do me this much grace: Permit me to take a holiday, just as men of lazy minds are wont to feast themselves on their own thoughts when they walk alone.[992] Such persons, without waiting to discover

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Rousseau, *Emile*, v: "je ne parle point de cette prétendue communauté de femmes dont le reproche tant répété prouve que ceux qui le lui font ne l'ont jamais lu." But Rousseau dissents violently from what he calls "cette promiscuité civile qui confond partout les deux sexes dans les mêmes emplois." Cf. further the denunciations of the Christian fathers *passim*, who are outdone by De Quincey's "Otaheitian carnival of licentious appetite, connected with a contempt of human life which is excessive even for paganism." Most of the obvious parallels between Plato and Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* follow as a matter of course from the very notion of communal marriage and supply no evidence for the dating of a supposed earlier edition of the whole or a part of the *Republic*. In any case the ideas of the *Republic* might have come to Aristophanes in conversation before publication; and the Greeks knew enough of the facts collected in such books as Westermarck's *Marriage*, not to be taken altogether by surprise by Plato's speculations. Cf. Herodotus iv. 104, and Aristotle *Politics* 1262 a 20. Cf. further Adam's exhaustive discussion in the appendix to this book, Grube, "The Marriage Laws in Plato's *Republic*," *Classical Quarterly*, 1927, pp. 95 ff., Teichmüller, *Literarische Fehden*, i. p. 19 n., and the more recent literature collected in Praechter-Ueberweg, 12th ed. i. p. 207, Pöhlmann, *Geschichte der Sozialenfrage und des Sozialsmus in der antiken Welt*, ii. p. 578, Pohlenz, *Aus Platon's Werdezeit*, pp. 225-228, C. Robert, *Hermes* lvii. pp. 351 ff.

[991] A distinct suggestion of the topics of the "useful" and the "possible" in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

[992] Cf. Isocrates ii. 47, on "those who in solitude do not deliberate but imagine what

how their desires may be realized, dismiss that topic to save themselves the labor of deliberating about possibilities and impossibilities, assume their wish fulfilled, and proceed to work out the details in imagination, and take pleasure in portraying what they will do when it is realized, thus making still more idle a mind that is idle without that.[993] I too now succumb to this weakness[994] and desire to postpone[995] and examine later the question of feasibility, but will at present assume that, and will, with your permission, inquire how the rulers will work out the details in practice, and try to show that nothing could be more beneficial to the state and its guardians than the effective operation of our plan. This is what I would try to consider first together with you, and thereafter the other topic, if you allow it."

"I do allow it," he said:

"proceed with the inquiry."

"I think, then," said I,

"that the rulers, if they are to deserve that name, and their helpers likewise, will, the one, be willing to accept orders,[996] and the other, to give them, in some things obeying our laws, and imitating[997] them in others which we leave to their discretion."

"Presumably."

"You, then, the lawgiver," I said,

"have picked these men and similarly will select to give over to them women as nearly as possible of the same nature.[998] And they, having houses and meals in common, and no private possessions of that

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they wish," and Chesterton's saying, "All feeble spirits live in the future, because it is a soft job"; cf. further on day-dreams, Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, ii. p. 71, and Lucian's "Πλοῖον ἢ εὐχαί". Plato's description anticipates the most recent psychology in everything except the term "autistic thinking."

[993] ἄλλως: Cf. 495 B.

[994] Cf. Blaydes on Aristophanes *Clouds* 727.

[995] Cf. Herodotus ix. 8. He returns to the postponed topic in 466 D, but again digresses and does not take it up definitely till 471 C or rather 473 C-D. The reason is that the third wave of paradox is also the condition of the possibility of realization. Cf. Introduction p. xvii.

[996] Cf. on 340 A-B.

[997] That is to say, they are to imitate or conform to our principles in the details which we leave to them. So in the *Laws*, 770 B, 846 C, 876 E, and the secondary divinities in the *Timaeus*, 69 C. Cf. *Politicus* 301 A, and Aristotle *Politics* 1261 b 2 "μιμεῖται".

[998] Cf. 456 B. Plato has already explained that he means "of like nature in respect to capacity for government." There is no contradiction of the doctrine of the *Politicus*, 310 A (Cf. *Laws* 773 A-B) that the mating should blend opposite temperaments. Those elements are already mixed in the selection of the guardians. Cf. 375 B-C, 410 D-E and *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 62, n. 481.

kind, will dwell together, and being commingled in gymnastics and in all their life and education, will be conducted by innate necessity to sexual union. Is not what I say a necessary consequence?"

"Not by the necessities of geometry," he said,

"but by those of love,[999] which are perhaps keener and more potent than the other to persuade and constrain the multitude."

"They are, indeed," I said;

"but next, Glaucon, disorder and promiscuity in these unions or in anything else they do would be an unhallowed thing in a happy state and the rulers will not suffer it."

"It would not be right," he said.

"Obviously, then, we must arrange marriages, sacramental so far as may be. And the most sacred marriages would be those that were most beneficial."

"By all means."

"How, then, would the greatest benefit result? Tell me this, Glaucon. I see that you have in your house hunting-dogs and a number of pedigree cocks.[1000] Have you ever considered something about their unions and procreations?"

"What?"[1001] he said.

"In the first place," I said,

"among these themselves, although they are a select breed, do not some prove better than the rest?"

"They do."

"Do you then breed from all indiscriminately, or are you careful to breed from the best[1002]?"

"From the best."

"And, again, do you breed from the youngest or the oldest, or, so far as may be, from those in their prime?"

"From those in their prime."

"And if they are not thus bred, you expect, do you not, that your birds and hounds will greatly degenerate?"

"I do," he said.

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[999] The phrase is imitated by Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1122 D "φυσικαῖς, οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς ἐλκόμενος ἀνάγκαις".

[1000] Cf. *Laws* 789 B-C.

[1001] The riddling question to which the response is "what?" is a mannerism derived from tragedy, which becomes very frequent in the later style of the *Sophist*, *Politicus* and *Philebus*.

[1002] This commonplace of stirpiculture or eugenics, as it is now called, begins with Theognis 184, and has thus far got no further.

"And what of horses and other animals?" I said;

"is it otherwise with them?"

"It would be strange if it were," said he.

"Gracious," said I,

"dear friend, how imperative, then, is our need of the highest skill in our rulers, if the principle holds also for mankind."

"Well, it does," he said,

"but what of it?"

"This," said I,

"that they will have to employ many of those drugs[1003] of which we were speaking. We thought that an inferior physician sufficed for bodies that do not need drugs but yield to diet and regimen. But when it is necessary to prescribe drugs we know that a more enterprising and venturesome physician is required."

"True; but what is the pertinency?"

"This," said I:

"it seems likely that our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the benefit[1004] of their subjects. We said, I believe, that the use of that sort of thing was in the category of medicine."

"And that was right," he said.

"In our marriages, then, and the procreation of children, it seems there will be no slight need of this kind of "right.""

"How so?"

"It follows from our former admissions," I said,

"that the best men must cohabit with the best women in as many cases as possible and the worst with the worst in the fewest, and that the offspring of the one must be reared and that of the other not, if the flock[1005] is to be as perfect as possible. And the way in which all this is brought to pass must be unknown to any but the rulers, if, again, the herd of guardians is to be as free as possible from dissension."

"Most true," he said.

"We shall, then, have to ordain certain festivals and sacrifices, in which we shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms, and our poets must compose hymns suitable to the marriages that then take place. But the number of the marriages we will leave to the discretion of the rulers, that they may keep the number of the citizens as nearly as may

[1003] A recurrence to the metaphor of 389 B, as we are reminded below in D.

[1004] Cf. 389 B, 414 C, and *Laws* 663 D "ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι"

[1005] Cf. on 343 A-B and *Politicus* 267 B-C, 268 B. *αὖ* below merely marks the second consideration, harmony, the first being eugenics.

be the same,[1006] taking into account wars and diseases and all such considerations, and that, so far as possible, our city may not grow too great or too small."

"Right," he said.

"Certain ingenious lots, then, I suppose, must be devised so that the inferior man at each conjugation may blame chance and not the rulers."

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"And on the young men, surely, who excel in war and other pursuits we must bestow honors and prizes, and, in particular, the opportunity of more frequent intercourse with the women, which will at the same time be a plausible pretext for having them beget as many of the children as possible."

"Right."

"And the children thus born will be taken over by the officials appointed for this, men or women or both, since, I take it, the official posts too are common to women and men. The offspring of the good, I suppose, they will take to the pen or créche, to certain nurses who live apart in a quarter of the city, but the offspring of the inferior, and any of those of the other sort who are born defective, they will properly dispose of in secret,[1007] so that no one will know what has become of them."

"That is the condition," he said,

"of preserving the purity of the guardians' breed."

"They will also supervise the nursing of the children, conducting the mothers to the pen when their breasts are full, but employing every device[1008] to prevent anyone from recognizing her own infant. And they will provide others who have milk if the mothers are insufficient. But they will take care that the mothers themselves shall not suckle too long, and the trouble of wakeful nights and similar burdens they will devolve upon the nurses, wet and dry."

"You are making maternity a soft job[1009] for the women of the

[1006] Plato apparently forgets that this legislation applies only to the guardians. The statement that ancient civilization was free from the shadow of Malthusianism requires qualification by this and many other passages. Cf. 372 C and *Laws* 740 D-E. The ancients in fact took it for granted.

[1007] Opinions differ whether this is euphemism for exposure. On the frequency or infrequency of this practice cf. Professor La Rue Van Hook's article in T.A.P.A. vol. li, and that of H. Bolkestein, *Class. Phil.* vol. xvii. (1922) pp. 222-239.

[1008] Cf. on 414 B and Aristotle *Politics* 1262 a 14 ff.

[1009] Another favorite idea and expression. Cf. *Gorgias* 459 C, *Laws* 648 C, 713 D, 720 C, 779 A, 903 E, Isocrates iv. 36, Xenophon *Memorabilia* iii. 13. 5.

guardians."

"It ought to be," said I,

"but let us pursue our design. We said that the offspring should come from parents in their prime."

"True."

"Do you agree that the period of the prime may be fairly estimated at twenty years for a woman and thirty for a man?"

"How do you reckon it?"[1010] he said.

"The women," I said,

"beginning at the age of twenty, shall bear for the state[1011] to the age of forty, and the man shall beget for the state from the time he passes his prime in swiftness in running to the age of fifty-five."

"That is," he said,

"the maturity and prime for both of body and mind."

"Then, if anyone older or younger than the prescribed age meddles with procreation for the state, we shall say that his error is an impiety and an injustice, since he is begetting for the city a child whose birth, if it escapes discovery, will not be attended by the sacrifices and the prayers which the priests and priestesses and the entire city prefer at the ceremonial marriages, that ever better offspring may spring from good sires[1012] and from fathers helpful to the state sons more helpful still. But this child will be born in darkness and conceived in foul incontinence."

"Right," he said.

"And the same rule will apply," I said,

"if any of those still within the age of procreation goes in to a woman of that age with whom the ruler has not paired him. We shall say that he is imposing on the state a base-born, uncertified, and unhallowed child."

"Most rightly," he said.

"But when, I take it, the men and the women have passed the age of lawful procreation, we shall leave the men free to form such relations with whomsoever they please, except[1013] daughter and mother and

[1010] Cf. on 458 C.

[1011] Half humorous legal language. Cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1335 b 28 "λειτουργεῖν . . . πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν", and Lucan's "urbi pater est, urbique maritus" (*Phars.* ii. 388). The dates for marriage are given a little differently in the *Laws*, 785 B, 833 C-D, men 30-35, women 16-20. On the whole question and Aristotle's opinion cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle *Politics* p. 183; cf. also Grube, *Class. Quarterly* 1927, pp. 95 ff., "The Marriage Laws in Plato's *Republic*."

[1012] Cf. Horace, *Odes* iv. 4. 29.

their direct descendants and ascendants, and likewise the women, save with son and father, and so on, first admonishing them preferably not even to bring to light[1014] anything whatever thus conceived, but if they are unable to prevent a birth to dispose of it on the understanding that we cannot rear such an offspring."

"All that sounds reasonable," he said;

"but how are they to distinguish one another's fathers and daughters, and the other degrees of kin that you have just mentioned?"

"They won't," said I,

"except that a man will call all male offspring born in the tenth and in the seventh month after he became a bridegroom his sons, and all female, daughters, and they will call him father.[1015] And, similarly, he will call their offspring his grandchildren[1016] and they will call his group grandfathers and grandmothers. And all children born in the period in which their fathers and mothers were procreating will regard one another as brothers and sisters. This will suffice for the prohibitions of intercourse of which we just now spoke. But the law will allow brothers and sisters to cohabit if the lot so falls out and the Delphic oracle approves."

"Quite right," said he.

"This, then, Glaucon, is the manner of the community of wives and children among the guardians. That it is consistent with the rest of our polity and by far the best way is the next point that we must get confirmed by the argument. Is not that so?"

"It is, indeed," he said.

"Is not the logical first step towards such an agreement to ask ourselves what we could name as the greatest good for the constitution of a state and the proper aim of a lawgiver in his legislation, and what would be the greatest evil, and then to consider whether the proposals we have just set forth fit into the footprints[1017] of the good and do not suit those of the evil?"

"By all means," he said.

"Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that

[1013] Cf. *Laws* 838 A and 924 E.

[1014] Cf. Newman, *op. cit.* p. 187.

[1015] Cf. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, p. 89: "A native of Hawaii, for example, calls by the name of father . . . every man of an age such that he could be his father." Cf. Aristophanes *Eccles.* 636-637.

[1016] Cf. 363 D and *Laws* 899 E, 927 B.

[1017] We may perhaps infer from the more explicit reference in *Theaetetus* 193 C that Plato is thinking of the "recognition" by footprints in Aeschylus *Choeph.*205-210.

distracts it and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?"

"We do not."

"Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths?"

"By all means," he said.

"But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings to the city and its inhabitants?"

"Of course."

"And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as "mine" and "not mine," and similarly with regard to the word "alien"?"[1018]

"Precisely so."

"That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression "mine" and "not mine" of the same things in the same way."

"Much the best."

"And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man.[1019] For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connections stretching to the soul for "integration"[1020] with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the

[1018]Cf. 423 B, Aristotle *Politics* 1261 b 16 ff., "Plato's *Laws* and the Unity of Plato's Thought," *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) p. 358, *Laws* 664 A, 739 C-E, Julian (Teubner) ii. 459, Teichmüller, *Lit. Fehden*, vol. i. p. 19, Mill, *Utilitarianism*, iii. 345: "In an improving state of the human mind the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest, which, if perfect, would make him never think of or desire any beneficial condition for himself in the benefits of which they are not included;" Spinoza, paraphrased by Hoffding, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.* i. p. 325: "It would be best, since they seek a common good, if all could be like one mind and one body." Rabelais I. lvii. parodies Plato: "Si quelqu'un ou quelqu'une disoit "beuvons," tous beuvoient" etc. Aristotle's criticism, though using some of Plato's phrases, does not mention his name at this point but speaks of *τίνες*, *Politics* 1261 b 7.

[1019]Cf. *Laws* 829 A.

[1020]I so translate to bring out the analogy between Plato and e.g. Sherrington. For "to the soul" Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 328, *Laws* 673 A, *Timaeus* 45 D, 584 C, *Philebus* 33, 34, 43 B-C. Poschenrieder, *Die Platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den Hippocratischen Schriften*, p. 67, compares the *De locis in homine*, vi. p. 278 Littré.

man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labors in pain or is eased by pleasure."

"The same," he said,

"and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism."

"That is the kind of a state, then, I presume, that, when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil, will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole."

"Inevitably," he said,

"if it is well governed."

"It is time," I said,

"to return to our city and observe whether it, rather than any other, embodies the qualities agreed upon in our argument.[1021]"

"We must," he said.

"Well, then, there are to be found in other cities rulers and the people as in it, are there not?"

"There are."

"Will not all these address one another as fellow-citizens?"

"Of course."

"But in addition to citizens, what does the people in other states call its rulers."

"In most cities, masters. In democratic cities, just this, rulers."

"But what of the people in our city. In addition to citizens, what do they call their rulers?"

"Saviors and helpers," he said.

"And what term do these apply to the people?"

"Payers of their wage and supporters."

"And how do the rulers in other states denominate the populace?"

"Slaves," he said.

"And how do the rulers describe one another?"

"Co-rulers," he said.

"And ours?"

"Co-guardians."

"Can you tell me whether any of the rulers in other states would speak of some of their co-rulers as "belonging" and others as outsiders?"

"Yes, many would."

"And such a one thinks and speaks of the one that "belongs" as his

[1021] For these further confirmations of an established thesis cf. on 442-443.

own, doesn't he, and of the outsider as not his own?"

"That is so."

"But what of your guardians. Could any of them think or speak of his co-guardian as an outsider?"

"By no means," he said;

"for no matter whom he meets, he will feel that he is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a mother, a son, a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of these."

"Excellent," said I;

"but tell me this further, will it be merely the names[1022] of this kinship that you have prescribed for them or must all their actions conform to the names in all customary observance toward fathers and in awe and care and obedience for parents, if they look for the favor[1023] of either gods or men, since any other behaviour would be neither just nor pious? Shall these be the unanimous oracular voices that they hear from all the people, or shall some other kind of teaching beset[1024] the ears of your children from their birth, both concerning[1025] what is due to those who are pointed out as their fathers and to their other kin?"

"These," he said;

"for it would be absurd for them merely to pronounce with their lips the names of kinship without the deeds."

"Then, in this city more than in any other, when one citizen fares well or ill, men will pronounce in unison the word of which we spoke: "It is mine that does well; it is mine that does ill.""

"That is most true," he said.

"And did we not say that this conviction and way of speech[1026] brings with it a community in pleasures and pains?"

"And rightly, too."

"Then these citizens, above all others, will have one and the same thing in common which they will name mine, and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasures and pains in common."

"Quite so."

"And is not the cause of this, besides the general constitution of the state, the community of wives and children among the guardians?"

[1022] *τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον* may be thought to anticipate Aristotle's objections.

[1023] Cf. 554 D "ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον".

[1024] Cf. the reliance on a unanimous public opinion in the *Laws*, 838 C-D.

[1025] *περὶ . . . περί*: for the preposition repeated in a different sense cf. Isocrates iv. 34, ix, 3, and Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, III. i. "As here by Caesar and by you cut off."

[1026] *δόγματός τε καὶ ῥήματος*: Cf. *Sophist* 265 C, *Laws* 797 C.

"It will certainly be the chief cause," he said.

"But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts."

"And we were right in so agreeing."

"Then it is the greatest blessing for a state of which the community of women and children among the helpers has been shown to be the cause."

"Quite so," he said.

"And this is consistent with what we said before. For we said,[1027] I believe, that these helpers must not possess houses of their own or land or any other property, but that they should receive from the other citizens for their support the wage of their guardianship and all spend it in common. That was the condition of their being true guardians."

"Right," he said.

"Is it not true, then, as I am trying to say, that those former and these present prescriptions tend to make them still more truly guardians and prevent them from distracting the city by referring "mine" not to the same but to different things, one man dragging off to his own house anything he is able to acquire apart from the rest, and another doing the same to his own separate house, and having women and children apart, thus introducing into the state the pleasures and pains of individuals? They should all rather, we said, share one conviction about their own, tend to one goal, and so far as practicable have one experience of pleasure and pain."

"By all means," he said.

"Then will not law-suits and accusations against one another vanish,[1028] one may say,[1029] from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common? So that we can count on their being free from the dissensions that arise among men from the possession of property, children, and kin."

"They will necessarily be quit of these," he said.

"And again, there could not rightly arise among them any law-suit for assault or bodily injury. For as between age-fellows[1030] we shall say that self-defence is honorable and just, thereby compelling them

[1027] Cf. 416-417.

[1028] For a similar list Cf. *Laws* 842 D. Aristotle, *Politics* 1263 b 20 f., objects that it is not lack of unity but wickedness that causes these evils.

[1029] Softens the strong word *οἰχήσεται*.

[1030] Cf. A.J.P. vol. xiii. p. 364, Aeschines iii. 255, Xenophon *Rep. Lac.* 4. 5, *Laws* 880 A.

to keep their bodies in condition."

"Right," he said.

"And there will be the further advantage in such a law that an angry man, satisfying his anger in such wise, would be less likely to carry the quarrel to further extremes."

"Assuredly."

"As for an older man, he will always have the charge of ruling and chastising the younger."

"Obviously."

"Again, it is plain that the young man, except by command of the rulers, will probably not do violence to an elder or strike him, or, I take it, dishonor him in any other way. Two guardians sufficient to prevent that there are, fear and awe, awe restraining him from laying hands on one who may be his parent, and fear in that the others will rush to the aid of the sufferer, some as sons, some as brothers, some as fathers."

"That is the way it works out," he said.

"Then in all cases the laws will leave these men to dwell in peace together."

"Great peace."

"And if these are free from dissensions among themselves, there is no fear that[1031] the rest of the city will ever start faction against them or with one another."

"No, there is not."

"But I hesitate, so unseemly[1032] are they, even to mention the pettiest troubles of which they would be rid, the flatterings[1033] of the rich, the embarrassments and pains of the poor in the bringing-up of their children and the procuring of money for the necessities of life for their households, the borrowings, the repudiations, all the devices with which they acquire what they deposit with wives and servitors to husband,[1034] and all the indignities that they endure in such matters, which are obvious and ignoble and not deserving of mention."

"Even a blind[1035] man can see these," he said.

"From all these, then, they will be finally free, and they will live a happier life than that men count most happy, the life of the victors at

[1031] One of the profoundest of Plato's political aphorisms. Cf. on 545 D, *Laws* 683 E, and Aristotle *Politics* 1305 a 39.

[1032] *Alma sdegnosa.* Cf. 371 E, 396 B, 397 D, 525 D.

[1033] Cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1263 b 22.

[1034] Cf. 416 D, 548 A, 550 D.

[1035] Proverbial. Cf. *Sophist* 241 D.

Olympia.[1036]"

"How so?"

"The things for which those are felicitated are a small part of what is secured for these. Their victory is fairer and their public support more complete. For the prize of victory that they win is the salvation of the entire state, the fillet that binds their brows is the public support of themselves and their children— they receive honor from the city while they live and when they die a worthy burial."

"A fair guerdon, indeed," he said.

"Do you recall," said I,

"that in the preceding[1037] argument the objection of somebody or other rebuked us for not making our guardians happy, since, though it was in their power to have everything of the citizens, they had nothing, and we, I believe, replied that this was a consideration to which we would return if occasion offered, but that at present we were making our guardians guardians and the city as a whole as happy as possible, and that we were not modelling[1038] our ideal of happiness with reference to any one class?"

"I do remember," he said.

"Well then, since now the life of our helpers[1039] has been shown to be fairer and better than that of the victors at Olympia, need we compare[1040] it with the life of cobblers and other craftsmen and farmers?"

"I think not," he said.

"But further, we may fairly repeat what I was saying then also, that if the guardian shall strive for a kind of happiness that will unmake[1041] him as a guardian and shall not be content with the way of life that is moderate and secure and, as we affirm, the best, but if some senseless and childish opinion about happiness shall beset him and impel him to use his power to appropriate everything in the city for himself, then he will find out that Hesiod[1042] was indeed wise, who said that "the

[1036] Cf. 540B-C, 621D, *Laws* 715C, 807C, 840A, 946-947, 964C, Cicero *Pro Flacco* 31 "Olympionicen esse apud Graecos prope maius et gloriosius est quam Romae triumphasse." The motive is anticipated or parodied by Dracontion, Athenaeus 237 D, where the parasite boasts—"γέρα γὰρ αὐτοῖς ταῦτα τοῖς τἀλύμπιανικῶσι δέδοται χρηστότητος οὕνεκα".

[1037] Cf. 419 E-20.

[1038] Cf. 420 C. Omitting *τό*, translate "that we were not fixing our eyes on any one class, and portraying that as happy."

[1039] *ἐπικούρων*: the word here includes the rulers.

[1040] *κατά*, comparable to, on a level with. Cf. *Apology* 17 B, *Gorgias* 512 B.

[1041] *μηδέ*: cf. 420 D.

[1042] *Hes. WD 40.* So *Plat. Laws 690 E.*

half was in some sort more than the whole." *Hes. WD 40*"

"If he accepts my counsel," he said,

"he will abide in this way of life."

"You accept, then, as we have described it, this partnership of the women with our men in the matter of education and children and the guardianship of the other citizens, and you admit that both within the city and when they go forth to war they ought to keep guard together and hunt together as it were like hounds, and have all things in every way, so far as possible, in common, and that so doing they will do what is for the best and nothing that is contrary to female human nature[1043] in comparison with male or to their natural fellowship with one another."

"I do admit it," he said.

"Then," I said,

"is not the thing that it remains to determine this, whether, namely, it is possible for such a community to be brought about among men as it is in the other animals,[1044] and in what way it is possible?"

"You have anticipated," he said,

"the point I was about to raise."

"For[1045] as for their wars," I said,

"the manner in which they will conduct them is too obvious for discussion."

"How so," said he.

"It is obvious that they will march out together,[1046] and, what is more, will conduct their children to war when they are sturdy, in order that, like the children of other craftsmen,[1047] they may observe the processes of which they must be masters in their maturity;"

"and in addition to looking on they must assist and minister in all the business of war and serve their fathers and mothers. Or have you never

[1043] *τήν*: this order is frequent and sometimes significant in the *Laws*. Cf. 690 C, 720 E, 814 E, 853 A, 857 D, 923 B.

[1044] Cf. on 451 D. The community in this case, of course, refers only to occupations.

[1045] *μὲν γάρ*: forced transition to a delaying digression.

[1046] So with modifications *Laws* 785 B, 794 C-D, 804 D-E, 806 A-B, 813-814, 829 E.

[1047] For this practice of Greek artists see Klein, *Praxiteles*, Newman, Introduction to Aristotle *Politics* p. 352, Pater, *The Renaissance* 104, *Protagoras* 328 A, *Laws* 643 B-C, *Protagoras* frag. 3 (Diels), Aristotle *Politics* 1336 b 36, Iambl. *Protrept.* xx., Polyb. vi. 2. 16, iii. 71. 6 "καὶ παιδομαθῆ περὶ τὰ πολεμικά", Aristides x. 72 who quoted Plato; Antidotus, Athenaeus, 240 B, where the parasite boasts that he was a *παιδομαθής* in his art, and Sosipater, Athenaeus 377 F, where the cook makes the same boast, Phocyl. frag. 13, (Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus*I., L.C.L.), Henry Arthur Jones, *Patriotism and popular Education*, Kipling, *From Sea to Sea*, p. 361. Greek language and satire contrasted such *παιδομαθεῖς* with the *ὀψιμαθεῖς* or late learners.

noticed the practice in the arts, how for example the sons of potters look on as helpers a long time before they put their hands to the clay?"

"They do, indeed."

"Should these then be more concerned than our guardians to train the children by observation and experience of what is to be their proper business?"

"That would be ridiculous," he said.

"But, further, when it comes to fighting, every creature will do better in the presence of its offspring?"

"That is so, but the risk, Socrates, is not slight, in the event of disasters such as may happen in war, that, losing their children as well as themselves, they make it impossible for the remnant of the state to recover."

"What you say is true," I replied;

"but, in the first place, is it your idea that the one thing for which we must provide is the avoidance of all danger?"

"By no means."

"And, if they are to take chances, should it not be for something success in which will make them better?"

"Clearly."

"Do you think it makes a slight difference and not worth some risk whether men who are to be warriors do or do not observe war as boys?"

"No, it makes a great difference for the purpose of which you speak."

"Starting, then, from this assumption that we are to make the boys spectators of war, we must further contrive[1048] security for them and all will be well, will it not?"

"Yes."

"To begin with, then," said I,

"will not the fathers be, humanly speaking, not ignorant of war and shrewd judges of which campaigns are hazardous and which not?"

"Presumably," he said.

"They will take the boys with them to the one and avoid the others?"

"Rightly."

"And for officers, I presume," said I,

"they will put in charge of them not those who are good for nothing else but men who by age and experience are qualified to serve at once as leaders and as caretakers of children."

"Yes, that would be the proper way."

[1048] *προσμηχανᾶσθαι*: Cf. on 414 B.

"Still, we may object, it is the unexpected[1049] that happens to many in many cases."

"Yes, indeed."

"To provide against such chances, then, we must wing[1050] the children from the start so that if need arises they may fly away and escape."

"What do you mean?" he said.

"We must mount them when very young," said I,

"and first have them taught to ride, and then conduct them to the scene of war, not on mettlesome war-steeds, but on the swiftest and gentlest horses possible; for thus they will have the best view of their own future business and also, if need arises, will most securely escape to safety in the train of elder guides."

"I think you are right," he said.

"But now what of the conduct of war? What should be the attitude of the soldiers to one another and the enemy? Am I right in my notions or not?"

"Tell me what notions," he said.

"Anyone of them who deserts his post, or flings away his weapons,[1051] or is guilty of any similar act of cowardice, should be reduced to the artisan or farmer class, should he not?"

"By all means."

"And anyone who is taken alive by the enemy[1052] we will make a present of to his captors, shall we not, to deal with their catch[1053] as they please?"

"Quite so."

"And don't you agree that the one who wins the prize of valor and distinguishes himself shall first be crowned by his fellows in the campaign, by the lads and boys each in turn?"

"I do."

"And be greeted with the right hand?"

"That, too."

[1049] *παρὰ δόξαν*: cf. Thucydides i. 122 "ἥκιστα ὁ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ", ii. 11, iii. 30, iv. 102, vii. 61.

[1050] *πτεροῦν*: metaphorical. In Aristophanes *Birds* 1436-1438 literal.

[1051] The terms are technical. Cf. *Laws* 943 D ff., Lipsius, *Das attische Recht* (1908), ii. pp. 452 ff.

[1052] *εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους*: technical. Cf. inscription in *Bulletin de corr. hellénique*, xii. p. 224, n. 1 "τῶν ἁλόντων εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους".

[1053] *ἄγρᾳ*: the word is chosen to give a touch of Spartan, or, as we should say, Roman severity. Cf. *Sophist* 235 C, Aeschylus *Eumenides* 148, Horace, *Odes*, iii. 5. 33 ff. Plutarch, *De aud. poet.* 30, says that in Homer no Greeks are taken prisoners, only Trojans.

"But I presume you wouldn't go as far as this?"

"What?"

"That he should kiss and be kissed by everyone[1054]?"

"By all means," he said,

"and I add to the law the provision that during that campaign none whom he wishes to kiss be allowed to refuse, so that if one is in love with anyone, male or female, he may be the more eager to win the prize."

"Excellent," said I,

"and we have already said that the opportunity of marriage will be more readily provided for the good man, and that he will be more frequently selected than the others for participation in that sort of thing, in order that as many children as possible may be born from such stock."

"We have," he replied.

"But, furthermore, we may cite Homer[1055] too for the justice of honoring in such ways the valiant among our youth. For Homer says that Ajax, who had distinguished himself in the war, was honored with the long chine,[1056] assuming that the most fitting meed for a brave man in the prime of his youth is that from which both honor and strength will accrue to him."

"Most rightly," he said.

"We will then," said I,

"take Homer as our guide in this at least. We, too, at sacrifices and on other like occasions, will reward the good so far as they have proved themselves good with hymns and the other privileges of which we have just spoken, and also with "seats of honor and meat and full cups" *Hom. Il. 8.162*, so as to combine physical training with honor for the good, both men and women."

"Nothing could be better," he said.

"Very well; and of those who die on campaign, if anyone's death has been especially glorious, shall we not, to begin with, affirm that he belongs to the golden race?"[1057]

"By all means."

[1054]The deplorable facetiousness of the following recalls the vulgarity of Xenophon's guard-house conversations. It is almost the only passage in Plato that one would wish to blot. Helvetius, otherwise anything but a Platonist, characteristically adopts it, Lange, *History of Materialism*, ii. p. 86.

[1055]*Hom. Il. 7.321-322.* Cf. also viii. 162, xii. 311.

[1056]I.e, the back. Hom. Il. 7.321-322.

[1057]Cf. 415 A.

"And shall we not believe Hesiod[1058] who tells us that when anyone of this race dies, so it is that they become "Hallowed spirits dwelling on earth, averters of evil, Guardians watchful and good of articulate-speaking mortals?" *Hes. WD 121*"

"We certainly shall believe him."

"We will inquire of Apollo,[1059] then, how and with what distinction we are to bury men of more than human, of divine, qualities, and deal with them according to his response.[1060]"

"How can we do otherwise?"

"And ever after[1061] we will bestow on their graves the tendance and worship paid to spirits divine. And we will practice the same observance when any who have been adjudged exceptionally good in the ordinary course of life die of old age or otherwise."

"That will surely be right," he said.

"But again, how will our soldiers conduct themselves toward enemies?"

"In what respect?"

"First, in the matter of making slaves of the defeated, do you think it right for Greeks to reduce Greek cities[1062] to slavery, or rather that so far as they are able, they should not suffer any other city to do so, but should accustom Greeks to spare Greeks, foreseeing the danger[1063] of enslavement by the barbarians?"

"Sparing them is wholly and altogether the better," said he.

"They are not, then, themselves to own Greek slaves, either, and they should advise the other Greeks not to?"

"By all means," he said;

"at any rate in that way they would be more likely to turn against the barbarians and keep their hands from one another."

"And how about stripping the dead after victory of anything except their weapons: is that well? Does it not furnish a pretext to cowards not to advance on the living foe, as if they were doing something needful when poking[1064] about the dead? Has not this snatching at the spoils ere new destroyed many an army?"

[1058] Cf. Stewart, *Myths of Plato*, p. 437.

[1059] Cf. 427 B-C.

[1060] *ἐξηγῆται*: cf. 427 C.

[1061] *τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον*: cf. Pindar in *Meno* 81 C, *Phaedo* 81 A.

[1062] For this Pan-Hellenic feeling cf. Xenophon *Ages.* 7. 6, *Hellen.* i. 6. 14, Aeschines ii. 115, Isocrates *Panegyricus.*

[1063] For the following Cf. *Laws* 693 A, and Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, iii. p. 275.

[1064] *κυπτάζωσι*: cf. Blaydes on Aristophanes *Nubes* 509.

"Yes, indeed."

"And don't you think it illiberal and greedy to plunder a corpse, and is it not the mark of a womanish and petty[1065] spirit to deem the body of the dead an enemy when the real foeman has flown away[1066] and left behind only the instrument[1067] with which he fought? Do you see any difference between such conduct and that of the dogs[1068] who snarl at the stones that hit them but don't touch the thrower?"

"Not the slightest."

"We must abandon, then, the plundering of corpses and the refusal to permit their burial.[1069]"

"By heaven, we certainly must," he said.

"And again, we will not take weapons to the temples for dedicatory[1070] offerings, especially the weapons of Greeks, if we are at all concerned to preserve friendly relations with the other Greeks. Rather we shall fear that there is pollution in bringing such offerings to the temples from our kind unless in a case where the god bids otherwise[1071]."

"Most rightly," he said.

"And in the matter of devastating the land of Greeks and burning their houses, how will your soldiers deal with their enemies."

"I would gladly hear your opinion of that."

"In my view," said I,

"they ought to do neither, but confine themselves to taking away the annual harvest. Shall I tell you why?"

"Do."

"In my opinion, just as we have the two terms, war and faction, so there are also two things, distinguished by two differentiae.[1072] The

[1065]Cf. Juvenal, *Satire* xiii. 189-191.

[1066]*ἀποπταμένου*: both Homer and Sappho so speak of the soul as flitting away.

[1067]The body is only the instrument of the soul. Cf. Socrates' answer to the question, "How shall we bury you?" *Phaedo* 115 C ff. and the elaboration of the idea in *Alc. I.* 129 E, whence it passed in to European literature.

[1068]Quoted by Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1406 b. Epictetus iii. 19. 4 complains that nurses encourage children to strike the stone on which they stumble. Cf. also Lucan vi. 220-223. Otto, *Sprichwörter der Römer*, p. 70, cites Pliny, N.H. xxix. 102, and Pacuv. v. 38, Ribb. *Trag.* Cf. Montaigne i. 4, "Ainsin emporte les bestes leur rage à s'attaquer à la pierre et au fer qui les a blecées."

[1069]Plato as a boy may have heard of the Thebans' refusal to allow the Athenians to bury their dead after Delium. Cf. Thucydides iv. 97-101, and Euripides *Supplices.*

[1070]For the practice cf. Aeschylus *Septem* 275-279 and *Agamemnon* 577-579. Italian cities and American states have restored to one another the flags so dedicated from old wars. Cf. Cicero *De inventione* ii. 70 "at tamen aeternum inimicitiarum monumentum Graios de Graiis statuere non oportet."

[1071]For similar caution cf. on 427 B-C.

two things I mean are the friendly and kindred on the one hand and the alien and foreign on the other. Now the term employed for the hostility of the friendly is faction, and for that of the alien is war."

"What you say is in nothing beside the mark," he replied.

"Consider, then, if this goes to the mark. I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian."

"Rightly," he said.

"We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature,[1073] and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred. Greeks, however, we shall say, are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction, and faction is the name we must give to that enmity."

"I will allow you that habit of speech," he said.

"Then observe," said I,

"that when anything of this sort occurs in faction, as the word is now used, and a state is divided against itself, if either party devastates the land and burns the houses of the other such factional strife is thought to be an accursed thing and neither party to be true patriots. Otherwise, they would never have endured thus to outrage their nurse and mother.[1074] But the moderate and reasonable thing is thought to be that the victors shall take away the crops of the vanquished, but that their temper shall be that of men who expect to be reconciled and not always to wage war."

"That way of feeling," he said,

"is far less savage than the other."

"Well, then," said I,

"is not the city that you are founding to be a Greek city?"

[1072]I have so translated in order to imply that the Plato of the *Republic* is already acquainted with the terminology of the *Sophist*. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, notes 375 and 377, followed by Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 504. But most editors take διαφορά here as dissension, and construe "applied to the disagreements of two things," which may be right. Cf. *Sophist* 228 A "στάσιν . . . τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν".

[1073]Plato shared the natural feeling of Isocrates, Demosthenes, and all patriotic Greeks. Cf. Isocrates *Panegyricus* 157, 184, *Panath.* 163; *Menexenus* 237 ff., *Laws* 692 C and 693 A. It is uncritical then with Newman (*op. cit.* p. 430) and many others to take as a recantation of this passage the purely logical observation in *Politicus* 262 D that Greek and barbarinan is an unscientific dichotomy of mankind. Cf. on the whole question the dissertation of Friedrich Weber, *Platons Stellung zu den Barbaren.*

[1074]Cf. 414 E, *Menexenus* 237 E, *Timaeus* 40 B, *Laws* 740 A, Aeschylus *Septem* 16.

"It must be," he said.

"Will they then not be good and gentle?"

"Indeed they will."

"And won't they be philhellenes,[1075] lovers of Greeks, and will they not regard all Greece as their own and not renounce their part in the holy places common to all Greeks ?"

"Most certainly."

"Will they not then regard any difference with Greeks who are their own people as a form of faction and refuse even to speak of it as war?"

"Most certainly."

"And they will conduct their quarrels always looking forward to a reconciliation?"

"By all means."

"They will correct them, then, for their own good, not chastising them with a view to their enslavement[1076] or their destruction, but acting as correctors, not as enemies."

"They will," he said.

"They will not, being Greeks, ravage Greek territory nor burn habitations, and they will not admit that in any city all the population are their enemies, men, women and children, but will say that only a few at any time are their foes,[1077] those, namely, who are to blame for the quarrel. And on all these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste the soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the suffering of the innocent."

"I," he said,

"agree that our citizens ought to deal with their Greek opponents on this wise, while treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks."

"Shall we lay down this law also, then, for our guardians that they are not to lay waste the land or burn the houses?"

"Let us so decree," he said,

"and assume that this and our preceding prescriptions are right.

[1075] Cf. *Epistles* 354 A, Herodotus ii. 178, Isocrates *Phil.* 122, *Panegyricus* 96, *Evagoras* 40, *Panath.* 241. The word is still significant for international politics, and must be retained in the translation.

[1076] Cf. Newman, *op. cit.* p. 143.

[1077] The same language was frequently used in the recent World War, but the practice was sometimes less civilized than that which Plato recommends. Hobhouse (*Mind in Evolution*, p. 384), writing earlier, said, "Plato's conclusions (*Republic* 469-471) show how narrow was the conception of humanitarian duties in the fourth century." It is, I think, only modern fancy that sees irony in the conclusion: "treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks."

But[1078] I fear, Socrates,that if you are allowed to go on in this fashion, you will never get to speak of the matter you put aside in order to say all this, namely, the possibility of such a polity coming into existence, and the way in which it could be brought to pass. I too am ready to admit that if it could be realized everything would be lovely[1079] for the state that had it, and I will add what you passed by, that they would also be most successful in war because they would be least likely to desert one another, knowing and addressing each other by the names of brothers, fathers, sons. And if the females should also join in their campaigns, whether in the ranks or marshalled behind to intimidate the enemy,[1080] or as reserves in case of need, I recognize that all this too would make them irresistible. And at home, also, I observe all the benefits that you omit to mention. But, taking it for granted that I concede these and countless other advantages, consequent on the realization of this polity, don't labor that point further; but let us at once proceed to try to convince ourselves of just this, that it is possible and how it is possible, dismissing everything else."

"This is a sudden assault,[1081] indeed," said I,

"that you have made on my theory, without any regard for my natural hesitation. Perhaps you don't realize that when I have hardly escaped the first two waves, you are now rolling up against me the "great third wave[1082]" of paradox, the worst of all. When you have seen and heard that, you will be very ready to be lenient,[1083] recognizing that I had good reason after all for shrinking and fearing to enter upon the discussion of so paradoxical a notion."

"The more such excuses you offer," he said,

"the less you will be released by us from telling in what way the realization of this polity is possible. Speak on, then, and do not put us off."

"The first thing to recall, then," I said,

"is that it was the inquiry into the nature of justice and injustice

[1078] It is a mistaken ingenuity that finds a juncture between two distinct versions here.

[1079] *πάντ' . . . ἀγαθά*: idiomatically colloquial. Cf. *Politicus* 284 B, *Laws* 711 D, 757 D, 780 D, Aristophanes *Acharnians* 978, 982, *Frogs* 302.

[1080] Cf. *Laws* 806 B.

[1081] *ὥσπερ* marks the figurative use as *τινα* in Aeschines, *Tim.* 135 "τινα καταδρομήν".

[1082] Cf. Introduction p. xvii. The third wave, sometimes the ninth, was proverbially the greatest. Cf. *Euthydemus* 293 A, Lucan v. 672 "decimus dictu mirabile fluctus," and Swineburne: "Who swims in sight of the third wave That never a swimmer shall cross or climb."

[1083] *συγγνώμην*: L. and S. wrongly with *ὅτι*, "to acknowledge that . . ."

that brought us to this pass.[1084]"

"Yes; but what of it?" he said.

"Oh, nothing,[1085]" I replied,

"only this: if we do discover what justice is, are we to demand that the just man shall differ from it in no respect, but shall conform in every way to the ideal? Or will it suffice us if he approximate to it as nearly as possible and partake of it more than others?"

"That will content us," he said.

"A pattern, then," said I,

"was what we wanted when we were inquiring into the nature of ideal justice and asking what would be the character of the perfectly just man, supposing him to exist, and, likewise, in regard to injustice and the completely unjust man. We wished to fix our eyes upon them as types and models, so that whatever we discerned in them of happiness or the reverse would necessarily apply to ourselves in the sense that whosoever is likest them will have the allotment most like to theirs. Our purpose was not to demonstrate the possibility of the realization of these ideals."

"In that," he said,

"you speak truly."

"Do you think, then, that he would be any the less a good painter,[1086] who, after portraying a pattern of the ideally beautiful man and omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture, should not be able to prove that it is actually possible for such a man to exist?"

[1084] Cf. Introduction p. xii. and note d. Plato seems to overlook the fact that the search was virtually completed in the fourth book.

[1085] *οὐδέν*: idiomatic, like the English of the translation. Cf. *Charmides* 164 A, *Gorgias* 498 A, 515 E. The emphatic statement that follows of the value of ideals as ideals is Plato's warning hint that he does not expect the literal realization of his Utopia, though it would be disillusionizing to say so too explicitly. Cf. introduction p. xxxi-xxxii, and my paper on Plato's *Laws, Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) pp. 351 and 353. This is one of the chief ideas that Cicero derived from Plato. He applies it to his picture of the ideal orator, and the mistaken ingenuity of modern scholarship has deduced from this and attributed to the maleficent influence of Plato the post-Renaissancee and eighteenth-century doctrine of fixed literary kinds. Cf. my note in the New York *Nation*, vol. ciii. p. 238, Sept. 7, 1916.

[1086] An ideal in the plastic arts is used to illustrate the thought. Cf. Aristotle *Poetics* 1461 b 14, *Politics* 1281 b 10, Cicero, *Orator* ii. 3, Xenophon *Memorabilia* iii. 10, Finsler, *Platon u. d. aristotelische Poetik*, p. 56. Polyb. vi. 47. 7 gives a different turn to the comaprison of the Republic to a statue. Plato is speaking from the point of view of ordinary opinion, and it is uncritical to find here and in 501 an admission that the artist copies the idea, which is denied in Book X. 597 E ff. Apelt, *Platonische Aufsätze*, p. 67.

"Not I, by Zeus," he said.

"Then were not we, as we say, trying to create in words the pattern of a good state?"

"Certainly."

"Do you think, then, that our words are any the less well spoken if we find ourselves unable to prove that it is possible for a state to be governed in accordance with our words?"

"Of course not," he said.

"That, then," said I,

"is the truth[1087] of the matter. But if, to please you, we must do our best to show how most probably and in what respect these things would be most nearly realized, again, with a view to such a demonstration, grant me the same point.[1088]"

"What?"

"Is it possible for anything to be realized in deed as it is spoken in word, or is it the nature of things that action should partake of exact truth less than speech, even if some deny it[1089]? Do you admit it or not?"

"I do," he said.

"Then don't insist," said I,

"that I must exhibit as realized in action precisely what we expounded in words. But if we can discover how a state might be constituted most nearly answering to our description, you must say that we have discovered that possibility of realization which you demanded. Will you not be content if you get this?"

"I for my part would."

"And I too," he said.

"Next, it seems, we must try to discover and point out what it is that is now badly managed in our cities, and that prevents them from being so governed, and what is the smallest change that would bring a state to this manner of government, preferably a change in one thing, if not, then in two, and, failing that, the fewest possible in number and the slightest in potency."

"By all means," he said.

[1087] Cf. 372 E.

[1088] The point is so important that Plato repeats it more specifically.

[1089] Plato is contradicting the Greek commonplace which contrasts the word with the deed. Cf. *Apology* 32 A, *Sophist* 234 E, Euripides frag. *Alcmene* "λόγος γὰρ τοὔργον οὐ νικᾷ ποτε", and perhaps Democritus's "λόγος ἔργου σκιή". Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 64. The word is the expression of the thought. It is more plastic (588 D, *Laws* 736 B) and, as Goethe says, "von einem Wort lässt sich kein Iota rauben."

"There is one change, then," said I,

"which I think that we can show would bring about the desired transformation. It is not a slight or an easy thing but it is possible."

"What is that?" said he.

"I am on the very verge," said I,

"of what we likened to the greatest wave of paradox. But say it[1090] I will, even if, to keep the figure, it is likely to wash[1091] us away on billows of laughter and scorn. Listen."

"I am all attention," he said.

"Unless," said I,

"either philosophers become kings[1092] in our states or those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophic intelligence, while the motley horde of the natures who at present pursue either apart from the other are compulsorily excluded, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, for our states, nor, I fancy, for the human race either. Nor, until this happens, will this constitution which we have been expounding in theory ever be put into practice within the limits of possibility and see the light of the sun. But this is the thing that has made me so long shrink from speaking out, because I saw that it would be a very paradoxical saying. For it is not easy[1093] to see that there is no other way

[1090] *εἰρήσεται*: so used by the orators to introduce a bold statement. Cf. Aeschines ii. 22, Demosthenes xix. 224, xi. 17, xiv. 24, xxi. 198, etc.

[1091] More literally deluge or overwhelm with ridicule.

[1092] This is perhaps the most famous sentence in Plato. Cf. for the idea 499 B, 540 D, *Laws* 711 D, 712 A, 713 E ff. It is paraphrased by the author of the seventh *Epistle* (324 B, 326 A-B, 328 A-B) who perhaps quotes Plato too frequently to be Plato himself. *Epistle* ii. 310 E, though sometimes quoted in this connection, is not quite the same thought. It is implied in the *Phaedrus* 252 E "φιλόσοφος καὶ ἡγεμονικός", and *Politicus* 293 C, and only seems to be contradicted in *Euthydemus* 306 B. Aristotle is said to have contradicted it in a lost work (fr. 79, 1489 b 8 ff.). It is paraphrased or parodied by a score of writers from Polybius xii. 28 to Bacon, Hobbes, More, Erasmus, and Bernard Shaw. Boethius transmitted it to the Middle Ages (*Cons. Phil.* i. 4. 11). It was always on the lips of Marcus Aurelius. Cf. Capitol, Aurelius i. 1 and iv. 27. It was a standardized topic of compliment to princes in Themistius, Julian, the *Panegyrici Latini*, and many modern imitators. Among the rulers who have been thus compared with Plato's philosophic king are Marcus Aurelius, Constantine, Arcadius, James I., Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. There is a partial history of the commonplace in T. Sinko's Program, *Sententiae Platonicae de philophis regnantibus fata quae fuerint*, Krakow, 1904, in the supplementary article of Karl Praechter, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, xiv. (1905) pp. 4579-491, and in the dissertation of Emil Wolff, *Francis Bacons Verhaltnis zu Platon*, Berlin, 1908, pp. 60 ff.

of happiness either for private or public life."
Whereupon he,

"Socrates," said he,

"after hurling at us such an utterance and statement as that, you must expect to be attacked by a great multitude of our men of light and leading,[1094] who forthwith will, so to speak, cast off their garments[1095] and strip and, snatching the first weapon that comes to hand, rush at you with might and main, prepared to do[1096] dreadful deeds. And if you don't find words to defend yourself against them, and escape their assault, then to be scorned and flouted will in very truth[1097] be the penalty you will have to pay."

"And isn't it you," said I,

"that have brought this upon me and are to blame?"

"And a good thing, too," said he;

"but I won't let you down, and will defend you with what I can. I can do so with my good will and my encouragement, and perhaps I might answer your questions more suitably[1098] than another. So, with such an aid to back you, try to make it plain to the doubters that the truth is as you say."

"I must try," I replied,

"since you proffer so strong an alliance. I think it requisite, then, if we are to escape the assailants you speak of, that we should define for them whom we mean by the philosophers, who we dare to say ought to be our rulers. When these are clearly discriminated it will be possible to defend ourselves by showing that to them by their very nature belong the study of philosophy and political leadership, while it befits the other sort to let philosophy alone and to follow their leader."

"It is high time," he said,

"to produce your definition."

"Come, then, follow me on this line, if we may in some fashion or other explain our meaning."

"Proceed," he said.

"Must I remind you, then," said I,

[1093]Plato's condescension to the ordinary mind that cannot be expected to understand often finds expression in this form. Cf. 366 C, 489 C, *Theaetetus* 176 C, and *Republic* 495 E "ἀνάγκη".

[1094]Lit. many and not slight men.

[1095]Cf. Hipponax, fr. 74 (58), Theophrast. *Char.* 27, Aristophanes *Wasps* 408.

[1096]Cf. *Apology* 35 A, *Theaetetus* 151 A.

[1097]*τῷ ὄντι* verifies the strong word *τωθαζόμενος*.

[1098]Cf. *Theaetetus* 162 A 7. The dialectician prefers a docile respondent. Cf. *Sophist* 217 C, *Parmenides* 137 B.

"or do you remember, that when we affirm that a man is a lover of something, it must be apparent that he is fond of all of it? It will not do to say that some of it he likes and some[1099] does not."

"I think you will have to remind me," he said,

"for I don't apprehend at all."

"That reply, Glaucon," said I,

"befitted another rather than you. It does not become a lover to forget that all adolescents in some sort sting and stir the amorous lover of youth and appear to him deserving of his attention and desirable. Is not that your "reaction" to the fair? One, because his nose is tip-tilted,[1100] you will praise as piquant, the beak of another you pronounce right-royal, the intermediate type you say strikes the harmonious mean, the swarthy are of manly aspect, the white are children of the gods divinely fair, and as for honey-hued, do you suppose the very word is anything but the euphemistic invention of some lover who can feel no distaste for sallowness when it accompanies the blooming time of youth?"

"And, in short, there is no pretext you do not allege and there is nothing you shrink from saying to justify you in not rejecting any who are in the bloom of their prime."

"If it is your pleasure," he said,

"to take me as your example of this trait in lovers, I admit it for the sake of the argument."

"Again," said I,

"do you not observe the same thing in the lovers of wine?[1101] They welcome every wine on any pretext."

"They do, indeed."

"And so I take it you have observed that men who are covetous of honor,[1102] if they can't get themselves elected generals, are captains of a company.[1103] And if they can't be honored by great men and

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[1099] *τὸ δὲ μή*: for the idiom Cf. *Philebus* 22 A, *Laws* 797 E, 923 C, Demodocus's epigram on the Chians, Aeschylus *Persae* 802, Sophocles *O. C.* 1671.

[1100] Another of the famous sentences that would be worth a monograph. Cf. Lucretius iv. 1160, Molière, *Misanthrope*, ii. 5, Horace, *Satire* i. 338. F. Brunetière, *Les Epoques du théâtre francïjais*, p. 76, thinks that Molière took it from Scarron, not from Lucretius. Shakespeare *Much Ado*, III. i. reverses the conceit, Santayana, *Reason in Society*, p. 25, writes prettily about it.

[1101] Cf. Aristotle *Eth.* i. 8. 10 "ἑκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος". Cf. the old Latin hexameters—"si bene quid memini causae suant quinque bibendi: Hospitis adventus, praesens sitis atque futura, Aut vini bonitas, aut quaelibet altera causa."

[1102] Cf. Theophrastus, *Char.* 21 (Loeb) *μικροφιλοτιμίας*, petty pride.

dignitaries, are satisfied with honor from little men and nobodies. But honor they desire and must have."

"Yes, indeed."

"Admit, then, or reject my proposition. When we say a man is keen about something, shall we say that he has an appetite for the whole class or that he desires only a part and a part not?"

"The whole," he said.

"Then the lover of wisdom, too, we shall affirm, desires all wisdom, not a part and a part not."

"Certainly."

"The student, then, who is finical[1104] about his studies, especially when he is young and cannot yet know by reason what is useful and what is not, we shall say is not a lover of learning or a lover of wisdom, just as we say that one who is dainty about his food is not really hungry, has not an appetite for food, and is not a lover of food, but a poor feeder."

"We shall rightly say so."

"But the one who feels no distaste in sampling every study, and who attacks his task of learning gladly and cannot get enough of it, him we shall justly pronounce the lover of wisdom, the philosopher, shall we not?" To which Glaucon replied,[1105]

"You will then be giving the name to a numerous and strange band, for all the lovers of spectacles[1106] are what they are, I fancy, by virtue of their delight in learning something. And those who always want to hear some new thing[1107] are a very queer lot to be reckoned among philosophers. You couldn't induce them to attend a serious debate or any such entertainment,[1108] but as if they had farmed out their ears to listen to every chorus in the land, they run about to all the Dionysiac

[1103] *τριττυαρχοῦσι*, command the soldiers of a trittys or third of one of the ten tribes.

[1104] *δυσχεραίνοντα*, squeamish, particular, *choicy.* Cf. 391 E, 426 D, and Pope, *Essay on Criticism*, 288—"Those heads, as stomachs, are not sure the best, Which nauseate all, and nothing can digest."

[1105] Plato as usual anticipates objections and misunderstandings. Cf. e.g. on 487 B.

[1106] Cf. the argument in the first sentence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that men's pleasure in sense-perception is a form of their love of knowledge.

[1107] *φιλήκοοι*: the word, like *curiosity* in Ruskin's interpretation, may have a higher and lower meaning. It is used half technically of intellectual interests generally. Cf. *Euthydemus* 304 B.The abstract *φιληκοΐα* became a virtual synonym of culture and reading.

[1108] Cf. on 498 A, and in *Parmenides* 126 E, Antiphon, who studied Eleatic dialectic in his youth, but now gives his time to horses. The word *διατριβή* has a long history in philosophy and literature, starting from such passages as *Charmides* 153 A and *Lysis* 204 A.

festivals,[1109] never missing one, either in the towns or in the country-villages. Are we to designate all these, then, and similar folk and all the practitioners of the minor arts as philosophers?"

"Not at all," I said;

"but they do bear a certain likeness[1110] to philosophers."

"Whom do you mean, then, by the true philosophers?"

"Those for whom the truth is the spectacle of which they are enamored,[1111]" said I.

"Right again,[1112]" said he;

"but in what sense do you mean it?"

"It would be by no means easy to explain it to another," I said,

"but I think that you will grant me this."

"What?"

"That since the fair and honorable is the opposite of the base and ugly, they are two."

"Of course."

"And since they are two, each is one.[1113]"

"That also."

"And in respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects."

"Right," he said.

"This, then," said I,

"is my division. I set apart and distinguish those of whom you were just speaking, the lovers of spectacles and the arts, and men of

[1109] In addition to the presentation of new plays at the city Dionysia, there were performances at the Peiraeus and in the demes.

[1110] Cf. *Theaetetus* 201 B 3, *Sophist* 240 B "οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' ἐοικὸς μέν".

[1111] Cf. Aristotle *Eth.* 1098 a 32 "θεατὴς γὰρ τἀληθοῦς".

[1112] Cf. 449 C.

[1113] Plato is merely restating the theory of Ideas to prepare for his practical distinction between minds that can and minds that cannot apprehend abstractions. He does not here enter into the metaphysics of the subject. But he does distinctly show that he is "already" aware of the difficulties raised in the *Parmenides*, 131 B ff., and of the misapprehension disposed of in the *Sophist* 252 ff. that the metaphysical isolation of the Ideas precludes their combination and intermingling in human thought and speech. For the many attempts to evade *ἀλλήλων κοινωνία* Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, n. 244, and add now Wilamowitz, *Platon*, i. p. 567, who, completely missing the point, refers to 505 A, which is also misunderstood. He adds "mit den Problemen des *Sophistes* hat das gar nichts zu tun; sie waren ihm noch nicht aufgestossen," which begs the question.

action, and separate from them again those with whom our argument is concerned and who alone deserve the appellation of philosophers or lovers of wisdom."

"What do you mean?" he said.

"The lovers of sounds and sights," I said,

"delight in beautiful tones and colors and shapes and in everything that art fashions out of these, but their thought is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful in itself."

"Why, yes," he said,

"that is so."

"And on the other hand, will not those be few[1114] who would be able to approach beauty itself and contemplate it in and by itself?"

"They would, indeed."

"He, then, who believes in beautiful things, but neither believes in beauty itself nor is able to follow when someone tries to guide him to the knowledge of it—do you think that his life is a dream or a waking[1115]? Just consider. Is not the dream state, whether the man is asleep or awake, just this: the mistaking of resemblance for identity?"

"I should certainly call that dreaming," he said.

"Well, then, take the opposite case: the man whose thought recognizes a beauty in itself, and is able to distinguish that self-beautiful and the things that participate in it, and neither supposes the participants to be it nor it the participants—is his life, in your opinion, a waking or a dream state?"

"He is very much awake," he replied.

"Could we not rightly, then, call the mental state of the one as knowing, knowledge, and that of the other as opining, opinion?"

"Assuredly."

"Suppose, now, he who we say opines but does not know should be angry and challenge our statement as not true. Can we find any way of soothing him and gently[1116] winning him over, without telling him too plainly that he is not in his right mind?"

"We must try," he said.

"Come, then, consider what we are to say to him, or would you have us question him in this fashion—premising that if he knows anything,

[1114] "Le petit nombre des élus" is a common topic in Plato. Cf. on 494 A.

[1115] The dream state is a very different thing for Plato from what it is for some modern sentimental Platonists. Cf. 520 C-D, *Phaedrus* 277 D, *Timaeus* 52 B, and 71 E, if rightly interpreted.

[1116] *ἠρέμα*: Cf. *Symposium* 221 B. Plato's humorous use of this word is the source of Emerson's humorous use of "gently."

nobody grudges it him, but we should be very glad to see him knowing something—but tell[1117] us this: Does he who knows know something or nothing? Do you reply in his behalf."

"I will reply," he said,

"that he knows something."

"Is it something that is or is not[1118]?"

"That is. How could that which is not be known?"

"We are sufficiently assured of this, then, even if we should examine it from every point of view, that that which entirely[1119]"is" is entirely knowable, and that which in no way "is" is in every way unknowable."

"Most sufficiently."

"Good. If a thing, then, is so conditioned as both to be and not to be, would it not lie between that which absolutely and unqualifiedly is and that which in no way is?"

"Between."

"Then if knowledge pertains to that which is and ignorance of necessity to that which is not, for that which lies between we must seek for something between nescience and science, if such a thing there be."

"By all means."

"Is there a thing which we call opinion?"

"Surely."

"Is it a different faculty from science or the same?"

"A different."

"Then opinion is set over one thing and science over another, each by virtue of its own distinctive power or faculty."

[1117]For the humor of the sudden shift to the second person cf. Juvenal, *Satire* i. "profer, Galla, caput."

[1118]To understand what follows it is necessary (1) to assume that Plato is not talking nonsense; (2) to make allowance for the necessity that he is under of combating contemporary fallacies and sophisms which may seem trivial to us (Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 50 ff.); (3) to remember the greater richness of the Greek language in forms of the verb "to be"; and the misunderstandings introduced by the indiscriminate use of the abstract verbal noun "being" in English—a difficulty which I have tried to meet by varying the terms of the translation; (4) to recognize that apart from metaphysics Plato's main purpose is to insist on the ability to think abstractly as a prerequisite of the higher education; (5) to observe the qualifications and turns of phrase which indicate that Plato himself was not confused by the double meaning of "is not," but was already aware of the distinctions explicitly explained in the *Sophist*. (Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 53 ff. nn. 389 ff.)

[1119]*παντελῶς*: cf. "μηδαμῇ" and 478 D "πάντως". Not foreseeing modern philology Plato did not think it necessary to repeat these qualifying adverbs in 478 B "ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν", which is still sometimes quoted to prove that Plato was "yet" naively unaware of the distinction between is-not-at-all (does not exist) and is-not-this-or-that.

"That is so."

"May we say, then, that science is naturally related to that which is,[1120] to know that and how that which is is? But rather, before we proceed, I think we must draw the following distinctions."

"What ones?"

"Shall we say that faculties,[1121] powers, abilities are a class of entities by virtue of which we and all other things are able to do what we or they are able to do? I mean that sight and hearing, for example, are faculties, if so be that you understand the class or type that I am trying to describe."

"I understand," he said.

"Hear, then, my notion about them. In a faculty I cannot see any color or shape or similar mark such as those on which in many other cases I fix my eyes in discriminating in my thought one thing from another. But in the case of a faculty I look to one thing only—that to which it is related and what it effects,[1122] and it is in this way that I come to call[1123] each one of them a faculty, and that which is related to[1124] the same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the same faculty, and that to another I call other. How about you, what is your practice?"

"The same," he said.

"To return, then, my friend," said I,

"to science or true knowledge, do you say that it is a faculty and a power, or in what class do you put it?"

"Into this," he said,

[1120] Apart from the metaphysical question of the relativity of all knowledge, the word *ἐπιστήμη* in Greek usage connotes certainty, and so Plato and Aristotle always take it. But more specifically that which (always) is, for Plato, is the "idea" which is not subject to change and therefore always is what it is, while a particular material thing subject to change and relativity both is and is not any and every predicate that can be applied to it. And since knowledge in the highest sense is for Plato knowledge of abstract and general ideas, both in his and in our sense of the word idea, knowledge is said to be of that which is. It is uncritical to ignore Plato's terminology and purpose and to talk condescendingly of his confusing subjective with objective certainty in what follows.

[1121] The history of the word *δύναμις* has been studied in recent monographs and its various meanings, from potentiality to active power, discriminated. Cf. J. Souilhé, *Etude sur le terme* δύναμις *dans les Dialogues de Platon*, Paris, 1919, pp. 96, 163 ff. But Plato makes his simple meaning here quite plain, and it would be irrelevant to bring in modern denunciations of the "old faculty psychology."

[1122] Cf. my note on Simplic. *De An.* 146. 21, *Class. Phil* . xvii. p. 143.

[1123] Cf. *Ion* 537 D "οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην τέχνην".

[1124] *ἐπί*: Cf. *Parmenides* 147 D-E "ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς;"

"the most potent of all[1125] faculties."

"And opinion—shall we assign it to some other class than faculty."

"By no means," he said,

"for that by which we are able to opine is nothing else than the faculty of opinion.[1126]"

"But not long ago you agreed that science and opinion are not identical."

"How could any rational man affirm the identity of the infallible with the fallible?"

"Excellent," said I,

"and we are plainly agreed that opinion is a different[1127] thing from scientific knowledge."

"Yes, different."

"Each of them, then, since it has a different power, is related to a different object."

"Of necessity."

"Science, I presume, to that which is, to know the condition of that which is. But opinion, we say, opines."

"Yes."

"Does it opine the same thing that science knows, and will the knowable and the opinable be identical, or is that impossible?"

"Impossible by our admissions,[1128]" he said.

"If different faculties are naturally related to different objects and both opinion and science are faculties, but each different from the other, as we say—these admissions do not leave place for the identity of the knowable and the opinable."

"Then, if that which is is knowable, something other than that which is would be the opinable.[1129]"

"Something else."

"Does it opine that which is not,[1130] or is it impossible even to

[1125]Cf. *Protagoras* 352 B, Aristotle *Eth.* 1145 b 24.

[1126]For the various meanings of *δόξα* Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 47 "the word *δόξα* may be used in this neutral, psychological sense; it may be taken unfavorably to denote mere opinion as opposed to knowledge, or favorably when true opinions and beliefs are set in antithesis to the appetites and instincts."

[1127]Plato reaffirms this strongly *Timaeus* 51 E, where, however, *νοῦς* is used, not *ἐπιστήμη*. Of course where distinctions are irrelevant Plato may use many of the terms that denote mental processes as virtual synonyms. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought* pp. 47-49.

[1128]Cf. *Symposium* 200 B, 201 D.

[1129]Cf. on 447 C.

[1130]Plato is, of course, aware that this is true only if *μὴ ὄν* be taken in the absolute

opine that which is not? Reflect: Does not he who opines bring his opinion to bear upon something or shall we reverse ourselves and say that it is possible to opine, yet opine nothing?"

"That is impossible."

"Then he who opines opines some one thing."

"Yes."

"But surely that which is not could not be designated as some one thing, but most rightly as nothing at all. To that which is not we of necessity assigned nescience, and to that which is, knowledge."

"Rightly," he said.

"Then neither that which is nor that which is not is the object of opinion."

"It seems not."

"Then opinion would be neither nescience nor knowledge."

"So it seems."

"Is it then a faculty outside of these, exceeding either knowledge in lucidity or ignorance in obscurity?"

"It is neither."

"But do you deem opinion something darker than knowledge but brighter than ignorance?"

"Much so," he said.

"And does it lie within the boundaries of the two?"

"Yes."

"Then opinion would be between the two."

"Most assuredly."

"Were we not saying a little while ago[1131] that if anything should turn up[1132] such that it both is and is not, that sort of thing would lie between that which purely and absolutely is and that which wholly is not, and that the faculty correlated with it would be neither science or nescience, but that which should appear to hold a place correspondingly between nescience and science."

"Right."

"And now there has turned up between these two the thing that

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sense. We cannot suppose that he himself is puzzled by a fallacy which he ironically attributes to the Sophists and to Protagoras (*Theaetetus* 167 A), and ridicules in the *Cratylus* 188 D and *Euthydemus* 286 C. Cf. *Unity of Platos' Thought*, pp. 53, 54. As Aristotle explicitly puts it, *De interpr.* 11. 11 "τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν ὅτι δοξαστὸν οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅν τι· δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι".

[1131]Cf. 477 A.

[1132]Cf. 477 A-B. This is almost a standardized method with Plato. Cf. 609 B, *Charmides* 168 B, *Gorgias* 496 C, 346 B, *Philebus* 11 D, 66 E, *Laws* 896 C.

we call opinion."

"There has."

"It would remain, then, as it seems, for us to discover that which partakes of both, of to be and not to be, and that could not be rightly designated either in its exclusive purity; so that, if it shall be discovered, we may justly pronounce it to be the opinable, thus assigning extremes to extremes and the intermediate to the intermediate. Is not that so?"

"It is."

"This much premised, let him tell me, I will say, let him answer me, that good[1133] fellow who does not think there is a beautiful in itself or any[1134] idea of beauty in itself always remaining the same and unchanged, but who does believe in many beautiful things—the lover of spectacles, I mean, who cannot endure to hear anybody say that the beautiful is one and the just one, and so of other things—and this will be our question: My good fellow, is there any one of these many fair-and-honorable things that will not sometimes appear ugly and base[1135]? And of the just things, that will not seem unjust? And of the pious things, that will not seem impious?"

"No, it is inevitable," he said,

"that they would appear to be both beautiful in a way and ugly, and so with all the other things you asked about."

"And again, do the many double things[1136] appear any the less halves than doubles?"

"None the less."

"And likewise of the great and the small things, the light and the

[1133]Ironical. Cf. *Phaedrus* 266 E.

[1134]*τινὰ* does not mean that the theory of Ideas is a novelty here or that the terminology is new and strange. It merely says that the type of mind that is absorbed in the concrete cannot apprehend any general aspect of things. *αὐτό* and *κατὰ ταὐτά* are the technical designation of the Idea here. Cf. my note on *Philebus* 64 A, *Class. Phil.* xx. (1925) p. 347.

[1135]Plato consciously uses mere logic to lend the emphasis and dignity of absolute metaphysics to his distinction between the two types of mind, which is for all practical purposes his main point here. If you cannot correctly define the beautiful, all your imperfect definitions will be refuted by showing that they sometimes describe what is ugly. Cf. *Hippias Major* 289 C and note on *Republic* i. 333 E. The many concrete objects are this and are not that, and so with conscious use of the ambiguity of the copula may be said to tumble about between being and not-being. That this is the consciously intended meaning may be inferred from the fact that in *Timaeus* 37 E, where Plato must have had in mind the conclusions of the *Sophist*, he still avails himself of this ambiguity to suggest an absolute being behind phenomena. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 55, 56, 60, *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina* pp. 48, 49.

[1136]Cf. on 524 A, B.

heavy things—will they admit these predicates any more than their opposites?"

"No," he said,

"each of them will always hold of, partake of, both."

"Then is each of these multiples rather than it is not that which one affirms it to be?"

"They are like those jesters who palter with us in a double sense at banquets," he replied,

"and resemble the children's riddle[1137] about the eunuch and his hitting of the bat—with what and as it sat on what they signify that he struck it. For these things too equivocate, and it is impossible to conceive firmly[1138] any one of them to be or not to be or both or neither."

"Do you know what to do with them, then?" said I,

"and can you find a better place to put them than that midway between existence or essence and the not-to-be? For we shall surely not discover a darker region than not-being[1139] that they should still more not be, nor brighter than being that they should still more be."

"Most true," he said.

"We would seem to have found, then, that the many conventions[1140]

[1137]The scholiast (Hermann vi. 34) quotes the riddle in two forms. It might run in English—"A tale there is, a man not yet a man, Seeing, saw not, a bird and not a bird, Perching upon a bough and not a bough, And hit it—not, with a stone and not a stone." The key words of the answer are eunuch, bat, reed, pumice-stone. Cf. also Athenaeus 448 E, 452 E, Gifford on *Euthydemus* 300 D. It was used in the Stoic schools of logic, and Epicurus is said to have used it to disprove Plato's statement that either the negative or the affirmative of a proposition must be true or false. Cf. Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 348.

[1138]Cf. *Theaetetus* 157 A.

[1139]Cf. *Sophist* 254 A "εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα".

[1140]A further thought is developed here, suggested in 479 A, B. Just as the many particular horses, trees, or tables shift and change, and are and are not in comparision with the unchanging multitude of each, so the many opinions of the multitude about justice and the good and the beautiful and other moral conceptions change, and both are and are not in comparison with the unalterable ideas of justice and beauty, which the philosopher more nearly apprehends. Thus, for the purposes of this contrast, notions, opinions, and what English usage would call ideas, fall into the same class as material objects. Cf. *Euthyphro* 6 D, *Phaedo* 78 D, *Parmenides* 131 D, *Gorgias* 488 D "τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα", *Laws* 715 B "τὰ τούτων δίκαια", 860 C "τοῖς μὲν τοίνυν πολλοῖς" etc., 962 D "τὰ τῶν πόλεων" (of states) *νόμιμα*. The practical truth of this distinction is unaffected by our metaphysics. Plato is speaking of what he elsewhere calls the *εἴδωλα* of justice, beauty and the like. Cf. 517 D, 532 D, *Theaetetus* 150 B, and "The Idea of Good in Plato's *Republic*," *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, i. p. 238.

of the many about the fair and honorable and other things are tumbled about in[1141] the mid-region between that which is not and that which is in the true and absolute sense."

"We have so found it."

"But we agreed in advance that, if anything of that sort should be discovered, it must be denominated opinable, not knowable, the wanderer between being caught by the faculty that is betwixt and between."

"We did."

"We shall affirm, then, that those who view many beautiful things but do not see the beautiful itself and are unable to follow another's guidance[1142] to it, and many just things, but not justice itself, and so in all cases—we shall say that such men have opinions about all things, but know nothing of the things they opine."

"Of necessity."

"And, on the other hand, what of those who contemplate the very things themselves in each case, ever remaining the same and unchanged—shall we not say that they know and do not merely opine?"

"That, too, necessarily follows."

"Shall we not also say that the one welcomes to his thought and loves the things subject to knowledge and the other those to opinion? Do we not remember that we said that those loved and regarded tones and beautiful colours and the like, but they could not endure the notion of the reality of the beautiful itself?"

"We do remember."

"Shall we then offend their ears if we call them doxophilists[1143] rather than philosophers and will they be very angry if we so speak?"

"Not if they heed my counsel," he said,

"for to be angry with truth is not lawful."

"Then to those who in each and every kind welcome the true being, lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion[1144] is the name we must give."

"By all means."

[1141] Cf. *Phaedrus* 275 E, *Phaedo* 81 C, 82 E. Isocrates uses *καλινδέομαι* in similar contemptuous connotation, v. 82, xiii. 20, xv. 30.

[1142] Cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 989 a 33 "τοῖς ἐπάγουσιν αὐτόν".

[1143] Plato coins a word which means "lovers of opinion."

[1144] Isocrates xv. 271 is conceivably an answer to this.

Book 6

"So now, Glaucon," I said,

"our argument after winding[1145] a long[1146] and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not."

"Yes," he said,

"a shorter way is perhaps not feasible."

"Apparently not," I said.

"I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose[1147] of discerning the difference between the just and the unjust life requires us to discuss."

"What, then," he said,

"comes next?"

"What else," said I,

"but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging,[1148] while those who are incapable of this but lose themselves and wander[1149] amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state?"

"What, then," he said,

"would be a fair statement of the matter?"

[1145]The argument is slightly personified. Cf. on 503 A.

[1146]It is captious to object that the actual discussion of the philosopher occupies only a few pages.

[1147]This is the main theme of the *Republic,* of which Plato never loses sight.

[1148]For *κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος* Cf. *Phaedo* 78 C, *Soph.* 248 A, *Tim.* 41 D, 82 B, *Epin.* 982 B and E.

[1149]Cf. p. 89, note h, on 505 C.

"Whichever," I said,

"appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society, these we should establish as guardians."

"Right," he said.

"Is this, then," said I,

"clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight?"

"Of course it is clear," he said.

"Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind[1150] and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern[1151] in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes[1152] on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established?"

"No, by heaven," he said,

"there is not much difference."

"Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience[1153] and are not second to them in any part of virtue?"

"It would be strange indeed," he said,

"to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities."

"Then what we have to say is how it would be possible for the same persons to have both qualifications, is it not?"

" Quite so."

"Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from birth; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this we shall also agree that the combination of qualities that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that we need no others for guardians of states than these."

"How so?"

[1150] Cf. *Luke* vi. 39, *Matt.* xv. 14, *John* xix. 39-41.

[1151] Cf. *Polit.* 277 B, 277 D f., etc., *Soph.* 226 C, *Parmen.* 132 D.

[1152] *ἀποβλέποντες* belongs to the terminology of the ideas. Cf. 472 C, *Cratyl.* 389 A, *Gorg.* 503 E, *Tim.* 28 A, *Prot.* 354 C, and my *What Plato Said,* p. 458 on *Euthyph.* 6 E.

[1153] Cf. 539 E, 521 B, *Phileb.* 62. Cf. Introd. p. xl; Apelt, *Republic,* p. 490.

"We must accept as agreed this trait of the philosophical nature, that it is ever enamored of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay.[1154]"

"Let us take that as agreed."

"And, further," said I,

"that their desire is for the whole of it and that they do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more precious or a less honored, part of it. That was the point of our former illustration[1155] drawn from lovers and men covetous of honor."

"You are right," he said.

"Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements must not have this further quality in their natures."

"What quality?"

"The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth."

"It is likely," he said.

"It is not only likely, my friend, but there is every necessity[1156] that he who is by nature enamored of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object of his love."

"Right," he said.

"Could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth[1157]?"

"Impossible," he said.

"Then can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and of falsehood?"

"By no means."

"Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form."

"By all means."

"But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel.[1158]"

"Surely."

[1154]Lit. is not made to wander by generation and decay. Cf. *Crat.* 411 C, *Phaedo* 95 E, whence Aristotle took his title. See *Class. Phil.* xvii. (1922) pp. 334-352.

[1155]Supra 474 C-D.

[1156]For similar expressions cf. 519 B, *Laws* 656 B, 965 C, *Symp.* 200 A.

[1157]This and many other passages prove Plato's high regard for the truth. Cf *Laws* 730 C, 861 D, *Crat.* 428 D, 382 A. In 389 B he only permits falsehood to the rulers as a drastic remedy to be used with care for edification. Cf. Vol. I. on 382 C and D.

[1158]For this figure Cf. *Laws* 844 A and 736 B, Eurip. *Suppl.* 1111 "παρεκτρέποντες ὀχετόν", Empedocles, Diels[1] 195 "λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύων" Lucretius ii. 365 "derivare queunt animum"; and for the idea cf. also *Laws* 643 C-D.

"So, when a man's desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument,[1159] if the man is a true and not a sham[1160] philosopher."

"That is quite necessary."

"Such a man will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth; for the things for the sake of which money and great expenditure are eagerly sought others may take seriously, but not he."

"It is so."

"And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature."

"What point?"

"You must not overlook any touch of illiberality.[1161] For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness[1162] in all things human and divine."

"Most true," he said.

"Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence[1163] can deem this life of man a thing of great concern[1164]?"

"Impossible," said he.

"Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?[1165]"

"Least of all."

"Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy."

[1159]Cf. my *Unity of Plato's Thought,* pp. 45-46, esp. n. 330, followed by Apelt, *Republic,* pp. 490-491. Cf. also Friedlander, *Platon,* ii. pp. 579-580, 584.

[1160]For πεπλασμένως Cf. *Soph.* 216 C "μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι".

[1161]Cf. *Theaet.* 144 D "χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα".

[1162]Cf. Goethe's "Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben."

[1163]Cf. *Theaet.* 174 E, of the philosopher, "εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν", and 173 E, 500 B-C. Cf. Marc. Aurel. vii. 35, Livy xxiv. 34 "Archimedes is erat unicus spectator caeli siderumque," Mayor, Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. p. 128. For πᾶς χρόνος cf. infra 498 D, 608 C, *Phaedo* 107 C, *Gorg.* 525 C, *Apol.* 40 E, *Tim.* 36 E, 47 B, 90 D. Cf. Isoc. i. 11, Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 46.

[1164]Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1123 b 32, the great-souled man, "ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα", Diog. Laert. vii. 128 "πάντων ὑπεράνω", Cic. *De fin.* iii. 8 "infra se omnia humana ducens." Cf. on 500 B-C. For similar pessimistic utterances about human life and mankind Cf. 604 B-C, 496 D-E, 500 B-C, 516 D, *Laws* 803 B. Cf. also *Laws* 708 E-709 B.

[1165]Cf. Vol. I. pp. 200 f. on 386 B-C; *Laws* 727 D, 828 D, 881 A, *Gorg.* 522 E, *Phaedo* 77 E, *Crito* 43 B, *Apol.* 35 A, 40 C. Cf. Spinoza's "There is nothing of which the free man thinks so little as death."

"I think not."

"What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains[1166]?"

"Impossible."

"This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.[1167]"

"Assuredly."

"Nor will you overlook this, I fancy."

"What?"

"Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully[1168] and with little result[1169] from much toil?"

"That could not be."

"And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion,[1170] could he fail to be void of knowledge?"

"How could he?"

"And so, having all his labor for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation?"

"Of course."

"The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory."

"By all means."

"But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and proportion."

"Certainly."

"And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion?"

"To proportion."

"Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided to the aspect of the ideal[1171] reality in all things."

[1166]Cf. *ibid*, Vol. I. on 442 E.

[1167]Cf. 375 B.

[1168]Cf. *Laches* 189 A-B "ἀηδῶς μανθάνων"

[1169]Cf. *Theaet.* 144 B.

[1170]Cf. *Theaet.* 144 B "λήθης γέμοντες". Cf. Cleopatra's "Oh, my oblivion is a very Antony" (*Ant. and Cleo.* I. iii. 90).

[1171]*ἰδέαν* is not exactly "idea." Cf. *Cratyl.* 389 B, *What Plato Said,* p. 358 on

"Assuredly."

"Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible[1172] with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?"

"Nay, most necessary," he said.

"Is there any fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a man could not properly practise unless he were by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent,[1173] gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety?"

"Momus[1174] himself," he said,

"could not find fault with such a combination."

"Well, then," said I,

"when men of this sort are perfected by education and maturity of age, would you not entrust the state solely to them?" And Adeimantus said,

"No one, Socrates, would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you[1175] argue thus feel in this way[1176]: They think that owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answer[1177] they are at every question led astray[1178] a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are accu-

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Euthyph. 6 D, *ibid.* p. 560 on *Rep.* 369 A and p. 585 on *Parmen.* 130 C-D. Cf. *Class. Phil.* xx. (1925) p. 347.

[1172]Lit. following on upon the other. Cf. *Tim.* 27 C "ἑπομένως", *Laws* 844 E.

[1173]*μεγαλοπρεπής* is frequently ironical in Plato, but not here. For the list of qualities of the ideal student cf. also 503 C, *Theaet.* 144 A-B, and Friedländer, *Platon,* ii. p. 418. Cf. *Laws* 709 E on the qualifications of the young tyrant, and Cic. *Tusc.* v. 24, with Renaissance literature on education.

[1174]The god of censure, who finds fault with the gods in Lucian's dialogues. Cf. Overbeck, *Schriftquellen,* p. 208, n. 1091, Otto, p. 227, *s. v.* Momus. Cf. Callimachus, fr. 70; and *Anth. Pal.* xvi. 262. 3-4: "αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος φθέγξεται, Ἄκρητος, Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἡ σοφίη", "Momus himself will cry out "Father Zeus, this was perfect skill."" (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to Erasmus, *Chiliad,* i. 5. 75 and interpreters on Aristaenet. *Epist.* i. I, p. 239, ed. Boissonade.

[1175]Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 35 n. 236, and *What Plato Said,* p. 488 on *Crito* 48 B. A speaker in Plato may thus refer to any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamowitz' suggested emendation (*Platon,* ii. p. 205) *ἃ ἂν λέγῃς* is due to a misunderstanding of this.

[1176]A *locus classicus* for Plato's anticipation of objections. Cf. 475 B, *Theaet.* 166 A-B, *Rep.* 609 C, 438-439, and Apelt, *Republic,* p. 492. Plato does it more tactfully than Isocrates, e.g. *Demon.* 44.

[1177]Cf. Apelt, *Aufsätze,* p. 73, Minto, *Logic, Induction and Deduction,* pp. 4 ff.; also *Gorg.* 461 D, 462 A, *Soph.* 230 B.

[1178]Cf. *Phaedrus* 262 B.

mulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their fall[1179] and the apparent contradiction of what they at first said[1180]; and that just as by expert draught-players[1181] the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move, so they are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by that outcome.[1182] I say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each question, but that when it comes to facts[1183] he sees that of those who turn to philosophy,[1184] not merely touching upon it to complete their education[1185] and dropping it while still young, but lingering too long[1186] in the study of it, the majority become cranks,[1187] not to say rascals, and those accounted the finest spirits among them are still rendered useless[1188] to society by the pursuit[1189] which you commend." And I, on hearing this, said,

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[1179]Cf. 451 A, and *Theaet.* 166 A, 168 A, 534 C "ἁπτῶτι".

[1180]Cf. *Phaedr.* 262 B, *Cleitophon* 410 A, *Gorg.* 495 A, schol.,"τοὺς πρώτους λόγους τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ δηλονότι", *Gorg.* 457 E "οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες", and also Agathon in *Symp.* 201 B.

[1181]For this figure cf. *Laws* 739 A, 820 C-D, 903 D, *Eryxias* 395 A-B, *Hipparchus* 220 E, Eurip. *Suppl.* 409. Aristotle, *Soph. El.* 165 a 10 ff., borrows the metaphor, but his *ψῆφοι* are those of book-keeping or reckoning. Cf. also Dem. *De cor.* 227 f.

[1182]Cf. *Hipp. Minor* 369 B-C and Grote ii. p. 64 "Though Hippias admits each successive step he still mistrusts the conclusion" also Apelt, p. 492, 357 A-B and *Laws* 903 A "βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις", and also *Hipparchus* 232 B for the idea that dialectic constrains rather than persuades. In the *Ion,* 533 C, Ion says he cannot *ἀντιλέγειν*, but the fact remains that he knows Homer but not other poets. Cf. also 536 D. The passage virtually anticipates Bacon's *Novum Organum,*App. XIII. "(syllogismus) . . . assensum itaque constringit, non res." Cf. Cic. *De fin.* iv. 3, *Tusc.* i. 8. 16, and the proverbial "οὐ γὰρ πείσεις, οὐδ' ἢν πείσῃς,", Aristoph. *Plutus* 600.

[1183]See *Soph.* 234 E for a different application of the same idea. There is no change of opinion. The commonplace Greek contrast of word and deed, theory and fact, is valid against eristic but not against dialectic. See *What Plato Said,* p. 534 on *Phaedo* 99 E, and on 473 A; also *What Plato Said,* p. 625 on *Laws* 636 A. A favorite formula of Aristotle runs, "This is true in theory and is confirmed by facts." Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1099 b 25, 1123 b 22, 1131 a 13, *Pol.* 1323 a 39-b 6, 1326 a 25 and 29, 1334 a 5-6.

[1184]Scholars in politics cut a sorry figure. For this popular view of philosophers Cf. *Theaet.* 173 C ff., 174 C-D, *Gorg.* 484-486 C, *Phaedo* 64 B. Cf. also Isoc. *passim*, e. g. *Antid.* 250, 312.

[1185]The perfect tense is ironical in *Crat.* 384 B, serious in *Laws* 670 A-B. In *Gorg.* 485 A it is replaced by "ὅσον παιδείας χάριν".

[1186]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 506 on *Gorg.* 484 C.

[1187]Cf. *Euthydem.* 306 E, *Protag.* 346 A, and for the idea without the word, *Soph.* 216 C.

[1188]Cf. Eurip. *Medea* 299, and on 489 B.

[1189]Cf. 497 A. In Euthydem. 307 B Plato uses both *ἐπιτήδευμα* and *πρᾶγμα*

"Do you think that they are mistaken in saying so?"

"I don't know," said he,

"but I would gladly hear your opinion."

"You may hear, then, that I think that what they say is true."

"How, then," he replied,

"can it be right to say that our cities will never be freed from their evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be useless to them, become their rulers?"

"Your question," I said,

"requires an answer expressed in a comparison or parable.[1190]"

"And you," he said,

"of course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!"

"So," said I,

"you are making fun of me after driving me into such an impasse of argument. But, all the same, hear my comparison so that you may still better see how I strain after[1191] imagery. For so cruel is the condition of the better sort in relation to the state that there is no single thing[1192] like it in nature. But to find a likeness for it and a defence for them one must bring together many things in such a combination as painters mix when they portray goat-stags[1193] and similar creatures.[1194] Conceive this sort of thing happening either on many ships or on one: Picture a shipmaster[1195] in height and strength surpassing all others on the ship,

[1190]Cf. *Gory.* 517 D, *Laws* 644 C, *Symp.* 215 A with Bury's note. Cf. the parable of the great beast 493, and of the many-headed beast, 588-589.

[1191]The word *γλίσχρως* is untranslatable, and often misunderstood. In 553 C it means "stingily"; in *Cratyl.* 414 C it is used of a strained etymology, and so in 435 C, usually misunderstood; in *Crito* 53 E of clinging to life; Cf. *Phaedo* 117 A; in Plutarch, *De Is. et Osir.* 28 of a strained allegory and *ibid.* 75 of a strained resemblance; in Aristoph. *Peace* 482 of a dog.

[1192]Cf. *Laws* 747 B.

[1193]Cf. Horace, *Ars Poetica, init.*; *What Plato Said,* p. 550 on *Phaedr.* 229 D-E, and 588 c f. The expression is still used, or revived, in Modern Greek newspapers.

[1194]The syntax of this famous allegory is anacoluthic and perhaps uncertain: but there need be no doubt about the meaning. Cf. my article in the *Classical Review,* xx. (1906) p. 247. Huxley commends the Allegory, *Methods and Results,* p. 313. Cf. also Carlyle's famous metaphor of the ship doubling Cape Horn by ballot. Cf. *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) p. 362.

[1195]The Athenian demos, as portrayed e.g. in Aristophanes' *Knights* 40 ff. and *passim.* Cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* 1406 b 35 "καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυκλήρῳ ἰσχυρῷ μὲν ὑποκώφῳ δέ", Polyb.vi. 44 "ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παραπλήσιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀδεσπότοις σκάφεσι", etc. Cf. the old sailor in Joseph Conrad's *Chance,* ch. i. "No ship navigated . . . in the happy-go-lucky manner . . . would ever arrive into port." For the figure of the ship of state Cf. *Polit.* 302 A ff., 299 B, *Euthydem.* 291 D, Aesch. *Seven against Thebes* 2-3, Theognis 670-685, Horace, *Odes* i. 15 with my note,

but who is slightly deaf[1196] and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge of navigation is on a par with[1197] his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming that it is his right to steer though he has never learned the art and cannot point out his teacher[1198] or any time when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm that it cannot be taught at all,[1199] but they are ready to make mincemeat of anyone[1200] who says that it can be taught, and meanwhile they are always clustered about[1201] the shipmaster importuning him and sticking at nothing[1202] to induce him to turn over the helm to them. And sometimes, if they fail and others get his ear, they put the others to death or cast them out[1203] from the ship, and then, after binding[1204] and stupefying the worthy shipmaster[1205] with mandragora or intoxication or otherwise, they take command of the ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage[1206] of it as is to be expected[1207] from such, and as if that were not enough, they praise and celebrate as a navigator, a pilot, a master of shipcraft, the man who is most cunning to lend a hand[1208] in persuading or constraining the shipmaster to let

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Urwick, *The Message of Plato,* pp. 110-111, Ruskin, *Time and Tide,* xiii: "That the governing authority should be in the hands of a true and trained pilot is as clear and as constant. In none of these conditions is there any difference between a nation and a boat's company." Cf. Longfellow's *The Building of the Ship, in fine.* Cf. *Laws* 758 A, 945 C. For the criticism of democracy by a figure cf. also *Polit.* 297 E ff.

[1196]Cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 42-44.

[1197]Cf. 390 C, 426 D, 498 B, *Theaetet.* 167 B, and Milton's "unknown and like esteemed," *Comus* 630.

[1198]For this and similar checks on pretenders to knowledge Cf. *Laches* 185 E, 186 A and C, *Alc. I.* 109 D and *Gorg.* 514 B-C.

[1199]Plato of course believed that virtue or the political art can be taught in a reformed state, but practically was not taught at Athens. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 14, on 518 D, *What Plato Said,* pp. 70 and 511, Newman, Introd. Aristot. *Pol.* p. 397, Thompson on *Meno* 70 A.

[1200]A hint of the fate of Socrates. Cf. 517 A, 494 E and *Euthyphro* 3 E.

[1201]The participle *περικεχυμένους* occurs in *Polit.* 268 C, but is avoided here by anacoluthon.

[1202]For the idiom *πάντα ποιεῖν* Cf. *Euthyph.* 8 C, 504 D-E, 471 C, 575 E, 494 E, *Gorg.* 479 C, *Phaedr.* 252 E, *Apol.* 39 A, and, slightly varied, Eurip. *Heracleidae* 841.

[1203]The word *ἐκβάλλοντας* helps the obvious allegory, for it also means banish.

[1204]Here figurative. Cf. *Gorg.* 482 E, *Theaet.* 165 E. Infra 615 E it is used literally.

[1205]Cf. *Polit.* 297 E. The expression is slightly ironical. Such is frequently the tone of *γενναῖος* in Plato. Cf. *Rep.* 454 A, 363 A, 544 C, 348 C*Hipp. Min.* 370 D, *Soph.* 231 B, *Hipp. Maj.* 290 , *Polit.* 274 E.

[1206]Cf. *Polit.* 302 A, *Laws* 906 E, Jebb on Soph. *Antig.* 189-190.

[1207]Cf. 407 D with Thucyd. iv. 26, vi 69, vii. 25.

[1208]Cf. 427 E, *Laws* 905 C, *Eryx.* 396 E, Aristoph. *Knights* 229.

them rule,[1209] while the man who lacks this craft[1210] they censure as useless. They have no suspicions[1211] that the true pilot must give his attention[1212] to the time of the year, the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a ship, and that he does not believe that there is any art or science of seizing the helm[1213] with or without the consent of others, or any possibility of mastering this alleged art[1214] and the practice of it at the same time with the science of navigation."

"With such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed[1215] be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler, a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion?"

"Quite so," said Adeimantus.

"You take my meaning, I presume, and do not require us to put the

[1209] Neither here nor in D-E can *ὅπως* with the future mean "in what way," and all interpretations based on that refers to getting control. Cf. 338 E, *Laws* 757 D, 714 C, 962 D-E, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 14. 5. Cf. *Class. Phil.* ix.(1914) pp. 358 and 362.

[1210] For *τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον* Cf. *Alc. II.* 145 C.

[1211] The ppl. must refer to the sailors; hence the acc. (see crit. note). Whatever the text and the amount of probable anacoluthon in this sentence, the meaning is that the unruly sailors (the mob) have no true conception of the state of mind of the real pilot (the philosophic statesman), and that it is he (adopting Sidgwick's *οἰομένῳ* for the MS. *οἰόμενοι* in E) who does not believe that the trick of getting possession of the helm is an art, or that, if it were, he could afford time to practise it. Those who read *οἰόμενοι* attribute the idea of the incompatibility of the two things to the sailors. But that overlooks the points I have already made about *ὅπως*, and *τέχνη* and is in any case improbable, because the sentence as a whole is concerned with the attitude of the true pilot (statesman), which may be represented by the words of Burke to his constituents, "I could hardly serve you as I have done and court you too." Cf. Sidgwick, "On a Passage in Plato's *Republic*", *Journal of Philology,* v. pp. 274-276, and my notes in *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 364 and xvi. p. 234.

[1212] For the force of the article cf. Thucyd. ii. 65 "τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει", and my article in *T.A.P.A.* 1893, p. 81, n. 6. Cf. also *Charm.* 156 E and *Rep.* 496 E.

[1213] *ὅπως . . . κυβερνήσει.* Cf. p. 20, note *h.*

[1214] The translation gives the right meaning. Cf. 518 D, and the examples collected in my emendation of *Gorgias* 503 D in *Class. Phil.* x. (1915) 325-326. The contrast between subjects which do and those which do not admit of constitution as an art and science is ever present to Plato's mind, as appears from the *Sophist, Politicus, Gorgias,* and *Phaedrus.* And he would normally express the idea by a genitive with *τέχνη.* Cf. *Protag.* 357 A, *Phaedrus* 260 E, also *Class. Rev.* xx. (1906) p. 247. See too Cic. *De or.* I. 4 "neque aliquod praeceptum artis esse arbitrarentur," and 518 D.

[1215] *τῷ ὄντι* verifies the allusion to the charge that Socrates was a babbler and a star-gazer or weather-prophet. Cf. *Soph.* 225 D, *Polit.* 299 B, and *What Plato Said,* p. 527 on *Phaedo* 70 C; Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 1480.

comparison to the proof[1216] and show that the condition[1217] we have described is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers."

"It is indeed," he said.

"To begin with, then, teach this parable[1218] to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honored in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising if they were honored."

"I will teach him,"[1219] he said.

"And say to him further: You are right in affirming that the finest spirit among the philosophers are of no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness,[1220] not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them. For it is not the natural[1221] course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him or that wise men should go to the doors of the rich.[1222] The author of that epigram[1223] was a liar. But the true nature of things is that

[1216]Plato like some modern writers is conscious of his own imagery and frequently interprets his own symbols. Cf. 517 A-B, 531 B, 588 B, *Gorg.* 493 D, 517 D, *Phaedo* 87 B, *Laws* 644 C, *Meno* 72 A-B, *Tim.* 19 B, *Polit.* 297 E. Cf. also the cases where he says he cannot tell what it is but only what it is like, e.g. *Rep.* 506 E, *Phaedr.* 246 A, *Symp.* 215 A 5.

[1217]διάθεσις and ἕξις are not discriminated by Plato as by Aristotle.

[1218]Cf. 476 D-E.

[1219]This passage illustrates one of the most interesting characteristics of Plato's style, namely the representation of thought as adventure or action. This procedure is, or was, familiar to modern readers in Matthew Arnold's account in *God and the Bible* of his quest for the meaning of god, which in turn is imitated in Mr. Updegraff's *New World.* It lends vivacity and interest to Pascal's *Provinciales* and many other examples of it can be found in modern literature. The classical instance of it in Plato is Socrates' narrative in the *Phaedo* of his search for a satisfactory explanation of natural phenomena, 96 A ff. In the *Sophist* the argument is represented as an effort to track and capture the sophist. And the figure of the hunt is common in the dialogues (Cf. Vol. I. p. 365). Cf. also *Rep.* 455 A-B, 474 B, 588 C-D, 612 C, *Euthyd.* 291 A-B, 293 A, *Phileb.* 24 A ff., 43 A, 44 D, 45 A, *Laws* 892 D-E, *Theaet.* 169 D, 180 E, 196 D, *Polit.* 265 B, etc.

[1220]Cf. 487 D. Cf. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy,* p. 3 "I am not sure that I do not think this the fault of our community rather than of the men of culture."

[1221]For the idiom φύσιν ἔχει cf. 473 A, Herod. ii. 45, Dem. ii. 26. Similarly ἔχει λόγον, *Rep.* 378 E, 491 D, 564 A, 610 A, *Phaedo* 62 B and D, *Gorg.* 501 A, etc.

[1222]This saying was attributed to Simonides. Cf. schol. Hermann, *Plato,* vol. vi. p. 346, Joel, *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates,* ii.1 p .81, Aristot. *Rhet.* 1301 a 8 Cf. *Phaedr.* 245 A "ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας", Thompson on *Phaedr.* 233 E, 364 B "ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας", *Laws* 953 D "ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ σοφῶν θύρας", and for the idea cf. also 568 A and *Theaet.* 170 A, *Timon of Athens* IV iii. 17 "The learned pate ducks to the golden fool."

[1223]For Plato's attitude toward the epigrams of the Pre-Socratics Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought,* pp. 68-69.

whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician, and everyone who needs to be governed[1224] to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything.[1225] But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we are just describing, and those whom these call useless and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots."

"Just so," he said.

"Hence, and under these conditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit should be highly esteemed by those whose way of life is quite the contrary. But far the greatest and chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon it by the pretenders[1226] to that way of life, those whom you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser of philosophy says that the majority of her followers[1227] are rascals and the better sort useless, while I admitted[1228] that what you said was true. Is not that so?"

"Yes."

"Have we not, then, explained the cause of the uselessness of the better sort?"

"We have."

"Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the degeneracy of the majority, and try to show if we can that philosophy is not to be blamed for this either?"

"By all means."

"Let us begin, then, what we have to say and hear by recalling the starting-point of our description of the nature which he who is to be a scholar and gentleman[1229] must have from birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recollect, was truth. That he was to seek always and altogether, on pain of[1230] being an impostor without part or lot

[1224]Cf. *Theaet.* 170 B and 590 C-D.

[1225]For the idiom with *ὄφελος* cf. 530 C, 567 B, *Euthyphro* 4 E, *Apol.* 36 C, *Crito* 46 A, *Euthydem.* 289 A, Soph. *O. C.* 259, where it is varied.

[1226]Cf. *Theaet.* 173 C, why speak of unworthy philosophers? and 495 C ff.

[1227]Possibly "wooers." Cf. 347 C, 521 B. Plato frequently employs the language of physical love in speaking of philosophy. Cf. 495-496, 490 B, *Theaet.* 148 E ff., *Pheado* 66 E, *Meno* 60 B, *Phaedr.* 266 B, etc.

[1228]Cf. *Theaet.* 169 D.

[1229]The quality of the *καλὸς κἀγαθός* gave rise to the abstraction *καλοκἀγαθία* used for the moral ideal in the Eudemian Ethics. Cf. Isoc. *Demon.* 6, 13, and 51, Stewart on *Eth. Nic.* 1124 a 4 (p. 339) and 1179 b 10 (p. 460).

[1230]For *ἤ* = or else Cf. *Prot.* 323 A and C, *Phaedr.* 237 C, 239 A, 245 D, *Gorg.* 494

in true philosophy."

"Yes, that was said."

"Is not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing opinion about him?"

"It is indeed," he said.

"Will it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with[1231] the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs[1232] to lay hold on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge and truly live and grow,[1233] and so find surcease from his travail[1234] of soul, but not before?"

"No plea could be fairer."

"Well, then, will such a man love falsehood, or, quite the contrary, hate it?"

"Hate it," he said.

"When truth led the way, no choir[1235] of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train."

"How could it?"

"But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance."

"Right," he said.

"What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the choir that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory.[1236] And when you interposed the objection that though everybody will be compelled

A, *Crat.* 426 B, etc.

[1231]Similar metaphors for contact, approach and intercourse with the truth are frequent in Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. For Plato cf. Campbell on *Theaet.* 150 B and 186 A. Cf. also on 489 D.

[1232]Cf. *Phaedo* 65 E f., *Symp.* 211 E-212 A.

[1233]Lit. be nourished. Cf. *Protag.* 313 C-D, *Soph.* 223 E, *Phaedr.* 248 B.

[1234]a Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphor. Cf. *Theaet.* 148 E ff., 151 A, and *passim*, *Symp.* 206 E, *Epist.* ii. 313 A, Epictet. *Diss.* i. 22. 17.

[1235]For the figurative use of the word χορός cf. 560 E, 580 B, *Euthydem.* 279 C, *Theaet.* 173 B.

[1236]For the list of virtues Cf. on 487 A.

to admit our statements,[1237] yet, if we abandoned mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom the words referred, everyone would say that he actually saw some of them to be useless and most of them base with all baseness, it was in our search for the cause of this ill-repute that we came to the present question: Why is it that the majority are bad? And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it must necessarily be?"

"That is so," he said.

"We have, then," I said,

"to contemplate the causes of the corruption of this nature in the majority, while a small part escapes,[1238] even those whom men call not bad but useless; and after that in turn we are to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp its pursuits and see what types of souls they are that thus entering upon a way of life which is too high[1239] for them and exceeds their powers, by the many discords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute of which you speak."

"Of what corruptions are you speaking?"

"I will try," I said,

"to explain them to you if I can. I think everyone will grant us this point, that a nature such as we just now postulated for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men and is found in only a few. Don't you think so?"

"Most emphatically."

"Observe, then, the number and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy these few."

"What are they?"

"The most surprising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.[1240]"

[1237] Cf. for the use of the dative *Polit.* 258 A "συγχωρεῖς οὖν οἷς λέγει", *Phaedo* 100 C "τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς", Horace, *Sat.* ii. 3. 305 "stultum me fateor, liceat concedere veris."

[1238] *Le petit nombre des élus.* Cf. 496 A-B and *Phaedo* 69 C-D, *Matt.* xx. 16, xxii. 14.

[1239] For the Greek double use of *ἄξιος* and *ἀνάξιος* Cf. *Laws* 943 E, Aesch. *Ag.* 1527. Cf. "How worthily he died who died unworthily" and Wyatt's line "Disdain me not without desert."

[1240] Cf. Burton, *Anatomy,* i. 1 "This St. Austin acknowledgeth of himself in his humble confessions, promptness of wit, memory, eloquence, they were God's good

"That does sound like a paradox," said he.

"Furthermore," said I,

"all the so-called goods[1241] corrupt and divert, beauty and wealth and strength of body and powerful family connections in the city and all things akin to them—you get my general meaning?"

"I do," he said,

"and I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it."

"Well," said I,

"grasp it rightly as a general proposition and the matter will be clear and the preceding statement will not seem to you so strange."

"How do you bid me proceed?" he said.

"We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed to the good than to the not-good.[1242]"

"Of course."

"So it is, I take it, natural that the best nature should fare worse[1243] than the inferior under conditions of nurture unsuited to it."

"It is."

"Then," said I,

"Adeimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature[1244] and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either

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gifts, but he did not use them to his glory." Cf. *Meno* 88 A-C, and Seneca, *Ep.* v. 7 "multa bona nostra nobis nocent."

[1241] Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 479 on *Charm.* 158 A. For "goods" Cf. *ibid.* p. 629 on *Laws* 697 B. The minor or earlier dialogues constantly lead up to the point that goods are no good divorced from wisdom, or the art to use them rightly, or the political or royal art, or the art that will make us happy. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 71.

[1242] This is for Plato's purpose a sufficiently clear statement of the distinction between contradictory and contrary opposition. Plato never drew out an Aristotelian or modern logician's table of the opposition of propositions. But it is a misunderstanding of Greek idiom or of his style to say that he never got clear on the matter. He always understood it. Cf. *Symp.* 202 A-B, and on 437 A-B, *What Plato Said,* p. 595 on *Soph.* 257 B, and *ibid.* p. 563 on *Rep.* 436 B ff.

[1243] *Corruptio optimi pessima.* Cf. 495 A-B, Xen. *Mem,* i. 2. 24, iv. 1. 3-4. Cf. Livy xxxviii. 17 "generosius in sua quidquid sede gignitur: insitum alienae terrae in id quo alitur, natura vertente se, degenerat," Pausanias vii. 17. 3.

[1244] Cf. 495 B; La Rochefoucauld, *Max.* 130 "Ia faiblesse est le seul défaut qu'on ne saurait corriger" and 467 "Ia faiblesse est plus opposée à Ia vertu que le vice."

for good or evil?"

"No," he said,

"that is the case."

"Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown[1245] and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue.[1246] Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists,[1247] and that there are sophists in private life[1248] who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning,[1249] and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart's desire young and old, men and women?"

"When?" said he.

"Why, when," I said,

"the multitude are seated together[1250] in assemblies or in courtrooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamor

[1245]Cf. 107 B, *Tim.* 42 D.

[1246]This is the *θεῖα μοῖρα* of 493 A and *Meno* 99 E. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 517.

[1247]See *What Plato Said,* pp. 12 ff. and on *Meno* 93-94. Plato again anticipates many of his modern critics. Cf. Grote's defence of the sophists *passim*, and Mill, *Unity of Religion*(*Three essays on Religion,* pp. 78, 84 ff.).

[1248]*ἰδιωτικούς* refers to individual sophists as opposed to the great sophist of public opinion. Cf. 492 D, 493 A, 494 A.

[1249]For *καὶ ἄξιον λόγου* Cf. *Euthydem* 279 C, *Laches* 192 A, *Laws* 908 B, 455 C, Thucyd. ii. 54. 5, Aristot. *Pol.* 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, *De part. an.* 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, Isoc. vi. 65.

[1250]Cf. *Gorg.* 490 B, Emerson, *Self-Reliance:* "It is easy . . . to brook the rage of the cultivated classes . . . . But . . . when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment," Carlyle, *French Revolution:* "Great is the combined voice of men . . . . He who can resist that has his footing somewhere beyond time." For the public as the great sophist cf. Brimley, *Essays,* p. 224 (The Angel in the House): "The miserable view of life and its purposes which society instils into its youth of both sexes, being still, as in Plato's time, the sophist par excellence of which all individual talking and writing sophists are but feeble copies." Cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* 4 II. 1. 601 "Die sophistische Ethik ist seiner Ansicht nach die einfache Konsequenz der Gewöhnlichen." This is denied by some recent critics. The question is a logomachy. Of course there is more than one sophistic ethics. Cf. Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions,* iv. pp. 247 ff., 263 ff., 275. For Plato's attitude toward the sophists see also *Polit.* 303 C, *Phaedr,* 260 C, *What Plato Said,* pp. 14-15, 158.

and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise.[1251] In such case how do you think the young man's heart, as the saying is, is moved within him?[1252] What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm[1253] the same things that they do to be honorable and base, and will do as they do, and be even such as they?"

"That is quite inevitable, Socrates," he said.

"And, moreover," I said,

"we have not yet mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion."

"What is it?" said he.

"That which these "educators" and sophists impose by action when their words fail to convince. Don't you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and death?"

"They most emphatically do," he said.

"What other sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think will prevail in opposition to these?"

"None, I fancy," said he.

"No," said I,

"the very attempt[1254] is the height of folly."

"For there is not, never has been and never will be,[1255] a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running counter to theirs[1256]—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend; for the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail.[1257] And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God[1258] preserves it

[1251]Cf. Eurip. *Orest.* 901, they shouted "ὡς καλῶς λέγοι", also *Euthydem.* 303 B "οἱ κίονες", 276 B and D, Shorey on Horace, *Odes* i.20.7 "datus in theatro cum tibi plausus," and also the account of the moulding process in *Protag.* 323-326.

[1252]What would be his plight, his state of mind; how would he feel? Cf. Shorey in *Class. Phil.* v. (1910) pp. 220-221, *Iliad* xxiv. 367, Theognis 748 "καὶ τίνα θυμὸν ἔχων"; *Symp.* 219 D 3 "τίνα οἴεσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν"; Eurip. *I.A.* 1173 "τίν' ἐν δόμοις με καρδίαν ἔξειν δοκεῖς";

[1253]Adam translates as if it were *καὶ φήσει.* Cf. my "Platonism and the History of Science," *Amer. Philos. Soc. Proc.* lxvi. p. 174 n. See Stallbaum *ad loc.*

[1254]Cf. *Protag.* 317 A-B, *Soph.* 239 C, *Laws* 818 D.

[1255]Cf. *Od.* xvi. 437. See Friedländer, *Platon,* ii. 386 n. who says *ἀλλοῖον γήγνεσθαι* can only = *ἀλλοιοῦσθαι*, "be made different."

[1256]Cf. 429 C for the idiom, and *Laws* 696 A "οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν".

[1257]Cf. *Symp.* 176 C (of Socrates), *Phaedr.* 242 B, *Theaet.* 162 D-E.

[1258]Cf. on 492 A, *Apol.* 33, *Phaedo* 58 E, *Protag.* 328 E, *Meno* 99 E, *Phaedr.* 244

you will not be speaking ill."

"Neither do I think otherwise," he said.

"Then," said I,

"think this also in addition."

"What?"

"Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals,[1259] inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast[1260] which he had in his keeping, how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable,[1261] never

C, *Laws* 642 C, 875 C, *Ion* 534 C.

[1259]Cf. Arnold, Preface to *Essays in Criticism*; *Phaedo* 60 D, *Laws* 817 B, *On Virtue* 376 D.

[1260]Cf. *Epist.* v. 321 D "ἔστιν γὰρ δή τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης καθάπερεί τινων ζῴων", "each form of government has a sort of voice, as if it were a kind of animal" (tr. L.A. Post). Hackforth says this is a clumsy imitation of the *Republic* which proves the letter spurious. Cf. Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici,* ii. 1 "If there be any among those common objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great enemy of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude . . . one great beast and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra," Horace, *Epist.* i. 1. 76 "belua multorum es capitum." Also Hamilton's "Sir, your people is a great beast," Sidney, *Arcadia,* bk. ii. "Many-headed multitude," Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics,* p. 172 " . . . like Plato's sophist is learning what the public is and is beginning to understand "the passions and desires" of that "huge and powerful brute,"" Shakes. *Coriolanus* iv. i. 2 "The beast with many heads Butts me away," *ibid.* ii. iii. 18 "The many-headed multitude." For the idea cf. also *Gorg.* 501 B-C ff., *Phaedr.* 260 C 260 C, "δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκώς", "having studied the opinions of the multitude," Isoc. ii. 49-50.

[1261]Cf. *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) p. 353, n. 1, *ibid.* xxiii. (1928) p. 361 (*Tim.* 75 D), *What Plato Said,* p. 616 on *Tim.* 47 E, Aristot. *Eth.* 1120 b 1 "οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον", Emerson, *Circle,* "Accept the actual for the necessary," Eurip, *I. A.* 724 "καλῶς ἀναγκαίως τε". Mill iv. 299 and Grote iv. 221 miss the meaning. Cf. Bk I. on 347 C, Newman, Aristot. *Pol.* i. pp. 113-114, Iamblichus, *Protrept.* Teubner 148 K.

having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator?"

"I do," he said.

"Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics? For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry[1262] or any other product of his craft or any political. service,[1263] and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable,[1264] the proverbial necessity of Diomede[1265] will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honorable, have you ever heard an attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous[1266]?"

"No," he said,

"and I fancy I never shall hear it either."

"Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?"

"Not in the least," he said.

"Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, is impossible for the multitude.[1267]"

"ἀγνοοῦντος . . . ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα", "not knowing how divergent have always been the good and the necessary."

[1262]Cf. *Laws* 659 B, 701 A, *Gorg.* 502 B.

[1263]Cf. 371 C, *Gorg.* 517 B, 518 B.

[1264]Plato likes to qualify sweeping statements and allow something to necessity and the weakness of human nature. Cf. *Phaedo* 64 E "καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη", 558 D-E, 500 D, 383 C.

[1265]The scholiast derives this expression from Diomedes' binding Odysseus and driving him back to camp after the latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on Aristoph. *Eccl.* 1029 gives a more ingenious explanation. See Frazer, *Pausanias,* ii. p. 264.

[1266]*καταγέλαστον* is a strong word. "Make the very jack-asses laugh" would give the tone. Cf. Carlyle, *Past and Present,* iv. "impartial persons have to say with a sigh that . . . they have heard no argument advanced for it but such as might make the angels and almost the very jack-asses weep." Cf. also Isoc. *Panegyr.* 14, *Phil.* 84, 101, *Antid.* 247, *Peace* 36, and *καταγέλαστος* in Plato *passim,* e.g. *Symp.* 189 B.

[1267]A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists. Cf. 503 B, *Polit.* 292 E, 297 B, 300 E. Novotny, *Plato's Epistles,* p. 87, uses this to support his view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes *Gorg.* 474 A "τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι", which is not quite relevant. Cf. Renan, *Etudes d'histoire relig.* p. 403 "La philosophie

"Impossible."

"It is inevitable,[1268] then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them."

"Inevitable."

"And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favor[1269] with it."

"Obviously."

"From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. We agreed[1270] that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature."

"Yes."

"Then even as a boy[1271] among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul."

"How could he fail to do so?" he said.

"His kinsmen and fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs."

"Of course."

"Then they will fawn[1272] upon him with petitions and honors, anticipating[1273] and flattering the power that will be his."

"That certainly is the usual way."

"How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes,[1274] and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians,[1275] and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense[1276]"

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sera toujours le fait d'une imperceptible minorité," etc.

[1268]It is psychologically necessary. Cf. *ibid*, Vol. 1. on 473 E. Cf. 527 A, *Laws* 655 E, 658 E, 681 C, 687 C, *Phaedr.* 239 C, 271 B, *Crito* 49 D.

[1269]Cf. *Gorg.* 481 E, 510 D, 513 B.

[1270]In 487 A.

[1271]Cf. 386 A. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of Alcibiades. *Alc.* I, 103 A ff, imitates the passage. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 24.

[1272]For *ὑποκείσονται* Cf. *Gorg.* 510 C, 576 A "ὑποπεσόντες" Eurip. *Orest.* 670 "ὑποτρέχειν", *Theaet.* 173 A "ὑπελθεῖν".

[1273]i.e. endeavoring to secure the advantage of it for themselves by winning his favor when he is still young and impressionable.

[1274]Cf. *Alc. I.* 104 B-C ff.

[1275]Cf. *Alc. I.* 105 B-C.

"He surely will," he said.

"And if to a man in this state of mind[1277] someone gently[1278] comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave[1279] to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear[1280] to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings[1281]"

"Far from it," said he.

"And even supposing," said I,

"that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at[1282] to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it,[1283] both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?"

"That is inevitable," he said.

"Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize?"

"None at all," he said.

"Do you see, then," said I,

"that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding,[1284] and so do the so-called goods—[1285] riches and all such instrumentalities[1286]?"

"No," he replied,

"it was rightly said."

"Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is the destruction and corruption[1287] of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case,[1288] as we affirm. And it is from men

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[1276] *ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν*, etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation.

[1277] Or perhaps "subject to these influences." Adam says it is while he is sinking into this condition.

[1278] Cf. Vol. I. on 476 E. Cf. 533 D, *Protag.* 333 E, *Phaedo* 83 A, *Crat.* 413 A, *Theaet.* 154. E.

[1279] Cf. *Phaedo* 66 C, *Symp.* 184 C, *Euthydem.* 282 B.

[1280] Cf. *Epin.* 990 A, *Epist.* vii. 330 A-B.

[1281] Cf. *Alc. I.* 135 E.

[1282] For *πᾶν ἔργον* cf. Sophocles, *E.* 615.

[1283] Cf. 517 E.

[1284] For *ἐκπεσεῖν* cf. 496 C.

[1285] Cf. on 591 C. p. 32, note a.

[1286] Cf. *Lysis* 220 A; Arnold's "machinery," Aristotle's *χορηγία*

[1287] Cf. 491 B-E, *Laws* 951 B "ἀδιάφθαρτος", Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 24.

of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel,[1289] but a small nature[1290] never does anything great to a man or a city."

"Most true," said he.

"Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers[1291] rush in and defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin,[1292] and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils."

"Why, yes," he replied,

"that is what they do say."

"And plausibly," said I;

"for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical[1293] arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft.[1294] For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated[1295] by their vulgar occupations[1296] even as their bodies are marred by their

[1288]For *καὶ ἄλλως* Cf. *Il.* ix. 699.

[1289]Cf. on 485 D "ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα".

[1290]Cf. on 491 E, p. 33, note d.

[1291]Cf. on 489 D, and *Theaet.* 173 C.

[1292]Cf. Taine, à Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865: "Comme Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa spécialité et c'est ches des spécialistes comme ceux-là que la malheureuse philosophie livée aux mains gantées et parfumées d'eau bénite va trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des enfants." cf. Epictet. iii. 21. 21. The passage is imitated by Lucian 3. 2. 287, 294, 298. For the shame that has befallen philosophy Cf. *Euthydem.* 304 ff., *Epist.* vii. 328 E, Isoc. *Busiris* 48, Plutarch 1091 E, Boethius, *Cons.* i. 3. There is no probability that this is aimed at Isocrates, who certainly had not deserted the mechanical arts for what he called philosophy. Rohde *Kleine Schriften,* i. 319, thinks Antisthenes is meant. But Plato as usual is generalizing. See *What Plato Said,* p. 593 on *Soph.* 242 C.

[1293]Cf. the different use of the idea in *Protag.* 318 E.

[1294]*τεχνίον* is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also *ἀνθρωπίσκοι* in C, and *ψυχάριον* in 519 A.

[1295]Cf. 611 C-D, *Theaet.* 173 A-B.

[1296]For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompatible with philosophy Cf. 522 B and 590 C, *Laws* 919 C ff., and *What Plato Said,* p. 663 on *Rivals* 137 B. Cf. Richard of Bury, *Philobiblon,* Prologue, "Fitted for the liberal arts, and equally

arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable?"

"Quite so," he said.

"Is not the picture which they present," I said,

"precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker[1297] who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master's daughter who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?"

"There is no difference at all," he said.

"Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents?"

"Will they not be bastard[1298] and base?"

"Inevitably."

"And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence[1299]?"

"Quite so," he said.

"There is a very small remnant,[1300] then, Adeimantus," I said,

"of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check[1301] by exile,[1302] and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns[1303] and disregards its parochial affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion Theages[1304] also might operate as a

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disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it were, by a sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts." Cf also Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2. 3, and *Ecclesiasticus* xxxviii. 25 f. "How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad . . . and whose talk is of bullocks? . . . so every carpenter and workmaster . . . the smith . . . the potter . . . "

[1297]For a similar short vivid description Cf. *Erastae* 134 B, *Euthyphro* 2 B. Such are common in Plautus, e.g. *Mercator* 639.

[1298]It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the half-Thracian Antisthenes. Cf. also *Theaet.* 150 C, and *Symp.* 212 A.

[1299]Cf. *Euthydem.* 306 D.

[1300]Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 A "ὀλίγαι δὴ λείπονται", and 404 A and on 490 E.

[1301]Perhaps "overtaken." Cf. Goodwin on Dem. *De cor.* 107.

[1302]It is possible but unnecessary to conjecture that Plato may be thinking of Anaxagoras or Xenophon or himself or Dion.

[1303]Cf. *Theaet.* 173 B, 540 D.

[1304]This bridle has become proverbial. Cf. Plut. *De san. tuenda* 126 B, Aelian, *Var. Hist.* iv. 15. For Theages cf. also *Apol.* 33 E and the spurious dialogue bearing is

restraint. For in the case of Theages all other conditions were at hand for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign,[1305] is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company[1306] and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics,[1307] and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice[1308] could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts,[1309] unwilling to share their misdeeds[1310] and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others,—for all these reasons I say the philosopher

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name.

[1305]The enormous fanciful literature on the daimonion does not concern the interpretation of Plato, who consistently treats it as a kind of spiritual tact checking Socrates from any act opposed to his true moral and intellectual interests. Cf. *What Plato Said,* pp. 456-457, on *Euthyphro* 3 B, Jowett and Campbell, p. 285.

[1306]For *τούτων . . . γενόμενοι* cf. Aristoph. *Clouds* 107 "τούτων γενοῦ μοι".

[1307]The irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is the starting-point of Plato's political and social speculations. Cf. 597 B, *Laws* 832 C f., *Epist.* vii. 326 A; Byron, *apud* Arnold, *Essays in Crit.* ii. p. 195 "I have simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all existing governments." This passage, *Apol.* 31 E ff. and *Gorg.* 521-522 may be considered Plato's apology for not engaging in politics. Cf. J. V. Novak, *Platon u. d. Rhetorik,* p. 495 (Schleiermacher, *Einl. z. Gorg.* pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, *Platon,* i. 441-442 "Wer kann hier die Klage über das eigene Los überhören?" There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has maintained, the *Republic* itself was intended as a programme of practical politics for Athens, and that its failure to win popular opinion is the chief cause of the disappointed tone of Plato's later writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger's *Neue Phil. Untersuchungen,* Heft 6, *Platos Apologie,* pp. 31-33, who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the *Apology* before the *Gorgias* and that the same doctrine in the seventh *Epistle* absolutely proves that the *Apology* is Plato's own. Cf. also *Theaet.* 173 C ff., *Hipp. Maj.* 281 C, *Euthydem.* 306 B, Xen. *Mem.* i. 6. 15.

[1308]Cf. 368 b, *Apol.* 32 E "εἰ . . . ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις" and 32 A "μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου".

[1309]Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* i. 64. For the antithetic juxtaposition cf. also *εἷς πᾶσιν* below; see too 520 B, 374 A, *Menex.* 241 B, *Phaedr.* 243 C, *Laws* 906 D, etc. More in the *Utopia* (Morley, *Ideal Commonwealths,* p. 84) paraphrases loosely from memory what he calls "no ill simile by which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philosopher's meddling with government"

[1310]Cf. Democrates fr. 38, Diels ii.3 p. 73 "καλὸν μὲν τὸν ἀδικέοντα κωλύειν · εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ ξυναδικεῖν", "it is well to prevent anyone from doing wrong, or else not to join in wrongdoing."

remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall[1311] in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope,[1312] serene and well content when the end comes."

"Well," he said,

"that is no very slight thing to have achieved before taking his departure."

"He would not have accomplished any very great thing either,[1313]" I replied,

"if it were not his fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature[1314] and together with his own preserve the common weal. The causes and the injustice of the calumniation of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add.[1315]"

"No," he said,

"I have nothing further to offer on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy?"

"None whatever," I said;

"but the very ground of my complaint is that no polity[1316] of today is worthy of the philosophic nature. This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont

[1311] Maximus of Tyre 21. 20 comments, "Show me a safe wall." See Stallbaum *ad loc.* for references to this passage in later antiquity. Cf. Heracleit. fr. 44, Diels 3 i. 67, J. Stenzel, *Platon der Erzieher,* p. 114, Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence,* p. 33, Renan, *Souvenirs,* xvii., P. E. More, *Shelburne Essays,* iii. pp. 280-281 Cf. also *Epist.* vii. 331 D, Eurip. *Ion* 598-601.

[1312] Cf. Vol. I on 331 A, 621 C-D, Marc. Aurel. xii. 36 and vi. 30 *in fine.* See my article "Hope" in Hasting's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.*

[1313] Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1094 b 9 "μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν", "yet the good of the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure" (tr. F. H. Peters).

[1314] For *αὐξήσεται* Cf. *Theaet.* 163 C "ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ" and Newman, Aristot. *Pol.* i. p. 68 "As the Christian is said to be complete in Christ so the individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the *πόλις*" Spencer, *Data of Ethics,* xv. "Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state." Cf. also 592 A-B, 520 A-C and Introd. Vol. I. p. xxvii.

[1315] An instance of Socrates' Attic courtesy. Cf 430 B, *Cratyl.* 427 D, *Theaet.* 183 C, *Gorg.* 513 C, *Phaedr.* 235 A. But in *Gorg.* 462 C it is ironical and perhaps in *Hipp. Maj.* 291 A.

[1316] *κατάστασις* = constitution in both senses. Cf. 414 A, 425 C, 464 A, 493 A, 426 C, 547 B. So also in the *Laws.* The word is rare elsewhere in Plato.

to be overcome and die out[1317] into the native growth,[1318] so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent[1319] that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices. Obviously then you are next, going to ask what is this best form of government."

"Wrong," he said[1320]

"I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another."

"In other respects it is this one," said I;

"but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.[1321]"

"That was said," he replied.

"But it was not sufficiently explained," I said,

"from fear of those objections on your part which have shown that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. And apart from that the remainder of the exposition is by no means easy.[1322]"

"Just what do you mean?"

"The manner in which a state that occupies itself with philosophy can escape destruction. For all great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly says, fine things are hard.[1323]"

"All the same," he said,

"our exposition must be completed by making this plain."

"It will be no lack of will," I said,

"but if anything,[1324] a lack of ability, that would prevent that. But

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[1317]For ἐξίτηλον Cf. *Critias* 121 A.

[1318]This need not be a botanical error. in any case the meaning is plain. Cf. *Tim.* 57 B with my emendation.

[1319]For the idiom cf. "αὐτὸ δείξει" *Phileb.* 20 C, with Stallbaum's note, *Theaet.* 200 E, *Hipp. Maj.* 288 B, Aristoph. *Wasps* 994, *Frogs* 1261, etc., Pearson on *Soph.* fr. 388. Cf. "αὐτὸ σημανεῖ", Eurip. *Bacch.* 476, etc.

[1320]Plato similarly plays in dramatic fashion with the order of the dialogue in 523 B, 528 A, 451 B-C, 458 B.

[1321]Cf. on 412 A and *What Plato Said,* p. 647 on *Laws* 962; 502 D.

[1322]Cf. *Soph.* 224 C. See critical note.

[1323]So Adam. Others take τῷ ὄντι with χαλεπά as part of the proverb. Cf. 435 C, *Crat.* 384 A-B with schol.

[1324]For the idiomatic ἀλλ' εἴπερ Cf. *Parmen.* 150 B, *Euthydem.* 296 B, Thompson on *Meno*, Excursus 2, pp. 258-264, Aristot. *An. Post.* 91 b 33, *Eth. Nic.* 1101 a 12, 1136 b 25, 1155 b 30, 1168 a 12, 1174 a 27, 1180 b 27, *Met.* 1028 a 24, 1044 a 11, *Rhet.* 1371 a 16.

you shall observe for yourself my zeal. And note again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in just the reverse of our present fashion.[1325]"

"In what way?"

"At present," said I,

"those who do take it up are youths, just out of boyhood,[1326] who in the interval[1327] before they engage in business and money-making approach the most difficult part of it, and then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. In later life they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to listen[1328] to the philosophic discussions of others. That sort of thing they think should be by-work. And towards old age,[1329] with few exceptions, their light is quenched more completely than the sun of Heracleitus,[1330] inasmuch as it is never rekindled."

"And what should they do?" he said.

"Just the reverse. While they are lads and boys they should occupy themselves with an education and a culture suitable to youth, and while their bodies are growing to manhood take right good care of them, thus securing a basis and a support[1331] for the intellectual life. But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain its maturity, they should make its exercises more severe, and when the bodily strength declines and they are past the age of political and military service, then at last they should be given free range of the pasture[1332] and

[1325]What Plato here deprecates Callicles in the *Gorgias* recommends, 484 C-D. For the danger of premature study of dialectic cf. 537 D-E ff. Cf. my *Idea of Education in Plato's Republic,* p. 11. Milton develops the thought with characteristic exuberance, *Of Education:* "They present their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with the most intellective abstractions of logic and metaphysics . . . to be tossed an turmoiled with their unballasted wits in fathomless and unquiet deeds of controversy," etc.

[1326]Cf. 386 A, 395 C, 413 C, 485 D, 519 A, Demosth. xxi. 154, Xen. *Ages.* 10.4, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1103 b 24, 1104 b 11, Isoc. xv. 289.

[1327]Cf. 450 C.

[1328]Cf. 475 D, Isoc. xii. 270 "ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἄλλου δεικνύοντος καὶ πονήσαντος ἠθέλησεν ἀκροατὴς γενέσθαι" "would not even be willing to listen to one worked out and submitted by another" (tr. Norlin in L.C.L.).

[1329]Cf. Antiphon's devotion to horsemanship in the *Parmenides,* 126 C. For "πρὸς τὸ γῆρας" cf. 552 D, *Laws* 653 A.

[1330]Diels i. 3 p. 78, fr. 6. Cf. Aristot. *Meteor.* ii. 2. 90, Lucretius v. 662.

[1331]Cf. 410 C and *What Plato Said,* p. 496 on *Protag.* 326 B-C.

[1332]Like cattle destined for the sacrifice. A favorite figure with Plato. Cf. *Laws* 635 A, *Protag.* 320 A. It is used literally in *Critias* 119 D.

do nothing but philosophize,[1333] except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world."

"You really seem to be very much in earnest, Socrates," he said;

"yet I think most of your hearers are even more earnest in their opposition and will not be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasymachus."

"Do not try to breed a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, who have just become friends and were not enemies before either. For we will spare no effort until we either convince him and the rest or achieve something that will profit them when they come to that life in which they will be born gain[1334] and meet with such discussions as these."

"A brief time[1335] your forecast contemplates," he said.

"Nay, nothing at all," I replied,

"as compared with eternity.[1336] However, the unwillingness of the multitude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a token,[1337] but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here."

"But the figure of a man "equilibrated" and "assimilated" to virtue's

[1333]Cf. 540 A-B, Newman, Aristot. *Pol.* i. pp. 329-330. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. 207-208, fancies that 498 C to 502 A is a digression expressing Plato's personal desire to be the philosopher in Athenian politics.

[1334]A half-playful anticipation of the doctrine of immortality reserved for Bk. x. 608 D ff. It involves no contradiction and justifies no inferences as to the date and composition of the *Republic.* Cf. Gomprez iii. 335. Cf. Emerson, *Experience*, *in fine*, "which in his passage into new worlds he will carry with him." Bayard Taylor (*American Men of Letters,* p. 113), who began to study Greek late in life, remarked, "Oh, but I expect to use it in the other world." Even the sober positivist Mill says (*Theism,* pp. 249-250) "The truth that life is short and art is long is from of old one of the most discouraging facts of our condition: this hope admits the possibility that the art employed in improving and beautifying the soul itself may avail for good in some other life even when seemingly useless in this."

[1335]For εἰς here cf. Blaydes on *Clouds* 1180, Herod. vii. 46, Eurip. *Heracleidae* 270.

[1336]Cf. on 486 A. see too Plut. *Cons. Apol.* 17. 111 C "a thousand, yes, ten thousand years are only an *ἀόριστος* point, nay, the smallest part of a point, as Simonides says." Cf. also *Lyra Graeca* (L. C. L.), ii. p. 338, *Anth. Pal.* x. 78.

[1337]*γενόμενον . . . λεγόμενον.* It is not translating to make no attempt to reproduce Plato's parody of "polyphonic prose." The allusion here to Isocrates and the Gorgian figure of *παρίσωσις* and *παρομοίωσις* is unmistakable. The subtlety of Plato's style treats the "accidental" occurrence of a Gorgian between the artificial style and insincerity of the sophists and the serious truth of his own ideals. Cf. Isoc. x. 18 "λεγόμενος . . . γενόμενος" *What Plato Said,* p. 544 on *Symp.* 185 C, F. Reinhardt, *De Isocratis aemulis,* p. 39, Lucilius, bk. v. init. "hoc "nolueris et debueris te si minu" delectat, quod *τεχνίον* Isocrateium est," etc.

self perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen in one case or in many. Do you think they have?"

"By no means."

"Neither, my dear fellow, have they ever seriously inclined to hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole endeavor was to search out the truth[1338] at any cost for knowledge's sake, and which dwell apart and salute from afar[1339] all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but opinion[1340] and strife in court-room and in private talk."

"They have not," he said.

"For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears[1341] declared under compulsion of the truth[1342] that neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration[1343] a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession[1344] either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as day-dreams are.[1345] Is not that so?"

"It is."

"If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past,[1346] or now are in some barbaric region[1347] far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention[1348] that the constitution we have

[1338]As the Platonic dialectic does (*Phileb.* 58 C-D, Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 611) in contrast with the rhetorician, the lawyer (*Theaet.* 172 D-E) and the eristic (*Euthydem.* 272 B, *Hipp. Maj.* 288 D).

[1339]Cf. Eurip. *Hippol.* 102, *Psalm* cxxxviii. 6 "the proud he knoweth afar off."

[1340]Cf. *Phaedrus* 253 D with *Theaetet.* 187 C, and *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 48.

[1341]Cf. on 489 A.

[1342]Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 984 b 10, 984 a 19.

[1343]Cf. *Laws* 757 E. But we must not attribute personal superstition to Plato. See *What Plato Said,* index, *s. v.* Superstition.

[1344]Cf. *Laws* 711 D, Thuc. vi. 24. 3; so iv. 4. 1 "ὁρμὴ ἐπέπεσε".

[1345]We might say, "talking like vain Utopians or idly idealists." The scholiast says, p. 348, "τοῦτο καὶ κενὴν φασι μακαρίαν". cf. *ibid,* Vol. I. on 458 A, and for *εὐχαί* on 450 D, and Novotny on *Epist.* vii. 331 D.

[1346]Cf. *Laws* 782 A, 678 A-B, and *What Plato Said,* p. 627 on *Laws* 676 A-B; Also Isoc. *Panath.* 204-205, seven hundred years seemed a short time.

[1347]Cf. *Phaedo* 78 A.

described has been, is, or will be[1349] realized[1350] when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state.[1351] It is not a thing impossible to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit."

"I also think so," he said.

"But the multitude—are you going to say?—does not think so," said I.

"That may be," he said.

"My dear fellow," said I,

"do not thus absolutely condemn the multitude.[1352] They will surely be of another mind if in no spirit of contention but soothingly and endeavoring to do away with the dispraise of learning you point out to them whom you mean by philosophers, and define as we recently did their nature and their pursuits so that the people may not suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking."

"Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging[1353] and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found."

"And I, you may be assured," he said,

"concur."

"And do you not also concur[1354] in this very point that the blame

[1348]For the ellipsis of the first person of the verb *Parmen.* 137 C, *Laches* 180 A. The omission of the third person is very frequent.

[1349]Cf. 492 E, *Laws* 711 E, 739 C, 888 E.

[1350]Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii, and *ibid.* on 472 B, and *What Plato Said,* p. 564, also 540 D, Newman, Aristot. *Pol.* i. p. 377.

[1351]This is what I have called the ABA style. Cf. 599 E, *Apol.* 20 C, *Phaedo* 57 B, *Laches* 185 A, *Protag.* 344 C, *Theaet.* 185 A, 190 B, etc. It is nearly what Riddell calls binary structure, *Apology,* pp. 204-217.

[1352]It is uncritical to find "contradictions" in variations of mood, emphasis, and expression that are broadly human and that no writer can avoid. Any thinker may at one moment and for one purpose defy popular opinion and for another conciliate it; at one time affirm that it doesn't matter what the ignorant people think or say, and at another urge that prudence bids us be discreet. So St. Paul who says (*Gal.* i. 10) "Do I seek to please men? for if I yet please men I should not be the servant of Christ," says also (*Rom* xiv. 16) "Let no then your good be evil spoken of." Cf. also *What Plato Said,* p. 646 on *Laws* 950 B.

[1353]A recurrence to etymological meaning. Cf. "ἄθυμον" 411 B, *Laws* 888 A, "εὐψυχίας" *Laws* 791 C, Thompson on *Meno* 78 E, Aristot. *Topics* 112 a 32-38, Eurip. *Heracleidae* 730 "ἀσθαλῶς", Shakes. *Rich. III.* v. v. 37 "reduce these bloody days again."

for this harsh attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in[1355] where they do not belong, wrangling with one another,[1356] filled with spite[1357] and always talking about persons,[1358] a thing least befitting philosophy?"

"Least of all, indeed," he said.

"For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities[1359] has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate[1360] himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration?"

"Impossible," he said.

"Then the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man.[1361] But calumny[1362] is plentiful everywhere."

[1354]For a similar teasing or playful repetition of a word cf. 517 C, 394 B, 449 C, 470 B-C.

[1355]For the figure of the *κῶμος* or revel rout cf. *Theaet.* 184A, Aesch. *Ag.* 1189, Eurip. *Ion* 1197, and, with a variation of the image, Virgil, Aen. i. 148.

[1356]Cf. Adam *ad loc.* and Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. 121.

[1357]Isoc. *Antid.* 260 seems to take this term to himself; Cf. *Panath.* 249, *Peace* 65, Lysias xxiv. 24 "πολυπράγμων εἰμὶ καὶ θρασὺς καὶ φιλαπεχθήμων" Demosth, xxiv, 6.

[1358]i.e. gossip. cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1125 a 5 "οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος", Epictetus iii. 16. 4. Cf. also *Phileb.* 59 b, *Theaet.* 173 D, 174 C.

[1359]Cf. on 486 A, also *Phileb.* 58 D, 59 A, *Tim.* 90 D, and perhaps *Tim.* 47 A and *Phaedo* 79. This passage is often supposed to refer to the ideas, and *ἐκεῖ* in 500 D shows that Plato is in fact there thinking of them, though in *Rep.* 529 A-B ff. he protests against this identification. And strictly speaking "κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα" in C would on Platonic principles be true only of the ideas. Nevertheless poets and imitators have rightly felt that the dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philosopher's mind of the contemplation of the heavens. This confusion or assimilation is, of course, still more natural to Aristotle, who thought the stars unchanging. Cf. *Met.* 1063 a 16 "ταὐτὰ δ' αἰεὶ καὶ μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα". Cf. also Sophocles, *Ajax* 669 ff., and Shorey in Sneath, *Evolution of Ethics,* pp. 261-263, Dio Chrys. xl. (Teubner ii. p. 199), Boethius, *Cons.* iii. 8 "respicite caeli spatium . . . et aliquando desinite vilia mirari."

[1360]*ἀφομοιοῦσθαι* suggests the *ὁμοίωσις θέῳ Theaet.* 176 B. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 578.

[1361]Cf. on 493 D, and for the idea 383 C.

[1362]Cf. *Hamlet*III. i. 141 "thou shalt not escape calumny," Bacchylides 12 (13). 202-203 "βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος πάντεσσι μέν ἐστιν ἐπ' ἔγοις".

"Yes, truly."

"If, then," I said,

"some compulsion[1363] is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there,[1364] and not merely to mould[1365] and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman[1366] of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue[1367]?"

"By no means," he said.

"But if the multitude become aware that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced[1368] by artists who used the heavenly model?"

"They will not be harsh," he said,

"if they perceive that."

"But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?"

"They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—[1369] no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary

[1363]The philosopher unwillingly holds office. Cf. on 345 E.

[1364] *ἐκεῖ* is frequently used in Plato of the world of ideas. Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 A. *Phaedo* 109 E.

[1365]For the word *πλάττειν* used of the lawgiver cf. 377 C, *Laws* 671 C, 712 B, 746 A, 800 B, *Rep.* 374 A, 377 c, 420 c, 466 A, 588 C, etc. For the idea that the ruler shapes the state according to the pattern Cf. 540 A-B. Plato applies the language of the theory of ideas to the "social tissue" here exactly as he applies it to the making of a tool in the *Cratylus* 389 C. In both cases there is a workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is more or less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the source of Aristotle's doctrine f matter and form. Cf. *Met.* 1044 a 25 *De part. an.* 630 b 25-27, 640 b 24 f., 642 a 10 ff., *De an.* 403 b 3, Seller, *Aristot.* (Eng.) i. p. 356. Cf. also *Gorg.* 503 D-E, *Polit.* 306 C, 309 D and *Unity of Plato's Thought,* pp. 31-32. Cf. Alcinous, *Εἰσαγωγή* ii. (Teubner vi. p. 153) "ἃ κατὰ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ὁρᾶται, μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη".

[1366]Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1329 a 21 "ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν". Cf. also 1275 b 29 with Newman, Introd. Aristot. *Pol.* p. 229. Cf. 395 C "δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας", *Theages* 125 A "δημιουργὸν . . . τῆς σοφίας".

[1367]Cf. *Laws* 968 A "πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς", *Phaedo* 82 A and *ibid,* Vol. I. on 430 C. Brochard, "La Morale de Platon," *L'Année Philosophique,* xvi. (1905) p. 12 "La justice est appelée une vertu populaire." This is a little misleading, if he means that justice itself is "une vertu populaire."

[1368]For *διαγράψειαν* cf. 387 B and *Laws* 778 A. See also Stallbaum *ad loc.*

[1369]Cf. Vol. I. on 426 B. This is one of the passages that may be used or misused to class Plato with the radicaIs. Cf. *Laws* 736 A-B, *Polit.* 293 D, *Euthyphro* 2 D-3 A. H. W. Schneider, *The Puritan Mind,* p. 36, says, "Plato claimed that before his Republic could be established the adult population must be killed off." Cf. however Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxix, *What Plato Said,* p. 83, and infra, p. 76, note a on 502 B.

reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean."

"And they would be right," he said.

"And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution?"

"Surely."

"And then, I take it, in the course of the work they would glance[1370] frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things,[1371] and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity[1372] which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God.[1373]"

"Right," he said.

"And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint in another until in the measure of the possible[1374] they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be."

"That at any rate[1375] would be the fairest painting."

"Are we then making any impression on those who you said[1376] were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying?"

"Much gentler," he said,

"if they are reasonable."

"How can they controvert it[1377]? Will they deny that the lovers of

[1370]The theory of ideas frequently employs this image of the artist looking off to his model and back again to his work. Cf. on 484 C, and *What Plato Said,* p. 458, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 37.

[1371]i.e. the idea of justice. For *φύσις* and the theory of ideas Cf. 597 C, *Phaedo* 103 b, *Parmen.* 132 D, *Cratyl.* 389 C-D, 390 E.

[1372]For *ἀνδρείκελον* Cf. *Cratyl.* 424 E.

[1373]*Il.* i. 131, *Od.* iii. 416. Cf. 589 D, 500 C-D, *Laws* 818 B-C, and *What Plato Said,* p. 578 on *Theaet.* 176 B, Cic. *Tusc.* i. 26. 65 "divina mallem ad not." Cf. also *Tim.* 90 A, *Phaedr.* 249 C. The modern reader may think of Tennyson, *In Mem.* cviii. "What find I in place But mine own phantom chanting hymns?" Cf. also Adam *ad loc.*

[1374]Cf. 500 D and on 493 D.

[1375]For *γοῦν* cf. *ibid*, vol. I. on 334 A.

[1376]Cf. 474 A.

wisdom are lovers of reality and truth?"

"That would be monstrous," he said.

"Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best?"

"Not that either."

"Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded?"

"Surely not."

"Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophic class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable[1378] in words be brought to pass in deed?"

"They will perhaps be less so," he said.

"Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Let us assume, then," said I,

"that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature?"

"Not one," he said.

"And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty[1379] of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time not one of all could be saved,[1380] will anyone maintain that?"

"How could he?"

"But surely," said I,

"the occurrence of one such is enough,[1381] if he has a state which

[1377]Cf. 591 A. This affirmation of the impossibility of denial or controversy is a motif frequent in the attic orators. Cf. Lysias xxx. 26, xxxi. 24, xiii. 49, vi. 46, etc.

[1378]Cf. 376 D, *Laws* 632 E, 841 C, *Phaedr.* 276 E. Frutiger, *Les Mythes de Platon,* p. 13, says Plato uses the word *μῦθος* only once of his own myths, *Polit.* 268 E.

[1379]Cf. *Laws* 711 D "τὸ χαλεπόν", and 495 A-B.

[1380]Cf. 494 A.

[1381]Cf. *Epist.* vii. 328 C and Novotny, *Plato's Epistles,* p. 170 Plato's apparent radicalism again. Cf. on 501 A. Cf. also *Laws* 709 E, but note the qualification in 875 C, 713 E-714 A. 691 C-D. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. pp. 381-383 seems to say that the *εἷς ἱκανός* is the philosopher—Plato.

obeys him,[1382] to realize[1383] all that now seems so incredible."

"Yes, one is enough," he said.

"For if such a ruler," I said,

"ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out."

"By no means."

"Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come[1384]?"

"I think not," said he.

"And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown."

"Yes, sufficiently."

"Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult[1385] yet not impossible."

"That is the conclusion," he said.

"This difficulty disposed of, we have next to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers[1386] of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study."

"Yes, we have to speak of that," he said.

"I gained nothing," I said,

"by my cunning[1387] in omitting heretofore[1388] the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization; for now I am none the less compelled to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of,[1389] but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting-point."

"We were saying, if you recollect, that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested[1390] in pleasures and pains, and make

[1382]Note the different tone of 565 E "λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον". Cf. *Phaedr.* 260 C "λαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθῃ".

[1383]Cf. on 499 D, and Frutiger, *Mythes de Platon,* p. 43.

[1384]Cf. *Epist.* vii. 327 B-C, viii. 357 B ff.

[1385]Cf. 502 A, Campbell's not on *Theaet.* 144 A, and Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 208.

[1386]Cf. on 412 A-B and 497 C-D, *Laws* 960 B. 463 B is not quite relevant.

[1387]For *τὸ σοφόν* Cf. *Euthydem.* 293 D, 297 D, *Gorg.* 493 A, Herod. v. 18 "τοῦτο οὐδὲν εἶναι σοφόν", *Symp.* 214 A "τὸ σύφισμα", *Laches* 183 D.

[1388]Cf. 423 E.

[1389]In Bk. V.

it apparent that they do not abandon[1391] this fixed faith[1392] under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must he rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire,[1393] is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as well.[1394] Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face[1395] in fear[1396] of starting[1397] our present debate."

"Most true," he said;

"I remember."

"We shrank, my friend," I said,

"from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect[1398] guardians we must establish philosophers."

"Yes, assume it to have been said," said he.

"Note, then, that they will naturally be few,[1399] for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart."

"What do you mean?" he said.

"Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with

[1390]Cf. 412 D-E, 413 C-414 A, 430 A-B, 537, 540 A, *Laws* 751 C.

[1391]Cf. on 412 E, 513 C, *Soph.* 230 B.

[1392]*τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο* is an illogical idiom. The antecedent is only implied. Cf. 373 C, 598 C. See my article in *Transactions of the American Phil. Assoc.* xlvii., (1916) pp. 205-236.

[1393]Cf. Theognis 417-318 "παρατρίβομαι ὥστε μολίβδῳ χρυσός", *ibid.*, 447-452, 1105-1106, Herod. vii. 10, Eurip. fr. 955 (N.). Cf. *Zechariah* xii. 9 " . . . will try them as gold is tried," *Job* xxiii. 10 "When he hath tried me I shall come forth as Gold." Cf. also *1 Peter* i. 7, *Psalm* xii. 6, lxvi. 10, *Isaiah* xlviii. 10.

[1394]The translation preserves the intentional order of the Greek. For the idea cf. 414 A and 465 D-E and for *ἆθλα* cf. 460 B. Cobet rejects *καὶ ἆθλα*, but emendations are needless.

[1395]Cf. *Phaedr.* 237 A, *Epist.* vii. 340 A. For the personification of the *λόγος* Cf. *What Plato Said,* 500 on *Protag.* 361 A-B. So too Cic. *Tusc.* i. 45. 108 "se ita tetra sunt quaedam, ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio."

[1396]Cf. 387 B.

[1397]Cf. the proverbial *μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα*, do not move the immovable, "let sleeping dogs lie," in *Laws* 684 D-E, 913 B. Cf. also *Phileb.* 16 C, and the American idiom "start something."

[1398]Cf. 503 D. 341 B, 340 E, 342 D.

[1399]Cf. on 494 A.

a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives;[1400] but such men, by reason of their quickness,[1401] are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them."

"You speak truly," he said.

"And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way[1402] when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed,[1403] and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them."

"It is so," he said.

"But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest[1404] education nor in honors nor in rule."

"And rightly," he said.

"Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing?"

"Of course."

"They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke,[1405] and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies or whether it will faint and flinch[1406] as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body."

"That is certainly the right way of looking at it," he said.

"But what do you understand by the greatest studies?"

[1400]The translation is correct. In the Greek the anacoluthon is for right emphasis, and the separation of *νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς* from the other members of the list is also an intentional feature of Plato's style to avoid the monotony of too long an enumeration. The two things that rarely combine are Plato's two temperaments. The description of the orderly temperament begins with *οἷοι* and *οἱ τοιοῦτοι* refers to the preceding description of the active temperament. The MSS. have *καὶ* before *νεανικοί*; Heindorf, followed by Wilamowitz, and Adam's minor edition, put it before *οἷοι*. Burnet follows the MSS. Adam's larger edition puts *καὶ νεανικοὶ τε* after *ἕπεται*. The right meaning can be got from any of the texts in a good viva voce reading. Plato's contrast of the two temperaments disregards the possible objection of a psychologist that the adventurous temperament is not necessarily intellectual. Cf. on 375 C, and *What Plato Said,* p. 573 on *Theaet.* 144 A-B, Cic. *Tusc.* v. 24.

[1401]Cf. *Theaet.* 144 A ff.

[1402]A tough of humor in a teacher

[1403]For the figure Cf. *Meno* 80 A, 84 B and C.

[1404]Lit. most precise. Cf. *Laws* 965 B "ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν".

[1405]In 412 C ff.

[1406]Cf. 535 B, *Protag.* 326 C.

"You remember, I presume," said I,

"that after distinguishing three kinds[1407] in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally."

"If I did not remember," he said,

"I should not deserve to hear the rest."

"Do you also remember what was said before this?"

"What?"

"We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way[1408] was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say."

"Well," he said,

"it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company."

"Nay, my friend," said I,

"a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,[1409] though some people sometimes think that

[1407]For the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I. on 435 A and 436 B, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 42, *What Plato Said,* p. 526 on *Phaedo* 68 C, p. 552 on *Phaedr.* 246 B, and p. 563 on *Rep.* 435 B-C.

[1408]Cf. Vol. I. on 435 C, *Phaedr.* 274 A, Friedländer, *Platon,* ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300 Frutiger, *Mythes de Platon,* pp. 81 ff., and my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*(*Univ. of Chicago Studies in Class. Phil.* vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education, which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it. The outcome of such an education is described as the vision of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the cardinal virtues in terms of the ultimate elements of human welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the idea of good may means teleological interpretation of the universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical treatment in the *Timaeus.* The *Republic* merely glances at the thought from time to time and returns to its own theme. Cf.also Introd. p. xxxv.

[1409]Cf. Cic. *De fin.* i. 1 "nec modus est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris." Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the style but the definite suggestion of Plato's distaste for relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the criticism of the *homo mensura* in the *Theaetetus,* in the statement of the *Laws* 716 C, that God is the measure of all things (*What Plato Said,* p. 631), and in the contrast in the *Politicus* 283-294 between measuring things against one another and measuring them by an idea. Cf. 531 A.

they have already done enough[1410] and that there is no need of further inquiry."

"Yes, indeed," he said,

"many experience this because of their sloth."

"An experience," said I,

"that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws."

"That seems likely," he said.

"Then," said I,

"such a one must go around[1411] the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him."

"Why, are not these things the greatest?" said he;

"but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described?"

"There is not only something greater," I said,

"but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline[1412] as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve[1413] to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest[1414] matters?"

"It would indeed,[1415]" he said;

"but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned?"

"By no means," said I;

"but do you ask the question."

"You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me by attacking the

[1410]Cf. *Menex.* 234 A, *Charm.* 158 C, *Symp.* 204 A, *Epist.* vii. 341 A. From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used in connection with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the idea of good and the divided line are discussed.

[1411]Cf. *Phaedr.* 274 A.

[1412]i.e. sketch, adumbration. The *ὑπογραφή* is the account of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433.

[1413]For *πᾶν ποιεῖν* cf. on 488 C, for *συντεινομένους Euthydem.* 288 D.

[1414]Such juxtaposition of forms of the same word is one of the most common features of Plato's style. Cf. 453 B "ἑνα ἕν", 466 D "πάντα πάντῃ", 467 D "πολλὰ πολλοῖς", 496 C "οὐδεὶς οὐδέν", *Laws* 835 C "μόνῳ μόνος", 958 B "ἑκόντα ἑκών". Cf. also *Protag.* 327 B, *Gorg.* 523 B, *Symp.* 217 B, *Tim.* 92 b, *Phaedo* 109 B, *Apol.* 232 C, and *Laws passim.*

[1415]The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 E, *Crito* 47 C, and D, *Laches* 195 D, *Gorg.* 467 E. See critical note.

argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard[1416] that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good[1417] by reference to which[1418] just things[1419] and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail[1420] without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit[1421] in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good[1422]?"

"No, by Zeus, I do not," he said.

"But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure[1423] to be the good, and the finer[1424] spirits intelligence or knowledge.[1425]"

[1416]Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the unavailing quest for "the good" in the earlier dialogues is an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. Vol. I. on 476 A and *What Plato Said,* p. 71. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* i. p. 567, does not understand.

[1417]Cf. 508 E, 517 C, *Cratyl.* 418 E. Cf. *Phileb.* 64 E and *What Plato Said,* p. 534, on *Phaedo* 99 A. Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of good to a formula and so seems to speak of it as a mystery. It was so regarded throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and by a majority of modern scholars. Cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic,* pp. 188-189, *What Plato Said,* pp. 72, 230-231, Introd. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv.

[1418]Lit. the use of which, i.e. a theory of the cardinal virtues is scientific only if deduced from an ultimate sanction or ideal.

[1419]The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely generalizing color. It makes no difference.

[1420]For the idiom *οὐδὲν ὄφελος* Cf. *Euthyph.* 4 E, *Lysis* 208 E, 365 B, *Charm.* 155 E, etc.

[1421]Cf. 427 A, *Phaedr.* 275 C, *Cratyl.* 387 A, *Euthyd.* 288 E, *Laws* 751 B, 944 C, etc.

[1422]*καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν* suggests but does not mean *καλοκἀγαθόν* in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the rhythm with Platonic fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. *Phileb.* 65 A and *Symp.* 210-211 where because of the subject the *καλόν* is substituted for the *ἀγαθόν.*

[1423]So Polus and Callicles in the *Gorgias* and later the Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also *What Plato Said,* p. 131; Eurip. *Hippol.* 382 "οἱ δ' ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ", and on 329 A-B. There is no contradiction here with the *Philebus.* Plato does not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the good.

[1424]*κομψοτέροις* is very slightly if at all ironical here. Cf. the American "sophisticated" in recent use. See too *Theaet.* 156 A, Aristot. *Eth. Nic* 1905 a 18 "οἱ χαρίεντες".

[1425]Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of Prodicus (Cf. *Protag.* 337 A

"Certainly."

"And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge[1426] it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good."

"Most absurdly," he said.

"Is it not absurd," said I,

"if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,[1427] as if we understood their meaning when they utter[1428] the word "good.""

"Most true," he said.

"Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion[1429] of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner[1430] compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures[1431]?"

"Most assuredly."

"The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not?"

"Certainly."

"Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes[1432] about it?"

"Of course."

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ff.) and Aristotle (Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose.

[1426]Cf. *Euthyd.* 281 D, *Theaet.* 288 D f., *Laws* 961 E "ὁ περὶ τί νοῦς". See *Unity of Plato's Thought,* n. 650. The demand for specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf. *Euthyph.* 13 D, *Laches* 192 E, *Gorg.* 451 A, *Charm.* 165 C-E, *Alc. I.* 124 E ff.

[1427]There is no "the" in the Greek. Emendations are idle. Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. my note on *Phileb.* 11 B-C in *Class. Phil.* vol. iii. (1908) pp. 343-345.

[1428]*φθέγξωνται* logically of mere physical utterance (Cf. *Theaet.* 157 B), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular utterance.

[1429]Lit. wandering, the mark of error. Cf. 484 B, *Lysis* 213 E, *Phaedo* 79 C, *Soph.* 230 B, *Phaedr.* 263 B, *Parmen.* 135 E, *Laws* 962 D.

[1430]*καὶ οὗτοι* is an illogical idiom of over-particularization. The sentence begins generally and ends specifically. Plato does not care, since the meaning is clear. Cf. *Protag.* 336 C, *Gorg.* 456 C-D, *Phaedo* 62 A.

[1431]A distinct reference to Callicles' admission in *Gorgias* 499 B "τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους" cf. 499 C, *Rep.* 561 C, and *Phileb.* 13 C "πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι". Stenzel's notion (*Studien zur Entw. d. Plat. Dialektik,* p. 98) that in the *Philebus* Plato "ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates 503 C weit entfernt" is uncritical. The *Republic* merely refers to the *Gorgias* to show that the question is disputed and the disputants contradict themselves.

[1432]*ἀμφισβητήσεις* is slightly disparaging, Cf. *Theaet.* 163 C, 158 C, 198 C, *Sophist* 233 B, 225 B, but less so than *ἐρίζειν* in *Protag.* 337 A.

"And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance[1433] without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here?"

"Quite so," he said.

"That, then, which every soul pursues[1434] and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition[1435] of its reality, but yet baffled[1436] and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things,[1437] and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,— in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens[1438] to whose hands we are to entrust all things?"

"Least of all," he said.

"I fancy, at any rate," said I,

"that the just and the honorable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known,[1439] will not have secured a guardian[1440] of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this."

"You surmise well," he said.

"Then our constitution will have its perfect and definitive organization[1441] only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees

[1433]Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. *Theaet.* 167 C, 172 A-B, and Shorey in *Class. Phil.* xvi (1921) pp. 164-168.

[1434]Cf. *Gorg.* 468 B "τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες", 505 A-B, *Phileb.* 20 D, *Symp.* 206 A, *Euthyd.* 278 E, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1173 a, 1094 a "οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται", Zeller, *Aristot.* i. pp. 344-345, 379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, *Purg.* xvii. 127-129.

[1435]Cf. *Phileb.* 64 A "μαντευτέον". Cf. Arnold's phrase, *God and the Bible,* chap. i. p. 23 "approximate language thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after."

[1436]As throughout the minor dialogues. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 71.

[1437]Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is the *παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* that makes them good; but for the practical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 "Toute aultre science est dommageable à celuy qui n'a Ia science de la bonté."

[1438]As in the "longer way" Plato is careful not to commit himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but postulates it for his guardians.

[1439]The personal or *ab urbe condita* construction. Cf. *Theaet.* 169 E.

[1440]the guardians must be able to give a reason, which they can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that the statesman must know better than other men. Cf. *Laws* 968 A, 964 C, 858 C-E, 817 C, Xen *Mem.* iii. 6. 8.

[1441]For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 B "λελέξεται"465 A "προστετάξεται", Eurip. *Heracleidae* 980 "πεπράξεται".

it."

"Necessarily," he said.

"But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different?"

"What a man it is," said I;

"you made it very plain[1442] long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it."

"Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates," he said,

"to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one's own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long.[1443]"

"But then," said I,

"do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know?"

"By no means," he said,

"as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines."

"Nay," said I,

"have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge[1444] are ugly things? The best of them are blind.[1445] Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way?"

"They do not differ at all," he said.

"Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous[1446] and fair?"

"Nay, in heaven's name, Socrates," said Glaucon,

"do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal.[1447] For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues."

[1442]For the personal construction 348 E, Isoc. *To Nic. I.* *καταφανής* is a variation in this idiom for *δῆλος*. Cf. also *Theaet.* 189 C, *Symp.* 221 B, *Charm.* 162 C, etc.

[1443]Cf. 367 D-E.

[1444]This is not a contradiction of *Meno* 97 B, *Theaet.* 201 B-C and *Phileb.* 62 A-B, but simply a different context and emphasis. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 47, nn. 338 and 339.

[1445]Cf. on 484 C, *Phaedr.* 270 E.

[1446]Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries. Cf. *Phaedr.* 250 C, *Phileb.* 16 C, *Rep.* 518 C, 478 C, 479 D, 518 A. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero calls the *lumina orationis* of Isocratean style. The rhetoric and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.

[1447]Cf. *Phileb.* 64 C "ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἤδη προθύροις", "we are now in the vestibule of the good."

"It will right well[1448] content me, my dear fellow," I said,

"but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock.[1449] Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself;[1450] for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today.[1451] But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness[1452] I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop."

"Well, speak on," he said,

"for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time."

"I could wish," I said,

"that I were able to make and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest[1453] and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest."

"We will do our best," he said,

"to be on our guard. Only speak on."

"Yes," I said,

"after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.[1454]"

[1448] *καὶ μάλα*, "jolly well," humorous emphasis on the point that it is much easier to "define" the conventional virtues than to explain the "sanction." Cf. *Symp.* 189 A, *Euthydem.* 298 D-E, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the *Republic.* Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. e.g. 610 E.

[1449] Excess of Zeal, *προθυμία*, seemed laughable to the Greeks. Cf. my interpretation of *Iliad* i. *in fine*, *Class. Phil.* xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223.

[1450] Cf. More, *Principia Ethica,* p. 17 "Good, then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, there is only one ethical writer, Professor Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognized and stated this fact."

[1451] This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume or a symbol. See Introd. p. xxvii, and my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic,* p. 212. *τὰ νῦν* repeats *τὸ νῦν εἶναι* (Cf. *Tim.* 48 C), as the evasive phrase *εἰσαῦθις* below sometimes lays the topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 E and 430 C.

[1452] Cf. *Laws* 897 D-E, *Phaedr.* 246 A.

[1453] This playful interlude relieves the monotony of the argument and is a transition to the symbolism. *τόκος* means both interest and offspring. Cf. 555 E, *Polit.* 267 A, Aristoph. *Clouds* 34, *Thesm.* 845, Pindar, *Ol.* x. 12. the equivocation, which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the article "Usury" in Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Relig. and Ethics.*

[1454] Cf. 475 E f. Plato as often begins by a restatement of the theory of ideas, i.e. practically of the distinction between the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. *Rep.* 596 A ff., *Phaedo* 108 b ff.

"What?" said he.

"We predicate "to be"[1455] of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech."

"We do."

"And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.[1456] "It is so." "And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen." "By all means." "With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things?" "With sight," he said. "And do we not," I said, "hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses?" "Surely." "Have you ever observed," said I, "how much the greatest expenditure the creator[1457] of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?[1458] "Why, no, I have not," he said. "Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium[1459] so that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard?" "They need nothing," he said. "Neither, I fancy," said I," do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any?"

"Not I," he said.

"But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need?"

"How?"

"Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though color be present, yet without the presence of a third thing[1460] specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible.[1461]"

[1455]The modern reader will never understand Plato from translations that talk about "Being." Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 605.

[1456]*ὃ ἔστιν* is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf. *Phaedo* 75 B, D, 78 D, *Parmen.* 129 B, *Symp.* 211 C, *Rep.* 490 B, 532 A, 597 A.

[1457]Creator, *δημιουργός*, God, the gods, and nature, are all virtual synonyms in such passages.

[1458]Cf. *Phaedr.* 259 D, *Tim.* 45 B.

[1459]This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound required a medium, *Tim.* 67 B. But the statement here is true enough to illustrate the thought.

[1460]Lit. kind of thing, *γένος*. Cf. 507 C-D.

"What[1462] is this thing of which you speak?" he said.

"The thing," I said,

"that you call light."

"You say truly," he replied.

"The bond, then, that yokes together visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form[1463] than that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honor."

"It surely is far from being so," he said.

"Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven[1464] as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?"

"Why, the one that you too and other people mean," he said;

"for your question evidently refers to the sun.[1465]"

"Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity?"

"What?"

"Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun."

"Why, no."

"But it is, I think, the most sunlike[1466] of all the instruments of sense."

[1461] Cf. Troland, *The Mystery of Mind,* p. 82: "In order that there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical object should exist before the eyes. there must also be a source of so-called "light." "

[1462] Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial genitive, and we need not.

[1463] The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of *ἰδέα*. Cf. *Laws* 689 D "καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος". "Form" over-translates *ἰδέᾳ* here, which is little more than a synonym for *γένος* above. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 250.

[1464] Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians did (*Cratyl.* 397 D, Aristoph. *Peace* 406 ff., Herod. iv. 188). Cf. *Laws* 821 B, 899 B, 950 D, *Apol.* 26 D, *Epinomis* 985 B, 988 B.

[1465] Cf. my *Idea of good in Plato's Republic* pp. 223-225, Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie,* pp. 374-384. Mediaeval writers have much to say of Platos mysterious Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses *τἀγαθόν* in much the same way. It is naive to take the language of Platonic unction too literally. Cf. *What Plato Said,* pp. 394 ff.

[1466] Cf. 509 A, Plotinus, *Enn.* i. 6. 9 "οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος" and vi. 7. 19, Cic. *Tusc.* i. 25. 73 *in fine* "quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare," Manilius ii. 115: "quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse, et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum?" Goethe's "Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, Die Sonne könnt es nic erblicken," and Goethe to Eckermann, Feb. 26, 1824: "Hätte ich nicht die Welt durch Anticipation bereits in mir getragen, ich wäre mit sehenden Augen blind geblieben."

"By far the most."

"And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun?"

"Certainly."

"Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself?"

"That is so," he said.

"This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good[1467] which the good begot to stand in a proportion[1468] with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision."

"How is that?" he said;

"explain further."

"You are aware," I said,

"that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them."

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"But when, I take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes."

"Certainly."

"Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent[1469] it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason."

[1467] i.e. creation was the work of benevolent design. This is one of the few passages in the *Republic* where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the *Timaeus.* It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of *τἀγαθόν* here either with god or with the ideas as a whole. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p 512.

[1468] Cf. *Gorg.* 465 B-C, 510 A-B, 511 E, 530 D, 534 A, 576 C, *Phaedo* 111 A-B, *Tim.* 29 C, 32 A-B. For *ἀνάλογον* in this sense cf. 511 E, 534 A, *Phaedo* 110 D.

[1469] Plato's rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being the good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato's ethical and political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of good, i.e. the "sanction," and not, as some commentators insist, the truth.

"Yes, it does,"

"This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea[1470] of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.[1471] Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still[1472] than these you will think rightly of it."

"But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform,[1473] but to think that either of them is the good[1474] is not right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and habit[1475] of the good."

"An inconceivable beauty you speak of," he said,

[1470] No absolute distinction can be drawn between *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in Plato. But *ἰδέα* may be used o carry the notion of "apprehended aspect" which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 379 A, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 35, *What Plato Said,* p. 585, *Class. Phil.* xx. (1925) p. 347.

[1471] The meaning is clear. we really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. the position and case of *γιγνωσκομένης* are difficult. But no change proposed is any improvement.

[1472] Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 B "*αἴσχιστον . . . αἴσχιον*", 578 B, *Symp.* 180 A-B and Bury *ad loc.* The same characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the *Symposium* where Agathon's speech, which seems the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates: similarly in the *Gorgias* and the tenth book of the *Republic,* Cf. Friedländer, *Platon,* i. p. 174, Introd. p. lxi. This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and practical conclusions. Cf. e.g. *Meno* 81 D-E.

[1473] *ἀγαθοειδῆ* occurs only here in classical Greek literature. Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose.

[1474] There is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous to distinguish good and the good here. cf. on 505 C, p. 89, note f.

[1475] *ἕξις* is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian "habit." However *Protag.* 344 C approaches it. Cf. also *Phileb.* 11 D, 41 C, Ritter-Preller, p. 285. Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive, e.g. "*ἕξις*" *Laws* 625 C, "*γένεσις*" *Laws* 691 B, *Tim.* 73 B, 76 E, "*μοῖρα*" *Phaedr.* 255 B, 274 E, *Menex.* 249 B,"*φύσις*" *Phaedo* 109 E, *Symp.* 186 B, *Laws* 729 C, 845 D, 944 D, etc. He may have chosen *ἕξις* here to suggest the ethical aspect of the good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction of *ἡδονή* below supports this view. Some interpreters think it = *τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει*, which is possible but rather pointless.

"if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely[1476] cannot mean that it is pleasure."

"Hush," said I,

"but examine the similitude of it still further in this way.[1477]"

"How?"

"The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation."

"Of course not."

"In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence[1478] in dignity and surpassing power." And Glaucon very ludicrously[1479] said,

"Heaven save us, hyperbole[1480] can no further go."

"The fault is yours," I said,

"for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it."

[1476]For *οὐ γὰρ δήπου* Cf. *Apol.* 20 C, *Gorg.* 455 A, *Euthyph.* 13 A.

[1477]i.e. not only do we understand a thing when we know its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of its existence, God's mind for the universe, man's mind for political institutions. this, being the only interpretation that makes sense o the passage, is presumably more or less consciously Plato's meaning. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. Quite irrelevant are Plato's supposed identification of the *ἀγαθόν* with the *ἕν*, one, and Aristotle's statement, *Met.* 988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the one is the cause of the ideas. the remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great part in Neoplatonism, in all philosophies of the unknowable and in all negative and mystic theologies.

[1478]It is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians who sometimes said *ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος*. Plato's sentence would have made *ὄντος* very inconvenient here. But *εἶναι* shows that *οὐσίας* is not distinguished from *τοῦ ὄντος* here. *ἐπέκεινα* became technical and a symbol for the transcendental in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. cf. Plotinus xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop. *De divinis nominibus,* ii. 2, Friedländer, *Platon,* i. p. 87.

[1479]He is amused at Socrates' emphasis. Fanciful is Wilamowitz' notion (*Platon,* i. p. 209) that the laughable thing is Glaucon's losing control of himself, for which he compares Aristoph. *Birds* 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment of Proclus, p. 265. The dramatic humor of Glaucon's surprise is Plato's way of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues. Cf. 536 B, 540 B, *Lysis* 223 B, *Protag.* 340 E, *Charm.* 175 E, *Cratyl.* 426 B, *Theaet.* 200 B, 197 D, etc. Cf. Friedländer, *Platon,* i. p. 172 on the *Phaedo.*

[1480]"What a *comble*!" would be nearer the tone of the Greek. There is no good English equivalent for *ὑπερβολῆς*. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne's remark that "nothing can be said hyperbolically of God." The banter here relieves the strain, as is Plato's manner.

"And don't desist," he said,

"but at least[1481] expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting."

"Why, certainly," I said,

"I am omitting a great deal."

"Well, don't omit the least bit," he said.

"I fancy," I said,

"that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out."

"Do not," he said.

"Conceive then," said I,

"as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball,[1482] but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible."

"I do."

"Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided[1483] into two unequal[1484] sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images."

"By images[1485] I mean, first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend."

"I do."

"As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man."

"I so assume it," he said.

[1481] Cf. 502 A, *Symp.* 222 E, *Meno* 86 E.

[1482] Cf. the similar etymological pun in *Cratyl.* 396 B-C. Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-translating for some tastes, or not translating at all.

[1483] The meaning is given in the text. Too many commentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See Introd. p. xxi for my interpretation of the passage.

[1484] Some modern and ancient critics prefer *ἀν' ἴσα*. It is a little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more honorable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. Plut. *Plat. Quest.* 3.

[1485] Cf. 402 B, *Soph.* 266 B-C.

"Would you be willing to say," said I,

"that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion:[1486] as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness?"

"I certainly would."

"Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section."

"In what way?"

"By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,[1487] and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas[1488] only and progressing systematically through ideas."

"I don't fully understand[1489] what you mean by this," he said.

"Well, I will try again," said I,

"for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them[1490] to themselves or

[1486]Cf. on 508 C, p. 103. note b.

[1487]Cf. my *Idea of good in Plato's republic,* pp. 230-234, for the *ἀνυπόθετον.* Ultimately, the *ἀνυπόθετον* is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed *axioma medium,* but to its relation to ultimate Good, To call the *ἀνυπόθετον* the Unconditioned or Absolute introduces metaphysical associations foreign to the passage. Cf. also Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

[1488]The practical meaning of this is independent of the disputed metaphysics. Cf. Introd. pp. xvi-xviii.

[1489]Cf. Vol. I. p. 79, note c on 347 A and p. 47, not f on 338 D; *What Plato Said,* p. 503 on *Gorg.* 463 D.

[1490]Aristot. *Top.* 100 b 2-3 "οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί", exactly expresses Plato's thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of logic. Cf. the mediaeval "contra principium negantem non est disputandum." A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is "real."

others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out."

"Certainly," he said,

"I know that."

"And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw[1491]? And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn[1492] as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the mind.[1493]"

"True," he said.

"This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true,[1494] but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter[1495] are esteemed as clear and held in honor.[1496]"

"I understand," said he,

"that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts."

"Understand then," said I,

"that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the

[1491]Cf. 527 A-B. This explanation of mathematical reasoning does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkely and the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the metaphysical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted if challenged.

[1492]i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere.

[1493]Stenzel, *Handbuch,* 118 "das er nur mit dem Verstande (*διανοίᾳ*) sieht" is mistaken. *διανοίᾳ* is used not in its special sense ("understanding." See p. 116, note c), but generally for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.

[1494]For the concessive *μέν* cf. 546 E, 529 D, *Soph.* 225 C.

[1495]The loosely appended dative *ἐκείνοις* is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. *Phaedo* 105 A. Wilamowitz' emendation (*Platon,* ii. p. 384) to *πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις* rests on a misunderstanding of the passage.

[1496]The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam *ad loc.*

reason[1497] itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,[1498] treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,[1499] underpinnings, footings,[1500] and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,[1501] and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense[1502] but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.[1503]"

"I understand," he said;

"not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding[1504] and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true intelligence[1505] about

[1497] *λόγος* here suggests both the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty.

[1498] Cf. 533 A. *Phileb.* 57 E.

[1499] *τῷ ὄντι* emphasized the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly *ὡς ἀληθῶς* in 551 E, *Phaedo* 80 D, *Phileb.* 64 E. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy,* p. 229, Thompson on *Meno* 86 E. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—*ἀρχή*—of the inquiry.

[1500] Cf. *Symp.* 211 C "ὥσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις", "like steps of a stair."

[1501] *παντὸς ἀρχήν* taken literally leads support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the *παντὸς ἀρχή* may be the virtual equivalent of the *ἱκανόν* of the *Phaedo.* It is the *ἀρχή* on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 B, p. 110, note a.

[1502] This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience.

[1503] The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. *What Plato Said,* pp. 233-234.

[1504] *διανοίᾳ* here as in 511 A is general and not technical.

[1505] *νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν* is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase

them although[1506] the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding[1507] and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason."

"Your interpretation is quite sufficient," I said;

"and now, answering to[1508] these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign belief[1509] to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,[1510] and arrange them in a proportion,[1511] considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality."

"I understand," he said;

"I concur and arrange them as you bid."

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means "have not sense" for its higher meaning Cf. *Meno* 99 C, *Laws* 962 A.

[1506] Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about *καίτοι* and *μετά* here. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. the meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quiet as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess *νοῦς* or reason in the highest sense.

[1507] Here the word *διάνοια* is given a technical meaning as a faculty inferior to *νοῦς*, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed.

[1508] For *ἐπί* Cf. *Polit.* 280 A, *Gorg.* 463 B.

[1509] *πίστις* is of course not "faith" in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly.

[1510] *εἰκασία* undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato.

[1511] Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b.

Book 7

"Next," said I, "compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience as this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern[1512] with a long entrance open[1513] to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as having their legs and necks

[1512]The image of the cave illustrates by another proportion the contrast between the world of sense-perception and the world of thought. Instead of going above the plane of ordinary experience for the other two members of the proportion, Plato here goes below and invents a fire and shadows cast from it on the walls of a cave to correspond to the sun and the "real" objects of sense. In such a proportion our "real" world becomes the symbol of Plato's ideal world. Modern fancy may read what meanings it pleases into the Platonic antithesis of the "real" and the "ideal." It has even been treated as an anticipation of the fourth dimension. But Plato never leaves an attentive and critical reader in doubt as to his own intended meaning. there may be at the most a little uncertainty as to which are merely indispensable parts of the picture. The source and first suggestion of Plato's imagery is an interesting speculation, but it is of no significance for the interpretation of the thought. Cf. John Henry Wright, "The Origin of Plato's Cave" in *Harvard Studies in Class. Phil.* xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy,* pp. 89-90, thinks the allegory Orphic. Cf. also Wright, loc. cit. pp. 134-135. Empedocles likens our world to a cave, Diels i.3 269. Cf. Wright, loc. cit. Wright refers it to the Cave of Vari in Attica, pp. 140-142. Others have supposed that Plato had in mind rather the puppet and marionette shows to which he refers. Cf. Diès in *Bulletin Budé,* No. 14 (1927) pp. 8 f. The suggestiveness of the image has been endless. The most eloquent and frequently quoted passage of Aristotle's early writings is derived from it, Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 37. It is the source of Bacon's "idols of the den." Sir Thomas Browne writes in *Urne-Buriall*: "We yet discourse in Plato's den and are but embryo philosophers." Huxley's allegory of "Jack and the Beanstalk" in *Evolution and Ethics*, pp. 47 ff. is a variation on it. Berkeley recurs to it, *Siris*, 263. The Freudians would have still more fantastic interpretations. Cf. Jung, *Analytic Psych.* p. 232. Eddington perhaps glances at it when he attributes to the new physics the frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shadows

[1513]Cf. *Phaedo* 111 C "ἀναπεπταμένους"

fettered[1514] from childhood, so that they remain in the same spot, able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of puppet-shows[1515] have partitions before the men themselves, above which they show the puppets." "All that I see," he said. "See also, then, men carrying[1516] past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material, some of these bearers presumably speaking and others silent."

"A strange image you speak of," he said, "and strange prisoners." "Like to us," I said; "for, to begin with, tell me do you think that these men would have seen anything of themselves or of one another except the shadows cast from the fire on the wall of the cave that fronted them?" "How could they," he said, "if they were compelled to hold their heads unmoved through life?" "And again, would not the same be true of the objects carried past them?"

"Surely." "If then they were able to talk to one another, do you not think that they would suppose that in naming the things that they saw[1517] they were naming the passing objects?"

[1514]Cf. *Phaedo* 67 E.

[1515]H. Rackham, *Class. Rev.* xxix. pp. 77-78, suggests that the *τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς* should be translated "at the marionettes" and be classed with *καινοῖς τραγῳδοῖς* (Pseph. *ap.* Dem. xviii. 116). For the dative he refers to Kuehner-Gerth, II. i. p. 445.

[1516]The men are merely a part of the necessary machinery of the image. Their shadows are not cast on the wall. The artificial objects correspond to the things of sense and opinion in the divided line, and the shadows to the world of reflections, *εἰκόνες*.

[1517]Cf. *Parmen.* 130 C, *Tim.* 51 B, 52 A, and my *De Platonis Idearum doctrina,* pp. 24-25; also E. Hoffmann in *Wochenschrift f. klass. Phil.* xxxvi. (1919) pp. 196-197. As we use the word tree of the trees we see, though the reality (*αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι*) is the idea of a tree, so they would speak of the shadows as the world, though the real reference unknown to them would be to the objects that cause the shadows, and back of the objects to the things of the "real" world of which they are copies. The general meaning, which is quite certain, is that they wold suppose the shadows to be the realities. The text and the precise turn of expression are doubtful. See crit. note. *παριόντα* is intentionally ambiguous in its application to the shadows or to the objects which cast them. They suppose that the names refer to the passing shadows, but (as we know) they really apply to the objects. Ideas and particulars are homonymous. Assuming a slight illogicality we can get somewhat the same meaning from the text *ταὐτά*. "Do you not think that they would identify the passing objects (which strictly speaking they do not know) with what they saw?" Cf. also P. Corssen, *Philologische*

"Necessarily." "And if their prison had an echo[1518] from the wall opposite them, when one of the passersby uttered a sound, do you think that they would suppose anything else than the passing shadow to be the speaker?" "By Zeus, I do not," said he. "Then in every way such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects." "Quite inevitably," he said. "Consider, then, what would be the manner of the release[1519] and healing from these bonds and this folly if in the course of nature[1520] something of this sort should happen to them: When one was freed from his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and, because of the dazzle and glitter of the light, was unable to discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw, what do you suppose would be his answer if someone told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality and turned toward more real things, he saw more truly? And if also one should point out to him each of the passing objects and constrain him by questions to say what it is, do you not think that he would be at a loss[1521] and that he would regard what he formerly saw as more real than the things now pointed out to him?" "Far more real," he said. "And if he were compelled to look at the light itself, would not that pain his eyes, and would he not turn away and flee to those things which he is able to discern and regard them as in very deed more clear and exact than the objects pointed out?" "It is so," he said.

"And if," said I, "someone should drag him thence by force up the ascent[1522] which is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not think that he would find it painful to be so haled along, and would chafe at it, and when he came out into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its beams

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Wochenschrift, 1913, p. 286. He prefers *οὐκ αὐτά* and renders: "Sie würden in dem, was sie sähen, das Vorübergehende selbst zu benennen glauben."

[1518] The echo and the voices (515 A) merely complete the picture.

[1519] *Phaedo* 67 D "λύειν", and 82 D "λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ. λύσις" became technical in Neoplatonism.

[1520] Lit. "by nature." *φύσις* in Plato often suggests reality and truth.

[1521] The entire passage is an obvious allegory of the painful experience of one whose false conceit of knowledge is tested by the Socratic *elenchus.* Cf. *Soph.* 230 B-D, and for *ἀπορεῖν Meno* 80 A, 84 B-C, *Theaet.* 149 A, *Apol.* 23 D. Cf. also *What Plato Said,* p. 5123 on *Meno* 80 A, Eurip. *Hippol.* 247 "τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμαν ὀδυνᾷ", "it is painful to have one's opinions set right," and 517 A, 494 D.

[1522] Cf. *Theaet.* 175 B, Boethius, *Cons.* iii. 12 "quicunque in superum diem mentem ducere quaeritis"; 529 A, 521 C, and the Neoplatonists' use of *ἀνάγειν* and their "anagogical" virtue and interpretation. Cf. Leibniz, ed. Gerhardt, vii. 270.

so that he would not be able to see[1523] even one of the things that we call real?" "Why, no, not immediately," he said. "Then there would be need of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses or reflections in water[1524] of men and other things, and later, the things themselves, and from these he would go on to contemplate the appearances in the heavens and heaven itself, more easily by night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day the sun and the sun's light.[1525]"

"Of course." "And so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting,[1526] but in and by itself in its own place."

"Necessarily," he said. "And at this point he would infer and conclude that this it is that provides the seasons and the courses of the year and presides over all things in the visible region, and is in some sort the cause[1527] of all these things that they had seen."

"Obviously," he said, "that would be the next step." "Well then, if he recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed for wisdom there, and his fellow-bondsmen, do you not think that he would count himself happy in the change and pity them[1528]?" "He would indeed." "And if there had been honors and commendations among them which they bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary precedences, sequences and co-existences,[1529] and so most

[1523]Cf. *Laws* 897 D, *Phaedo* 99 D.

[1524]Cf. *Phaedo* 99 D. Stallbaum says this was imitated by Themistius, *Orat.* iv. p. 51 B.

[1525]It is probably a mistake to look for a definite symbolism in all the details of this description. There are more stages of progress than the proportion of four things calls for all that Plato's thought requires is the general contrast between an unreal and a real world, and the goal of the rise from one to the other in the contemplation of the sun, or the idea of good, Cf. 517 B-C.

[1526]i.e. a foreign medium.

[1527]Cf. 508 B, and for the idea of good as the cause of all things cf. on 509 B, and Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. P. Corssen, *Philol. Wochenschrift,* 1913, pp. 287-299, unnecessarily proposes to emend *ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων* to *ὧν σκιὰς ἑ.* or *ὧν σφεῖς σκιὰς ἑ.*, "ne sol umbrarum, quas videbant, auctor fuisse dicatur, cum potius earum rerum, quarum umbras videbant, fuerit auctor."

[1528]Cf. on 486 a, p. 10, note a.

[1529]Another of Plato's anticipations of modern thought. This is precisely the Humian, Comtian, positivist, pragmatist view of causation. Cf. *Gorg.* 501 A "τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰθότος γίγνεσθαι" "relying on routine and habitude for

successful in guessing at what was to come, do you think he would be very keen about such rewards, and that he would envy and emulate those who were honored by these prisoners and lorded it among them, or that he would feel with Homer[1530] and "greatly prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a landless man," *Hom. Od. 11.489* and endure anything rather than opine with them and live that life?"

"Yes," he said, "I think that he would choose to endure anything rather than such a life." "And consider this also," said I, "if such a one should go down again and take his old place would he not get his eyes full[1531] of darkness, thus suddenly coming out of the sunlight?" "He would indeed."

"Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners in "evaluating" these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time required for habituation would not be very short—would he not provoke laughter,[1532] and would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him[1533]?" "They certainly would," he said. "This image then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above is the soul's ascension to the intelligible region,[1534] you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But God knows[1535] whether it

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merely preserving a memory of what is wont to result." (Loeb tr.)

[1530]The quotation is almost as apt as that at the beginning of the *Crito.*

[1531]On the metaphor of darkness and light cf. also *Soph.* 254 A.

[1532]Like the philosopher in the court-room. Cf. *Theaet.* 172 C, 173 C ff., *Gorg.* 484 D-E. Cf. also on 387 C-D. 515 D, 517 D, *Soph.* 216 D, *Laches* 196 B, *Phaedr.* 249 D.

[1533]An obvious allusion to the fate of Socrates. For other stinging allusions to this Cf. *Gorg.* 486 B, 521 C, *Meno* 100 B-C. Cf. Hamlet's "Wormwood, wormwood" (III. ii. 191). The text is disputed. See crit. note. A. Drachmann, "Zu Platons Staat," *Hermes,* 1926, p. 110, thinks that an *οἴει* or something like it must be understood as having preceded, at least in Plato's thought, and that *ἀποκτείνειν* can be taken as a gloss or variant of *ἀποκτεινύναι* and the correct reading must be *λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι ἄν.* See also Adam *ad loc.*

[1534]Cf. 508 B-C, where Arnou (*Le Désir de dieu dans la philos. de Plotin,* p. 48 and Robin (*La Théorie plat. de l'amour,* pp. 83-84) make *τόπος νοητός* refer to "le ciel astronomique" as opposed to the *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος* of the *Phaedrus* 247 A-E, 248 B, 248 D-249 A. The phrase *νοητὸς κόσμος*, often attributed to Plato, does not occur in his writings.

is true. But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth[1536] in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely[1537] in private or public must have caught sight of this." "I concur," he said, "so far as I am able." "Come then," I said, "and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who have attained to this height are not willing[1538] to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and the yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeness of our image holds" "Yes, it is likely." "And again, do you think it at all strange," said I, "if a man returning from divine contemplations to the petty miseries[1539] of men cuts a sorry figure[1540] and appears most ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, and before he has become sufficiently accustomed to the environing darkness, he is compelled in courtrooms[1541] or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the images[1542] that cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions of these things in the minds of those who have never seen justice itself?" "It would be by no men strange," he said.

"But a sensible man," I said, "would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light,[1543]

[1535]Plato was much less prodigal of affirmation about metaphysical ultimates than interpreters who take his myths literally have supposed. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 515, on *Meno* 86 B.

[1536]Cf. 506 E.

[1537]This is the main point for the *Republic.* The significance of the idea of good for cosmogony is just glanced at and reserved for the *Timaeus.* Cf. on 508 B, p. 102, note a and p. 505-506. For the practical application Cf. *Meno* 81 D-E. See also Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

[1538]Cf. 521 A, 345 E, and Vol. I. on 347 D, p. 81, note d.

[1539]Cf. 346 E.

[1540]Cf. *Theaet.* 174 C "ἀσχημοσύνη".

[1541]For the contrast between the philosophical and the pettifogging soul Cf. *Theaet.* 173 C-175 E. Cf. also on 517 A, p 128, note b.

[1542]For *ἀγαλμάτων* cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic,* p. 237, *Soph.* 234 C, *Polit.* 303 C.

[1543]Aristotle, *De an.* 422 a 20 f. says the over-bright is *ἀόρατον* but otherwise than the dark.

and, believing that the same thing happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh[1544] unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision.[1545] And so[1546] he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above." "That is a very fair statement," he said. "Then, if this is true, our view of these matters must be this, that education is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their professions.[1547] What they aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if they were inserting[1548] vision into blind eyes." "They do indeed," he said. "But our present argument indicates," said I, "that the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-shifting periact[1549] in the theater, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being. And this, we say, is the good,[1550] do we not?"

[1544]Cf. *Theaet.* 175 D-E.

[1545]Lit. "or whether coming from a deeper ignorance into a more luminous world, it is dazzled by the brilliance of a greater light."

[1546]i.e. only after that. For *οὕτω δή* in this sense cf. 484 D, 429 D, 443 E, *Charm.* 171 E.

[1547]*ἐπαγγελλόμενοι* connotes the boastfulness of their claims. Cf. *Protag.* 319 A, *Gorg.* 447 c, *Laches* 186 C, *Euthyd.* 273 E, Isoc. *Soph.* 1, 5, 9, 10, *Antid.* 193, Xen. *Mem.* iii. 1. 1, i. 2. 8, Aristot. *Rhet.* 1402 a 25.

[1548]Cf. Theognis 429 ff. Stallbaum compares Eurip. *Hippol.* 917 f. Similarly *Anon. Theaet. Comm.* (Berlin, 1905), p. 32, 48. 4 "καὶ δεῖν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἐνθέσεως μαθημάτων, ἀλλὰ ἀναμνήσεως". Cf. also St. Augustine: "Nolite putare quemquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine. Admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae;" and Emerson's "strictly speaking, it is not instruction but provocation that I can receive from another soul."

[1549]*περιακτέον* is probably a reference to the *περίακτοι* or triangular prisms on each side of the stage. They revolved on an axis and had different scenes painted on their three faces. Many scholars are of the opinion that they were not known in the classical period, as they are mentioned only by late writers; but others do not consider this conclusive evidence, as a number of classical plays seem to have required something of the sort. Cf. O. Navarre in Daremberg-Saglio *s. v.* Machine, p. 1469.

[1550]Hard-headed distaste for the unction or seeming mysticism of Plato's language

"Yes." "Of this very thing, then," I said, "there might be an art,[1551] an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about." "Yes, that seems likely," he said. "Then the other so-called virtues[1552] of the soul do seem akin to those of the body. For it is true that where they do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by habit[1553] and practice. But the excellence of thought,[1554] it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality, a thing that never loses its potency, but, according to the direction of its conversion, becomes useful and beneficent, or, again, useless and harmful.
Have you never observed in those who are popularly spoken of as bad, but smart men,[1555] how keen is the vision of the little soul,[1556] how quick it is to discern the things that interest it,[1557] a proof that it is not a poor vision which it has, but one forcibly enlisted in the service of evil, so that the sharper its sight the more mischief it accomplishes?"

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should not blind us to the plain meaning. Unlike Schopenhauer, who affirms the moral will to be unchangeable, Plato says that men may be preached and drilled into ordinary morality, but that the degree of their intelligence is an unalterable endowment of nature. Some teachers will concur.

[1551]Plato often distinguishes the things that do or do not admit of reduction to an art or science. Cf. on 488 E p. 22, note b. Adam is mistaken in taking it "Education (*ἡ παιδεία*) would be an art," etc.

[1552]This then is Plato's answer (intended from the first) to the question whether virtue can be taught, debated in the *Protagoras* and *Meno.* The intellectual virtues (to use Aristotle's term), broadly speaking, cannot be taught; they are a gift. And the highest moral virtue is inseparable from rightly directed intellectual virtue. Ordinary moral virtue is not rightly taught in democratic Athens, but comes by the grace of God. In a reformed state it could be systematically inculcated and "taught." Cf. *What Plato Said,* pp. 51-512 on *Meno* 70 A. but we need not infer that Plato did not believe in mental discipline. cf. Charles Fox, *Educational Psychology,* p. 164 "The conception of mental discipline is a least as old as Plato, as may be seen from the seventh book of the *Republic* . . ."

[1553]Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1103 a 14-17 "ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους". Plato does not explicitly name "ethical" and "intellectual" virtues. Cf. Fox, *op. cit.* p. 104 "Plato correctly believed . . . "

[1554]Plato uses such synonyms as *φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς, διάνοια*, etc., as suits his purpose and context. He makes no attempt to define and discriminate them with impracticable Aristotelian meticulousness.

[1555]Cf. *Theaet.* 176 D, *Laws* 689 C-D, Cic. *De offic.* i. 19, and also *Laws* 819 A.

[1556]Cf. *Theaet.* 195 A, "ibid." 173 A "σμικροὶ . . . τὰς ψυχάς", Marcus Aurelius' "ψυχάριον εἴ βαστάζων νεκρόν", Swinburne's "A little soul for a little bears up this corpse which is man" ("Hymn to Proserpine," *in fine*), Tennyson's "If half the little soul is dirt."

[1557]Lit. "Toward which it is turned."

"I certainly have," he said. "Observe then," said I, "that this part of such a soul, if it had been hammered from childhood, and had thus been struck free[1558] of the leaden weights, so to speak, of our birth and becoming, which attaching themselves to it by food and similar pleasures and gluttonies turn downwards the vision of the soul[1559]—If, I say, freed from these, it had suffered a conversion towards the things that are real and true, that same faculty of the same men would have been most keen in its vision of the higher things, just as it is for the things toward which it is now turned." "It is likely," he said. "Well, then," said I, "is not this also likely[1560] and a necessary consequence of what has been said, that neither could men who are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever adequately preside over a state, nor could those who had been permitted to linger on to the end in the pursuit of culture—the one because they have no single aim[1561] and purpose in life to which all their actions, public and private, must be directed, and the others, because they will not voluntarily engage in action, believing that while still living they have been transported to the Islands of the Blest.[1562]"

"True," he said. "It is the duty of us, the founders, then," said I, "to compel the best natures to attain the knowledge which we pronounced the greatest, and to win to the vision of the good, to scale that ascent, and when they have reached the heights and taken an adequate view, we must not allow what is now permitted." "What is that?" "That they should linger there," I said, "and refuse to go down again[1563] among

[1558]The meaning is plain, the precise nature of the image that carries it is doubtful. Jowett's "circumcision" was suggested by Stallbaum's "purgata ac circumcisa," but carries alien associations. The whole may be compared with the incrustation of the soul, 611 C-D, and with Phaedo 81 B f.

[1559]Or "eye of the mind." Cf. 533 D, *Sym.* 219 A, *Soph.* 254 A, Aristot. *Eth.* 1144 a 30 , and the parallels and imitations collected by Gomperz, *Apol. der Heilkunst,* 166-167. cf. also *What Plato Said,* p. 534, on *Phaedo* 99 E, Ovid, *Met.* 15.64: ". . . quae natura negabat Visibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hausit." Cf. Friedlander, *Platon,* i. pp. 12-13, 15, and perhaps *Odyssey*, i. 115, Marc. Aurel. iv. 29 "καταμύειν τῷ νοερῷ ὄμματι".

[1560]For likely and necessary cf. on 485 C, p. 6, note c.

[1561]*σκοπόν*: this is what distinguishes the philosophic statesman from the opportunist politician. Cf. 452 E, *Laws* 962 A-B, D, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 18 n. 102.

[1562]Cf. 540 B, *Gorg.* 526 C, 520 D "ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ" and *Phaedo* 114 C, 109 B. Because they will still suppose that they are "building Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land" (Blake).

[1563]Cf. 539 E and *Laws* 803 B-C, and on 520 C, Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics,* p. 53 "the hero of our story descended the bean-stalk and came back to the common world," etc.

those bondsmen and share their labors and honors, whether they are of less or of greater worth." "Do you mean to say that we must do them this wrong, and compel them to live an inferior life when the better is in their power?" "You have again forgotten,[1564] my friend," said I, "that the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition[1565] in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion,[1566] and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit[1567] which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a view to using them for the binding together of the commonwealth." "True," he said, "I did forget it." "Observe, then, Glaucon," said I, "that we shall not be wronging, either, the philosophers who arise among us, but that we can justify our action when we constrain them to take charge of the other citizens and be their guardians.[1568] For we will say to them that it is natural that men of similar quality who spring up in other cities should not share in the labors there. For they grow up spontaneously[1569] from no volition of the government in the several states, and it is justice that the self-grown, indebted to none for its breeding, should not be zealous either to pay to anyone the price of its nurture.[1570] But you we have engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city to be, as it were, king-bees[1571] and leaders in the hive. You have received a better and more complete education[1572] than the others, and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go[1573] then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others

[1564]Cf. Vol. I. pp. 314-315 on 419.

[1565]i.e. happiness, not of course exceptional happiness.

[1566]Persuasion and compulsion are often bracketed or contrasted. Cf. also *Laws* 661 C, 722 B, 711 C, *Rep.* 548 B.

[1567]Cf. 369 C ff. The reference there however is only to the economic division of labor. For the idea that laws should be for the good of the whole state cf. 420 B ff., 466 A, 341-342, *Laws* 715 B, 757 D, 875 A.

[1568]"Noblesse oblige." This idea is now a commonplace of communist orations.

[1569]*αὐτόματοι* Cf. *Protag.* 320 A, *Euthyd.* 282 C. For the thought that there are a few men naturally good in any state cf. also *Laws* 951 B, 642 C-D.

[1570]Cf. Isoc. *Archidamus* 108 "ἀποδῶμεν τὰ τροφεῖα τῇ πατρίδι". Stallbaum refers also to *Phoenissae* 44. For the country as *τροφός* see Vol. I. p. 303, note e on 414 E.

[1571]Cf. *Polit.* 301 D-E, Xen. *Cyr.* v.1.24, *Oecon.* 7.32-33.

[1572]For *τελεώτερον . . . πεπαιδευμένους* Cf. *Prot.* 342 E "τελέως πεπαιδευμένου".

[1573]They must descend into the cave again. Cf. 539 E and *Laws* 803 B-C. Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philos.* 89-90: "it was he alone, so far as we know, that insisted on philosophers descending by turns into the cave from which they had been released

and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there. For once habituated you will discern them infinitely[1574] better than the dwellers there, and you will know what each of the "idols"[1575] is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good. So our city will be governed by us and you with waking minds, and not, as most cities now which are inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream[1576] by men who fight one another for shadows[1577] and wrangle for office as if that were a great good, when the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office[1578] must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this." "By all means," he said. "Will our alumni, then, disobey us when we tell them this, and will they refuse to share in the labors of state each in his turn while permitted to dwell the most of the time with one another in that purer world[1579]?"

"Impossible," he said: "for we shall be imposing just commands on men who are just. Yet they will assuredly approach office as an unavoidable necessity,[1580] and in the opposite temper from that of the present rulers in our cities."

"For the fact is, dear friend," said I, "if you can discover a better way of life than office-holding for your future rulers, a well-governed city becomes a possibility. For only in such a state will those rule who are really rich,[1581] not in gold, but in the wealth that makes happiness—a good and wise life. But if, being beggars and starvelings[1582] from lack of goods of their own, they turn to affairs of state thinking that it is

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and coming to the help of their former fellow-prisoners." He agrees with Stewart (*Myths of Plato,* p. 252, n. 2) that Plato had in mind the Orphic *κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου* to "rescue the spirits in prison." Cf. Wright, *Harvard Studies,* xvii. p. 139 and *Complete Poems of Henry More,* pp. xix-xx "All which is agreeable to that opinion of Plato: That some descend hither to declare the Being and Nature of the Gods; and for the greater Health, Purity and Perfection of this Lower World." This is taking Plato somewhat too literally and confusing him with Plotinus.

[1574]For *μυρίῳ* cf. Eurip. *Androm.* 701.

[1575]i.e. images, Bacon's "idols of the den."

[1576]Plato is fond of the contrast, *ὕπαρ . . . ὄναρ.* Cf. 476 C, *Phaedr.* 277 D, *Phileb.* 36 E, 65 E, *Polit.* 277 D, 278 E, *Theaet.* 158 B, *Rep.* 574 D, 576 B, *Tim.* 71 E, *Laws* 969 B, also 533 B-C.

[1577]Cf. on 586 C, p. 393.

[1578]Cf. on 517 C, p. 131, note 3.

[1579]The world of ideas, the upper world as opposed to that of the cave. Cf. Stallbaum *ad loc.*

[1580]Cf. Vol. I. p. 80, note b on 347 C.

[1581]Cf. *Phaedrus in fine*, *ibid* 416 E-417 A, 547 B.

[1582]Stallbaum refers to Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 3. 39 "οἶομαί σε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἥδιον πλουτεῖν,

thence that they should grasp their own good, then it is impossible. For when office and rule become the prizes of contention,[1583] such a civil and internecine strife[1584] destroys the office-seekers themselves and the city as well." "Most true," he said. "Can you name any other type or ideal of life that looks with scorn on political office except the life of true philosophers[1585]?" I asked. "No, by Zeus," he said. "But what we require," I said, "is that those who take office[1586] should not be lovers of rule. Otherwise there will be a contest with rival lovers."

"Surely." "What others, then, will you compel to undertake the guardianship of the city than those who have most intelligence of the principles that are the means of good government and who possess distinctions of another kind and a life that is preferable to the political life?" "No others," he said. "Would you, then, have us proceed to consider how such men may be produced in a state and how they may be led upward[1587] to the light even as some[1588] are fabled to have ascended from Hades to the gods?" "Of course I would." "So this, it seems, would not be the whirling of the shell[1589] in the children's game, but a conversion and turning about of the soul from a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day—that ascension[1590] to reality of our

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ὅτι πεινήσας χρημάτων πεπλούτηκας", "for you must enjoy your riches much more, I think, for the very reason that it was only after being hungry for wealth that you became rich." (Loeb tr.) Cf. also 577 E-578 A, and Adam *ad loc.*

[1583]Cf. 347 D, *Laws* 715 A, also 586 C and *What Plato Said,* p. 627, on *Laws* 678 E, Isoc. *Areop.* 24, *Pan.* 145 and 146.

[1584]Cf. Eurip. *Heracleidae* 415 "οἰκεῖος ἤδη πόλεμος ἐξαρτεύεται".

[1585]Cf. 580 d ff., pp. 370 ff.

[1586]*ἰέναι ἐπί* in erotic language means "to woo." Cf. on 489 C, p. 26, note b, also 347 C, 588 B, 475 C.

[1587]Cf. on 515 E, p. 124, note b.

[1588]This has been much debated. Cf. Adam *ad loc.* Professor Linforth argues from Pausanias i. 34 that Amphiaraus is meant.

[1589]Cf. *Phaedr.* 241 B; also the description of the game in Plato Comicus, *Fr. 153 apud* Norwood, *Greek Comedy,* p. 167. The players were divided into two groups. A shell or potsherd, black on one side and white on the other, was thrown, and according to the face on which it fell one group fled and the other pursued. Cf. also commentators on Aristoph. *Knights* 855.

[1590]Much quoted by Neoplatonists and Christian Fathers. Cf. Stallbaum *ad loc.* Again we need to remember that Plato's main and explicitly reiterated purpose is to describe a course of study that will develop the power of consecutive consistent abstract thinking. All metaphysical and mystical suggestions of the imagery which conveys this idea are secondary and subordinate. So, e.g. Urwick, *The Message of Plato,* pp. 66-67, is mistaken when he says " . . . Plato expressly tells us that his education is designed simply and solely to awaken the spiritual faculty which every soul contains, by "wheeling the soul round and turning it away from the world of change and decay." He is not concerned with any of those "excellences of mind" which

parable which we will affirm to be true philosophy." "By all means." "Must we not, then, consider what studies have the power to effect this?"

"Of course." "What, then, Glaucon, would be the study that would draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being? A thought strikes me while I speak[1591]: Did we not say that these men in youth must be athletes of war[1592]" "We did." "Then the study for which we are seeking must have this additional[1593] qualification." "What one?" "That it be not useless to soldiers.[1594]" "Why, yes, it must," he said, "if that is possible." "But in our previous account they were educated in gymnastics and music.[1595]" "They were, he said. "And gymnastics, I take it, is devoted[1596] to that which grows and perishes; for it presides over the growth and decay of the body.[1597]"

"Obviously." "Then this cannot be the study that we seek." "No." "Is it, then, music, so far as we have already described it?[1598]" "Nay, that," he said, "was the counterpart of gymnastics, if you remember. It educated the guardians through habits, imparting by the melody a certain harmony of spirit that is not science,[1599] and by the rhythm measure and grace, and also qualities akin to these in the words of tales that are fables and those that are more nearly true. But it included no study that tended to any such good as you are now seeking." "Your recollection is most exact," I said; "for in fact it had nothing of the kind. But in heaven's name, Glaucon, what study could there be of that kind? For all the arts were in our opinion base and mechanical.[1600]" "Surely; and yet what other study is left apart from music,

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may be produced by training and discipline, his only aim is to open the eye of the soul . . . " The general meaning of the sentence is plain but the text is disputed. See crit. note.

[1591]A frequent pretence in Plato. Cf. 370 A, 525 C, *Euthyphro* 9 C, *Laws* 686 C, 702 B, *Phaedr.* 262 C with Friedländer, *Platon,* ii. p. 498, *Laws* 888 D with Tayler Lewis, *Plato against the Atheists,* pp. 118-119. Cf. also Vol. I. on 394 D-E, and Isoc. *Antid.* 159 "ἐνθυμοῦμαι δὲ μεταξὺ λέγων", *Panath.* 127.

[1592]Cf. 416 D, 422 B, 404 A, and Vol. I. p. 266, note a, on 403 E.

[1593]*προσέχειν* is here used in its etymological sense. Cf. pp. 66-67 on 500 A.

[1594]This further prerequisite of the higher education follows naturally from the plan of the *Republic;* but it does not interest Plato much and is, after one or two repetitions, dropped.

[1595]Cf. 376 E ff.

[1596]For τετεύτακε Cf. *Tim.* 90 B "τετευταχότι"

[1597]Cf. 376 E. This is of course no contradiction of 410 C.

[1598]The ordinary study of music may cultivate and refine feeling. Only the mathematics of music would develop the power of abstract thought.

[1599]Knowledge in the true sense, as contrasted with opinion or habit.

gymnastics and the arts?"

"Come," said I, "if we are unable to discover anything outside of these, let us take something that applies to all alike.[1601]"

"What?" "Why, for example, this common thing that all arts and forms of thought[1602] and all sciences employ, and which is among the first things that everybody must learn."

"What?" he said. "This trifling matter,[1603]" I said, "of distinguishing one and two and three. I mean, in sum, number and calculation. Is it not true of them that every art and science must necessarily partake of them?" "Indeed it is," he said. "The art of war too?" said I. "Most necessarily," he said. "Certainly, then," said I, "Palamedes[1604] in the play is always making Agamemnon appear a most ridiculous[1605] general. Have you not noticed that he affirms that by the invention of number he marshalled the troops in the army at Troy in ranks and companies and enumerated the ships and everything else as if before that they had not been counted, and Agamemnon apparently did not know how many feet he had if he couldn't count? And yet what sort of a General do you think he would be in that case?" "A very queer one in my opinion," he said, "if that was true." "Shall we not, then," I said, "set down as a study requisite for a soldier the ability to reckon and number?" "Most certainly, if he is to know anything whatever of the ordering of his troops—or rather if he is to be a man at all.[1606]" "Do you observe then," said I, "in this study what I do?"

"What?"

"It seems likely that it is one of those studies which we are seeking that naturally conduce to the awakening of thought, but that no one makes the right use[1607] of it, though it really does tend to draw the mind to

[1600]Cf. *ibid*, p. 49 note e on 495 E. This idea is the source of much modern prejudice against Plato.

[1601]Cf. *Symp.* 186 B "ἐπὶ πᾶν τείνει".

[1602]*διάνοιαι* is not to be pressed in the special sense of 511 D-E.

[1603]A playful introduction to Plato's serious treatment of the psychology of number and the value of the study of mathematics.

[1604]Palamedes, like Prometheus, is a "culture hero," who personifies in Greek tragedy the inventions and discoveries that produced civilization. Cf. the speech of Prometheus in Aesch. *Prom.* 459 ff. and *Harvard Studies*, xii. p. 208, n. 2.

[1605]Quoted by later writers in praise of mathematics. Cf. Theo Smyrn. p. 7 ed. Gelder. For the necessity of mathematics Cf. *Laws* 818 C.

[1606]Cf. *Laws* 819 D.

[1607]Plato's point of view here, as he will explain, is precisely the opposite of that of modern educators who would teach mathematics concretely and not puzzle the children with abstract logic. But in the *Laws* where he is speaking of primary and secondary education for the entire population he anticipates the modern kindergarten

essence and reality." "What do you mean?" he said. "I will try," I said, "to show you at least my opinion. Do you keep watch and observe the things I distinguish in my mind as being or not being conducive to our purpose, and either concur or dissent, in order that here too we may see more clearly[1608] whether my surmise is right." "Point them out," he said. "I do point them out," I said, "if you can discern that some reports of our perceptions do not provoke thought to reconsideration because the judgement[1609] of them by sensation seems adequate,[1610] while others always invite the intellect to reflection because the sensation yields nothing that can be trusted.[1611]" "You obviously mean distant[1612] appearances," he said, "and shadow-painting.[1613]" "You have quite missed my meaning,[1614]" said I. "What do you mean?" he said. "The experiences that do not provoke thought are those that do not at the same time issue in a contradictory perception.[1615] Those that do have that effect I set down as provocatives, when the perception no more manifests one thing than its contrary, alike whether its impact[1616] comes from nearby or afar. An illustration will make my meaning plain. Here, we say, are three fingers, the little finger, the second and the middle." "Quite so," he said. "Assume that I speak of them as seen near at hand. But this is the point that you are to consider."

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ideas (819 B-C).

[1608]For *σαφέστερον* cf. 523 C. Cf. Vol. I. p. 47, note f, on 338 D, and *What Plato Said,* p. 503, on *Gorg.* 463 D.

[1609]Cf. *Phileb.* 38 C. *Unity of Plato's Thought,* n. 337.

[1610]*ἱκανῶς* is not to be pressed here.

[1611]For *οὐδὲν ὑγιές* cf. 496 C, 584 A, 589 C, *Phaedo* 69 B, 89 E, 90 E, *Gorg.* 524 E, *Laws* 776 E, *Theaet.* 173 B, Eurip. *Phoen.* 201, *Bacch.* 262, *Hel.*. 746, etc.

[1612]The most obvious cause of errors of judgement. Cf. *Laws* 663 B.

[1613]Cf. Vol. I. p. 137 on 365 C.

[1614]The dramatic misapprehension by the interlocutor is one of Plato's methods for enforcing his meaning. Cf. on 529 A, p. 180, note a, *Laws* 792 B-C.

[1615]Cf. Jacks, *Alchemy of Thought,* p. 29: "The purpose of the world, then, being to attain consciousness of itself as a rational or consistent whole, is it not a little strange that the first step, so to speak, taken by the world for the attainment of this end is that of presenting itself in the form of contradictory experience?" *αἴσθησις* is not to be pressed. Adam's condescending apology for the primitive character of Plato's psychology here is as uncalled-for as all such apologies. Plato varies the expression, but his meaning is clear. Cf. 524 D. No modern psychologists are able to use "sensation," "perception," "judgement," and similar terms with perfect consistency.

[1616]For *προσπίπτουσα* Cf. *Tim.* 33 A, 44 A, 66 A, *Rep.* 515 A, 561 C, *Laws* 791 C, 632 A, 637 A, *Phileb.* 21 C; also *accidere* in Lucretius, e.g. iv. 882, ii. 1024-1025, iv. 236 and iii. 841, and Goethe's "Das Blenden der Erscheinung, die sich an unsere Sinne drängt."

"What?" "Each one of them appears to be equally a finger,[1617] and in this respect it makes no difference whether it is observed as intermediate or at either extreme, whether it is white or black, thick or thin, or of any other quality of this kind. For in none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled to question the reason and to ask what in the world is a finger, since the faculty of sight never signifies to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite of a finger." "Why, no, it does not," he said.

"Then," said I, "it is to be expected that such a perception will not provoke or awaken[1618] reflection and thought." "It is." "But now, what about the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision's view of them adequate, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them is situated[1619] outside or in the middle; and similarly of the relation of touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And are not the other senses also defective in their reports of such things?

Or is the operation of each of them as follows? In the first place, the sensation that is set over the hard is of necessity related also to the soft,[1620] and it reports to the soul that the same thing is both hard and soft to its perception." "It is so," he said.

"Then," said I, "is not this again a case where the soul must be at a loss[1621] as to what significance for it the sensation of hardness

[1617] This anticipates Aristotle's doctrine that "substances" do not, as qualities do, admit of more or less.

[1618] We should never press synonyms which Plato employs for *ποικιλία* of style or to avoid falling into a rut of terminology.

[1619] *κεῖσθαι* perhaps anticipates the Aristotelian category.

[1620] Cf. *Theaet.* 186 ff., *Tim.* 62 B, Taylor, *Timaeus,* p. 233 on 63 D-E, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* nn. 222 and 225, Diels, *Dialex.* 5 (ii.3 p. 341). *Protag.* 331 D anticipates this thought, but Protagoras cannot follow it out. Cf. also *Phileb.* 13 A-B. Stallbaum also compares *Phileb.* 57 D and 56 C f.

[1621] Plato gives a very modern psychological explanation. Thought is provoked by the contradictions in perceptions that suggest problems. The very notion of unity is contradictory of uninterpreted experience. This use of *ἀπορεῖν* (Cf. 515 D) anticipates much modern psychology supposed to be new. Cf. e.g. Herbert Spencer, *passim*, and Dewey, *How We Think,* p. 12 "we may recapitulate by saying that the origin of thinking is some perplexity, confusion, or doubt"; also *ibid*, p. 62. Meyerson, *Déduction relativiste* p. 142, says "Mais Platon . . . n'avait-il pas dit qu'il était impossible de raisonner si ce n'est en partant d'une perception?" citing *Rep.* 523-524, and Rodier, Aristot. *De anima,* i. p. 191. But that is not Plato's point here. Zeller, *Aristot.* i. p. 166 (Eng.), also misses the point when he says "Even as to the passage from the former to the latter he had only the negative doctrine that the contradictions of opinion and fancy ought to lead us to go further and to pass to the pure treatment of ideas."

has, if the sense reports the same thing as also soft? And, similarly, as to what the sensation of light and heavy means by light and heavy, if it reports the heavy as light, and the light as heavy?" "Yes, indeed," he said, "these communications[1622] to the soul are strange and invite reconsideration." "Naturally, then," said I, "it is in such cases as these that the soul first summons to its aid the calculating reason[1623] and tries to consider whether each of the things reported to it is one or two.[1624]"

"Of course." "And if it appears to be two, each of the two is a distinct unit.[1625]"

"Yes." "If, then, each is one and both two, the very meaning[1626] of "two" is that the soul will conceive them as distinct.[1627] For if they were not separable, it would not have been thinking of two, but of one."

"Right." "Sight too saw the great and the small, we say, not separated but confounded.[1628] "Is not that so?"

"Yes." "And for[1629] the clarification of this, the intelligence is compelled to contemplate the great and small,[1630] not thus confounded but as distinct entities, in the opposite way from sensation."

"True." "And is it not in some such experience as this that the question first occurs to us, what in the world, then, is the great and

[1622]For *ἑρμηνεῖαι* Cf. *Theaet.* 209 A.

[1623]Cf. *Parmen.* 130 A "τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις".

[1624]Cf. *Theaet.* 185 B, *Laws* 963 C, *Sophist* 254 D, *Hipp. Major* 301 D-E, and, for the dialectic here, *Parmen.* 143 D.

[1625]Or, as the Greek puts it, "both "one" and "other."" Cf. Vol. 1. p. 516, note f on 416 A. For *ἕτερον* Cf. *What Plato Said,* pp. 522, 580, 587-588.

[1626]*γε vi termini* Cf. 379 B, 576 C, *Parmen.* 145 A, *Protag.* 358 C.

[1627]*κεχωρισμένα* and *ἀχώριστα* suggest the terminology of Aristotle in dealing with the problem of abstraction.

[1628]Plato's aim is the opposite of that of the modern theorists who say that teaching should deal integrally with the total experience and not with the artificial division of abstraction.

[1629]The final use of *διά* became more frequent in later Greek. Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 982 b 20, *Eth. Nic.* 1110 a 4. *Gen. an.* 717 a 6, *Poetics* 1450 b 3, 1451 b 37. Cf. *Lysis* 218 B, *Epin.* 975 A, Olympiodorus, *Life of Plato,*Teubner vi. 191, *ibid.* p. 218, and schol.*passim,* Apsines, Spengel i. 361, line 18.

[1630]Plato merely means that this is the psychological origin of our attempt to form abstract and general ideas. My suggestion that this passage is the probable source of the notion which still infests the history of philosophy, that the great-and-the-small was a metaphysical entity or principle in Plato's later philosophy, to be identified with indeterminate dyad, has been disregarded. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought,* 84. But it is the only plausible explanation that has ever been proposed of the attribution of that "clotted nonsense" to Plato himself. For it is fallacious to identify "μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον" in *Philebus* 24 C, 25 C, 21 E, and elsewhere with the *μέγα καὶ σμικρόν.* But there is no limit to the misapprehension of texts by hasty or fanciful readers in any age.

the small?" "By all means." "And this is the origin of the designation "intelligible" for the one, and "visible" for the other." "Just so," he said. "This, then, is just what I was trying to explain a little while ago when I said that some things are provocative of thought and some are not, defining as provocative things that impinge upon the senses together with their opposites, while those that do not I said do not tend to awaken reflection." "Well, now I understand," he said, "and agree." "To which class, then, do you think number and the one belong[1631]?" "I cannot conceive," he said. "Well, reason it out from what has already been said. For, if unity is adequately[1632] seen by itself or apprehended by some other sensation, it would not tend to draw the mind to the apprehension of essence, as we were explaining in the case of the finger. But if some contradiction is always seen coincidentally with it, so that it no more appears to be one than the opposite, there would forthwith be need of something to judge between them, and it would compel the soul to be at a loss and to inquire, by arousing thought in itself, and to ask, whatever then is the one as such, and thus the study of unity will be one of the studies that guide and convert the soul to the contemplation of true being." "But surely," he said, "the visual perception of it[1633] does especially involve this. For we see the same thing at once as one and as an indefinite plurality.[1634]" "Then if this is true of the one," I said, "the same holds of all number, does it not?"

"Of course." "But, further, reckoning and the science of arithmetic[1635] are wholly concerned with number." "They are, indeed." "And the qualities of number appear to lead to the apprehension of truth." "Beyond anything," he said. "Then, as it seems, these would be among the studies that we are seeking. For a soldier must learn them in order to marshal his troops, and a philosopher, because he must rise out of the region of generation and lay hold on essence or he

[1631]To waive metaphysics, unity is, as modern mathematicians say, a concept of the mind which experience breaks up. The thought is familiar to Plato from the *Meno* to the *Parmenides.* But it is not true that Plato derived the very notion of the concept from the problem of the one and the many. Unity is a typical concept, but the consciousness of the concept was developed by the Socratic quest for the definition.

[1632]Cf. 523 B. The meaning must be gathered from the context.

[1633]See crit. note and Adam *ad loc.*

[1634]This is the problem of the one and the many with which Plato often plays, which he exhaustively and consciously illustrates in the *Parmenides,* and which the introduction to the *Philebus* treats as a metaphysical nuisance to be disregarded in practical logic. We have not yet got rid of it, but have merely transferred it to psychology.

[1635]Cf. *Gorg.* 450 D, 451 B-C.

can never become a true reckoner.[1636]" "It is so," he said. "And our guardian is soldier and philosopher in one."

"Of course." "It is befitting, then, Glaucon, that this branch of learning should be prescribed by our law and that we should induce those who are to share the highest functions of state to enter upon that study of calculation and take hold of it, not as amateurs, but to follow it up until they attain to the contemplation of the nature of number,[1637] by pure thought, not for the purpose of buying and selling,[1638] as if they were preparing to be merchants or hucksters, but for the uses of war and for facilitating the conversion of the soul itself from the world of generation to essence and truth." "Excellently said," he replied. "And, further," I said, "it occurs to me,[1639] now that the study of reckoning has been mentioned, that there is something fine in it, and that it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided it is pursued for the sake of knowledge[1640] and not for huckstering." "In what respect?" he said. "Why, in respect of the very point of which we were speaking, that it strongly directs the soul upward and compels it to discourse about pure numbers,[1641] never acquiescing if

[1636]Cf. my review of Jowett, *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 365. My view there is adopted by Adam *ad loc.*, and Apelt translates in the same way.

[1637]It is not true as Adam says that "the nature of numbers cannot be fully seen except in their connection with the Good." Plato never says that and never really meant it, though he might possibly have affirmed it on a challenge. Numbers are typical abstractions and educate the mind for the apprehension of abstractions if studied in their nature, in themselves, and not in the concrete form of five apples. There is no common sense nor natural connection between numbers and the good, except the point made in the *Timaeus* 53 B, and which is not relevant here, that God used numbers and forms to make a cosmos out of a chaos.

[1638]Instead of remarking on Plato's scorn for the realities of experience we should note that he is marking the distinctive quality of the mind of the Greeks in contrast with the Egyptians and orientals from whom they learned and the Romans whom they taught. Cf. 525 D "καπηλεύειν", and Horace, *Ars Poetica* 323-332, Cic. *Tusc.* i. 2. 5. *Per contra* Xen. *Mem.* iv. 7, and Libby, *Introduction to History of Science,* p. 49: "In this the writer did not aim at the mental discipline of the students, but sought to confine himself to what is easiest and most useful in calculation, "such as men constantly require in cases of inheritance, legacies, partition, law-suits, and trade, and in all their dealings with one another, or where the measuring of lands, the digging of canals, geometrical computation, and other objects of various sorts and kinds are concerned."".

[1639]Cf. on 521 D, p. 147, note e.

[1640]Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 982 a 15 "τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν", and *Laws* 741 C. Montesquieu *apud* Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy,* p. 6: "The first motive which ought to impel us to study is the desire to augment the excellence of our nature and to render an intelligent being more intelligent."

[1641]Lit. "numbers (in) themselves," i.e. ideal numbers or the ideas of numbers. For

anyone proffers to it in the discussion numbers attached to visible and tangible bodies. For you are doubtless aware that experts in this study, if anyone attempts to cut up the "one" in argument, laugh at him and refuse to allow it; but if you mince it up,[1642] they multiply, always on guard lest the one should appear to be not one but a multiplicity of parts.[1643]" "Most true," he replied.

"Suppose now, Glaucon, someone were to ask them,

"My good friends, what numbers[1644] are these you are talking about, in which the one is such as you postulate, each unity equal to every other without the slightest difference and admitting no division into parts?" What do you think would be their answer?" "This, I think—that they are speaking of units which can only be conceived by thought, and which it is not possible to deal with in any other way." "You see, then, my friend," said I, "that this branch of study really seems to be indispensable for us, since it plainly compels the soul to employ pure thought with a view to truth itself." "It most emphatically does." "Again, have you ever noticed this, that natural reckoners are by nature quick in virtually all their studies? And the slow, if they are trained and drilled in this, even if no other benefit results, all improve and become quicker than they were[1645]?" "It is so," he said.

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this and the following as one of the sources of the silly notion that mathematical numbers are intermediate between ideal and concrete numbers, cf. my *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina,* p. 33, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* pp. 83-84, *Class. Phil.* xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218.

[1642]Cf. *Meno* 79 C "κατακερματίζης", Aristot. *Met.* 1041 a 19 "ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς αὐτὸ ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι", *Met.* 1052 b a ff., 15 ff. and 1053 a 1 "τὴν γὰρ μονάδα τιθέασι πάντη ἀδιαίρετον. κερματίζειν" is also the word used of breaking money into small change.

[1643]Numbers are the aptest illustration of the principle of the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides* that thought has to postulate unities which sensation (sense perception) and also dialectics are constantly disintegrating into pluralities. Cf. my *Ideas of Good in Plato's Republic,* p. 222. Stenzel, *Dialektik,* p. 32, says this dismisses the problem of the one and the many "das ihn (Plato) später so lebhaft beschäftigen sollte." But that is refuted by *Parmen.* 159 C "οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν". The "problem" was always in Plato's mind. He played with it when it suited his purpose and dismissed it when he wished to go on to something else. Cf. on 525 A, *Phaedr.* 266 B, *Meno* 12 C, *Laws* 964 A, *Soph.* 251.

[1644]This is one of the chief sources of the fancy that numbers are intermediate entities between ideas and things. Cf. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity,* i. p. 219: "Mathematical particulars are therefore not as Plato thought intermediate between sensible figures and universals. Sensible figures are only less simple mathematical ones." Cf. on 525 D. Plato here and elsewhere simply means that the educator may distinguish two kinds of numbers—five apples, and the number five as an abstract idea. Cf. *Theaet. 19* E: We couldn't err about eleven which we only think, i.e. the abstract number eleven. Cf. also Berkeley, *Siris,* 288.

"And, further, as I believe, studies that demand more toil in the learning and practice than this we shall not discover easily nor find many of them.[1646]" "You will not, in fact." "Then, for all these reasons, we must not neglect this study, but must use it in the education of the best endowed natures." "I agree," he said. "Assuming this one point to be established," I said, "let us in the second place consider whether the study that comes next[1647] is suited to our purpose." "What is that? Do you mean geometry," he said. "Precisely that," said I. "So much of it," he said, "as applies to the conduct of war[1648] is obviously suitable. For in dealing with encampments and the occupation of strong places and the bringing of troops into column and line and all the other formations of an army in actual battle and on the march, an officer who had studied geometry would be a very different person from what he would be if he had not." "But still," I said, "for such purposes a slight modicum[1649] of geometry and calculation would suffice. What we have to consider is whether the greater and more advanced part of it tends to facilitate the apprehension of the idea of good.[1650] That tendency, we affirm, is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn its vision round to the region where dwells the most blessed part of reality,[1651] which it is imperative that it should behold." "You are

[1645]Cf. Isoc. *Antid.* 267 "αὐτοὶ δ' αὐτῶν εὐμαθέστεροι". For the idiom *αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν* cf. also 411 C. 421 D, 571 D, *Prot.* 350 A and D, *Laws* 671 B, *Parmen.* 141 A, *Laches* 182 C. "Educators" have actually cited him as authority for the opposite view. On the effect of Mathematical studies cf. also *Laws* 747 B, 809 C-D, 810 C, Isoc. *Antid.* 276. Cf. Max Tyr. 37 7 "ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἴη ἄν τι ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ τὸ φαυλότατον". Mill on Hamilton ii. 311 "If the Practice of mathematical reasoning gives nothing else it gives wariness of mind." *ibid.* 312.

[1646]The translation is, I think, right. Cf. *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 365, and Adam *ad loc.*

[1647]Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy,* p. 111: "Even Plato puts arithmetic before geometry in the *Republic* in deference to tradition." For the three branches of higher learning, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, Cf. *Laws* 811 E-818 A, Isoc. *Antid.* 261-267, *Panath.* 26, *Bus.* 226; Max, Tyr. 37 7.

[1648]Cf. *Basilicon Doron* (Morley, *A Miscellany,* p. 144): "I grant it is meete yee have some entrance, specially in the Mathematickes, for the knowledge of the art militarie, in situation of Campes, ordering of battels, making fortifications, placing of batteries, or such like."

[1649]This was Xenophon's view, *Mem.* vi. 7. 2. Whether it was Socrates' nobody knows. Cf. pp. 162-163 on 525 C, *Epin.* 977 E, Aristoph. *Clouds* 202.

[1650]Because it develops the power of abstract thought. Not because numbers are deduced from the idea of good. Cf. on 525, p. 162, note b.

[1651]Cf. 518 C. Once more we should remember that for the practical and educational application of Plato's main thought this and all similar expressions are rhetorical surplusage or "unction," which should not be pressed, nor used e.g. to identify the idea of good with god. Cf. Introd. p. xxv.

right," he said. "Then if it compels the soul to contemplate essence, it is suitable; if genesis,[1652] it is not." "So we affirm.[1653]"
"This at least," said I, "will not be disputed by those who have even a slight acquaintance with geometry, that this science is in direct contradiction with the language employed in it by its adepts.[1654]" "How so?" he said. "Their language is most ludicrous,[1655] though they cannot help it,[1656] for they speak as if they were doing something[1657] and as if all their words were directed towards action. For all their talk[1658] is of squaring and applying[1659] and adding and the like,[1660] whereas in

[1652]Or "becoming." Cf. 485 B, 525 B.

[1653]*γε δή* is frequent in confirming answers. Cf. 557 B, 517 C, *Symp.* 172 C, 173 E, *Gorg.* 449 B, etc.

[1654]Geometry (and mathematics) is inevitably less abstract than dialectics. But the special purpose of the Platonic education values mathematics chiefly as a discipline in abstraction. Cf. on 523 A, p. 152, note b; and Titchener, *A Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 265-266: "There are probably a good many of us whose abstract idea of "triangle" is simply a mental picture of the little equilateral triangle that stands for the word in text-books of geometry." There have been some attempts to prove (that of Mr. F. M. Cornford in *Mind,* April 1932, is the most recent) that Plato, if he could not anticipate in detail the modern reduction of mathematics to logic, did postulate something like it as an ideal, the realization of which would abolish his own sharp distinction between mathematics and dialectic. The argument rests on a remote and strained interpretation of two or three texts of the *Republic* (cf. e.g. 511 and 533 B-D) which, naturally interpreted, merely affirm the general inferiority of the mathematical method and the intermediate position for education of mathematics as a propaedeutic to dialectics. Plato's purpose throughout is not to exhort mathematicians as such to question their initiatory postulates, but to mark definitely the boundaries between the mathematical and other sciences and pure dialectics or philosophy. The distinction is a true and useful one today. Aristotle often refers to it with no hint that it could not be abolished by a new and different kind of mathematics. And it is uncritical to read that intention into Plato's words. He may have contributed, and doubtless did contribute, in other ways to the improvement and precision of mathematical logic. But he had no idea of doing away with the fundamental difference that made dialectics and not mathematics the coping-stone of the higher education—science as such does not question its first principles and dialectic does. Cf. 533 B-534 E.

[1655]The very etymology of "geometry" implies the absurd practical conception of the science. Cf. *Epin.* 990 C "γελοῖον ὄνομα".

[1656]Cf. *Polit.* 302 E, *Laws* 757 E, 818 B, *Phileb.* 62 B, *Tim.* 69 D, and also on 494 A. The word *ἀναγκαίως* has been variously misunderstood and mistranslated. It simply means that geometers are compelled to use the language of sense perception though they are thinking of abstractions (ideas) of which sense images are only approximations.

[1657]Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 1051 a 22 "εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ· διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν", "geometrical constructions, too, are discovered by an actualization, because it is by dividing that we discover them." (Loeb tr.)

[1658]For *φθεγγόμενοι* cf. on 505 C, p. 89, note g.

[1659]Cf. Thompson on *Meno* 87 A.

fact the real object of the entire study is pure knowledge.[1661]" "That is absolutely true," he said. "And must we not agree on a further point?"

"What?" "That it is the knowledge of that which always is,[1662] and not of a something which at some time comes into being and passes away." "That is readily admitted," he said, "for geometry is the knowledge of the eternally existent." "Then, my good friend, it would tend to draw the soul to truth, and would be productive of a philosophic attitude of mind, directing upward the faculties that now wrongly are turned earthward." "Nothing is surer," he said. "Then nothing is surer," said I, "than that we must require that the men of your Fair City[1663] shall never neglect geometry, for even the by-products of such study are not slight." "What are they?" said he. "What you mentioned," said I, "its uses in war, and also we are aware that for the better reception of all studies[1664] there will be an immeasurable[1665] difference between the student who has been imbued with geometry and the one who has not." "Immense indeed, by Zeus," he said. "Shall we, then, lay this down as a second branch of study for our lads?" "Let us do so," he said. "Shall we set down astronomy as a third, or do you dissent?" "I certainly agree," he said; "for quickness of perception about the seasons and the courses of the months and the years is serviceable,[1666] not only to agriculture and navigation, but still more to the military art." "I am amused,[1667]" said I, "at your apparent fear lest

[1660]E. Hoffmann, *Der gegenwärtige Stand der Platonforschung,* p. 1091 (Anhang, Zeller, *Plato,* 5th ed.), misunderstands the passage when he says: "Die Abneigung Platons, dem Ideellen irgendwie einen dynamischen Charakter zuzuschreiben, zeigt sich sogar in terminologischen Andeutungen; so verbietet er *Republ.* 527 A für die Mathematik jede Anwendung dynamischer Termini wie *τετραγωνίζειν, παρατείνειν, προστιθέναι*" Plato does not forbid the use of such terms but merely recognizes their inadequacy to express the true nature and purpose of geometry.

[1661]Cf. Meyerson, *De l'explication dans les sciences,* p. 33: "En effet, Platon déjà fait ressortir que la géométrie, en dépit de l'apparence, ne poursuit aucun but pratique et n'a tout entière d'autre objet que Ia connaissance."

[1662]i.e. mathematical ideas are (Platonic) ideas like other concepts. Cf. on 525 D, p. 164, note a.

[1663]*καλλιπόλει*: Plato smiles at his own Utopia. There were cities named Callipolis, e.g. in the Thracian Chersonese and in Calabria on the Gulf of Tarentum. Cf. also Herod. vii. 154. fanciful is the attempt of some scholars to distinguish the Callipolis as a separate section of the *Republic,* or to take it as the title of the *Republic.*

[1664]Plato briefly anticipates much modern literature on the value of the study of mathematics. Cf. on 526 B, p. 166, note a. Olympiodorus says that when geometry deigns to enter into matter she creates mechanics which is highly esteemed.

[1665]For *ὅλῳ καὶ παντί* cf. 469 C. *Laws* 779 B, 734 E, *Phaedo* 79 E, *Crat.* 434 A.

[1666]Xen. *Mem.* iv. 7. 3 ff. attributes to Socrates a similar utilitarian view of science.

[1667]For *ἡδὺς εἶ* cf. 337 D, *Euthydem.* 300 A, *Gorg.* 491 E "*ἥδιστε*", *Rep.* 348 C

the multitude[1668] may suppose you to be recommending useless studies.[1669] It is indeed no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified[1670] and kindled afresh by such studies when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes[1671]; for by it only is reality beheld. Those who share this faith will think your words superlatively[1672] true. But those who have and have had no inkling of it will naturally think them all moonshine.[1673] For they can see no other benefit from such pursuits worth mentioning.

Decide, then, on the spot, to which party you address yourself. Or are you speaking to neither, but chiefly carrying on the discussion for your own sake,[1674] without however judging any other who may be able to profit by it?" "This is the alternative I choose," he said, "that it is for my own sake chiefly that I speak and ask questions and reply." "Fall back[1675] a little, then," said I; "for we just now did not rightly select the study that comes next[1676] after geometry." "What was our mistake?" he said. "After plane surfaces," said I, "we went on to solids in revolution before studying them in themselves. The right way is next in order after the second dimension[1677] to take the third. This, I suppose, is the dimension of cubes and of everything that has depth." "Why, yes, it is," he said; "but this subject, Socrates, does not appear to have been investigated yet.[1678]" "There are two causes

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"γλυκὺς εἶ", *Hipp. Maj.* 288 B.

[1668] Cf. on 499 D-E, p. 66, note a.

[1669] Again Plato anticipates much modern controversy.

[1670] Cf. Xen. *Symp.* 1. 4 "ἐκκεκαθαρμένοις τὰς ψυχάς", and *Phaedo* 67 B-C.

[1671] Another instance of Plato's "unction." Cf. *Tim.* 47 A-B, Eurip. *Orest.* 806 "μυρίων κρείσσων", and Stallbaum *ad loc.* for imitations of this passage in antiquity.

[1672] For *ἀμηχάνως ὡς* Cf. *Charm.* 155 D "ἀμήχανόν τι οἷον". Cf. 588 A, *Phaedo* 80 C, 95 C, *Laws* 782 A, also *Rep.* 331 A "θαυμάστος ὡς", *Hipp. Maj.* 282 C, *Epin.* 982 C-E, Aristoph. *Birds* 427, *Lysist.* 198, 1148.

[1673] This is the thought more technically expressed in the "earlier" work, *Crito* 49 D. Despite his faith in dialectics Plato recognizes that the primary assumptions on which argument necessarily proceeds are irreducible choices of personality. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 478, *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) p. 352.

[1674] Cf. *Charm.* 166 D, *Phaedo* 64 C, *Soph.* 265 A, *Apol.* 33 A.

[1675] *ἄναγε* is a military term. Cf. Aristoph. *Birds* 383, Xen. *Cyr.* vii. 1.45, iii. 3. 69.

[1676] *ἑξῆς* Cf. *Laches* 182 B.

[1677] Lit. "increase" Cf. Pearson, *The Grammar of Science,* p. 411: "He proceeds from curves of frequency to surfaces of frequency, and then requiring to go beyond these he finds his problem lands him in space of many dimensions."

[1678] This is not to be pressed. Plato means only that the progress of solid geometry is unsatisfactory. Cf. 528 D. There may or may not be a reference here to the "Delian

of that," said I: "first, inasmuch as no city holds them in honor, these inquiries are languidly pursued owing to their difficulty. And secondly, the investigators need a director,[1679] who is indispensable for success and who, to begin with, is not easy to find, and then, if he could be found, as things are now, seekers in this field would be too arrogant[1680] to submit to his guidance. But if the state as a whole should join in superintending these studies and honor them, these specialists would accept advice, and continuous and strenuous investigation would bring out the truth. Since even now, lightly esteemed as they are by the multitude and hampered by the ignorance of their students[1681] as to the true reasons for pursuing them,[1682] they nevertheless in the face of all these obstacles force their way by their inherent charm[1683] and it would not surprise us if the truth about them were made apparent." "It is true," he said, "that they do possess an extraordinary attractiveness and charm. But explain more clearly what you were just speaking of. The investigation[1684] of plane surfaces, I presume, you took to be

problem" of the duplication of the cube (cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* i. p. 503 for the story) and other specific problems which the historians of mathematics discuss in connection with this passage. Cf. Adam *ad loc.* To understand Plato we need only remember that the extension of geometry to solids was being worked out in his day, perhaps partly at his suggestion, e.g. by Theaetetus for whom a Platonic dialogue is named, and that Plato makes use of the discovery of the five regular solids in his theory of the elements in the *Timaeus.* Cf. also *Laws* 819 E ff. for those who wish to know more of the ancient traditions and modern conjectures I add references: Eva Sachs, *De Theaeteto Ath. Mathematico,* Diss. Berlin, 1914, and *Die fünf platonischen Körper* (Philolog. Untersuch. Heft 24), Berlin, 1917; E. Hoppe, *Mathematik und Astronomie im klass. Altertum,* pp. 133 ff.; Rudolf Eberling, *Mathematik und Philosophie bei Plato,* Münden, 1909, with my review in *Class. Phil.* v. (1910) p. 114; Seth Demel, *Platons Verhältnis zur Mathematik,* Leipzig, with my review, *Class. Phil.* xxiv. (1929) pp. 312-313; and, for further bibliography on Plato and mathematics, Budé, *Rep.* Introd. pp. lxx-lxxi.

[1679]Plato is perhaps speaking from personal experience as director of the Academy. Cf. the hint in *Euthydem.* 290 C.

[1680]i.e. the mathematicians already feel themselves to be independent specialists.

[1681]This interpretation is, I think, correct. For the construction of this sentence cf. Isoc. xv. 84. The text is disputed; see crit. note.

[1682]Lit. "in what respect they are useful." Plato is fond of the half legal *καθ' ὅ τι.* Cf. *Lysis* 210 C, *Polit.* 298 C.

[1683]An eminent modern psychologist innocently writes: "The problem of why geometry gives pleasure is therefore a deeper problem than the mere assertion of the fact. Furthermore, there are many known cases where the study of geometry does not give pleasure to the student." Adam seems to think it may refer to the personality of Eudoxus.

[1684]*πραγματείαν*: interesting is the development of this word from its use in *Phaedo* 63 A ("interest," "zeal," "inquiring spirit." Cf. Aristot. *Top.* 100 a 18, *Eth. Nic.*

geometry?"

"Yes," said I. "And then," he said, "at first you took astronomy next and then you drew back."

"Yes," I said, "for in my haste to be done I was making less speed.[1685] For, while the next thing in order is the study[1686] of the third dimension or solids, I passed it over because of our absurd neglect[1687] to investigate it, and mentioned next after geometry astronomy,[1688] which deals with the movements of solids." "That is right," he said. "Then, as our fourth study," said I, "let us set down astronomy, assuming that this science, the discussion of which has been passed over, is available,[1689] provided, that is, that the state pursues it." "That is likely," said he; "and instead of the vulgar utilitarian[1690] commendation of astronomy, for which you just now rebuked me, Socrates, I now will praise it on your principles. For it is obvious to everybody, I think, that this study certainly compels the soul to look upward[1691]

1103 b 26, Polyb. i. 1. 4, etc.

[1685] An obvious allusion to the proverb found in many forms in many languages. Cf. also *Polit.* 277 A-B, 264 B, Soph. *Antig.* 231 "σχολῇ ταχύς", Theognis 335, 401 "μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν", Suetonius, *Augustus* 25, Aulus Gellius x. 11. 4, Macrob. *Sat.* vi. 8. 9, "festina lente," "hâtez-vous lentement" (Boileau, *Art poétique,* i. 171), "Chi va piano va sano e va lontano" (Goldoni, *I volponi,*I. ii.), *Eile mit Weile* and similar expressions; Franklin's "Great haste makes great waste," etc.

[1686] *μέθοδον*: this word, like *πραγματεία* came to mean "treatise."

[1687] This is the meaning. Neither Stallbaum's explanation, "quia ita est comparata, ut de ea quaerere ridiculum sit,"" nor that accepted by Adam, "quia ridicule tractatur," is correct, and 529 E and 521 A are not in point. Cf. 528 B p. 176, note a.

[1688] Cf. *Laws* 822 A ff.

[1689] i.e. "assuming this to exist," *vorhanden sein,* which is the usual meaning of *ὑπάρχειν* in classical Greek. The science, of course, is solid geometry, which is still undeveloped, but in Plato's state will be constituted as a regular science through endowed research.

[1690] Cf. Vol. I. p. 410, note c, on 442 E, *Gorg.* 482 E, *Rep.* 581 D, *Cratyl.* 400 A, *Apol.* 32 A, Aristot. *Pol.* 1333 b 9.

[1691] Cf. my review if Warburg, *Class. Phil.* xxiv. (1929) p. 319. The dramatic misunderstanding forestalls a possible understanding by the reader. Cf. on 523 B. The misapprehension is typical of modern misunderstandings. Glaucon is here the prototype of all sentimental Platonists or anti-Platonists. The meaning of "higher" things in Plato's allegory is obvious. But Glaucon takes it literally. Similarly, modern critics, taking Plato's imagery literally and pressing single expressions apart from the total context, have inferred that Plato would be hostile to all the applications of modern science to experience. They refuse to make allowance for his special and avowed educational purpose, and overlook the fact that he is prophesying the mathematical astronomy and science of the future. The half-serious exaggeration of his rhetoric can easily be matched by similar utterances of modern thinkers of the most various schools, from Rousseau's "écarter tous les faits" to Judd's "Once we acquire the power to neglect all the concrete facts . . . we are free from the incumbrances that come

and leads it away from things here to those higher things." "It may be obvious to everybody except me," said I, "for I do not think so." "What do you think?" he said. "As it is now handled by those who are trying to lead us up to philosophy,[1692] I think that it turns the soul's gaze very much downward." "What do you mean?" he said. "You seem to me in your thought to put a most liberal[1693] interpretation on the "study of higher things,"" I said, "for apparently if anyone with back-thrown head should learn something by staring at decorations on a ceiling, you would regard him as contemplating them with the higher reason and not with the eyes.[1694] Perhaps you are right and I am a simpleton. For I, for my part, am unable to suppose that any other study turns the soul's gaze upward[1695] than that which deals with being and the invisible. But if anyone tries to learn about the things of sense, whether gaping up[1696] or blinking down,[1697] I would never say that he really learns—for nothing of the kind admits of true knowledge—nor would I say that his soul looks up, but down, even though he study floating on his back[1698] on sea or land." "A fair retort,[1699]" he said; "your rebuke is deserved. But how, then, did you mean that astronomy ought to be taught contrary to the present fashion if it is to be learned in a way to conduce to our purpose?"

"Thus," said I, "these sparks that paint the sky,[1700] since they are

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through attention to the concrete facts." Cf. also on 529 B, 530 B and 534 A.

[1692] *ἀνάγοντες* is tinged with the suggestions of 517 A, but the meaning here is those who use astronomy as a part of the higher education. *φιλοσοφία* is used in the looser sense of Isocrates. Cf. *A.J.P.* xvi. p. 237.

[1693] For *οὐκ ἀγεννῶς Gorg.* 462 D, where it is ironical, as here, *Phaedr.* 264 B, *Euthyph.* 2 C, *Theaet.* 184 C. In *Charm.* 158 C it is not ironical.

[1694] The humorous exaggeration of the language reflects Plato's exasperation at the sentimentalists who prefer star-gazing to mathematical science. Cf. *Tim.* 91 D on the evolution of birds from innocents who supposed that sight furnished the surest proof in such matters. Yet such is the irony of misinterpretation that this and the following pages are the chief support of the charge that Plato is hostile to science. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c.

[1695] Cf. *Theaet.* 174 A "ἄνω βλέποντα".

[1696] Cf. Aristoph. *Clouds* 172.

[1697] *συμμύω* probably refers to the eyes. But cf. Adam *ad loc.*

[1698] Cf. *Phaedr.* 264 A, and Adam in *Class. Rev.* xiii. p. 11.

[1699] Or rather, "serves me right," or, in the American language, "I've got what's coming to me." The expression is colloquial. Cf. *Epist.* iii. 319 E, Antiphon cxxiv. 45. But "δίκην ἔχει" in 520 B = "it is just."

[1700] Cf. *Tim.* 40 A "κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον", Eurip. *Hel.* 1096 "ἀστέρων ποικίλματα", Critias, *Sisyphus,* Diels ii.3 p. 321, lines 33-34 "τό τ' ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας χρόνου καλὸν ποίκιλμα τέκτονος σοφοῦ". Cf. also *Gorg.* 508 A, Lucretius v. 1205 "stellis micantibus aethera fixum," ii. 1031 ff., *Aeneid* iv. 482 "stellis

decorations on a visible surface, we must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and most exact of material things but we must recognize that they fall far short of the truth,[1701] the movements, namely, of real speed and real slowness in true number and in all true figures both in relation to one another and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain. These can be apprehended only by reason and thought, but not by sight; or do you think otherwise?" "By no means," he said.

"Then," said I, "we must use the blazonry of the heavens as patterns to aid in the study of those realities, just as one would do who chanced upon diagrams drawn with special care and elaboration by Daedalus or some other craftsman or painter.

For anyone acquainted with geometry who saw such designs would admit the beauty of the workmanship, but would think it absurd to examine them seriously in the expectation of finding in them the absolute truth with regard to equals or doubles or any other ratio." "How could it be otherwise than absurd?" he said. "Do you not think," said I, "that one who was an astronomer in very truth would feel in the same way when he turned his eyes upon the movements of the stars? He will be willing to concede that the artisan[1702] of heaven fashioned it and all that it contains in the best possible manner for such a fabric; but when it comes to the proportions of day and night, and of their relation to the month, and that of the month to the year, and of the other stars to these and one another, do you not suppose that he will regard as a very strange fellow the man who believes that these things

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ardentibus aptum," vi. 797, xi. 202, Ennius, *Ann.* 372. The word *ποικίλματα* may further suggest here the complication of the movements in the heavens

[1701] The meaning of this sentence is certain, but the expression will no more bear a matter-of-fact logical analysis than that of *Phaedo* 69 A-B, or *Rep.* 365 C, or many other subtle passages in Plato. No material object perfectly embodies the ideal and abstract mathematical relation. These mathematical ideas are designated as the true,*ἀληθινῶν*, and the real,*ὄν*. As in the *Timaeus* (38 C, 40 A-B, 36 D-E) the abstract and ideal has the primacy and by a reversal of the ordinary point of view is said to contain or convey the concrete. The visible stars are in and are carried by their invisible mathematical orbits. By this way of speaking Plato, it is true, disregards the apparent difficulty that the movement of the visible stars then ought to be mathematically perfect. But this interpretation is, I think, more probable for Plato than Adam's attempt to secure rigid consistency by taking *τὸ ὂν τάχος* etc., to represent invisible and ideal planets, and *τὰ ἐνόντα* to be the perfect mathematical realities, which are in them. *ἐνόντα* would hardly retain the metaphysical meaning of *ὄντα*. For the interpretation of 529 D cf. also my "Platonism and the History of Science," *Am. Philos. Soc, Proc.* lxvi. p. 172.

[1702] *δημιουργῷ*: an anticipation of the *Timaeus*.

go on for ever without change[1703] or the least deviation[1704]—though they possess bodies and are visible objects—and that his unremitting quest[1705] the realities of these things?" "I at least do think so," he said, "now that I hear it from you." "It is by means of problems,[1706] then," said I, "as in the study of geometry, that we will pursue astronomy too, and we will let be the things in the heavens,[1707] if we are to

[1703]Cf. Bruno *apud* Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy,* i. 125 and 128, and Galileo, *ibid.* i. 178; also Lucretius v. 302-305.

[1704]Plato was right against the view that Aristotle imposed on the world for centuries. We should not therefore say with Adam that he would have attached little significance to the perturbations of Neptune and the consequent discovery of Uranus. It is to Plato that tradition attributes the problem of accounting by the simplest hypothesis for the movement of the heavenly bodies and "saving the phenomena." The alleged contradiction between this and *Laws* 821 B ff. and *Tim.* 41 A is due to a misapprehension. That the stars in their movements do not perfectly express the exactness of mathematical conceptions is no more than modern astronomers say. In the *Laws* passage Plato protests against the idea that there is no law and order governing the movement of the planets, but that they are "wandering stars," as irregular in their movements as they seem. In the *Timaeus* he is saying that astronomy or science took its beginning from the sight and observation of the heavenly bodies and the changing seasons. In the *Republic* Plato's purpose is to predict and encourage a purely mathematical astronomy and the indicate its place in the type of education which he wishes to give his guardians. There is not the slightest contradiction or change of opinion in the three passages if interpreted rightly in their entire context.

[1705]The meaning is not appreciably affected by a slight doubt as to the construction of *ζητεῖν.* It is usually taken with *ἄτοπον* (regarded as neuter), the meaning being that the Philosophic astronomer will think it strange to look for the absolute truth in these things. This double use of *ἄτοπον* is strained and it either makes *παντὶ τρόπῳ* awkward or attributes to Plato the intention of decrying the concrete study of astronomy. I think *ζητεῖν* etc. are added by a trailing anacoluthon such as occurs elsewhere in the *Republic.* Their subject is the real astronomer who, using the stars only as "diagrams" or patterns (529 D), seeks to learn a higher exacter mathematical truth than mere observation could yield. Madvig's *ζητήσει* implies a like view of the meaning but smooths out the construction. But my interpretation of the passage as a whole does not depend on this construction. If we make *ζητεῖν* depend on *ἄτοπον* (neuter)*ἡγήσεται*, the meaning will be that he thinks it absurd to expect to get that higher truth from mere observation. At all events Plato is not here objecting to observation as a suggestion for mathematical studies but to its substitution for them, as the next sentence shows.

[1706]That is just what the mathematical astronomy of today does, and it is a *πολλαπλάσιον ἔργον* compared with the merely observational astronomy of Plato's day. Cf. the interesting remarks of Sir James Jeans, *apud* S. J. Woolf, *Drawn from Life,* p. 74: "The day is gone when the astronomer's work is carried on only at the eyepiece of a telescope. Naturally, observations must be made, but these must be recorded by men who are trained for that purpose, and I am not one of them," etc. Adam's quotation of Browning's "Abt Vogler" in connection with this passage will only confirm the opinion of those who regard Plato as a sentimental enemy of science.

[1707]Cf. also *Phileb.* 59 A, Aristot. *Met.* 997 b 35 "οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ ἀστρολογία

have a part in the true science of astronomy and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul." "You enjoin a task," he said, "that will multiply the labor[1708] of our present study of astronomy many times." "And I fancy," I said, "that our other injunctions will be of the same kind if we are of any use as lawgivers. "However, what suitable studies have you to suggest?"

"Nothing," he said, "thus off-hand." "Yet, surely," said I, "motion[1709] in general provides not one but many forms or species, according to my opinion. To enumerate them all will perhaps be the task of a wise man,[1710] but even to us two of them are apparent." "What are they?" "In addition to astronomy, its counterpart, I replied." "What is that?" "We may venture to suppose," I said, "that as the eyes are framed for astronomy so the ears are framed,[1711] for the movements of harmony; and these are in some sort kindred sciences,[1712] as the

τόνδε". This intentional Ruskinian *boutade* has given great scandal. The Platonist, we are told *ad nauseam,* deduces the world from his inner consciousness. This is of course not true (Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 45). But Plato, like some lesser writers, loves to emphasize his thought by paradox and surprise, and his postulation and of a mathematical astronomy required emphasis. Cf. my *Platonism and the History of Science,* pp. 171-174. This and similar passages cannot be used to prove that Plato was unscientific, as many hostile or thoughtless critics have attempted to do. Cf. e.g. the severe strictures of Arthur Platt, *Nine Essays,* Cambridge Univ. Press, 1921, pp. 12-16, especially p. 16: "Plato being first and foremost a metaphysician with a sort of religious system would not have us study anything but metaphysics and a kind of mystic religion." Woodbridge Riley, *From Myth to Reason,* p. 47: " . . . Plato...was largely responsible for turning back the clock of scientific progress. To explain the wonders of the world he preferred imagination to observation." Cf. also Benn, *Greek Philosophers,* vol. i. pp. 173 and 327, Herrick, *The Thinking Machine,* p. 335, f. C. s. Schiller, *Plato and he Predecessors,* p. 81: " . . . that Plato's anti-empirical bias renders him profoundly anti-scientific, and that his influence has always, openly or subtly, counteracted and thwarted the scientific impulse, or at least diverted it into unprofitable channels." Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science,* pp. 27-28: "Plato was a great philosopher but in the history of experimental science he must be counted a disaster." Such statements disregard the entire context of the Platonic passages they exploit, and take no account of Plato's purpose or of other passages which counteract his seemingly unscientific remarks. Equally unfair is the practice of comparing Plato unfavorably with Aristotle in this respect, as Grote e.g. frequently does (Cf. *Aristotle,* p. 233). Plato was an artist and Aristotle an encyclopaedist; but Plato as a whole is far nearer the point of view of recent science than Aristotle. Cf. my *Platonism and the History of Science,* p. 163; also 532 A and on 529 A, p. 180, note a and *What Plato Said,* p. 236.

[1708]Cf. *Phaedr.* 272 B "καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν γε φαίνεται ἔργον".

[1709]Plato here generalizes motion as a subject of science.

[1710]The modesty is in the tone of the *Timaeus.*

[1711]For *πέπηγεν* cf. 605 A.

[1712]The similar statement attributed to Archytas, Diels i.3 p. 331, is probably an

Pythagoreans[1713] affirm and we admit,[1714] do we not, Glaucon?" "We do," he said.

"Then," said I, since the task is, so great, shall we not inquire of them[1715] what their opinion is and whether they have anything to add? And we in all this[1716] will be on the watch for what concerns us." "What is that?" "To prevent our fosterlings from attempting to learn anything that does not conduce to the end[1717] we have in view, and does not always come out at what we said ought to be the goal of everything, as we were just now saying about astronomy.

Or do you not know that they repeat the same procedure in the case of harmonies[1718]? They transfer it to hearing and measure audible concords and sounds against one another,[1719] expending much useless labor just as the astronomers do." "Yes, by heaven," he said, "and most absurdly too. They talk of something they call minims[1720] and, laying

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imitation of this.

[1713]Pythagoras is a great name, but little is known of him. "Pythagoreans" in later usage sometimes means mystics, sometimes mathematical physicists, sometimes both. Plato makes use of both traditions but is dominated by neither. For Erich Frank's recent book, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer,* cf. my article in *Class. Phil.* vol. xxiii. (1928) pp. 347 ff. The student of Plato will do well to turn the page when he meets the name Pythagoras in a commentator.

[1714]For this turn of phrase cf. Vol. I. p. 333, 424 C, *Protag.* 316 A, *Symp.* 186 E.

[1715]For the reference to experts Cf. 400 B, 424 C. Cf. also *What Plato Said,* p. 484, on *Laches* 184 D-E.

[1716]*παρά* of course here means "throughout" and not "contrary."

[1717]I take the word *ἀτελές* etymologically (cf. pp. 66-67, note b, on 500 A), with reference to the end in view. Others take it in the ordinary Greek sense, "imperfect," "incomplete."

[1718]This passage is often taken as another example of Plato's hostility to science and the experimental method. It is of course not that, but the precise interpretation is difficult. Glaucon at first misapprehends (cf. p. 180, note a, on 529 A) and gives an amusing description of the mere empiricist in music. But Socrates says he does not mean these, but those who try to apply mathematics to the perception of sound instead of developing a (Kantian) *a priori* science of harmony to match the mathematical science of astronomy. Cf. also p. 193, note g, on 531 B, W. Whewell, *Transaction of the Cabridge Philos. Soc.* vol. ix. p. 389, and for music A. Rivaud, "Platon et la musique," *Rev. d'Histoire de la Philos.* 1929, pp. 1-30; also Stallbaum *ad loc.*, and E. Frank, *Platon u. d. sog. Pyth.,* Anhang, on the history of Greek music. He expresses surprise (p. 199) that Glaucon knows nothing of Pythagorean theories of music. Others use this to prove Socrates' ignorance of music.

[1719]This hints at the distinction developed in the *Politicus* between relative measurement of one thing against another and measurement by a standard. Cf. *Polit.* 283 E, 284 B-C, *Theat.* 186 A.

[1720]*πυκνώματα* (condensed notes). The word is technical. Cf. Adam *ad loc.* But, as *ἄττα* shows, Plato is using it loosely to distinguish a measure of sense perception from a mathematically determined interval.

their ears alongside, as if trying to catch a voice from next door,[1721] some affirm that they can hear a note between and that this is the least interval and the unit of measurement, while others insist that the strings now render identical sounds,[1722] both preferring their ears to their minds.[1723]"

"You," said I, "are speaking of the worthies[1724] who vex and torture the strings and rack them[1725] on the pegs; but—not to draw out the comparison with strokes of the plectrum and the musician's complaints of too responsive and too reluctant strings[1726]—I drop the figure,[1727] and tell you that I do not mean these people, but those others[1728] whom we just now said we would interrogate about harmony. Their method exactly corresponds to that of the astronomer; for the numbers they seek are those found in these heard concords, but they do not ascend[1729] to generalized problems and the consideration which numbers are inherently concordant and which not and why in each case." "A superhuman task," he said. "Say, rather, useful,[1730] said I,

[1721]Cf. Pater, *Renaissance,* p. 157. The phrase, *ἐκ γειτόνων*, is colloquial and, despite the protest of those who insist that it only means in the neighborhood, suggests overhearing what goes on next door—as often in the New Comedy.

[1722]Cf. Aldous Huxley, *Jesting Pilate,* p. 152: "Much is enthusiastically taught about the use of quarter tones in Indian music. I listened attentively at Lucknow in the hope of hearing some new and extraordinary kind of melody based on these celebrated fractions. But I listened in vain." Gomprez, *Greek Thinkers,* iii. pp. 334-335, n. 85, thinks that Plato "shrugs his shoulders at experiments." He refers to Plutarch, *Life of Marcellus,* xiv. 65, and *Quaest. Conv.* viii. 2. 1, 7, where Plato is represented as "having been angry with Eudoxus and Archytas because they employed instruments and apparatus for the solution of a problem, instead of relying solely on reasoning."

[1723]So Malebranche, *Entretiens sur la métaphysique,* 3, x.: "Je pense que nous vous moquez de moi. C'est la raison et non les sens qu'il faut consulter."

[1724]For *χρηστός* in this ironical sense cf. also 479 A, *Symp.* 177 B.

[1725]The language of the imagery confounds the torture of slaves giving evidence on the rack with the strings and pegs of a musical instrument. For the latter cf. Horace, *A.P.* 348, "nam neque chorda sonum reddit quem vult manus et mens Poscentique gravem persaepe remittit acutum." Stallbaum says that Plato here was imitated by Aristaenetus, *Epist.* xiv. libr. 1 "τί πράγματα παρέχετε χορδαῖς;"

[1726]This also may suggest a reluctant and a too willing witness.

[1727]Cf. on 489 A, p. 23, note d.

[1728]He distinguishes from the pure empirics just satirized those who apply their mathematics only to the data of observation. This is perhaps one of Plato's rare errors. For though there may be in some sense a Kantian *a priori* mechanics of astronomy, there can hardly be a purely *a priori* mathematics of acoustics. What numbers are consonantly harmonious must always remain a fact of direct experience. Cf. my *Platonism and the History of Science,* p. 176.

[1729]Cf. Friedländer, *Platon,* p. 108, n. 1.

for the investigation of the beautiful and the good,[1731] but if otherwise pursued, useless." "That is likely," he said. "And what is more," I said, I take it that if the investigation[1732] of all these studies goes far enough to bring out their community and kinship[1733] with one another, and to infer their affinities, then to busy ourselves with them contributes to our desired end, and the labor taken is not lost; but otherwise it is vain." "I too so surmise," said he; "but it is a huge task of which you speak, Socrates." "Are you talking about the prelude,[1734]" I said, "or what? Or do we not know that all this is but the preamble of the law itself, the prelude of the strain that we have to apprehend? For you surely do not suppose that experts in these matters are reasoners and dialecticians[1735]? " "No, by Zeus," he said, "except a very few whom I have met." "But have you ever supposed," I said, "that men who could not render and exact an account[1736] of opinions in discussion would ever know anything of the things we say must be known?" ""No" is surely the answer to that too."

"This, then, at last, Glaucon," I said, "is the very law which dialectics[1737] recites, the strain which it executes, of which, though it be-

[1730]Cf. *Tim.* 47 C-D. Plato always keeps to his point—Cf. 349 B-C, 564 A-B—or returns to it after a digression. Cf. on 572 B, p. 339, note e.

[1731]Cf. on 505 B, p. 88, note a.

[1732]*μέθοδος*, like *πραγματείαν* in D, is used almost in the later technical sense of "treatise" or "branch of study." Cf. on 528 D, p. 178, note a.

[1733]Cf. on 537 C, *Epin.* 991 E.

[1734]Plato is fond of this image. It suggests here also the preamble of a law, as the translation more explicitly indicates. Cf. 532 D, anticipated in 457 C, and *Laws* 722 D-E, 723 A-B and E, 720 D-E, ;772 E, 870 D, 854 A, 932 A and *passim.*

[1735]Cf. *Theaet.* 146 B, and perhaps *Euthyd.* 290 C. Though mathematics quicken the mind of the student, it is, apart from metaphysics, a matter of common experience that mathematicians are not necessarily good reasoners on other subjects. Jowett's wicked jest, "I have hardly ever known a mathematician who could reason," misled an eminent professor of education who infers that Plato disbelieved in "mental discipline" (*Yale Review,* July 1917). Cf. also Taylor, Note in Reply to Mr. A. W. Benn, *Mind,* xii. (1903) p. 511; Charles Fox, *Educational Psychology* pp. 187-188: " . . . a training in the mathematics may produce exactness of thought . . . provided that the training is of such a kind as to inculcate an ideal which the pupil values and strives to attain. Failing this, Glaucon's observation that he had "hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning" is likely to be repeated." On the text cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. pp. 384-385, and Adam *ad loc.*

[1736]*λόγον . . . δοῦναι* A commonplace Platonic plea for dialectics. Cf. 534 B, *Prot.* 336 C, *Polit.* 286 A, *Theaet.* 202 C, 175 C, 183 D, *Soph.* 230 A, *Phaedo* 78 C-D, 95 D, *Charm.* 165 B, Xen. *Oecon.* 11. 22. Cf. also "λόγον λαβεῖν" *Rep.* 402 A, 534 B, *Soph.* 246 C, *Theaet.* 208 D, and Thompson on *Meno* 76 D.

[1737]Cf. *Phileb.* 58 D, *Meno* 75 C-D, *Charm.* 155 A, *Cratyl.* 390 C, and on 533 B, pp. 200 f., note f.

longs to the intelligible, we may see an imitation in the progress[1738] of the faculty of vision, as we described[1739] its endeavor to look at living things themselves and the stars themselves and finally at the very sun. In like manner, when anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense[1740] to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our parable, came to the goal of the visible." "By all means," he said. "What, then, will you not call this progress of thought dialectic?"

"Surely." "And the release from bonds," I said, "and the conversion from the shadows to the images[1741] that cast them and to the light and the ascent[1742] from the subterranean cavern to the world above,[1743] and there the persisting inability[1744] to look directly at animals and plants and the light of the sun, but the ability to see the phantasms created by God[1745] in water and shadows of objects that are real and

[1738] This is not a literal rendering, but gives the meaning.

[1739] Cf. 516 A-B. Plato interprets his imagery again here and in B infra.

[1740] Cf. p. 180, note a, and p. 187, note c. Cf. also 537 D, and on 476 A ff. Cf. Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics,* p. 9: "Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols"; E. S. Robinson, *Readings in General Psych.* p. 295: "A habit of suppressing mental imagery must therefore characterize men who deal much with abstract ideas; and as the power of dealing easily and firmly with these ideas is the surest criterion of a high order if intellect . . . "; Pear, *Remembering and Forgetting,* p. 57: "He (Napoleon) is reported to have said that "there are some who, from some physical or moral peculiarity of character, form a picture (tableau) of everything. No matter what knowledge, intellect, courage, or good qualities they may have, these men are unfit to command""; A. Bain, *Mind,* 1880, p. 570: "Mr. Galton is naturally startled at finding eminent scientific men, by their own account, so very low in the visualizing power. His explanation, I have no doubt, hits the mark; the deficiency is due to the natural antagonism of pictorial aptitude and abstract thought."; Judd, *Psychology of High School Subjects,* p. 921: "It did not appear on superficial examination of the standings of students that those who can draw best are the best students from the point of view of the teacher of science."

[1741] *εἴδωλα*: cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic,* p. 238; also 516 A, *Theaet.* 150 C, *Soph.* 240 A, 241 E, 234 C, 266 B with 267 C, and *Rep.* 517 D "ἀγαλμάτων".

[1742] *ἐπάνοδος* became almost technical in Neoplatonism. Cf. also 517 A, 529 A, and p. 124, note b.

[1743] Lit. "sun," i.e. the world illumined by the sun, not by the fire in the cave.

[1744] See crit. note. The text of Iamblichus is the only reasonable one. The reading of the manuscripts is impossible. For the adverb modifying a noun cf. 558 B "οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία", *Laws* 638 B "σφόδρα γυναικῶν", with England's note, *Theaet.* 183 E "πάνυ πρεσβύτης", *Laws* 791 C "παντελῶς παίδων", 698 C "σφόδρα φιλία", *Rep.* 564 A "ἄγαν δουλείαν", with Stallbaum's note.

[1745] *θεῖα* because produced by God or nature and not by man with a mirror or a

not merely, as before, the shadows of images cast through a light which, compared with the sun, is as unreal as they—all this procedure of the arts and sciences that we have described indicates their power to lead the best part of the soul up to the contemplation of what is best among realities, as in our parable the clearest organ in the body was turned to the contemplation of what is brightest in the corporeal and visible region." "I accept this," he said, "as the truth; and yet it appears to me very hard to accept, and again, from another point of view, hard to reject.[1746] Nevertheless, since we have not to hear it at this time only, but are to repeat it often hereafter, let us assume that these things are as now has been said, and proceed to the melody itself, and go through with it as we have gone through the prelude. Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of dialectic? Into what divisions does it fall? And what are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest on the road and then come to the end of our journeying."

"You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further,[1747] though on my part there will be no lack of goodwill.[1748] And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm.[1749] But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm.[1750] Is not that so?"

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paintbrush. See crit. note and *Class. Review,* iv. p. 480. I quoted *Sophist* 266 B-D, and Adam with rare candor withdrew his emendation in his Appendix XIII. to this book. Apelt still misunderstands and emends, p.296 and note.

[1746]This sentence is fundamental for the understanding of Plato's metaphysical philosophy generally. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 30, n. 192, *What Plato Said,* p. 268 and 586 on *Parmen.* 135 C. So Tennyson says it is hard to believe in God and hard not to believe.

[1747]This is not mysticism or secret doctrine. It is, in fact, the avoidance of dogmatism. but that is not all. Plato could not be expected to insert a treatise on dialectical method here, or risk an absolute definition which would only expose him to misinterpretation. The principles and methods of such reasoning, and the ultimate metaphysical conclusions to which they may lead, cannot be expounded in a page or a chapter. They can only be suggested to the intelligent, whose own experience will help them to understand. As the *Republic* and *Laws* entire explain Plato's idea of social good, so all the arguments in the dialogues illustrate his conception of fair and unfair argument. Cf. *What Plato Said,* Index *s. v.* Dialectics, and note f below.

[1748]For the idiom *οὐδὲν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι* Cf. *Symp.* 210 A, *Meno* 77 A, *Laws* 961 C, Aesch. *Prom.* 343, Thucyd. viii. 22. 1, Eurip. *Hippol.* 285.

[1749]On Plato's freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 515 on *Meno* 86 B.

[1750]On Plato's freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 515 on *Meno* 86 B.

"Surely." "And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal[1751] this, and that only to one experienced[1752] in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?" "That, too," he said, "we may properly affirm." "This, at any rate," said I, "no one will maintain in dispute against us[1753]: that there is any other way of inquiry[1754] that attempts systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said[1755] did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it— are, as we see, dreaming[1756] about being, but the clear waking vision[1757] of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account[1758] of them. For

[1751]The mystical implications of *φήνειεν* are not to be pressed. It is followed, as usual in Plato, by a matter-of-fact statement of the essential practical conclusion (*γοῦν*)that no man can be trusted to think straight in large matters who has not been educated to reason and argue straight.

[1752]Plato anticipates the criticism that he neglects experience.

[1753]i.e. dispute our statement and maintain. The meaning is plain. It is a case of what I have called illogical idiom. Cf. *T.A.P.A.* vol. xlvii. pp. 205-234. The meaning is that of *Philebus* 58 E, 59 A. Other "science" may be more interesting or useful, but sound dialectics alone fosters the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake. Cf. *Soph.* 295 C, *Phaedr.* 265-266. Aristotle, *Topics* i. 2. 6, practically comes back to the Platonic conception of dialectics. The full meaning of dialectics in Plato would demand a treatise. It is almost the opposite of what Hegelians call by that name, which is represented in Plato by the second part of the *Parmenides.* The characteristic Platonic dialectic is the checking of the stream of thought by the necessity of securing the understanding and assent of an intelligent interlocutor at every step, and the habit of noting all relevant distinctions, divisions, and ambiguities, in ideas and terms. When the interlocutor is used merely to relieve the strain on the leader's voice or the reader's attention, as in some of the later dialogues, dialectic becomes merely a literary form.

[1754]Cicero's "via et ratione." *περὶ παντός* is virtually identical with *αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι.* It is true that the scientific specialist confines himself to his specialty. The dialectician, like his base counterfeit the sophist (*Soph.* 231 A), is prepared to argue about anything, *Soph.* 232 cf., *Euthyd.* 272 A-B.

[1755]Cf. 525 C, 527 B.

[1756]The interpreters of Plato must allow for his Emersonian habit of hitting each nail in turn as hard as he can. There is no real contradiction between praising mathematics in comparison with mere loose popular thinking, and disparaging it in comparison with dialectics. There is no evidence and no probability that Plato is here proposing a reform of mathematics in the direction of modern mathematical logic, as has been suggested. Cf. on 527 A. It is the nature of mathematics to fall short of dialectics.

[1757]Cf. *Phileb.* 20 B and on 520 C, p. 143, note g.

where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known,[1759] what possibility is there that assent[1760] in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science?"

"None," said he.

"Then," said I, "is not dialectics the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul[1761] is sunk in the barbaric slough[1762] of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences often from habit,[1763] though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. "Understanding,"[1764] I believe, was the term we employed. But I presume we shall not dispute about the name[1765] when things of such moment lie before us for consideration." "No, indeed," he said.[1766][…]

[1758]Cf. on 531 E.

[1759]The touch of humor is the expression may be illustrated by Lucian, *Hermotimus* 74, where it is used to justify Lucian's skepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt's remark on Coleridge, "Excellent talker if you allow him to start from no premises and come to no conclusion."

[1760]Or "admission." Plato thinks of even geometrical reasoning as a Socratic dialogue. Cf. the exaggeration of this idea by the Epicureans in Cic. *De fin.* i. 21 "quae et a falsis initiis profecta, vera esse non possunt: et si essent vera nihil afferunt quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus." Dialectic proceeds *διὰ συγχωρήσεων*, the admission of the interlocutor. Cf. *Laws* 957 D, *Phaedr.* 237 C-D, *Gorg.* 487 E, *Lysis* 219 C, *Prot.* 350 E, *Phileb.* 12 A, *Theaet.* 162 A, 169 D-E, 164 C, *Rep.* 340 B. But such admissions are not valid unless when challenged they are carried back to something satisfactory—*ικανόν*—(not necessarily in any given case to the idea of good). But the mathematician as such peremptorily demands the admission of his postulates and definitions. Cf. 510 B-D, 511 B.

[1761]Cf. on 519 B, p. 138, note a.

[1762]Orphism pictured the impious souls as buried in mud in the world below; cf. 363 D. Again we should not press Plato's rhetoric and imagery either as sentimental Platonists or hostile critics. See Newman, Introd. Aristot. *Pol.* p. 463, n. 3.

[1763]All writers and philosophers are compelled to "speak with the vulgar." Cf. e.g. Meyerson, *De l'explication dans les sciences,* i. p. 329: "Tout en sachant que la couleur n'est pas réellement une qualité de l'object, à se servir cependant, dans la vie de tous les jours, d'une locution qui l'affirme."

[1764]Cf. on 511 D, pp. 116-117, note c.

[1765]This unwillingness to dispute about names when they do not concern the argument is characteristic of Plato. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 516 on *Meno* 78 B-C for numerous instances. Stallbaum refers to Max. Tyr. *Diss.* xxvii. p. 40 "ἐγὼ γάρ τοι τά τε ἄλλα, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐλευθερίᾳ πείθομαι Πλάτωνι".

"Are you satisfied, then," said I, "as before,[1767] to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief,[1768] and the fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellection, opinion dealing with generation and intellection with essence, and this relation being expressed in the proportion[1769]: as essence is to generation, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to image-thinking or surmise? But the relation between their objective correlates[1770] and the division into two parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the intelligible, let us dismiss,[1771] Glaucon, lest it involve us in discussion many times as long as the preceding."

"Well," he said, "I agree with you about the rest of it, so far as I am able to follow." "And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to exact an account[1772] of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that the one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence[1773] about the matter?" "How could I say that he does?" he replied. "And is not this true of the good likewise[1774]—that the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good, and who cannot, as it were in battle, running the gauntlet[1775]

[1766]The next sentence is hopelessly corrupt and is often considered an interpolation. The translation omits it. See Adam, Appendix XVI. to Bk. VII., Bywater, *Journal of Phil.* (Eng.) v. pp. 122-124.

[1767]Supra 511 D-E.

[1768]Always avoid "faith" in translating Plato.

[1769]Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b.

[1770]That is the meaning, though some critics will object to the phrase. Lit. "the things over which these (mental states) are set, or to which they apply."

[1771]There are two probable reasons for this: (1) The objective classification is nothing to Plato's present purpose; (2) The second member of the proportion is lacking in the objective correlates. Numbers are distinguished from ideas not in themselves but only by the difference of method in dialectics and in mathematics. Cf. on 525 D, 526 A, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* pp. 83-84, and *Class. Phil.* xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218. The explicit qualifications of my arguments there have been neglected and the arguments misquoted but not answered. They can be answered only by assuming the point at issue and affirming that Plato did assign an intermediate place to mathematical conceptions, for which there is no evidence in Plato's own writings.

[1772]Cf. on 531 E, p. 195, note f.

[1773]Cf. on 511 D, p. 117, note a.

[1774]This would be superfluous on the interpretation that the *ἱκανόν* must always be the idea of good. What follows distinguishes the dialectician from the the eristic sophist. For the short cut, *καὶ . . . ὡσαύτως*, cf. 523 E, 580 D, 585 D, 346 A, etc.

[1775]It imports little whether the objections are in his own mind or made by others.

of all tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping[1776] in his reasoning—the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends any adumbration[1777] of it, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge; and dreaming and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep for ever?[1778]" "Yes, by Zeus," said he, "all this I will stoutly affirm." "But, surely," said I, "if you should ever nurture in fact your children[1779] whom you are now nurturing and educating in word,[1780] you would not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state, and determine the greatest matters, being themselves as irrational[1781] as the lines so called in geometry." "Why, no," he said. "Then you will provide by law that they shall give special heed to the discipline that will enable them to ask and answer[1782] questions in the most scientific manner?" "I will so legislate," he said, "in conjunction with you."

"Do you agree, then," said I, "that we have set dialectics above all other studies to be as it were the coping-stone[1783]—and that no other higher kind of study could rightly be placed above it, but that our discussion of studies is now complete[1784]" "I do," he said. "The distribution, then,

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Thought is a discussion of the soul with itself (Cf. *Theaet.* 189 E, *Phileb.* 38 E, *Soph.* 263 E), and when the interlocutor refuses to proceed Socrates sometimes continues the argument himself by supplying both question and answer, e.g. *Gorg.* 506 C ff. Cf. further *Phaedrus* 278 C, *Parman.* 136 D-E, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 17.

[1776]Cf. *Theaet.* 160 D, *Phileb.* 45 A. The practical outcome=*Laws* 966 A-B, *Phaedr.* 278 C, *Soph.* 259 B-C. Cf. Mill, *Diss. and Disc.* iv. p. 283: "There is no knowledge and no assurance of right belief but with him who can both confute the opposite opinion and successfully defend his own against confutation."

[1777]For *εἰδώλου* cf. on 532 B, p. 197, not e. This may be one of the sources of *Epist.* vii. 342 B.

[1778]For Platonic intellectualism the life of the ordinary man is something between sleep and waking. Cf. *Apol.* 31 A. Note the touch of humor in *τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν.* Cf. Bridges, *Psychology,* p. 382: "There is really no clear-cut distinction between what is usually called sleeping and waking. In sleep we are less awake than in the waking hours, and in waking life we are less asleep than in sleep."

[1779]Plato likes to affirm his ideal only of the philosophic rulers.

[1780]Cf. 376 D, 369 C, 472 E, *Critias* 106 A.

[1781]A slight touch of humor. Cf. the schoolgirl who said, "These equations are inconsiderate and will not be solved."

[1782]A frequent periphrasis for dialectics. Cf. "τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι" *Gorg.* 461 E, *Charm.* 166 D, *Prot.* 338 D, *Alc. I.* 106 B.

[1783]For *ὥσπερ θριγκός* cf. Eur. *Herc. Fur.* 1280, Aesch. *Ag.* 1283: and *Phileb.* 38 C-D ff.

[1784]Cf. 541 B.

remains," said I, "to whom we are to assign these studies and in what way."

"Clearly," he said. "Do you remember, then, the kind of man we chose in our former selection[1785] of rulers?" "Of course," he said. "In most respects, then," said I, "you must suppose that we have to choose those same natures. The most stable, the most brave and enterprising[1786] are to be preferred, and, so far as practicable, the most comely.[1787] But in addition we must now require that they not only be virile and vigorous[1788] in temper, but that they possess also the gifts of nature suitable to this type of education." "What qualities are you distinguishing?" "They must have, my friend, to begin with, a certain keenness for study, and must not learn with difficulty. For souls are much more likely to flinch and faint[1789] in severe studies than in gymnastics, because the toil touches them more nearly, being peculiar to them and not shared with the body."

"True," he said. "And we must demand a good memory and doggedness and industry[1790] in every sense of the word. Otherwise how do you suppose anyone will consent both to undergo all the toils of the body and to complete so great a course of study and discipline?" "No one could," he said, "unless most happily endowed." "Our present mistake," said I, "and the disesteem that has in consequence fallen upon philosophy are, as I said before,[1791] caused by the unfitness of her associates and wooers. They should not have been bastards[1792] but true scions." "What do you mean?" he said. "In the first place," I said, "the aspirant to philosophy must not limp[1793] in his industry, in the one half of him loving, in the other shunning, toil. This happens when anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all the labors of the body, yet is not fond of learning or of listening[1794] or inquiring, but in all such matters hates work. And he too is lame whose industry is one-sided in the reverse way." "Most true," he said. "Likewise in

[1785]Cf. 412 D-E, 485-487, 503 A, C-E.

[1786]Intellectually as well as physically. Cf. 357 A, *Prot.* 350 B f.

[1787]Cf. *Symp.* 209 B-C, *Phaedr.* 252 E and Vol. I. p. 261 on 402 D. Ascham, *The Schoolmaster,* Bk. I. also approves of this qualification.

[1788]For *βλοσυρούς* Cf. *Theaet.* 149 A.

[1789]Cf. 504 A, 364 E, *Gorg.* 480 C, *Protag.* 326 C, *Euthyphro* 15 C.

[1790]The qualities of the ideal student again. Cf. on 487 A.

[1791]Cf. 495 C ff., pp. 49-51.

[1792]Montaigne, i. 24 (vol. i. p. 73), "les âmes boiteuses, les bastardes et vulgaires, sont indignes de Ia philosophie."

[1793]Cf. *Laws* 634 A, *Tim.* 44 C.

[1794]Cf. 548 E, *Lysis* 206 C, *Euthyd.* 274 C, 304 C, and Vol. I. p. 515 on 475 D.

respect of truth," I said, "we shall regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood[1795] and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively as a pig.[1796]"

"By all means," he said. "And with reference to sobriety," said I, "and bravery and loftiness of soul[1797] and all the parts of virtue,[1798] we must especially be on our guard to distinguish the base-born from the true-born. For when the knowledge necessary to make such discriminations is lacking in individual or state, they unawares employ at random[1799] for any of these purposes the crippled and base-born natures, as their friends or rulers." "It is so indeed," he said. "But we," I said, "must be on our guard in all such cases, since, if we bring men sound of limb and mind to so great a study and so severe a training, justice herself will have no fault to find[1800] with us, and we shall preserve the state and our polity. But, if we introduce into it the other sort, the outcome will be just the opposite, and we shall pour a still greater flood[1801] of ridicule upon philosophy." "That would indeed be shameful," he said. "Most certainly," said I: "but here again I am making myself a little ridiculous." "In what way?" "I forgot," said I, "that we were jesting,[1802] and I spoke with too great intensity.[1803] For, while speaking, I turned my eyes upon philosophy,[1804] and when I saw how she is

[1795]Cf. 382 A-B-C.

[1796]Cf. *Laws* 819 D, *Rep.* 372 D, *Politicus* 266 C, and my note in *Class. Phil.* xii. (1917) pp. 308-310. Cf. too the proverbial *ὕς γνοίη*, *Laches* 196 D and *Rivals* 134 A; and Apelt's emendation of *Cratyl.* 393 C, *Progr. Jena,* 1905, p. 19.

[1797]Cf. 487 A and vol. I. p. 261, note c on 402 C. The cardinal virtues are not rigidly fixed in Plato. Cf. on 427 E, vol. I. p. 346.

[1798]Plato is using ordinary language and not troubling himself with the problem of *Protag.* 329 D (*What Plato Said,* p. 497) and *Laws* 633 A (*What Plato Said,* p. 624). Cf. also on 533 D.

[1799]*πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι* lit. "for whatsoever they happen to of these (services)." Cf. *Symp.* 181 B, *Prot.* 353 A, *Crito* 44 D and 45 D, *Gorg.* 522 C, *Laws* 656 C, *Rep.* 332 B, 561 D, Dem. iv. 46, Isoc. *Panath.* 25, 74, 239, Aristot. *Mat.* 1013 a 6.

[1800]Cf. 487 A. For *δίκη* cf. Hirzel, *Dike, Themis und Verwandtes,* p.116.

[1801]*καταντλήσομεν*: cf. 344 d.

[1802]Jest and earnest are never far apart in Plato. Fabling about justice is an old man's game, *Laws* 685 A, 769 A. Life itself is best treated as play, *Laws* 803 C. Science in *Tim.* 59 D is *παιδιά*, like literature in the *Phaedrus* 276 D-E, *ibid.* 278 B. Cf. Friedländer, *Platon,* i. pp. 38 and 160, and *What Plato Said,* pp. 553 and 601.

[1803]For similar self-checks Cf. *Laws* 804 B, 832 B, 907 B-C, *Phaedr.* 260 D, 279 B. For *ἐντεινάμενος* cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 969.

[1804]Cf. Isoc. *Busiris* 49. Whatever the difficulties of the chronology it is hard to

undeservedly reviled, I was revolted, and, as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are in fault." "No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for me[1805] as a hearer." "But too much so for me as a speaker," I said. "But this we must not forget, that in our former selection we chose old men, but in this one that will not do. For we must not take Solon's[1806] word for it that growing old a man is able to learn many things. He is less able to do that than to run a race. To the young[1807] belong all heavy and frequent labors."

"Necessarily," he said. "Now, all this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies that are indispensable preparation for dialectics must be presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory instruction.[1808]" "Why so?"

"Because," said I, "a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly; for while bodily labors[1809] performed under constraint do not harm the body, nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind."

"True," he said.

"Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play.[1810] That will also better enable you to discern the natural capacities of each." "There is reason in that," he said. "And do you not remember," I said, "that we also declared[1811] that we must conduct the children to war on horseback to be spectators, and wherever it may be safe, bring them to the front and give them a taste of blood as we do with whelps?" "I do remember." "And those who as time goes on show the most facility in all these toils and studies and alarms are to be selected and enrolled on a list.[1812]" "At what age?" he said. "When they are released from their prescribed gymnastics. For

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believe that this is not one of Isocrates' many endeavors to imitate Platonic effects.

[1805] Cf. *Soph.* 226 C, Sophocles, *Ajax* 397.

[1806] *γηράσκω δ' ἀεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος*, "I grow old ever learning many things." Cf. *Laches* 188 A-B; Otto, p. 317.

[1807] Cf. *Theaet.* 146 B. This has been misquoted to the effect that Plato said the young are the best philosophers.

[1808] This and *παίζοντας* below (537 A) anticipate much modern Kindergarten rhetoric.

[1809] Newman, Introd. Aristot. *Pol.* 358, says Aristotle rejects this distinction, *Pol.* 1338 b 40 "μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ᾖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν".

[1810] Cf. 424 E-425 A, *Laws* 819 B-C, 643 B-D, 797 A-B, *Polit.* 308 D. Cf. the naive statement in Colvin And Bagley, *Human Behavior,* p. 41: "The discovery [*sic!*] by Karl Groos that play was actually a preparation for the business of later life was almost revolutionary from the standpoint of educational theory and practice."

[1811] Cf. 467, vol. I. pp. 485-487.

[1812] *ἐγκριτέον* cf. 413 D, 377 C, 486 D, *Laws* 802 B, 820 D, 936 A, 952 A.

that period, whether it be two or three years, incapacitates them for other occupations.[1813] For great fatigue and much sleep are the foes of study, and moreover one of our tests of them, and not the least, will be their behavior in their physical exercises.[1814]" "Surely it is," he said. "After this period," I said, "those who are given preference from the twenty-year class will receive greater honors than the others, and they will be required to gather the studies which they disconnectedly pursued as children in their former education into a comprehensive survey[1815] of their affinities with one another and with the nature of things." "That, at any rate, he said, is the only instruction that abides with those who receive it." "And it is also," said I, "the chief test of the dialectical nature and its opposite. For he who can view things in their connection is a dialectician; he who cannot, is not." "I concur," he said. "With these qualities in mind," I said, "it will be your task to make a selection of those who manifest them best from the group who are steadfast in their studies and in war and in all lawful requirements, and when they have passed the thirtieth year to promote them, by a second selection from those preferred in the first,[1816] to still greater honors, and to prove and test them by the power of dialectic[1817] to see which of them is able to disregard the eyes and other senses[1818] and go on to being itself in company with truth. And at this point, my friend,

[1813]Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1339 a 7 f. "ἅμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ", etc.; Plut. *De Ed. Puer.* 11, *De Tuenda San.* C. 25, quoted by Newman, Aristot. *Pol.* I. p. 359, are irrelevant to this passage, but could be referred to the balancing of music and gymnastics in 410-412.

[1814]Cf. *Laws* 829 B-C.

[1815]*σύνοψιν*: cf. 531 D. This thought is endlessly repeated by modern writers on education. Cf. Mill, *Diss. and Disc.* iv. 336; Bagley, *The Educative Process,* p. 180: "The theory of concentration proposed by Ziller . . . seeks to organize all the subject matter of instruction into a unifies system, the various units of which shall be consciously related to one another in the minds of the pupils"; Haldane, *The Philosophy of Humanism,* p. 94: "There was a conference attended by representatives of various German Universities . . . which took place at Hanstein, not far from Göttingen in May 1921. . . . The purpose of the movement is nominally the establishment of a Humanistic Faculty. But in this connection "faculty" does not mean a separate faculty of humanistic studies. . . . The real object is to bring these subjects into organic relation to one another." Cf. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity,* vol. i. p. 4 "So true is it that, as Plato puts it, the metaphysician is a "synoptical" man." Cf. also Aristot. *Soph. El.* 167 a 38 "διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον". Stenzel, *Dialektik,* misuses the passage to support the view that Plato's dialectic still looks for unity and not for divisions and distinctions, as in the *Sophist.* Cf. also *ibid.* p.72.

[1816]For the technical meaning of the word *προκρίτων* Cf. *Laws* 753 B-D.

[1817]For this periphrasis cf. *Phaedr.* 246 D, *Tim.* 85 E. Cf. also on 509 A.

[1818]The reader of Plato ought not to misunderstand this now. Cf. on 532 A, pp. 196

the greatest care[1819] is requisite." "How so?" he said. "Do you not note," said I, "how great is the harm caused by our present treatment of dialectics?" "What is that?" he said. "Its practitioners are infected with lawlessness.[1820]" "They are indeed." "Do you suppose," I said, "that there is anything surprising in this state of mind, and do you not think it pardonable[1821]?" "In what way, pray?" he said.

"Their case," said I, "resembles that of a supposititious son reared in abundant wealth and a great and numerous family amid many flatterers, who on arriving at manhood should become aware that he is not the child of those who call themselves his parents, and should I not be able to find his true father and mother. Can you divine what would be his feelings towards the flatterers and his supposed parents in the time when he did not know the truth about his adoption, and, again, when he knew it? Or would you like to hear my surmise?" "I would." "Well, then, my surmise is," I said, "that he would be more likely to honor his reputed father and mother and other kin than the flatterers, and that there would be less likelihood of his allowing them to lack for anything, and that he would be less inclined to do or say to them anything unlawful, and less liable to disobey them in great matters than to disobey the flatterers—during the time when he did not know the truth." "It is probable," he said. "But when he found out the truth, I surmise that he would grow more remiss in honor and devotion to them and pay more regard to the flatterers, whom he would heed more than before[1822] and would henceforth live by their rule, associating with them

f., note d, and 530 p. 187, note c.

[1819]Plato returns to an idea suggested in 498 A, and warns against the mental confusion and moral unsettlement that result from premature criticism of life by undisciplined minds. In the terminology of modern education, he would not encourage students to discuss the validity of the Ten commandments and the Constitution of the United States before they could spell, construe, cipher, and had learned to distinguish an undistributed middle term from a *petitio principii.* Cf. *Phaedo* 89 D-E. We need not suppose with Grote and others that this involves any "reaction" or violent change of the opinion he held when he wrote the minor dialogues that portray such discussions. In fact, the still later *Sophist,* 230 B-C-D, is more friendly to youthful dialectics. Whatever the effect of the practice of Socrates or the Sophists, Plato himself anticipates Grote's criticism in the *Republic* by representing Socrates as discoursing with ingenuous youth in a more simple and edifying style. Cf. *Lysis* 207 D ff., *Euthydem.* 278 E-282 C, 288 D-290 D. Yet again the *Charmides* might be thought an exception. Cf. also Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen,* ii. 1, p. 912, who seems to consider the *Sophist* earlier than the *Republic.*

[1820]i.e. they call all restrictions on impulses and instincts tyrannical conventions. Cf. *Gorg.* 483-484, Aristoph. *Clouds, passim*, and on nature and law cf. Vol. I. p. 116, note a, on 359 C.

[1821]Cf. on 494 A, p. 43, note c.

openly, while for that former father and his adoptive kin he would not care at all, unless he was naturally of a very good disposition." "All that you say," he replied, "would be likely to happen.[1823] But what is the pertinency of this comparison to the novices of dialectic[1824]?" "It is this. We have, I take it, certain convictions[1825] from childhood about the just and the honorable, in which, in obedience and honor to them, we have been bred as children under their parents." "Yes, we have." "And are there not other practices going counter to these, that have pleasures attached to them and that flatter and solicit our souls, but do not win over men of any decency; but they continue to hold in honor the teachings of their fathers and obey them?" "It is so" "Well, then," said I, "when a man of this kind is met by the question,[1826]

"What is the honorable?" and on his giving the answer which he learned from the lawgiver, the argument confutes him, and by many and various refutations upsets[1827] his faith and makes him believe that this thing is no more honorable than it is base,[1828] and when he has had the same experience about the just and the good and everything that he chiefly held in esteem, how do you suppose that he will conduct himself thereafter in the matter of respect and obedience to this traditional morality?" "It is inevitable," he said, "that he will not continue to honor and obey as before."

"And then," said I, "when he ceases to honor these principles and to think that they are binding on him,[1829] and cannot discover the true principles, will he be likely to adopt any other way of life than that which flatters his desires[1830]?" "He will not," he said. "He will, then, seem to have become a rebel to law and convention instead of the

[1822] *διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον*: Cf. *Phaedo* 85 B.

[1823] *οἷά περ ἂν γένοιτο* is the phrase Aristotle uses to distinguish the truth of poetry from the facts of history.

[1824] That is the meaning. Lit. "those who lay hold on discourse."

[1825] Plato's warning apples to our day no less than to his own. Like the proponents of ethical nihilism in Plato's Athens, much of our present-day literature and teaching questions all standards of morality and aesthetics, and confuses justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness. Cf. also on 537 D, p. 220, note a.

[1826] The question is here personified, as the *λόγος* so often is, e.g. 503 A. Cf. *What Plato Said* on *Protag.* 361 A-B.

[1827] A possible allusion to the *καταβάλλοντες λόγοι* of the sophist. Cf. *Euthydem.* 277 D, 288 A, *Phaedo* 88 C, *Phileb.* 15 E and *What Plato Said,* p. 518, on *Crito* 272 B.

[1828] This is the oral counterpart of the intellectual skepticism or *μισολογία* of *Phaedo* 90 C-D. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 531, on *Phaedo* 89.

[1829] For *οἰκεῖα* Cf. 433 E, 433 D, and *Class. Phil.* xxiv. (1929) pp. 409-410.

[1830] Cf. *Laws* 633 E and 442 A-B. Others render it, "than the life of the flatterers (parasites)." Why not both?

conformer that he was."

"Necessarily." "And is not this experience of those who take up dialectics in this fashion to be expected and, as I just now said, deserving of much leniency?" "Yes, and of pity too," he said. "Then that we may not have to pity thus your thirty-year-old disciples, must you not take every precaution when you introduce them to the study of dialectics?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "And is it not one chief safeguard not to suffer them to taste of it while young?[1831] For I fancy you have not failed to observe that lads, when they first get a taste of disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always employing it contentiously, and, imitating confuters, they themselves confute others.[1832] They delight like spies in pulling about and tearing with words all who approach them." "Exceedingly so," he said. "And when they have themselves confuted many and been confuted by many, they quickly fall into a violent distrust of all that they formerly held true; and the outcome is that they themselves and the whole business of philosophy are discredited with other men." "Most true," he said. "But an older man will not share this craze,[1833]" said I, "but rather choose to imitate the one who consents to examine truth dialectically than the one who makes a jest[1834] and a sport of mere contradiction, and so he will himself be more reasonable and moderate, and bring credit rather than discredit upon his pursuit."

"Right," he said. "And were not all our preceding statements made with a view to this precaution our requirement that those permitted

[1831]See on 498 A-B. Cf. Richard of Bury, *Philobiblon*(Morley, *A Miscellany,* pp. 49-50): "But the contemporaries of our age negligently apply a few years of ardent youth, burning by turns with the fire of vice; and when they have attained the acumen of discerning a doubtful truth, they immediately become involved in extraneous business, retire, and say farewell to the schools of philosophy; they sip the frothy must of juvenile wit over the difficulties of philosophy, and pour out the purified old wine with economical care."

[1832]Cf. *Apol.* 23 C, *Phileb.* 15 E, Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 46, Isoc. xii. 26 and x. 6; also Friedländer, *Platon,* ii. p. 568.

[1833]But in another mood or from another angle this is the bacchic madness of philosophy which all the company in the *Symposium* have shared, 218 A-B. Cf. also *Phaedr.* 245 B-C, 249 C-E, *Sophist* 216 D, *Phileb.* 15 D-E, and *What Plato Said,* p. 493 on *Protag.* 317 D-E.

[1834]Cf. *Gorg.* 500 B-C. Yet the prevailing seriousness of Plato's own thought does not exclude touches of humor and irony, and he vainly warns the modern reader to distinguish between jest and earnest in the drama of disputation in his dialogues. Many misinterpretations of Plato's thought are due to the failure to heed this warning. Cf. e.g . *Gorgias* 474 A (*What Plato Said,* p. 504), which Robin, *L'Année Philos.* xxi. p. 29, and others miss, *Rep.* 376 B, *Symp.* 196 C, *Protag.* 339 f., *Theaet.* 157 A-B, 160 B,165 B,and *passim.* Cf. also on 536 C, p. 214, note b.

to take part in such discussions must have orderly and stable natures, instead of the present practice[1835] of admitting to it any chance and unsuitable applicant?" "By all means," he said. "Is it enough, then, to devote to the continuous and strenuous study of dialectics undisturbed by anything else, as in the corresponding discipline in bodily exercises, twice as many years as were allotted to that?" "Do you mean six or four?" he said.

"Well," I said, "set it down as five.[1836] For after that you will have to send them down into the cave[1837] again, and compel them to hold commands in war and the other offices suitable to youth, so that they may not fall short of the other type in experience[1838] either. And in these offices, too, they are to be tested to see whether they will remain steadfast under diverse solicitations or whether they will flinch and swerve.[1839]" "How much time do you allow for that?" he said. "Fifteen years," said I, "and at the age of fifty[1840] those who have survived the tests and approved themselves altogether the best in every task and form of knowledge must be brought at last to the goal. We shall require them to turn upwards the vision of their souls[1841] and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld the good itself they shall use it as a pattern[1842] for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves throughout the remainder of their lives, each in his turn,[1843] devoting the greater part of their time to the study of philosophy, but when the turn comes for each, toiling in the service

[1835]For the idiom *μὴ ὡς νῦν* etc. Cf. on 410 B "οὐχ ὥσπερ"; also 610 D, *Gorg.* 522 A, *Symp.* 179 E, 189 C, *Epist.* vii. 333 A, Aristoph. *Knights* 784, Eurip. *Bacchae* 929, *Il.* xix. 493, *Od.* xxiv. 199, xxi. 427, Dem. iv. 34, Aristot. *De an.* 414 A 22.

[1836]It is very naive of modern commentators to cavil at the precise time allotted to dialectic, and still more so to infer that there was not much to say about the ideas. Dialectic was not exclusively or mainly concerned with the metaphysics of the ideas. It was the development of the reasoning powers by rational discussion.

[1837]Cf. 519 C ff., pp. 139-145.

[1838]Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 2. 13 seems to copy this. Cf. on 484 D. Critics of Plato frequently overlook the fact that he insisted on practical experience in the training of his rulers. Newman, Aristot. *Pol.* i. p. 5 points out that this experience takes the place of special training in political science.

[1839]Cf. "ὑποκινήσαντ'", Aristoph. *Frogs* 643.

[1840]An eminent scholar quaintly infers that Plato could not have written this page before he himself was fifty years old.

[1841]Plato having made his practical meaning quite clear feels that he can safely permit himself the short cut of rhetoric and symbolism in summing it up. He reckoned without Neoplatonists ancient and modern. Cf. also on 519 B, p. 138, note a.

[1842]Cf. 500 D-E. For *παράδειγμα* cf. 592 B and *What Plato Said,* p. 458, on *Euthyphro* 6 E, and p. 599, on *Polit.* 277 D.

[1843]Cf. 520 D.

of the state and holding office for the city's sake, regarding the task not as a fine thing but a necessity[1844]; and so, when each generation has educated others[1845] like themselves to take their place as guardians of the state, they shall depart to the Islands of the Blest[1846] and there dwell. And the state shall establish public memorials[1847] and sacrifices for them as to divinities if the Pythian oracle approves[1848] or, if not, as to divine and godlike men.[1849]" "A most beautiful finish, Socrates, you have put upon your rulers, as if you were a statuary.[1850]" "And on the women[1851] too, Glaucon," said I; "for you must not suppose that my words apply to the men more than to all women who arise among them endowed with the requisite qualities." "That is right," he said, "if they are to share equally in all things with the men as we laid it down." "Well, then," said I, "do you admit that our notion of the state and its polity is not altogether a daydream,[1852] but that though it is difficult,[1853] it is in a way possible[1854] and in no other way than that described—when genuine philosophers,[1855] many or one, becoming masters of the state scorn[1856] the present honors, regarding them as illiberal and worthless, but prize the right[1857] and the honors that come from that above all things, and regarding justice as the chief and the one indispensable thing, in the service and maintenance of that reorganize and administer their city?" "In what way?" he said.

"All inhabitants above the age of ten," I said, "they will send out into the fields, and they will take over the children,[1858] remove them from

[1844]Cf. 347 C-D, 520 E.

[1845]Plato's guardians, unlike Athenian statesmen, could train their successors. Cf. *Protag.* 319 E-320 B, *Meno* 99 B. Also "ἄλλους ποιεῖν" *Meno* 100 A, *Gorg.* 449 B, 455 C, *Euthyph.* 3 C, *Phaedr.* 266 C, 268 B, *Symp.* 196 E, *Protag.* 348 E, Isoc. *Demon.* 3, *Panath.* 28, *Soph.* 13, *Antid.* 204, Xen. *Oecon.* 15. 10, and *παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους*, generally used of the sophists, *Gorg.* 519 E, *Protag.* 317 B, *Euthyd.* 306 E, *Laches* 186 D, *Rep.* 600 C.

[1846]Cf. p. 139, note d. Plato checks himself in mid-flight and wistfully smiles at his own idealism. Cf. on 536 B-C, also 540 C and 509 C. Frutiger, *Mythes de Platon,* p. 170.

[1847]Cf. *Symp.* 209 E.

[1848]For this caution cf. 461 E and Vol. I. p. 344, note c, on 427 C.

[1849]Plato plays on the words *δαίμων* and *εὐδαίμων*. Cf. also *Crat.* 398 b-C.

[1850]Cf. 361 D.

[1851]Lit. "female rulers."

[1852]Cf. on 450 D and 499 C.

[1853]Cf. 499 D.

[1854]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 564 on *Rep.* 472 B-E, and p. 65, not h, on 499 D.

[1855]Cf. 463 C-D, 499 B-C.

[1856]Cf. 521 B, 516 C-D.

[1857]*τὸ ὀρθόν*: Cf. *Theaet.* 161 C, *Meno* 99 A.

the manners and habits of their parents, and bring them up in their own customs and laws which will be such as we have described. This is the speediest and easiest way in which such a city and constitution as we have portrayed could be established and prosper and bring most benefit to the people among whom it arises." "Much the easiest," he said, "and I think you have well explained the manner of its realization if it should ever be realized."

"Then," said I, "have we not now said enough[1859] about this state and the corresponding type of man—for it is evident what our conception of him will be?" "It is evident," he said, "and, to answer your question, I think we have finished."

[1858]This is another of the passages in which Plato seems to lend support to revolutionaries. Cf. p. 71, note g. Cf. *Laws* 752 C, where it is said that the children would accept the new laws if the parents would not. Cf. 415 D, and also *What Plato Said,* p. 625, on *Laws* 644 A and p. 638, on 813 D. There is some confusion in this passage between the inauguration and the normal conduct of the ideal state, and Wilamowitz, *Platon,* i. p. 439 calls the idea "ein hingeworfener Einfall." But Plato always held that the reformer must have or make a clean slate. Cf. 501 A, *Laws* 735 E. And he constantly emphasizes the supreme importance of education;*Rep.* 377 A-B, 423 E, 416 C, *Laws* 641 B, 644 A-B, 752 C, 765 E-766 A, 788 C, 804 D. For *παραλαβόντες* Cf. *Phaedo* 82 E "παραλαβοῦσα".

[1859]Cf. 535 A.

Book 8

"Very good. We are agreed then, Glaucon, that the state which is to achieve the height of good government must have community[1860] of wives and children and all education, and also that the pursuits of men and women must be the same in peace and war, and that the rulers or kings[1861] over them[1862] are to be those who have approved themselves the best in both war and philosophy."

"We are agreed," he said.

"And we further granted this, that when the rulers are established in office they shall conduct these soldiers and settle them in habitations[1863] such as we described, that have nothing private for anybody but are common for all, and in addition to such habitations we agreed, if you remember, what should be the nature of their possessions.[1864]"

"Why, yes, I remember," he said,

"that we thought it right that none of them should have anything that ordinary men[1865] now possess, but that, being as it were athletes[1866] of war and guardians, they should receive from the others as pay[1867] for their guardianship each year their yearly sustenance, and

[1860]Strictly speaking, this applies only to the guardians, but Cf. *Laws* 739 C ff., Aristotle, *Pol.* 1261 a 6 and 1262 a 41, like many subsequent commentators, misses the point.

[1861]Cf. 445 D and *What Plato Said,* p. 539, on *Menex.* 238 C-D.

[1862]So Jowett. Adam *ad loc.* insists that the genitive is partitive, "those of their number are to be kings."

[1863]Cf. 415 E.

[1864]Cf. 416 C.

[1865]Cf. 429 A.

[1866]Cf. on 403 E and 521 D. Polyb. i. 6. 6 "ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀληθινοὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων"

[1867]Cf. 416 E.

devote their entire attention to the care of themselves and the state."

"That is right," I said.

"But now that we have finished this topic let us recall the point at which we entered on the digression[1868] that has brought us here, so that we may proceed on our way again by the same path."

"That is easy," he said;

"for at that time, almost exactly as now, on the supposition that you had finished the description of the city, you were going on to say[1869] that you assumed such a city as you then described and the corresponding type of man to be good, and that too though, as it appears, you had a still finer city and type of man to tell of; "

" but at any rate you were saying that the others are aberrations,[1870] if this city is right. But regarding the other constitutions, my recollection is that you said there were four species[1871] worth speaking of[1872] and observing their defects[1873] and the corresponding types of men, in order that when we had seen them all and come to an agreement about the best and the worst man, we might determine whether the best is the happiest and the worst most wretched or whether it is otherwise.[1874] And when I was asking what were the four constitutions you had in mind, Polemarchus and Adeimantus thereupon broke in, and that was how you took up the discussion again and brought to this point.[1875]"

"Your memory is most exact," I said.

"A second time then, as in a wrestling-match, offer me the same hold,[1876] and when I repeat my question try to tell me what you were

[1868]Cf. Vol. I. p. 424, note c, and *What Plato Said,* p. 640, on *Laws* 857 C.

[1869]Cf. 449 A-B.

[1870]Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1285 b 1-2, 1289 b 9.

[1871]Aristot. *Pol.* 1291-1292 censures the limitation to four. But cf. *ibid*, Introd. p. xlv. Cf. *Laws* 693 D, where only two mother-forms of government are mentioned, monarchy and democracy, with Aristot. *Pol.* 1301 b 40 "δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία". Cf. also *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 31 ff. The *Politicus* mentions seven (291 f., 301 f.). Isoc. *Panath.* 132-134 names three kinds—oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy—adding that others may say much more about them. See note *ad loc.* in Loeb Isocrates and *Class. Phil.* vol. vii. p. 91. Cf. Hobbes, *Leviathan* 19 "Yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that have been and are in the world will not perhaps easily reduce them to three . . . as, for example, elective kingdoms," etc.

[1872]For *ὧν καὶ πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἴη* Cf. *Laws* 908 B "ἃ καὶ διακρίσεως ἄξια", *Laches* 192 A "οὗ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον λέγειν", *Tim.* 82 "ἓν γένος ἐνὸν ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας". Cf. also *Euthydem.* 279 C, Aristot. *Pol.* 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, *De part. an.* 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, Isoc. vi. 56. and Vol. I. p. 420, note f, on 445 C.

[1873]For the relative followed by a demonstrative cf. also 357 B.

[1874]Plato's main point again. Cf. 545 A, 484 A-B and Vol. I. p.xii, note d.

[1875]Cf. on 572 b, p. 339, note e.

then about to say."

"I will if I can," said I.

"And indeed," said he,

"I am eager myself to hear what four forms of government you meant."

"There will be no difficulty about that," said I.

"For those I mean are precisely those that have names[1877] in common usage: that which the many praised,[1878] your[1879] Cretan and Spartan constitution; and the second in place and in honor, that which is called oligarchy, a constitution teeming with many ills, and its sequent counterpart and opponent, democracy ; and then the noble[1880] tyranny surpassing them all, the fourth and final malady[1881] of a state. Can you mention any other type[1882] of government, I mean any other that constitutes a distinct species[1883]? For, no doubt, there are hereditary principalities[1884] and purchased[1885] kingships, and similar intermediate constitutions which one could find in even greater numbers among the barbarians than among the Greeks.[1886]"

"Certainly many strange ones are reported," he said.

"Are you aware, then," said I,

"that there must be as many types of character among men as

[1876]Cf. *Phileb.* 13 D "εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας" *Phaedr.* 236 B, *Laws* 682 E, Aristoph. *Clouds* 551 (Blaydes), *Knights* 841, *Lysist.* 672.

[1877]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 596, on *Sophist* 267 D.

[1878]Cf. *Crito* 52 E, Norlin on Isoc. *Nicocles* 24 (Loeb), *Laws* 612 D-E, Aristot. *Pol.* 1265 b 32, Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5. 15.

[1879]*ἡ . . . αὕτη*, "ista." Cf. *Midsummer Night's Dream,* I. ii. *ad fin.* and *Gorg.* 502 B, 452 E.

[1880]Of course ironical. Cf. 454 A, and *What Plato Said,* p. 592, on *Soph.* 231 B.

[1881]Cf. 552 C, *Protag.* 322 d, Isoc. *Hel.* 34, Wilamowitz on Eurip. *Heracles* 542. For the effect of surprise Cf. *Rep.* 334 A, 373 A, 555 A, *Theaet.* 146 A, *Phileb.* 46 A "κακόν" and 64 E "συμφορά".

[1882]*ἰδέαν*: cf. Introd. p. x.

[1883]Cf. 445 C. For *διαφανεῖ* Cf. *Tim.* 60 A, 67 A, *Laws* 634 C, and on 548 C, p. 253, note g.

[1884]*δυναστεῖαι* Cf. *Laws* 680 B, 681 D. But the word usually has an invidious suggestion. See Newman on Aristot. *Pol.* 1272 b 10. Cf. *ibid.* 1292 b 5-10, 1293 a 31, 1298 a 32; also *Lysias* ii. 18, where it is opposed to democracy, Isoc. *Panath.* 148, where it is used of the tyranny of Peisistratus, *ibid.* 43 of Minos. Cf. *Panegyr.* 39 and Norlin on *Panegyr.* 105 (Loeb). Isocrates also uses it frequently of the power or sovereignty of Philip, *Phil.* 3, 6, 69, 133, etc. Cf. also *Gorg.* 492 B, *Polit.* 291 D.

[1885]Newman on Aristot. *Pol.* 1273 a 35 thinks that Plato may have been thinking of Carthage. Cf. Polyb. vi. 56. 4.

[1886]Plato, as often is impatient of details, for which he was rebuked by Aristotle. Cf. also *Tim.* 57 D, 67 C, and the frequent leaving of minor matters to future legislators in the *Republic* and *Laws,*Vol. I. p. 294, note b, on 412 B.

there are forms of government[1887]? Or do you suppose that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak or rock[1888] and not from the characters[1889] of the citizens, which, as it were, by their momentum and weight in the scales[1890] draw other things after them?"

"They could not possibly come from any other source," he said.

"Then if the forms of government are five, the patterns of individual souls must be five also."

"Surely."

"Now we have already described the man corresponding to aristocracy[1891] or the government of the best, whom we aver to be the truly good and just man."

"We have."

"Must we not, then, next after this, survey the inferior types, the man who is contentious and covetous of honor,[1892] corresponding to the Laconian constitution, and the oligarchical man in turn, and the democratic and the tyrant, in order that,[1893] after observing the most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of the possessor, so that we may either follow the counsel of Thrasymachus and pursue injustice or the present argument and pursue justice?"

"Assuredly," he said,

"that is what we have to do.[1894]"

[1887]For the correspondence of individual and state cf. also 425 E, 445 C-D, 579 C and on 591 E. Cf. *Laws* 829 A, Isoc. *Peace* 120.

[1888]Or "stock or stone," i.e. inanimate, insensible things. For the quotation *ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας* Cf. *Odyssey* xix. 163, *Il.* xxii. 126 *aliter*, *Apol.* 34 D and Thompson on *Phaedrus* 275 B; also Stallbaum *ad loc.*

[1889]The *mores,* 45 E, 436 A. Cf. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics,* p. 206: "A lazy nation may be changed into an industrious, a rich into a poor, a religious into a profane, as if by magic, if any single cause, though slight, or any combination of causes, however subtle, is strong enough to change the favorite and detested types of character."

[1890]For the metaphor cf. also 550 E and on 556 E.

[1891]*ἀριστοκρατία* is used by both Plato and Aristotle some times technically, sometimes etymologically as the government of the best, whoever they may be. Cf. 445 D, and *Menex.* 238 C-D (*What Plato Said,* p. 539).

[1892]Cf. *Phaedr.* 256 C 1, 475 A, 347 B.

[1893]Cf. on 544 A, p. 237, note g.

[1894]In considering the progress of degeneration portrayed in the following pages, it is too often forgotten that Plato is describing or satirizing divergences from ideal rather than an historical process. Cf. Rehm, *Der Untergang Roms im abendländischen Denken,* p. 11: "Plato gibt eine zum Mythos gesteigerte Naturgeschichte des Staates, so wie Hesiod eine als Mythos zu verstehende Natur-, d.h. Entartungsgeschichte des

"Shall we, then, as we began by examining moral qualities in states before individuals, as being more manifest there, so now consider first the constitution based on the love of honor? I do not know of any special name[1895] for it in use. We must call it either timocracy[1896] or timarchy. And then in connection with this we will consider the man of that type, and thereafter oligarchy and the oligarch, and again, fixing our eyes on democracy, we will contemplate the democratic man: and fourthly, after coming to the city ruled by a tyrant and observing it, we will in turn take a look into the tyrannical soul,[1897] and so try to make ourselves competent judges[1898] of the question before us."

"That would be at least[1899] a systematic and consistent way of conducting the observation and the decision," he said.

"Come, then," said I,

"let us try to tell in what way a timocracy would arise out of an aristocracy. Or is this the simple and unvarying rule, that in every form of government revolution takes its start from the ruling class itself,[1900] when dissension arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself,

Menschengeschlechts gibt." Cf. Sidney B. Fay, on Bury, *The Idea of Progress,* in "Methods of Social Science," edited by Stuart A. Rice, p. 289: " . . . there was a widely spread belief in an earlier "golden age" of simplicity, which had been followed by a degeneration and decay of the human race. Plato's theory of degradation set forth a gradual deterioration through the successive stages of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and despotism. The Greek theory of "cycles," with its endless, monotonous iteration, excluded the possibility of permanent advance or "progress."" Kurt Singer, *Platon der Gründer,* p. 141, says that the timocratic state reminds one of late Sparta, the democratic of Athens after Pericles, the oligarchic is related to Corinth, and the tyrannical has some Syracusan features. Cicero, *De div.* ii., uses this book of the *Republic* to console himself for the revolutions in the Roman state, and Polybius's theory of the natural succession of governments is derived from it, with modifications (Polyb. vi. 4. 6 ff. Cf. vi. 9. 10 "αὕτη πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις"). Aristotle objects that in a cycle the ideal state should follow the tyranny.

[1895]Cf. on 544 C, p. 238, note b.

[1896]In Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 33-34, the meaning is "the rule of those who possess a property qualification."

[1897]Cf. 577 A-B.

[1898]Cf. 582 A ff.

[1899]For the qualified assent Cf. *Hamlet*I. i. 19 "What? is Horatio there? A piece of him." It is very frequent in the *Republic,* usually with *γοῦν.* Cf. 442 D, 469 B, 476 C, 501 C, 537 C, 584 A, 555 B, 604 D,and Vol. I. p. 30, note a, on 334 A; also 460 C and 398 B, where the interlocutor adds a condition, 392 B, 405 B, 556 E, 581 B, and 487 A, where he uses the corrective *μὲν οὖν.*

[1900]For the idea that the state is destroyed only by factions in the ruling class cf. also *Laws* 683 E. Cf. 465 B, Lysias xxv. 21, Aristot. *Pol.* 1305 b, 1306 a 10 "ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὑτῆς", 1302 a 10 Polybius, Teubner, vol. ii. p. 298 (vi. 57). Newman, Aristot. *Pol.* i. p. 521, says that Aristotle "does not remark on Plato's observation . . . though he cannot have agreed with it." Cf. Halévy, *Notes*

however small it be, innovation is impossible?"

"Yes, that is so."

"How, then, Glaucon," I said,

"will disturbance arise in our city, and how will our helpers and rulers fall out and be at odds with one another and themselves? Shall we, like Homer, invoke the Muses[1901] to tell "how faction first fell upon them," *Hom. Il. 1.6* and say that these goddesses playing with us and teasing us as if we were children address us in lofty, mock-serious tragic[1902] style?"

"How?"

"Somewhat in this fashion. Hard in truth[1903] it is for a state thus constituted to be shaken and disturbed; but since for everything that has come into being destruction is appointed,[1904] not even such a fabric as this will abide for all time, but it shall surely be dissolved, and this is the manner of its dissolution. Not only for plants that grow from the earth but also for animals that live upon it there is a cycle of bearing and barrenness[1905] for soul and body as often as the revolutions of their orbs come full circle, in brief courses for the short-lived and oppositely for the opposite; but the laws of prosperous birth or infertility for your race, the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined with sensation,[1906] but they will escape them, and there will be a time when they will beget children out of season. Now for divine begettings there is a period comprehended by a perfect number,[1907] and for mortal by the first in which augmentations dominating and dominated when they have attained to three distances and four limits of the assimilating and the dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render all things conversable[1908] and

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et souvenirs, p. 153 "l'histoire est là pour démontrer clairement que, depuis un siècle, not gouvernements n'ont jamais été renversés que par eux-mêmes"; Bergson, *Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion,* p. 303: "Mais l'instinct résiste. Il ne commence à céder que lorsque Ia classe supérieure elle-même l'y invite."

[1901] For the mock-heroic style of this invocation Cf. *Phaedr.* 237 A, *Laws* 885 C.

[1902] Cf. 413 B, *Meno* 76 E, Aristot. *Meteorol.* 353 b 1, Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 146.

[1903] Cf. *Alc. I.* 104 E.

[1904] Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 627 on *Laws* 677 A; also Polyb. vi. 57, Cic. *De rep.* ii. 25.

[1905] Cf. Pindar, *Mem.* vi. 10-12 for the thought.

[1906] Cf. *Tim.* 28 A "δόξη μετ' αἰσθήσεως".

[1907] For its proverbial obscurity cf. Cic. *Ad att.* vii. 13 "est enim numero Platonis obscurius," Censorinus, *De die natali* xi. See *ibid*, Introd. p. xliv for literature on this "number."

[1908] *προσήγορα*: Cf. *Theaet.* 146 A.

commensurable with one another, whereof a basal four-thirds wedded to the pempad yields two harmonies at the third augmentation, the one the product of equal factors taken one hundred times, the other of equal length one way but oblong,—one dimension of a hundred numbers determined by the rational diameters of the pempad lacking one in each case, or of the irrational[1909] lacking two; the other dimension of a hundred cubes of the triad. And this entire geometrical number is determinative of this thing, of better and inferior births. And when your guardians, missing this, bring together brides and bridegrooms unseasonably,[1910] the offspring will not be well-born or fortunate. Of such offspring the previous generation will establish the best, to be sure, in office, but still these, being unworthy, and having entered in turn[1911] into the powers of their fathers, will first as guardians begin to neglect us, paying too little heed to music[1912] and then to gymnastics, so that our young men will deteriorate in their culture; and the rulers selected from them will not approve themselves very efficient guardians for testing Hesiod's and our races of gold, silver, bronze and iron.[1913]" "And this intermixture of the iron with the silver and the bronze with the gold will engender unlikeness[1914] and an unharmonious unevenness, things that always beget war and enmity wherever they arise. "Of this lineage, look you," *Hom. Il. 6.211* we must aver the dissension to be, wherever it occurs and always."

""And rightly too,"" he said,

"we shall affirm that the Muses answer."

"They must needs," I said,

"since they are[1915] Muses."

"Well, then," said he,

"what do the Muses say next?"

"When strife arose," said I,

"the two groups were pulling against each other, the iron and bronze towards money-making and the acquisition of land and houses and gold and silver, and the other two, the golden and silvern, not being poor, but by nature rich in their souls,[1916] were trying to draw them

[1909] Cf. 534 D; also *Theaet.* 202 B "ῥητάς".

[1910] Cf. 409 D.

[1911] *αὖ*: cf. my note in *Class. Phil.* xxiii. (1928) pp. 285-287.

[1912] This does not indicate a change in Plato's attitude toward music, as has been alleged.

[1913] Cf. 415 A-B.

[1914] Cf. *Theaet.* 159 A.

[1915] *γε vi termini* Cf. 379 A-B.

back to virtue and their original constitution, and thus, striving and contending against one another, they compromised[1917] on the plan of distributing and taking for themselves the land and the houses, enslaving and subjecting as perioeci and serfs[1918] their former friends[1919] and supporters, of whose freedom they had been the guardians, and occupying themselves with war and keeping watch over these subjects."

"I think," he said,

"that this is the starting-point of the transformation."

"Would not this polity, then," said I,

"be in some sort intermediate between aristocracy and oligarchy ?"

"By all means."

"By this change, then, it would arise. But after the change what will be its way of life? Is it not obvious that in some things it will imitate the preceding polity, in some the oligarchy, since it is intermediate, and that it will also have some qualities peculiar to itself?"

"That is so," he said.

"Then in honoring its rulers and in the abstention of its warrior class from farming[1920] and handicraft and money-making in general, and in the provision of common public tables[1921] and the devotion to physical training and expertness in the game and contest of war—in all these traits it will copy the preceding state?"

"Yes."

"But in its fear to admit clever men to office, since the men it has of this kind are no longer simple[1922] and strenuous but of mixed strain, and in its inclining rather to the more high-spirited and simple-minded type, who are better suited for war than for peace, and in honoring the stratagems and contrivances of war and occupying itself with war most of the time—in these respects for the most part its qualities will be peculiar to itself?"

"Yes."

"Such men," said I,

"will be avid of wealth, like those in an oligarchy, and will cherish

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[1916]Cf. 416 E-417 A, 521 A, *Phaedrus* 279 B-C.

[1917]For *εἰς μέσον* Cf. *Protag.* 338 A; 572 D, 558 B.

[1918]An allusion to Sparta. On slavery in Plato cf. Newman i. p. 143. Cf. 549 A, 578-579, *Laws* 776-777; Aristot. *Pol.* 1259 a 21 f., 1269 a 36 f., 1330 a 29.

[1919]Cf. 417 A-B.

[1920]Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1328 b 41 and Newman i. pp. 107-108.

[1921]Cf. 416 E, 458 C, *Laws* 666 B, 762 C, 780 A-B, 781 C, 806 E, 839 C, *Critias* 112 C.

[1922]Cf. 397 E, Isoc. ii. 46 "ἁπλοῦς δ' ἡγοῦνται τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας". Cf. the psychology of Thucyd. iii. 83.

a fierce secret lust for gold[1923] and silver, owning storehouses[1924] and private treasuries where they may hide them away, and also the enclosures[1925] of their homes, literal private love-nests[1926] in which they can lavish their wealth on their women[1927] and any others they please with great expenditure."

"Most true," he said.

"And will they not be stingy about money, since they prize it and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of others' wealth[1928] because of their appetites, enjoying[1929] their pleasures stealthily, and running away from the law as boys from a father,[1930] since they have not been educated by persuasion[1931] but by force because of their neglect of the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy, and because of their preference of gymnastics to music?"

"You perfectly describe," he said,

"a polity that is a mixture[1932] of good and evil."

"Why, yes, the elements have been mixed," I said,

"but the most conspicuous[1933] feature in it is one thing only, due to the predominance of the high-spirited element, namely contentiousness and covetousness of honor.[1934]"

[1923]This was said to be characteristic of Sparta. Cf. Newman on Aristot. *Pol.* 1270 a 13, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 14, 203 and 7. 6, and the Chicago Dissertation of P. H. Epps, *The Place of Sparta in Greek History and Civilization,* pp. 180-184.

[1924]Cf. 416 D.

[1925]Cf. *Laws* 681 A, *Theaet.* 174 E.

[1926]*νεοττιάς* suggests Horace's "tu nidum servas" (Epist. i. 10.6). Cf also *Laws* 776 A.

[1927]Cf. *Laws* 806 A-C, 637 B-C, Aristot. *Pol.* 1269 b 3, and Newman ii. p. 318 on the Spartan women. Cf. Epps, *op. cit.* pp. 322-346.

[1928]*φιλαναλωταί*, though different, suggests Sallust's "alieni appetens sui profusus" (*Cat.* 5). Cf. *Cat.* 52 "publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam."

[1929]Cf. 587 A, *Laws* 636 D, *Symp.* 187 E, *Phaedr.* 251 E.

[1930]Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1270 b 34 with Newman's note; and *Euthyphro* 2 C "tell his mother the state."

[1931]Cf. *Laws* 720 D-E. This is not inconsistent with *Polit.* 293 A, where the context and the point of view are different.

[1932]This is of course not the mixed government which Plato approves *Laws* 691-692, 712 D-E, 759 B. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 629.

[1933]For *διαφανέστατον* cf. 544 D. The expression *διαφανέστατον . . . ἕν τι μόνον*, misunderstood and emended by Apelt, is colored by an idea of Anaxagoras expressed by Lucretius i. 877-878: "illud Apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta." *Anaxag.* Fr. 12. Diels 1.3, p. 405 "ἀλλ' ὅτων πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἓν ἕκαστον ἐστι καὶ ἦν". Cf. *Phaedr.* 238 A, *Cratyl.* 393 misunderstood by Dümmler and emended (*ἐναργής* for *ἐγκρατής*) with the approval of Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 350.

[1934]There is no contradiction between this and *Laws* 870 C if the passage is read carefully.

"Very much so," said he.

"Such, then, would be the origin and nature of this polity if we may merely outline the figure of a constitution in words and not elaborate it precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show us the most just and the most unjust type of man, and it would be an impracticable task to set forth all forms[1935] of government without omitting any, and all customs and qualities of men."

"Quite right," he said.

"What, then, is the man that corresponds to this constitution? What is his origin and what his nature?"

"I fancy," Adeimantus said,

"that he comes rather close[1936] to Glaucon here in point of contentiousness."

"Perhaps," said I,

"in that, but I do not think their natures are alike in the following respects."

"In what?"

"He will have to be somewhat self-willed[1937] and lacking in culture,[1938] yet a lover of music and fond of listening[1939] to talk and speeches, though by no means himself a rhetorician; and to slaves such a one would be harsh,[1940] not scorning them as the really educated do, but he would be gentle with the freeborn and very submissive to officials, a lover of office and of honor,[1941] not basing his claim to office[1942] on ability to speak or anything of that sort but on his exploits in war or preparation for war, and he would be a devotee of gymnastics and hunting.[1943]"

[1935] Cf. on 544 D, p. 240, note a.

[1936] Cf. *Phaedo* 65 A, Porphyry, *De abst.* i. 27, Teubner, p. 59 "ἐγγὺς τείνειν ἀποσιτίας".

[1937] *αὐθαδέστερον.* The fault of Prometheus (Aesch. *P. V.* 1034, 1937) and Medea must not be imputed to Glaucon.

[1938] Cf. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy,* who imitates or parodies Plato throughout, e.g. p. 83 "A little inaccessible to ideas and light," and pp. 54-55 "The peculiar serenity of aristocracies of Teutonic origin appears to come from their never having had any ideas to trouble them."

[1939] Cf. 475 D, 535 D, *Lysis* 206 C.

[1940] Cf. p. 249, note g, on 547 C, and Newman ii. p. 317. In i. p. 143, n. 3 he says that this implies slavery in the ideal state, in spite of 547 C.

[1941] Cf. Lysias xix. 18. Lysias xxi. portrays a typical *φιλότιμος.* Cf *Phaedr.* 256 C, Eurip. *I. A.* 527. He is a Xenophontic type. Cf Xen. *Oecon.* 14. 10, *Hiero* 7. 3, *Agesil.* 10. 4. Isoc. *Antid.* 141 and 226 uses the word in a good sense. Cf. "But if it be a sin to covet honor," Shakes. *Henry V.* iv. iii. 28.

[1942] Cf. the *ἀξιώματα* of *Laws* 690 A, Aristot. *Pol.* 1280 a 8 ff., 1282 b 26, 1283-1284.

"Why, yes," he said,

"that is the spirit of that polity.[1944]"

"And would not such a man be disdainful of wealth too in his youth, but the older he grew the more he would love it because of his participation in the covetous nature and because his virtue is not sincere and pure since it lacks the best guardian?"

"What guardian?" said Adeimantus.

"Reason," said I,

"blended with culture,[1945] which is the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout life in the soul that possesses it."

"Well said," he replied.

"This is the character," I said,

"of the timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his name."

"By all means."

"His origin[1946] is somewhat on this wise: Sometimes he is the young son of a good father who lives in a badly governed state and avoids honors and office and law-suits and all such meddlesomeness[1947] and is willing to forbear something of his rights[1948] in order to escape trouble.[1949]"

"How does he originate?" he said.

"Why, when, to begin with," I said,

"he hears his mother complaining[1950] that her husband is not one of

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[1943] Cf. Arnold on the "barbarians" in *Culture and Anarchy,* pp. 78, 82, 84.

[1944] For the *ἦθος* of a state cf. Isoc. *Nic.* 31.

[1945] The Greek words *λόγος* and *μουσική* are untranslatable. Cf. also 560 B. For *μουσική* cf. 546 D. Newman i. p. 414 fancies that his is a return to the position of Book IV. from the disparagement of music in 522 A. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 4 on this supposed ABA development of Plato's opinions.

[1946] *δέ γ'* marks the transition from the description of the type to its origin. Cf. 547 E, 553 C, 556 B, 557 B, 560 D, 561 E, 563 B, 566 E. Ritter, pp. 69-70, comments on its frequency in this book, but does not note the reason. There are no cases in the first five pages.

[1947] Cf. Lysias xix. 18 "ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ ἦν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν", with the contrasted type *ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι*, Isoc. *Antid.* 227 "ἀπραγμονεστάτους μὲν ὄντας ἐν τῇ πόλει". Cf. "πολυπραγμοσύνη" 444 B, 434 B, Isoc. *Antid.* 48, *Peace* 108, 30, and 26, with Norlin's note (Loeb). Cf. also Aristoph. *Knights* 261.

[1948] *ἐλαττοῦσθαι* cf. Thuc. i. 77. 1, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1198 b 26-32, *Pol.* 1319 a 3.

[1949] For *πράγματα ἔχειν* cf. 370 A, *Gorg.* 467 D, *Alc. I.* 119 B, Aristoph. *Birds* 1026, *Wasps* 1392. Cf. "πράγματα παρέχειν", *Rep.* 505 A, 531 B, *Theages* 121 D, Herod. i. 155, Aristoph. *Birds* 931, *Plutus* 20, 102.

[1950] Wilamowitz, *Platon,* i. p. 434 with some exaggeration says that this is the only woman character in Plato and is probably his mother, Perictione. Pohlenz, *Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1921, p. 18, disagrees. For the complaints cf. Gerard, *Four Years in Germany,* p. 115 "Now if a lawyer gets to be about forty years old and is not some kind of a

the rulers and for that reason she is slighted among the other women, and when she sees that her husband is not much concerned about money and does not fight and brawl in private lawsuits and in the public assembly, but takes all such matters lightly, and when she observes that he is self-absorbed[1951] in his thoughts and neither regards nor disregards her overmuch,[1952] and in consequence of all this laments and tells the boy that his father is too slack[1953] and no kind of a man, with all the other complaints with which women[1954] nag[1955] in such cases."

"Many indeed," said Adeimantus,

"and after their kind.[1956]"

"You are aware, then," said I,

"that the very house-slaves of such men, if they are loyal and friendly, privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and if they observe a debtor or any other wrongdoer whom the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to punish all such when he grows to manhood and prove himself more of a man than his father, and when the lad goes out he hears and sees the same sort of thing.[1957] Men who mind their own affairs[1958] in the city are spoken of as simpletons and are held in slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people's affairs are honored and praised. Then it is[1959] that the youth, hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand listening to the words of his father, and with a near view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other men, is solicited by both, his father watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle[1960] in his soul and the others the appetitive and the passionate[1961]; and as he is not by nature of a bad

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Rat his wife begins to nag him . . ."

[1951]Cf. *Symp.* 174 D, Isoc. *Antid.* 227.

[1952]Cf. the husband in Lysias i. 6.

[1953]*λίαν ἀνειμένος*: one who has grown too slack or negligent. Cf. Didot, *Com. Fr.* p. 728 "τίς ὧδε μῶρος καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος"; Porphyry, *De abst.* ii. 58.

[1954]Cf. *Phaedo* 60 A.For Plato's attitude towards women Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 632, on *Laws* 631 D.

[1955]*ὑμνεῖν*. Cf. *Euthydem.* 296 D, Soph. *Ajax* 292. Commentators have been troubled by the looseness of Plato's style in this sentence. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 385.

[1956]Cf. Aristoph. *Thesm.* 167 "ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει".

[1957]*ἕτερα τοιαῦτα*: cf. on 488 B; also *Gorg.* 481 E, 482 A, 514 D, *Euthyd.* 298 E, *Protag.* 326 A, *Phaedo* 58 D, 80 D, *Symp.* 201 E, etc.

[1958]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 480, on *Charm.* 161 B.

[1959]*τότε δή* cf. 551 A, 566 C, 330 E, 573 A, 591 A, *Phaedo* 85 A, 96 B and D, *Polit.* 272 E. Cf. also *τότ' ἤδη*, on 565 C.

[1960]Cf. on 439 D, Vol. I. p. 397, note d.

[1961]For these three principles of the soul cf. on 435 A ff., 439 D-E ff., 441 A.

disposition but has fallen into evil communications,[1962] under these two solicitations he comes to a compromise[1963] and turns over the government in his soul[1964] to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul[1965] and covetous of honor.[1966]"

"You have, I think, most exactly described his origin."

"Then," said I,

"we have our second polity and second type of man."

"We have," he said.

"Shall we then, as Aeschylus: would say, "tell of another champion before another gate," *Aesch. Seven 451* [1967] or rather, in accordance with our plan,[1968] the city first?"

"That, by all means," he said.

"The next polity, I believe, would be oligarchy."

"And what kind of a regime," said he,

"do you understand by oligarchy?"

"That based on a property qualification,[1969]" said I,

"wherein the rich hold office and the poor man is excluded."

"I understand," said he.

"Then, is not the first thing to speak of how democracy passes over into this?"

"Yes."

"And truly," said I,

"the manner of the change is plain even to the proverbial blind man.[1970]"

"How so?"

"That treasure-house[1971] which each possesses filled with gold destroys that polity; for first they invent ways of expenditure for themselves and pervert the laws to this end, and neither they nor their wives obey them."

[1962] Cf. the fragment of Menander, *φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρήσθ' ὁμιλίαι κακαί*, quoted in 1 *Cor.* xv. 33 (Kock, *C.A.F.* iii. No. 218). Cf. also *Phaedr.* 250 A "ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν", Aesch. *Seven Against Thebes* 599 "ἔσθ' ὁμιλίας κακῆς κάκιον οὐδέν".

[1963] Cf. p. 249, note f.

[1964] Cf. 553 B-C, 608 B.

[1965] *ὑψηλόφρων* is a poetical word. Cf. Eurip. *I. A.* 919.

[1966] Cf. p. 255, note f.

[1967] *λέγ' ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πύλαις εἰληχότα.*

[1968] Cf. *Laws* 743 C, and *Class. Phil.* ix. (1914) p. 345.

[1969] Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 33, Isoc. *Panath.* 131, *Laws* 698 B *aliter.*

[1970] Cf. 465 D, *Soph.* 241 D.

[1971] Cf. 548 A, 416 D.

"That is likely," he said.

"And then, I take it, by observing and emulating one another they bring the majority of them to this way of thinking."

"That is likely," he said.

"And so, as time goes on, and they advance[1972] in the pursuit of wealth, the more they hold that in honor the less they honor virtue. May not the opposition of wealth and virtue[1973] be conceived as if each lay in the scale[1974] of a balance inclining opposite ways?"

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"So, when wealth is honored in a state, and the wealthy, virtue and the good are less honored."

"Obviously."

"And that which men at any time honor they practise,[1975] and what is not honored is neglected."

"It is so."

"Thus, finally, from being lovers of victory and lovers of honor they become lovers of gain-getting and of money, and they commend and admire the rich man and put him in office but despise the man who is poor."

"Quite so."

"And is it not then that they pass a law defining the limits[1976] of an oligarchical polity, prescribing[1977] a sum of money, a larger sum where it is more[1978] of an oligarchy, where it is less a smaller, and proclaiming that no man shall hold office whose property does not come up to the required valuation? And this law they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting to that they establish their government by

[1972] *εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν*: cf. 437 A, 604 B, *Prot.* 339 D, *Symp.* 174 D, *Polit.* 262 D, *Soph.* 258 C, 261 B, *Alc. I.* 132 B, *Protag.* 357 D where *ἧς* is plainly wrong, Aristoph. *Knights* 751.

[1973] Cf. 591 D, *Laws* 742 E, 705 B, 8931 C ff., 836 A, 919 B with *Rep.* 421 D; also Aristot. *Pol.* 1273 a 37-38.

[1974] Cf. on 544 E, Demosth. v. 12.

[1975] This sentence has been much quoted. Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* i. 2 "honos alit artes . . . iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque inprobantur." Themistius and Libanius worked it into almost every oration. Cf. Mrs. W. C. Wright, *The Emperor Julian,* p. 70, n. 3. Cf. also Stallbaum *ad loc.* For *ἀσκεῖται* cf. Pindar, *Ol.* viii. 22.

[1976] *ὅρον*: cf. 551 C, *Laws* 714 C, 962 D, 739 D, 626 B, *Menex.* 238 D, *Polit.* 293 E, 296 E, 292 C, *Lysis* 209 C, Aristot. *Pol.* 1280 a 7, 1271 a 35, and Newman i. p. 220, *Eth. Nic.* 1138 b 23. Cf. also *τέλος Rhet.* 1366 a 3. For the true criterion of office-holding see *Laws* 715 C-D and Isoc. xii. 131. For wealth as the criterion cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1273 a 37.

[1977] For *ταξάμενοι* cf. Vol. I. p. 310, note c, on 416 E.

[1978] Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1301 b 13-14.

terrorization.[1979] Is not that the way of it?"

"It is."

"The establishment then, one may say, is in this wise."

"Yes," he said,

"but what is the character of this constitution, and what are the defects that we said it had?"

"To begin with," said I,

"consider the nature of its constitutive and defining principle. Suppose men should appoint the pilots[1980] of ships in this way, by property qualification, and not allow[1981] a poor man to navigate, even if he were a better pilot."

"A sorry voyage they would make of it," he said.

"And is not the same true of any other form of rule?"

"I think so."

"Except of a city," said I,

"or does it hold for a city too?"

"Most of all," he said,

"by as much as that is the greatest and most difficult[1982] rule of all."

"Here, then, is one very great defect in oligarchy."

"So it appears."

"Well, and is this a smaller one?"

"What?"

"That such a city should of necessity be not one,[1983] but two, a city of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and always plotting[1984] against one another."

"No, by Zeus," said he,

"it is not a bit smaller."

"Nor, further, can we approve of this—the likelihood that they will not be able to wage war, because of the necessity of either arming and

[1979] Cf. 557 A.

[1980] Cf. 488, and *Polit.* 299 B-C, *What Plato Said,* p. 521, on *Euthydem.* 291 D.

[1981] Stallbaum says that ἐπιτρέποι is used absolutely as in 575 D, *Symp.* 213 E, *Lysis* 210 B, etc. Similarly Latin *permitto.* Cf. Shorey on Jowett's translation of *Meno* 92 A-B, *A. J. P.* xiii. p. 367. See too Diog. L. i. 65.

[1982] Men are the hardest creatures to govern. Cf. *Polit.* 292 D, and *What Plato Said,* p. 635, on *Laws* 766 A.

[1983] For the idea that a city should be a unity Cf. *Laws* 739 D and on 423 A-B. Cf. also 422 E with 417 A-B, Livy ii. 24 "adeo duas ex una civitate discordia fecerat." Aristot. *Pol.* 1316 b 7 comments "ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων" . . . and tries to prove the point by his topical method.

[1984] Cf. 417 B.

employing the multitude,[1985] and fearing them more than the enemy, or else, if they do not make use of them, of finding themselves on the field of battle, oligarchs indeed,[1986] and rulers over a few. And to this must be added their reluctance to contribute money, because they are lovers of money."

"No, indeed, that is not admirable."

"And what of the trait we found fault with long ago[1987]—the fact that in such a state the citizens are busy-bodies and jacks-of-all-trades, farmers, financiers and soldiers all in one? Do you think that is right?"

"By no manner of means."

"Consider now whether this polity is not the first that admits that which is the greatest of all such evils."

"What?"

"The allowing a man to sell all his possessions,[1988] which another is permitted to acquire, and after selling them to go on living in the city, but as no part of it,[1989] neither a money-maker, nor a craftsman, nor a knight, nor a foot-soldier, but classified only as a pauper[1990] and a dependent."

"This is the first," he said.

"There certainly is no prohibition of that sort of thing in oligarchical states. Otherwise some of their citizens would not be excessively rich, and others out and out paupers."

"Right."

" But observe this. When such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he then of any more use to the state in the matters of which we were speaking, or did he merely seem to belong to the ruling class, while in reality he was neither ruler nor helper in the state, but only a consumer of goods[1991]?"

"It is so," he said;

[1985]For the idea that the rulers fear to arm the people cf. Thuc. iii. 27, Livy iii. 15 "consules et armare plebem et inermem pati timebant."

[1986]He plays on the word. In 565 C "ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς" is used in a different sense. Cf. *Symp.* 181 A "ὡς ἀληθῶς πάνδημος", *Phaedo* 80 D "εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς".

[1987]Cf. 374 B, 434 A, 443 D-E. For the specialty of function Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 480, on *Charm.* 161 E.

[1988]So in the *Laws* the householder may not sell his lot, *Laws* 741 B-C, 744 D-E. Cf. 755 A, 857 A, Aristot. *Pol.* 1270 a 19, Newman i. p. 376.

[1989]Cf Aristot. *Pol.* 1326 a 20, Newman i. pp. 98 and 109. Cf Leslie Stephen, *Util.* ii. 111 "A vast populace has grown up outside of the old order."

[1990]Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1266 b 13.

[1991]*ἑτοίμων* "things ready at hand." Cf. 573 A, Polyb. vi. (Teubner, vol. ii. p. 237); Horace *Epist.* i. 2. 27 "fruges consumere nati."

"he only seemed, but was just a spendthrift."

"Shall we, then, say of him that as the drone[1992] springs up in the cell, a pest of the hive, so such a man grows up in his home, a pest of the state?"

"By all means, Socrates," he said.

"And has not God, Adeimantus, left the drones which have wings and fly stingless one and all, while of the drones here who travel afoot he has made some stingless but has armed others with terrible stings? And from the stingless finally issue beggars in old age,[1993] but from those furnished with stings all that are denominated[1994] malefactors?"

"Most true," he said.

"It is plain, then," said I,

"that wherever you see beggars in a city, there are somewhere in the neighborhood concealed thieves and cutpurses and temple-robbers and similar artists in crime."

"Clearly," he said.

"Well, then, in oligarchical cities do you not see beggars?"

"Nearly all are such," he said,

"except the ruling class."

"Are we not to suppose, then, that there are also many criminals in them furnished with stings, whom the rulers by their surveillance forcibly[1995] restrain?"

"We must think so," he said.

"And shall we not say that the presence of such citizens is the result of a defective culture and bad breeding and a wrong constitution of the state?"

"We shall."

"Well, at any rate such would be the character of the oligarchical state, and these, or perhaps even more than these, would be the evils that afflict it."

"Pretty nearly these," he said.

"Then," I said,

[1992] Cf. *Laws* 901 A, Hesiod, *Works and Days* 300 f., Aristoph. *Wasps* 1071 ff., Eurip. *Suppl.* 242, Xen. *Oecon.* 17. 15, and Virgil, *Georg.* iv. 168 "ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent." the sentence was much quoted. Stallbaum refers to Ruhnken on *Tim.* 157 ff. for many illustration, and to Petavius *ad* Themist. *Orat.* xxiii. p. 285 D.

[1993] Cf 498 A, *Laws* 653 A; also the modern distinction between defectives and delinquents.

[1994] *κέκληνται*: Cf. 344 B-C.

[1995] *βίᾳ* is so closely connected with *κατέχουσιν* that the double dative is not felt to be awkward. But Adam takes *ἐπιμελείᾳ* as an adverb.

"let us regard as disposed of the constitution called oligarchy, whose rulers are determined by a property qualification.[1996] And next we are to consider the man who resembles it—how he arises and what after that his character is."

"Quite so," he said.

"Is not the transition from that timocratic youth to the oligarchical type mostly on this wise?"

"How?"

"When a son born to the timocratic man at first emulates his father, and follows in his footsteps[1997] and then sees him suddenly dashed,[1998] as a ship on a reef,[1999] against the state, and making complete wreckage[2000] of both his possessions and himself perhaps he has been a general, or has held some other important office, and has then been dragged into court by mischievous sycophants and put to death or banished[2001] or outlawed and has lost all his property—"

"It is likely," he said.

"And the son, my friend, after seeing and suffering these things, and losing his property, grows timid, I fancy, and forthwith thrusts headlong[2002] from his bosom's throne[2003] that principle of love of honor and that high spirit, and being humbled by poverty turns to the getting of money, and greedily[2004] and stingily and little by little by thrift and hard work collects property. Do you not suppose that such a one will then establish on that throne the principle of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of gold, and girt with the Persian sword?"

"I do," he said.

"And under this domination he will force the rational and high-spirited principles to crouch lowly to right and left[2005] as slaves, and

[1996] Cf. on 550 C. p. 261, note h.

[1997] Cf. 410 B, Homer *Od.* xix. 436 "ἴχνη ἐρευνῶντος", ii. 406, iii. 30, v. 193, vii. 38 "μετ' ἴχνια βαῖνε".

[1998] For *πταίσαντα* cf. Aesch. *Prom.* 926, *Ag.* 1624 (Butl. emend.).

[1999] Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1007, *Eumen.* 564, Thuc. vii. 25. 7, and Thompson on *Phaedr.* 255 D.

[2000] Lit. "spilling." Cf. Lucian, *Timon* 23.

[2001] For *ἐκπεσόντα* cf. 560 A, 566 A. In Xen. *An.* vii. 5. 13 it is used of shipwreck. Cf. "ἐκβάλλοντες" 488 C.

[2002] Cf. Herod. vii. 136.

[2003] Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 983. Cf. 550 B.

[2004] For *γλίσχρως* cf. on 488 A, *Class. Phil.* iv. p. 86 on Diog. L. iv. 59, Aelian, *Epist. Rust.* 18 "γλίσχρως τε καὶ κατ' ὀλίγον".

[2005] *ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν*: Cf. *Protag.* 315 B, *Tim.* 46 C, *Critias* 117 C, etc., Herod. iv. 175.

will allow the one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of making more money from a little,[2006] and the other to admire and honor nothing but riches and rich men, and to take pride in nothing but the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to that?"

"There is no other transformation so swift and sure of the ambitious youth into the avaricious type."

"Is this, then, our oligarchical man?" said I.

"He is developed, at any rate, out of a man resembling the constitution from which the oligarchy sprang."

"Let us see, then, whether he will have a like character."

"Let us see."

"Would he not, in the first place, resemble it in prizing wealth above everything?"

"Inevitably."

"And also by being thrifty and laborious, satisfying only his own necessary[2007] appetites and desires and not providing for expenditure on other things, but subduing his other appetites as vain and unprofitable?"

"By all means."

"He would be a squalid[2008] fellow," said I,

"looking for a surplus of profit[2009] in everything, and a hoarder, the type the multitude approves.[2010] Would not this be the character of the man who corresponds to such a polity?"

"I certainly think so," he said.

"Property, at any rate, is the thing most esteemed by that state and that kind of man."

"That, I take it," said I,

"is because he has never turned his thoughts to true culture."

[2006] Cf. 554 A, 556 C, Xen. *Mem.* ii. 6. 4 "μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ", and Aristot. *Pol.* 1257 b 407, and 330 C. See too Inge, *Christian Ethics,* p. 220: "The Times obituary notice of Holloway (of the pills) will suffice. "Money-making is an art by itself; it demands for success the devotion of the whole man,"" etc. For the phrase *σκοπεῖν ὁπόθεν* cf. Isoc. *Areop.* 83, *Panegyr.* 133-134 "σκοπεῖν ἐξ ὧν".

[2007] Cf. on 558 D, p. 291, note i.

[2008] *αὐχμηρός*: Cf. *Symp.* 203 D.

[2009] For *περιουσίαν* cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 50 and *Theaet.* 154 E.

[2010] Cf. *Phaedr.* 256 E, *Meno* 90 A-B by implication. Numenius (ed. Mullach iii. 159) relates of Lacydes that he was "a bit greedy (*ὑπογλισχρότερος*) and after a fashion a thrifty manager (*οἰκονομικός*)—as the expression is—the sort approved by most people." Emerson, *The Young American,* "they recommend conventional virtues, whatever will earn and preserve property." But this is not always true in an envious democracy: cf. Isoc. xv. 159-160 and America today.

"I think not," he said,

"else he would not have made the blind[2011] one leader of his choir and first in honor.[2012]"

"Well said," I replied.

"But consider this. Shall we not say that owing to this lack of culture the appetites of the drone spring up in him, some the beggarly, others the rascally, but that they are forcibly restrained by his general self-surveillance and self- control[2013]?"

"We shall indeed," he said.

"Do you know, then," said I,

"to what you must look to discern the rascalities of such men?"

"To what?" he said.

"To guardianships of orphans,[2014] and any such opportunities of doing injustice with impunity."

"True."

"And is it not apparent by this that in other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a seeming just man, he by some better[2015] element in himself forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling within,[2016] not persuading them that it "is better not"[2017] nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his possessions generally."

"Quite so," he said.

"Yes, by Zeus," said I,

"my friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to spend the money of others, you will discover the existence of drone-like appetites."

"Most emphatically."

"Such a man, then, would not be free from internal dissension.[2018] He would not be really one, but in some sort a double[2019] man. Yet

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[2011] Plato distinctly refers to the blind god Wealth. Cf. Aristoph. *Plutus,*Eurip. fr. 773, *Laws* 631 C "πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλός" which was often quoted. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 624, Otto, p. 60.

[2012] Cf. Herod. iii. 34, vii. 107.

[2013] Cf. 552 E "ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ". For *ἄλλης* cf. 368 B "ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου".

[2014] For the treatment of inferiors and weaker persons as a test of character Cf. *Laws* 777 D-E, Hesiod, *Works and Days,* 330, and Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic,* pp. 84-85, who, however, errs on the meaning of *αἰδώς.* For orphans cf. also *Laws* 926-928, 766 C, 877 C, 909 C-D.

[2015] *ἐπιεικεῖ* is here used generally, and not in its special sense of "sweet reasonableness."

[2016] For *ἐνούσας* Cf. *Phileb.* 16 D, *Symp.* 187 E.

[2017] Cf. 463 D. For the idea here Cf. *Phaedo* 68-69, *What Plato Said,* p. 527.

[2018] For the idea "at war with himself," Cf. 440 B and E (*στάσις*), *Phaedr.* 237 D-E, and Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1099 a 12 f.

for the most part, his better desires would have the upper hand over the worse."

"It is so."

"And for this reason, I presume, such a man would be more seemly, more respectable, than many others; but the true virtue of a soul in unison and harmony[2020] with itself would escape him and dwell afar."

"I think so."

"And again, the thrifty stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally in the city for any prize of victory or in any other honorable emulation. He is unwilling to spend money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into alliance for the winning of the victory, he fights in true oligarchical[2021] fashion with a small part of his resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds himself rich![2022]"

"Yes indeed," he said.

"Have we any further doubt, then," I said,

"as to the correspondence and resemblance[2023] between the thrifty and money-making man and the oligarchical state?"

"None," he said.

"We have next to consider, it seems, the origin and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the character of that type of man and range him beside the others for our judgement.[2024]"

"That would at least be a consistent procedure."

"Then," said I,

"is not the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected in some such way as this—by the insatiate greed for that which it set before itself as the good,[2025] the attainment of the greatest possible wealth?"

"In what way?"

"Why, since its rulers owe their offices to their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law the prodigals who arise among the youth from spending and wasting their substance. Their object is, by lending

[2019] Cf. 397 E.

[2020] Cf. on 443 D-E, Vol. I. p. 414, note e; also *Phaedo* 61 A, and *What Plato Said,* p. 485 on *Laches* 188 D.

[2021] *ὀλιγαρχικῶς* keeps up the analogy between the man and the state. Cf. my "Idea of Justice," *Ethical Record,*Jan. 1890, pp. 188, 191, 195.

[2022] i.e. he saves the cost of a determined fight. For the effect of surprise cf. on 544 C, p. 239, note f.

[2023] *ὁμοιότητι*: cf. 576 C.

[2024] Cf. *Phileb.* 55 C "εἰς τὴν κρίσιν", *Laws* 856 C, 943 C.

[2025] The *σκοπός* or *ὅρος*. Cf. on 551 A, p. 263, note e, and Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1094 a 2.

money on the property of such men, and buying it in, to become still richer and more esteemed."

"By all means."

"And is it not at once apparent in a state that this honoring of wealth is incompatible with a sober and temperate citizenship,[2026] but that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably neglected."

"That is pretty clear," he said.

"And such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness[2027] in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty men of no ignoble quality.[2028]"

"It surely has."

"And there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens, and eager for revolution.[2029]"

"'Tis so."

"But these money-makers with down-bent heads,[2030] pretending not even to see[2031] them, but inserting the sting of their money[2032] into any of the remainder who do not resist, and harvesting from them in interest as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum, foster the drone and pauper element in the state."

"They do indeed multiply it," he said.

"And they are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing as he likes with his own,[2033] or in this way, by a second law that does away with such abuses."

"What law?"

[2026] Ackermann, *Das Christliche bei Plato,* compares *Luke* xvi.13 "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." Cf. also *Laws* 742 D-E, 727 E f., 831 C.

[2027] *ἀκολασταίνειν* Cf. *Gorg.* 478 A, *Phileb.* 12 D.

[2028] Cf. *Laws* 832 A "οὐκ ἀφυεῖς". For the men reduced to poverty swelling the number of drones cf. Eurip. *Herc. Fur.* 588-592, and Wilamowitz *ad loc.*

[2029] Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1305 b 40-41, 1266 b 14.

[2030] Cf. Persius, *Sat.* ii. 61 "o curvae in terras animae, et caelestium inanes," Cf. 586 A "κεκυφότες". Cf. also on 553 D for the general thought.

[2031] Cf. *Euthyph.* 5 C, *Polit.* 287 A, Aristoph. *Peace* 1051, *Plut.* 837, Eurip. *Hippol.* 119, *I. T.* 956, *Medea* 67, Xen. *Hell.* iv. 5. 6.

[2032] Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, "the poison of their money." *τιτρώσκοντες* suggests the poisonous sting, especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones. For *ἐνιέντες* cf. Eurip. *Bacchae* 851 "ἐνεὶς . . . λύσσαν", "implanting madness." In the second half of the sentence the figure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the principal, which breeds interest,. cf. 507 A, p. 96.

[2033] Cf. on 552 A, *Laws* 922 E-923 A.

"The law that is next best, and compels the citizens to pay heed to virtue.[2034] For if a law commanded that most voluntary contracts[2035] should be at the contractor's risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke just now would grow up there."

"Much fewer," he said.

"But as it is, and for all these reasons, this is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce their subjects, and as for themselves and their off-spring, do they not make the young spoiled[2036] wantons averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand up against pleasure and pain,[2037] and mere idlers?"

"Surely."

"And do they not fasten upon themselves the habit of neglect of everything except the making of money, and as complete an indifference to virtue as the paupers exhibit?"

"Little they care."

"And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the ruled are brought together on the march, in wayfaring, or in some other common undertaking, either a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow-soldiers or, for that matter, in actual battle, and observe one another, then the poor are not in the least scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, sunburnt[2038] pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous flesh,[2039] and sees him panting and helpless[2040]—do you not suppose he will think that such fellows keep their wealth by the cowardice[2041] of the poor, and that when the latter are together in private, one will pass the word to another "our men are good for nothing"?"

[2034]Cf. *Protag.* 327 D "ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι", *Symp.* 185 B, and for *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 464, on *Apol.* 29 D-E.

[2035]For refusing to enforce monetary contracts Cf. *Laws* 742 C, 849 E, 915 E, and Newman ii. p. 254 on Aristot. *Pol.* 1263 b 21.

[2036]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 483, on *Laches* 179 D, and Aristot. *Pol.* 1310 a 23.

[2037]Cf. 429 C-D, *Laches* 191 D-E, *Laws* 633 D.

[2038]Cf. Tucker on Aesch. *Suppl.* 726.

[2039]Cf. Soph. *Ajax* 758 "περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα".

[2040]For a similar picture cf. Aristoph. *Frogs* 1086-1098. Cf. also *Gorg.* 518 C, and for the whole passage Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5. 15, Aristot. *Pol.* 1310 a 24-25.

[2041]The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force. For *κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ* cf. Lysias ii. 65 "κακίᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν", *Rhesus* 813-814 "τῇ Φρυγῶν κακανδρίᾳ", *Phaedrus* 248 B, *Symp.* 182 D, *Crito* 45 E, Eurip. *Androm.* 967, Aristoph. *Thesm.* 868 "τῇ κοράκων πονηρίᾳ".

"Nay, I know very well that they do," said he.

"And just as an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse[2042] from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that, all the man is one internal war, in like manner does not the corresponding type of state need only a slight occasion,[2043] the one party bringing in[2044] allies from an oligarchical state, or the other from a democratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, and sometimes even apart from any external impulse faction arises[2045]?"

"Most emphatically."

"And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out[2046] others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share[2047] in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.[2048]"

"Why, yes," he said,

"that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by force of arms or by terrorism[2049] resulting in the withdrawal of one of the parties."

"What, then," said I,

"is the manner of their life and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man."

"It is plain," he said.

[2042]Cf. Soph. *O. T.* 961 "σμικρὰ παλαῖα σώματ' εὐνάζει ῥοπή" "a slight impulse puts aged bodies to sleep," Demosth. *Olynth.* ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 E.

[2043]Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, *apud* Höffding, i. 30 "Like every other being each illness has its appointed time of development and close—interference is futile," with *Tim.* 89 B.

[2044]Cf. Thuc. i. 3, ii. 68, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108.

[2045]*στασιάζει* is applied here to disease of body. Cf. Herod. v. 28 "νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι", "grievously ill of faction." Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.

[2046]Cf. 488 C, 560 A, *Gorg.* 466 C, 468 D, *Prot.* 325 B. Exile, either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as in ancient Greece, must often be interpreted *cum grano salis.*

[2047]*ἐξ ἴσου*: one of the watchwords of democracy. Cf. 561 B and C, 599 B, 617 C, *Laws* 919 D, *Alc. I.* 115 D, *Crito* 50 E, Isoc. *Archid.* 96, *Peace* 3.

[2048]But Isoc. *Areop.* 22-23 considers the lot undemocratic because it might result in the establishment in office of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin *ad loc.* For the use of the lot in Plato Cf. *Laws* 759 B, 757 E, 690 C, 741 B-C, 856 D, 946 B, *Rep.* 460 A, 461 E. Cf. Apelt, p. 520.

[2049]Cf. 551 B.

"To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every man licence[2050] to do as he likes?"

"So it is said," he replied.

"And where there is such licence, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan[2051] for leading his own life in the way that pleases him."

"Obvious."

"All sorts[2052] and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other?"

"Of course."

"Possibly," said I,

"this is the most beautiful of polities as a garment of many colors, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps," I said,

"many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women[2053] when they see bright-colored things."

"Yes indeed," he said.

"Yes," said I,

"and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution."

"Why so?"

"Because, owing to this licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that

[2050] *ἐξουσία*: cf. Isoc. xii. 131 "τὴν δ' ἐξουσίαν ὅ τι βούλεται τις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν". Cf. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy,* chap. ii. Doing as One Likes.

[2051] *κατασκευή* is a word of all work in Plato. Cf. 419 A, 449 A, 455 A, *Gorg.* 455 E, 477 B, etc.

[2052] *παντοδαπός* usually has an unfavorable connotation in Plato. Cf. 431 b-C, 561 D, 567 E, 550 D, *Symp.* 198 B, *Gorg.* 489 C, *Laws* 788 C, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 uses it in a favorable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does. for the mixture of things in a democracy cf. Xen. *Rep. Ath.* 2. 8 "φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι . . . Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων"; and *Laws* 681 D. Libby, *Introduction to History of Science,* p. 273, says "Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization to confirm Plato's judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in the democratic state." De Tocqueville also, and many English observers, have commented on the monotony and standardization of American life.

[2053] For the idea that women and children like many colors cf. Sappho's admiration for Jason's mantle mingled with all manner of colors (*Lyr. Graec.* i. 196). For the classing together of women and boys Cf. *Laws* 658 D, Shakes. *As You Like It,*III. ii. 435 "As boys and women are for the most part cattle of this color," Faguet, *Nineteenth Century*"Lamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et des femmes distinguées."

pleases him, as if in a bazaar[2054] of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own."

"Perhaps at any rate," he said,

"he would not be at a loss for patterns."

"And the freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a city, even if you are qualified,[2055] or again, to submit to rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest are at war,[2056] or to keep the peace when the others do so, unless you desire peace; and again, the liberty, in defiance of any law that forbids you, to hold office and sit on juries none the less, if it occurs to you to do so, is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment[2057] for the time being?"

"Perhaps," he said,

"for so long."

"And is not the placability[2058] of some convicted criminals exquisite[2059]? Or have you never seen in such a state men condemned to death or exile who none the less stay on, and go to and fro among the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the man slips in and out[2060] like a revenant[2061]?"

"Yes, many," he said.

"And the tolerance of democracy, its superiority[2062] to all our metic-

[2054]Cf. Plutarch, *Dion* 53. Burke says "A republic, as an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of government, but a magazine of every species." Cf. *Laws* 789 B for an illustration of the point. Filmer, *Patriarcha,* misquotes this saying "The Athenians sold justice . . . , which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where everything is to be sold."

[2055]Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1271 a 12 "δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς". Cf. 347 B-C.

[2056]Cf. *Laws* 955 B-C, where a penalty is pronounced for making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph. *Acharn. passim.*

[2057]*διαγωγή*: cf. 344 E, where it is used more seriously of the whole conduct of life. Cf. also *Theaet.* 177 A, *Polit.* 274 D, *Tim.* 71 D, *Laws* 806 E, Aristot. *Met.* 981 b 18 and 982 b 24 uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too Zeller, *Aristot.* ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5.

[2058]Cf. 562 D. For the mildness of the Athenian democracy cf. Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51, xxiv. 51 Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. *Antid.* 20, *Areopagit.* 67-68, *Hel.* 27; also *Menex.* 243 E and also *Euthydem.* 303 D "δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις". Here the word *πρᾳότης* is ironically transferred to the criminal himself.

[2059]*κομψή*: cf. 376 A, *Theaet.* 171 A.

[2060]For *περινοστεῖ* cf. Lucian, *Bis Acc.* 6, Aristoph. *Plut.* 121, 494, *Peace* 762.

[2061]His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering "spirit," "one returned from the dead" (a perfectly possible meaning for *ἥρως*. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* i. p. 435 translates *Geist*) than with that of a hero returning from the wars. Cf. Adam *ad loc.*

[2062]For *οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία* cf. on 532 B "ἔτι ἀδυναμία".

ulous requirements, its disdain or our solemn[2063] pronouncements[2064] made when we were founding our city, that except in the case of transcendent[2065] natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things fair and good,—how superbly[2066] it tramples under foot all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices[2067] and way of life a man turns to politics, but honoring him if only he says that he loves the people![2068]"

"It is a noble[2069] polity, indeed!" he said.

"These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful[2070] form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike![2071]"

"Yes," he said,

"everybody knows that."

"Observe, then, the corresponding private character. Or must we first, as in the case of the polity, consider the origin of the type?"

"Yes," he said.

"Is not this, then, the way of it? Our thrifty[2072] oligarchical man would have a son bred in his father's ways."

"Why not?"

"And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary."

"Obviously."

[2063] *σεμνύνοντες* here has an ironical or colloquial tone—"high-brow," "top-lofty."

[2064] Cf. 401 B-C, 374 C and on 467 A, *Laws* 643 B, Delacroix, *Psychologie de l'art,* p. 46.

[2065] For *ὑπερβεβλημένη* Cf. *Laws* 719 D, Eurip. *Alcest.* 153.

[2066] *μεγαλοπρεπῶς* is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362 C, *Symp.* 199 C, *Charm.* 175 C, *Theaet.* 161 C, *Meno* 94 B, *Polit.* 277 B, *Hipp. Maj.* 291 E.

[2067] In Aristoph. *Knights* 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade are the very things that fit him for political leadership.

[2068] Cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 732 f., 741 and *passim.* Andoc. iv. 16 "εὔνους τῷ δήμῳ". Emile Faguet, *Moralistes,* iii. p. 84, says of Tocqueville, "Il est bien je crois le premier qui ait dit que la démocratie abaisse le niveau intellectuel des gouvernements." For the other side of the democratic shield see Thucyd. ii. 39.

[2069] For the ironical use of *γενναία* cf. 544 C, *Soph.* 231 B, *Theaet.* 209 E.

[2070] *ἡδεῖα*: cf. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government, *τοῖς χρωμένοις ἡδίους.*

[2071] Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 634, on *Laws* 744 B-C, and *ibid.* p. 508 on *Gorg.* 508 A, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1131 a 23-24, Newman, i. p. 248, Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 2. 18.

[2072] Cf. 572 C, Theogn. 915 f., *Anth. Pal.* x. 41, Democr. fr. 227 and 228, DieIs ii.3 p. 106, and Epicharm. *fr.* 45, Diels i.3 126.

"And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define[2073] our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites[2074]?"

"Let us do so."

"Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so ?"

"Most assuredly."

"Then we shall rightly use the word "necessary" of them?"

"Rightly."

"And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary?"

"Fairly indeed."

"Let us select an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend the type.[2075]"

"Let us do so."

"Would not the desire of eating to keep in health and condition and the appetite for mere bread and relishes[2076] be necessary?"

"I think so."

"The appetite for bread is necessary in both respects, in that it is beneficial and in that if it fails we die."

"Yes."

"And the desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness?"

"By all means."

"And should we not rightly pronounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these and seeks other varieties of food, and that by correction[2077] and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul's attainment of intelligence and sobriety?"

"Nay, most rightly."

[2073] Cf. *What Plato Said,* p.485, on *Laches* 190 B, and p. 551, on *Phaedr.* 237 E.

[2074] Cf. 554 A, 571 B, *Phaedo* 64 D-E, *Phileb.* 62 E, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this distinction. Cf. Cic. *De fin.* i. 13. 45, *Tusc.* v. 33, 93, Porphyry, *De abst.* i. 49. Ath. xii. 511 quotes this passage and says it anticipates the Epicureans.

[2075] Or "grasp them in outline."

[2076] For *ὄψον* cf. on 372 C, Vol. I. p. 158, note a.

[2077] For *κολαζομένη* cf. 571 B, *Gorg.* 505 B, 491 E, 507 D. For the thought cf. also 519 A-B.

"And may we not call the one group the spendthrift desires and the other the profitable,[2078] because they help production?"

"Surely."

"And we shall say the same of sexual and other appetites?"

"The same."

"And were we not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the drone is the man who teems[2079] with such pleasures and appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary desires, while the one who is ruled by his necessary appetites is the thrifty oligarchical man?"

"Why, surely."

"To return, then," said I,

"we have to tell how the democratic man develops from the oligarchical type. I think it is usually in this way."

"How?"

"When a youth, bred in the illiberal and niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste of the honey of the drones and associates with fierce[2080] and cunning creatures who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety[2081] and condition, there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning of the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy."

"Quite inevitably," he said.

"May we not say that just as the revolution in the city was brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside, coming to the support of the similar and corresponding party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized when a like and kindred[2082] group of appetites from outside comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul?"

"By all means," he said.

"And if, I take it, a counter-alliance[2083] comes to the rescue of the oligarchical part of his soul, either it may be from his father or from his other kin, who admonish and reproach him, then there arises faction[2084] and counter-faction and internal strife in the man with him-

[2078] Lit. "money-making." Cf. 558 D.

[2079] For *γέμοντα* cf. 577 D, 578 A, 603 D, 611 B, *Gorg.* 525 A, 522 E, etc.

[2080] *αἴθων* occurs only here in Plato. It is common in Pindar and tragedy. Ernst Maass, "Die Ironie des Sokrates," *Sokrates,* 11, p. 94 "Platon hat an jener Stelle des *Staats,* von der wir ausgingen, die schlimmen Erzieher gefährliche Fuchsbestien genannt." (Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* xi. 20.)

[2081] Cf. on 557 C, p. 286, note a.

[2082] Cf. 554 D.

[2083] For the metaphor cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 24 "ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν", "they [Critias and Alcibiades] found in him [Socrates] an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions." (Loeb tr.)

self."

"Surely."

"And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic element retires before the oligarchical, some of its appetites having been destroyed and others[2085] expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man's soul and order is restored."

"That sometimes happens," he said.

"And sometimes, again, another brood of desires akin to those expelled are stealthily nurtured to take their place, owing to the father's ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong."

"Yes, that is wont to be the way of it."

"And they tug and pull back to the same associations and in secret intercourse engender a multitude."

"Yes indeed."

"And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel[2086] of the young man's soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians[2087] in the minds of men who are dear to the gods."

"Much the best," he said.

"And then false and braggart words[2088] and opinions charge up the height and take their place and occupy that part of such a youth."

"They do indeed."

"And then he returns, does he not, to those Lotus-eaters[2089] and without disguise lives openly with them. And if any support[2090] comes from his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those braggart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress within him and refuse admission to the auxiliary force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys to the words of older friends in private life. And they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming reverence and awe "folly"[2091] thrust it forth, a

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[2084]Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.

[2085]*τινες . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δὲ*. For the partitive apposition cf. 566 E, 584 D, *Gorg.* 499 C. Cf. also *Protag.* 330 A, *Gorg.* 450 C, *Laws* 626 E, Eurip. *Hec.* 1185-1186.

[2086]Cf. *Tim.* 90 A.

[2087]For the idea of guardians of the soul Cf. *Laws* 961 D, 549 B Cf. also on *Phaedo* 113 D, *What Plato Said,* p. 536.

[2088]Cf. *Phaedo* 92 D.

[2089]Plato, like Matthew Arnold, liked to use nicknames for classes of people: Cf. *Rep.* 415 D "γηγενεῖς", *Theaet.* 181 A "ῥέοντας", *Soph.* 248 A "εἰδῶν φίλους", *Phileb.* 44 E "τοῖς δυσχερέσιν". So Arnold in *Culture and Anarchy* uses Populace, Philistines, Barbarians, Friends of Culture, etc., Friends of Physical Science, *Lit. and Dogma,* p. 3.

[2090]*βοήθεια*: cf. Aristot. *De an.* 404 a 12.

dishonored fugitive. And temperance they call "want of manhood" and banish it with contumely, and they teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are "rusticity" and "illiberality," and they combine with a gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive them over the border.[2092]"

"They do indeed."

"And when they have emptied and purged[2093] of all these the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed[2094] and occupied, and whom they are initiating with these magnificent and costly rites,[2095] they proceed to lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and prodigality and shamelessness, resplendent[2096] in a great attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in celebration of their praises they euphemistically denominate insolence "good breeding," licence "liberty," prodigality "magnificence," and shamelessness "manly spirit.""

"And is it not in some such way as this," said I,

"that in his youth the transformation takes place from the restriction to necessary desires in his education to the liberation and release of his unnecessary and harmful desires?"

"Yes, your description is most vivid," said he.

"Then, in his subsequent life, I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time no more on his necessary than on his unnecessary pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the period of storm and stress does not last too long, and as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him passes, and he receives back a part of the banished elements and does not abandon himself altogether to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and maintains all his pleasures on a footing of

[2091]Cf. 474 D, Thucyd. iii. 82 Wilamowitz, *Platon,* i. 435-436 says that Plato had not used Thucydides. But cf. Gomperz iii. 331, and *What Plato Said,* pp. 2-3, 6, 8. See Isoc. *Antid.* 284 "σκώπτειν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένους εὐφυεῖς καλοῦσι", etc., *Areop.* 20 and 49, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1180 b 25, Quintil. iii. 7. 25 and viii. 6. 36, Sallust, *Cat.*C 52 "iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus," etc.

[2092]*ὑπερορίζουσι*: Cf. *Laws* 855 C "ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα", 866 D.

[2093]Cf. 567 C and 573 B where the word is also used ironically, and *Laws* 735, *Polit.* 293 D, *Soph.* 226 D.

[2094]*κατέχομαι* is used of divine "possession" or inspiration in *Phaedr.* 244 E, *Ion* 533 E, 536 B, etc., Xen. *Symp.* 1. 10.

[2095]Plato frequently employs the language of the mysteries for literary effect. Cf. *Gorg.* 497 C, *Symp.* 210 A and 218 B, *Theaet.* 155 E-156 A, *Laws* 666 B, 870 D-E, *Phaedr.* 250 B-C, 249 C, *Phaedo* 81 A, 69 C, *Rep.* 378 A, etc., and Thompson on *Meno* 76 E.

[2096]Cf. Eurip. *fr.* 628. 5 (Nauck), Soph. *El.* 1130.

equality, forsooth,[2097] and so lives turning over the guard-house[2098] of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them all equally.[2099]"

"Quite so."

"And he does not accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honorable and good desires, and others from those that are base,[2100] and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he shakes his head[2101] at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed."

"Such is indeed his state of mind and his conduct."

"And does he not," said I,

"also live out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the day, now wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute[2102] and again drinking only water and dieting; and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up[2103] and says and does whatever enters his head.[2104] And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end."

"That is a perfect description," he said,

[2097]For the ironical δή cf. 562 D, 563 B, 563 D, 374 B, 420 E and on 562 E, p. 307, note h.

[2098]Cf. *Phaedr.* 241 A "μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ". For this type of youth Cf. Thackeray's Barnes Newcome. For the lot cf. *ibid*, p. 285, note d, on 557 A.

[2099]Notice the frequency of the phrase ἐξ ἴσου in this passage. Cf. 557 A.

[2100]An obvious reference to the *Gorgias*. Cf. *Gorg.* 494 E, *Phileb.* 13 B ff., *Protag.* 353 D ff., *Laws* 733.

[2101]The Greek Says "throws back his head"—the characteristic negative gesture among Greeks. In Aristoph. *Acharn.* 115 the supposed Persians give themselves away by nodding assent and dissent in Hellenic style, as Dicaeopolis says.

[2102]For the word καταυλούμενος cf. 411 A, *Laws* 790 E, Lucian, *Bis acc.* 17, and for the passive Eur. *I. T.* 367. Cf. also Philetaerus, *Philaulus, fr.* 18, Kock ii. p. 235, Eur. *fr.* 187. 3 "μολποῖσι δ' ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ' ἀεὶ θηρεύεται". For the type cf. Theophrastus, *Char.* 11, Aristoph. *Wasps* 1475 ff.

[2103]Cf. *Protag.* 319 D.

[2104]For *ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ* cf. on 536 A, p. 213, note f,*ὅταν τύχῃ*Eurip. *Hippol.* 428, *I. T.* 722, Eurip. *Fr.* 825 (Didot),*ὅπου ἂν τύχωσιν*Xen. *Oec.* 20. 28,*ὃν ἂν τύχῃς*Eurip. *Tor.* 68.

"of a devotee of equality."

"I certainly think," said I,

"that he is a manifold[2105] man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that like that city[2106] he is the fair and many-colored one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities."

"Yes, that is so," he said.

"Shall we definitely assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with democracy and would properly be designated as democratic?"

"Let that be his place," he said.

"And now," said I,

"the fairest[2107] polity and the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny and the tyrant."

"Certainly," he said.

"Come then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises.[2108] That it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain."

"Yes, plain."

"Is it, then, in a sense, in the same way in which democracy arises out of oligarchy that tyranny arises from democracy?"

"How is that?"

"The good that they proposed to themselves[2109] and that was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it was wealth,[2110] was it not?"

"Yes."

"Well, then, the insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything else for the sake of money-making was the cause of its undoing."

"True," he said.

"And is not the avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and criterion of good the thing which dissolves it[2111] too?"

[2105] *παντοδαπόν*: cf. on 557 C.

[2106] Cf. 557 D.

[2107] For the irony cf. 607 E "τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν", 544 C "γενναία", 558 C "ἡδεῖα".

[2108] *τίς τρόπος . . . γήγνεται* is a mixture of two expressions that need not be pressed. Cf. *Meno* 96 D, *Epist.* vii. 324 B. A. G. Laird, in *Class. Phil.,* 1918, pp. 89-90 thinks it means "What *τρόπος* (of the many *τρόποι* in a democracy) develops into a *τρόπος* of tyranny; for that tyranny is a transformation of democracy is fairly evident." That would be a recognition of what Aristotle says previous thinkers overlook in their classification of polities.

[2109] Their idea of good. Cf. 555 b "προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ". Cf. *Laws* 962 E with Aristot. *Pol.* 1293 b 14 ff. Cf. also Aristot. *Pol.* 1304 b 20 "αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν". Cf. also p. 263, note e on 551 B (*ὅρος*) and p. 139, note c on 519 C (*σκοπός*).

[2110] Cf. 552 B, and for the disparagement of wealth p. 262, note b, on 550 E.

"What do you say its criterion to be?"

"Liberty,[2112]" I replied;

"for you may hear it said that this is best managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care to live.[2113]"

"Why, yes," he replied,

"you hear that saying everywhere."

"Then, as I was about to observe,[2114] is it not the excess and greed of this and the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of a dictatorship?"

"How?" he said.

"Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers for its leaders[2115] and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine,[2116] and then, if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly,it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed[2117] oligarchs.[2118]"

"Yes, that is what they do," he replied.

"But those who obey the rulers," I said,

"it reviles as willing slaves[2119] and men of naught,[2120] but it commends and honors in public and private rulers who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty should go to all lengths[2121]?"

[2111]Zeller, *Aristot.* ii. p. 285, as usual credits Aristotle with the Platonic thought that every form of government brings ruin on itself by its own excess.

[2112]Cf. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy,* p. 43 "The central idea of English life and politics is the assertion of personal liberty."

[2113]Aristot. *Pol.* 1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in Plato's *Republic.*

[2114]*ᾗ . . . ἐρῶν*: cf. 449 A, *Theaet.* 180 C.

[2115]Or "protectors," "tribunes,"*προστατούντων.* Cf. on 565 C, p. 318, note d.

[2116]Cf. Livy xxxix. 26 "velut ex diutina siti nimis avide meram haurientes libertatem," Seneca, *De benefic.* i. 10 "male dispensata libertas," Taine, *Letter,*Jan. 2, 1867 "nous avons proclamé et appliqué l'égalité . . . C'est un vin pur et généreux; mais nous avons bu trop du nôtre."

[2117]*μαρούς* is really stronger, "pestilential fellows." Cf. *Apol.* 23 D, Soph. *Antig.* 746. It is frequent in Aristophanes.

[2118]For the charge of oligarchical tendencies cf. Isoc. *Peace* 51 and 133, *Areop.* 57, *Antid.* 318, *Panath.* 158.

[2119]Cf. *Symp.* 184 C, 183 A. Cf. the essay of Estienne de la Boétie, *De la servitude volontaire.* Also Gray, *Ode for Music,* 6 "Servitude that hugs her chain."

[2120]For *οὐδὲν ὄντας* cf. 341 C, *Apol.* 41 E, *Symp.* 216 E, *Gorg.* 512 C, *Erastae* 134 C, Aristoph. *Eccles.* 144, Horace, *Sat.* ii. 7. 102 "nil ego," Eurip. *I. A.* 371, Herod. ix. 58 "οὐδένες ἐόντες".

[2121]Cf. *Laws* 699 E "ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν", Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 543 "ἐπὶ πᾶν ἰέναι", Soph. *El.* 615 "εἰς πᾶν ἔργον".

"Of course."

"And this anarchical temper," said I,

"my friend, must penetrate into private homes and finally enter into the very animals.[2122]"

"Just what do we mean by that?" he said.

"Why," I said,

"the father habitually tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his sons, and the son likens himself to the father and feels no awe or fear of his parents,[2123] so that he may be forsooth a free man.[2124] And the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner likewise."

"Yes, these things do happen," he said.

"They do," said I,

"and such other trifles as these. The teacher in such case fears and fawns upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the teacher or to their overseers either. And in general the young ape their elders and vie with them in speech and action, while the old, accommodating[2125] themselves to the young, are full of pleasantry[2126] and graciousness, imitating the young for fear they may be thought disagreeable and authoritative."

"By all means," he said.

"And the climax of popular liberty, my friend," I said,

"is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free[2127] than the owners who paid for them. And I

[2122]Cf. 563 C, *Laws* 942 D.

[2123]A common conservative complaint. Cf. Isoc. *Areop.* 49, Aristoph. *Clouds,* 998, 1321 ff., Xen. *Rep. Ath.* 1. 10, *Mem.* iii. 5. 15; Newman i. pp. 174 and 339-340. Cf. also Renan, *Souvenirs,* xviii.-xx., on American vulgarity and liberty; Harold Lasswell, quoting Bryce, "Modern Democracies," in *Methods of Social Science,* ed. by Stuart A. Rice, p. 376: "The spirit of equality is alleged to have diminished the respect children owe to parents, and the young to the old. This was noted by Plato in Athens. But surely the family relations depend much more on the social, structural and religious ideas of a race than on forms of government"; Whitman, "Where the men and women think lightly of the laws . . . where children are taught to be laws to themselves . . . there the great city stands."

[2124]For the ironical ἵνα δή cf. on 561 B. Cf. *Laws* 962 E "ἐλεύθερον δή", *Meno* 86 and Aristoph. *Clouds* 1414.

[2125]Cf. *Protag.* 336 A, *Theaet.* 174 A, 168 B.

[2126]For εὐτραπελίας cf. Isoc. xv. 296, vii. 49, Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1108 a 23. In *Rhet.* 1389 b 11 he defnes it as πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις. Arnold once addressed the Eton boys on the word.

[2127]Cf. Xen. *Rep. Ath.* 1. 10. "τῶν δούλων δ' αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείστη ἐστὶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀκολασία", Aristoph. *Clouds init.,* and on slavery *Laws* 777 E, p. 249, note g on 547 C and 549 A.

almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men."

"Shall we not, then," said he,

"in Aeschylean phrase,[2128] say "whatever rises to our lips"?"

"Certainly," I said,

"so I will. Without experience of it no one would believe how much freer the very beasts[2129] subject to men are in such a city than elsewhere. The dogs literally verify the adage[2130] and "like their mistresses become." And likewise the horses and asses are wont to hold on their way with the utmost freedom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets them and who does not step aside.[2131] And so all things everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of liberty.[2132]"

"It is my own dream[2133] you are telling me," he said;

"for it often happens to me when I go to the country."

"And do you note that the sum total of all these items when footed up is that they render the souls of the citizens so sensitive[2134] that they

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[2128]Nauck *fr.* 351. Cf. Plut. *Amat.* 763 C, Themist. *Orat.* iv. p. 52 B; also Otto, p. 39, and Adam *ad loc.*

[2129]Cf. 562 E, Julian, *Misopogon,* 355 B . . . *μέχρι τῶν ὄνων ἐστὶν ἐλευθερία παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν καμήλων; ἄγουσί τοι καὶ ταύτας οἱ μισθωτοὶ διὰ τῶν στοῶν ὥσπερ τὰς νύμφας* " . . . what great independence exists among the citizens, even down to the very asses and camels? The men who hire them out lead even these animals through the porticoes as though they were brides." (Loeb tr.) Cf. Porphyry, *Vit. Pythag.*Teubner, p. 22, 23 "μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων διικνεῖτο αὐτοῦ ἡ νουθέτησις"

[2130]Otto, p. 119. Cf. "Like mistress, like maid."

[2131]Eurip. *Ion* 635-637 mentions being jostled off the street by a worse person as one of the indignities of Athenian city life.

[2132]Cf. the reflections in *Laws* 698 f., 701 A-C, *Epist.* viii. 354 D, *Gorg.* 461 E; Isoc. *Areop.* 20, *Panath.* 131, Eurip. *Cyclops* 120 "ἀκούει δ' οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδενός", Aristot. *Pol.* 1295 b 15 f. Plato, by reaction against the excesses of the ultimate democracy, always satirizes the shibboleth "liberty" in the style of Arnold, Ruskin and Carlyle. He would agree with Goethe (Eckermann i. 219, Jan. 18, 1827) "Nicht das macht frei, das vir nichts über uns erkennen wollen, sondern eben, dass wir etwas verehren, das über uns ist." Libby, *Introd. to Hist. of Science,* p. 273, not understanding the irony of the passage, thinks much of it the unwilling tribute of a hostile critic. In *Gorg.* 484 A Callicles sneers at equality from the point of view of the superman. Cf. also on 558 C, p. 291, note f; Hobbes, *Leviathan* xxi. and Theopompus's account of democracy in *Byzantium, fr.* 65. Similar phenomena may be observed in an American city street or Pullman club car.

[2133]Cf Callimachus, *Anth. Pal.* vi. 310, and xii. 148 "μὴ λέγε . . . τοὐμὸν ὄνειρον ἐμοί", Cic. *Att.* vi. 9. 3, Lucian, *Somnium seu Gallus* 7 "ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὐμὸν ἐνύπνιον ἰδών", Tennyson, "Lucretius": "That was mine, my dream, I knew it."

[2134]This sensitiveness, on which Grote remarks with approval, is characteristic of present-day American democracy. Cf. also Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy,* p. 51 "And so if he is stopped from making Hyde Park a bear garden or the streets impassable

chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude[2135] and will not endure it? For you are aware that they finally pay no heed even to the laws[2136] written or unwritten,[2137] so that forsooth they may have no master anywhere over them."

"I know it very well," said he.

"This, then, my friend," said I,

"is the fine and vigorous root from which tyranny grows, in my opinion."

"Vigorous indeed," he said;

"but what next?"

"The same malady," I said,

"that, arising in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more widely diffused and more violent as a result of this licence, enslaves democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to bring about a corresponding reaction[2138] to the opposite in the seasons, in plants, in animal bodies,[2139] and most especially in political societies."

"Probably," he said.

"And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state."

"Yes, that is probable."

"Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution[2140] than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude."

"That is reasonable," he said.

"That, however, I believe, was not your question,[2141] but what identical[2142] malady arising in democracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it?"

"You say truly," he replied.

"That then," I said,

"was what I had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men,

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he says he is being butchered by the aristocracy."

[2135]Cf. *Gorg.* 491 E "δουλεύων ὀτῳοῦν", *Laws* 890 A.

[2136]Cf. *Laws* 701 B "νόμων ζητεῖν μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι"

[2137]For unwritten law Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 637, on *Laws* 793 A.

[2138]Cf. Lysias xxv. 27, Isoc. viii. 108, vii. 5, Cic. *De rep.* i. 44 "nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus principum, sic hunc nimis liberum . . . " etc.

[2139]For the generalization Cf. *Symp.* 188 A-B.

[2140]Cf. 565 D. The slight exaggeration of the expression is solemnly treated by ApeIt as a case of logical false conversion in Plato.

[2141]Plato keeps to the point. Cf. on 531 C, p. 193, note i.

[2142]*ταὐτόν* implies the concept. Cf. *Parmen.* 130 D, *Phileb.* 34 E, 13 B, *Soph.* 253 D. Cf. also *Tim.* 83 C, *Meno* 72 C, *Rep.* 339 A.

the most enterprising and vigorous portion being leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were likening them to drones,[2143] some equipped with stings and others stingless."

"And rightly too," he said.

"These two kinds, then," I said,

"when they arise in any state, create a disturbance like that produced in the body[2144] by phlegm and gall. And so a good physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and chiefly[2145] to prevent their springing up, but if they do arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells and all."

"Yes, by Zeus," he said,

"by all means."

"Then let us take it in this way," I said,

"so that we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly.[2146]"

"How?"

"Let us in our theory make a tripartite[2147] division of the democratic state, which is in fact its structure. One such class, as we have described, grows up in it because of the licence, no less than in the oligarchic state."

"That is so."

"But it is far fiercer in this state than in that."

"How so?"

"There, because it is not held in honor, but is kept out of office, it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the speaker's stand and keeps up a buzzing[2148] and tolerates[2149] no dissent, so that everything with slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a state."

"Quite so," he said.

[2143] Cf. 555 D-E.

[2144] Cf. the parallel of soul and body in 444 C f., *Soph.* 227 *Crito* 47 D f., *Gorg.* 504 B-C, 505 B, 518 A, 524 D. For *φλέγμα* Cf. *Tim.* 83 C, 85 A-B.

[2145] *μάλιστα μὲν . . . ἂν δέ*: cf. 378 A, 414 C, 461 C, 473 B, *Apol.* 34 A, *Soph.* 246 D.

[2146] For *εὐκρινέστερον* Cf. *Soph.* 246 D.

[2147] Cf. *Phileb.* 23 C, which Stenzel says argues an advance over the Sophist, because Plato is no longer limited to a bipartite division.

[2148] Cf. 573 A.

[2149] *ἀνέχεται* cf. Isoc. viii. 14 "ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὔσης οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία", etc. For the word cf. Aristoph. *Acharn.* 305 "οὐκ ἀνασχήσομαι", *Wasps* 1337.

"And so from time to time there emerges or is secreted from the multitude another group of this sort."

"What sort?" he said.

"When all are pursuing wealth the most orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become the richest."

"It is likely."

"Then they are the most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and it is the easiest to extract.[2150]"

"Why, yes," he said,

"how could one squeeze it out of those who have little?"

"The capitalistic[2151] class is, I take it, the name by which they are designated—the pasture of the drones."

"Pretty much so," he said.

"And the third class,[2152] composing the "people," would comprise all quiet[2153] cultivators of their own farms[2154] who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly."

"Yes, it is," he said,

"but it will not often do that,[2155] unless it gets a share of the honey."

"Well, does it not always share," I said,

"to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing[2156] to the people what they take from the well-to-do,[2157] to keep the lion's share for themselves[2158]?"

"Why, yes," he said,

"it shares in that sense."

"And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their

[2150] For *βλίττεται* cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Knights* 794.

[2151] That is the significance of *πλούσιοι* here, lit. "the rich."

[2152] For the classification of the population cf. Vol. I. pp. 151-163, Eurip. *Suppl.* 238 ff., Aristot. *Pol.* 1328 b ff., 1289 b 33, 1290 b 40 ff., Newman i. p. 97

[2153] *ἀπράγμονες*: cf. 620 C, Aristoph. *Knights* 261, Aristot. *Rhet.* 1381 a 25, Isoc. *Antid.* 151, 227. But Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40 takes a different view. See my note in *Class. Phil.* xv. (1920) pp. 300-301.

[2154] *αὐτουργοί*: Cf. *Soph.* 223 D, Eurip. *Or.* 920, Shorey in *Class. Phil.* xxiii. (1928) pp. 346-347.

[2155] Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1318 b 12.

[2156] Cf. Isoc. viii. 13 "τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους".

[2157] For *τοὺς ἔχοντας* cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Knights* 1295. For the exploitation of the rich at Athens cf. Xen. *Symp.* 4. 30-32, Lysias xxi. 14, xix. 62, xviii. 20-21, Isoc. *Areop.* 32 ff., *Peace* 131, Dem. *De cor.* 105 ff., on his triarchic law; and also Eurip. *Herc. Fur.* 588-592.

[2158] Cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 717-718, 1219-1223, and Achilles in *Il.* ix. 363.

power."

"Of course."

"And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.[2159]"

"Surely."

"And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will[2160] but through misapprehension,[2161] and being misled by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then,[2162] whether they wish it or not,[2163] they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them."

"Precisely."

"And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side."

"Yes, indeed."

"And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector[2164] and cherish and magnify him?"

"Yes, it is."

"This, then, is plain," said I,

"that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root[2165] and from nothing else."

"Very plain."

"What, then, is the starting-point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the protector's acts begin

[2159]i.e. reactionaries. Cf. on 562 D, p. 306, note b, Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 C "μισόδημος". The whole passage perhaps illustrates the "disharmony" between Plato's upperclass sympathies and his liberal philosophy.

[2160]So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph. *Acharn.* 515-516.

[2161]Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1110 a 1, in his discussion of voluntary and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or through misapprehension (*δι' ἄγνοιαν*) are involuntary.

[2162]For *τότ' ἤδη* cf. 569 A, *Phaedo* 87 E, *Gorg.* 527 D, *Laches* 181 D, 184 A, and on 550 A, p. 259, note i.

[2163]So Aristot. *Pol.* 1304 b 30 "ἠναγκάσθησαν σύσταντες καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆμον", Isoc. xv. 318 "ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες . . . ἠνάγκασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις".

[2164]Cf. 562 D, Eurip. *Or.* 772 "προστάτας", Aristoph. *Knights* 1128. The *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου* was the accepted leader of the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, *S. I. G.* 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476. The implications of this passage contradict the theory that the oligarchy is nearer the ideal than the democracy. But Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme. Cf. Introd. pp. xlv-xlvi.

[2165]Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1310 b 14 "οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν", etc., *ibid.* 1304 b 20 ff.

to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia[2166]?"

"What is that?" he said.

"The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale?"

"I have."

"And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob,[2167] does not withhold his hand from the shedding of tribal blood,[2168] but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, blotting out[2169] a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands[2170]—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate[2171] that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf?"

"It is quite inevitable," he said.

"He it is," I said,

"who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property.[2172]"

"Yes, he."

"May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant?"

"Obviously."

"And if they are unable to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth."

[2166]Cf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p. 189) and Cook's *Zeus,* vol. i. p. 70. The archaic religious rhetoric of what follows testifies to the intensity of Plato's feeling. Cf. the language of the *Laws* on homicide, 865 ff.

[2167]Note the difference of tone from 502 B. Cf. *Phaedr.* 260 C.

[2168]Cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* ii. 32; Lucan i. 331: "nullus semel ore receptus Pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces."

[2169]For *ἀφανίζων* Cf. *Gorg.* 471 B.

[2170]The apparent contradiction of the tone here with *Laws* 684 E could be regarded mistakenly as another "disharmony." Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical measures in Greek history. Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen,* ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, *Les Idées politiques d'Isocrate,* p. 150, who refers to Andoc. *De myst.* 88, Plato, *Laws* 684, Demosth. *Against Timocr.* 149 (heliastic oath), Michel, *Recueil d'inscriptions grecques,* 1317, the oath at Itanos.

[2171]Cf. 619 C.

[2172]Cf. 565 A.

"That is certainly wont to happen," said he.

"And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition[2173] of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe[2174] for the friend of democracy."

"They do indeed," he said.

"And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves."

"Yes, indeed."

"And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth the repute of hostility to democracy,[2175] then in the words of the oracle delivered to Croesus, "By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos Swift is his flight, he stays not nor blushes to show the white feather." *Hdt. 1.55*"

"No, for he would never get a second chance to blush."

"And he who is caught, methinks, is delivered to his death."

"Inevitably."

"And then obviously that protector does not lie prostrate, "mighty with far-flung limbs," *Hom. Il. 16.776* in Homeric overthrow,[2176] but overthrowing many others towers in the car of state[2177] transformed from a protector into a perfect and finished tyrant."

"What else is likely?" he said.

"Shall we, then, portray the happiness," said I,

"of the man and the state in which such a creature arises?"

"By all means let us describe it," he said.

"Then at the start and in the first days does he not smile[2178] upon all men and greet everybody he meets and deny that he is a tyrant, and promise many things in private and public, and having freed men from debts, and distributed lands to the people and his own associates, he affects a gracious and gentle manner to all?"

"Necessarily," he said.

[2173]Cf Herod. i. 59, Aristot. *Rhet.* 1357 b 30 ff. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1305 a 7-15, says that this sort of thing used to happen but does not now, and explains why. For *πολυθρύλητον* Cf. *Phaedo* 100 B.

[2174]For the ethical dative *αὐτοῖς* cf. on 343 Vol. I. p. 65, note c.

[2175]For *μισόδημος* cf. Aristoph. *Wasps* 474, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast *φιλόδημον*, Aristoph. *Knights* 787, *Clouds* 1187.

[2176]In *Hom. Il. 16.776* Cebriones, Hector's charioteer, slain by Patroclus,*κεῖτο μέγας μεγαλωστί*, "mighty in his mightiness." (A. T. Murray, Loeb tr.)

[2177]For the figure Cf. *Polit.* 266 E. More common in Plato is the figure of the ship in this connection. Cf. on 488.

[2178]Cf. Eurip. *I. A.* 333 ff., Shakes. *Henry IV.*Part I. I. iii. 246 "This king of smiles, this Bolingbroke."

"But when, I suppose, he has come to terms with some of his exiled enemies[2179] and has got others destroyed and is no longer disturbed by them, in the first place he is always stirring up some war[2180] so that the people may be in need of a leader."

"That is likely."

"And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him?"

"Obviously."

"And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking wars[2181]?"

"Yes, he is compelled to do so."

"And by such conduct will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens?"

"Of course."

"And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish[2182] and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?"

"Yes, it is likely."

"Then the tyrant must do away[2183] with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe."

"Obviously."

"He must look sharp to see, then, who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city.[2184]"

[2179]Not "foreign enemies" as almost all render it. Cf. my note on this passage in *Class. Rev.* xix. (1905) pp. 438-439, 573 B "ἔξω ὠθεῖ", Theognis 56, Thuc. iv. 66 and viii. 64.

[2180]Cf. *Polit.* 308 A, and in modern times the case of Napoleon.

[2181]For *ταράττειν* in this sense cf. Dem. *De cor.* 151 "ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος . . . ἐταράχθη", Soph. *Antig.* 795 "νεῖκος . . . ταράξας".

[2182]*ξυγκαταστησάντων* is used in Aesch. *Prom.* 307 of those who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods. See also Xen *Ages.* 2.31, *Isoc. 4.126.*

[2183]Cf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. *δή*, as often in the *Timaeus,* marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf. *Tim.* 67 C, 69 A, 77 C, 82 B, and *passim.*

[2184]Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i. p. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and outstanding men Cf. *Laws* 832 C, *Gorg.* 510 B-C, Xen. *Hiero* 5. I, Isoc. viii.

"A fine purgation," he said.

"Yes," said I,

"just the opposite of that which physicians practise on our bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse."

"Yes, for apparently he must," he said,

"if he is to keep his power."

"Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him," said I,

"which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life."

"Such it is," he said.

"And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards?"

"Of course."

"Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them?"

"Unbidden," he said,

"they will wing their way[2185] to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage."

"Drones, by the dog," I said,

"I think you are talking of again, an alien[2186] and motley crew.[2187]"

"You think rightly," he said.

"But what of the home supply,[2188] would he not choose to employ that?"

"How?"

"By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard."

"Assuredly," he said,

"since these are those whom he can most trust."

"Truly," said I,

"this tyrant business[2189] is a blessed[2190] thing on your showing, if

112, Eurip. *Ion* 626-628. But cf. Pindar, *Pyth,* iii, 71, of Hiero,*οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς.*

[2185]Cf. *Laws* 952 E, *Rep.* 467 D.

[2186]Cf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatics in the Soviet armies.

[2187]*παντοδαπούς*: cf. on 557 C.

[2188]For *αὐτόθεν* cf. Herod. i. 64 "τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος", Thuc. i. 11, Xen. *Ages.* 1. 28.

[2189]For the idiomatic and colloquial *χρῆμα* cf. Herod. i. 36, Eurip. *Androm.* 181, *Theaet.* 209 E, Aristoph. *Clouds* 1, *Birds* 826, *Wasps* 933, *Lysistr.* 83, 1085, *Acharn.* 150, *Peace* 1192, *Knights* 1219, Frogs 1278.

such are the friends and "trusties" he must employ after destroying his former associates."

"But such are indeed those he does make use of," he said.

"And these companions admire him," I said,

"and these new citizens are his associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him."

"Why should they not?"

"Not for nothing,[2191]" said I,

"is tragedy in general esteemed wise, and Euripides beyond other tragedians.[2192]"

"Why, pray?"

"Because among other utterances of pregnant thought[2193] he said, "Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.[2194]" He meant evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise."

"Yes, he and the other poets," he said,

"call the tyrant's power "likest God's"[2195] and praise it in many other ways."

"Wherefore," said I,

"being wise as they are, the poets of tragedy will pardon us and those whose politics resemble ours for not admitting them[2196] into our polity, since they hymn the praises of tyranny."

"I think," he said,

"that the subtle minds[2197] among them will pardon us."

"But going about to other cities, I fancy, collecting crowds and hiring fine, loud, persuasive voices,[2198] they draw the polities towards tyrannies or democracies."

"Yes, indeed."

"And, further, they are paid and honored for this, chiefly, as is

[2190]For the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. p. 368, note a.

[2191]For *οὐκ ἐτός* cf. 414 E. The idiom is frequent in Aristoph. Cf. e.g. *Acharn.* 411, 413, *Birds* 915, *Thesm.* 921, *Plut.* 404, 1166, *Eccl.* 245.

[2192]This is plainly ironical and cannot be used by the admirers of Euripides.

[2193]Cf. "πυκιναὶ φρένες" *Iliad* xiv. 294, "πυκινὸς νόος" xv. 41 etc.

[2194]Cf. *Theages* 125 B f. The line is also attributed to Sophocles. Cf. Stemplinger, *Das Plagiat in der griechischen Literatur,* p. 9; Gellius xiii. 18, F. Dümmler, *Akademika,* p. 16. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* i. p. 119 thinks this an allusion to Euripides and Agathon at the court of Archelaus of Macedon. Isocrates ix. 40, like the poets, praises the tyrants, but ii. 3-5 contrasts their education unfavorably with that of the ordinary citizen. Throughout the passage he is plainly thinking of Plato.

[2195]Cf. Vol. I. p. 119, note c, Eurip. *Tro.* 1169, Isoc. ii. 5.

[2196]Cf. 394 D, *What Plato Said,* p. 561, 598 ff.

[2197]*κομψοί* is used playfully or ironically.

[2198]Cf. *Gorg.* 502 B ff., *Laws* 817 C, and for the expression *Protag.* 347 D.

to be expected, by tyrants, and secondly by democracy.[2199] But the higher they go, breasting constitution hill, the more their honor fails, as it were from lack of breath[2200] unable to proceed."

"Quite so."

"But this," said I,

"is a digression.[2201] Let us return to that fair, multitudinous, diversified and ever-changing bodyguard of the tyrant and tell how it will be supported."

"Obviously," he said,

"if there are sacred treasures in the city he will spend these as long as they last and the property of those he has destroyed, thus requiring smaller contributions from the populace."

"But what when these resources fail[2202]?"

"Clearly," he said,

"his father's estate will have to support him and his wassailers, his fellows and his she-fellows."

"I understand," I said,

"that the people which begot the tyrant[2203] will have to feed him and his companions."

"It cannot escape from that," he said.

"And what have you to say," I said,

"in case the people protests and says that it is not right that a grown-up son should be supported by his father, but the reverse, and that it did not beget and establish him in order that, when he had grown great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector, it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and the so-called "better classes,"[2204] and that it now bids him and his crew depart from the city as a father expels[2205] from his house a son together with troublesome revellers?"

"The demos, by Zeus," he said,

"will then learn to its cost[2206] what it is and what[2207] a creature it

[2199]Cf. *Laches* 183 A-B.

[2200]Cf. Shakes. *Ant. and Cleop.*III. X. 25 "Our fortune on the sea is out of breath".

[2201]Cf. on 572 B, p. 339, note e.

[2202]Cf. 574 D, Diels1 p. 578, Anon. Iambl. 3.

[2203]Cf. Soph. *O. T.* 873 "ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον".

[2204]For *καλῶν κἀγαθῶν* cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 185, and Blaydes on 735. See also on 489 E, p. 27, note d.

[2205]Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 123.

[2206]For the threatening *γνώσεται* cf. 362 A, 466 C, *Il.* xviii. 270 and 125, Theocr. xxvi. 19 "τάχα γνώσῃ", and Lucian, *Timon* 33 "εἴσεται".

begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to expel the stronger."

"What do you mean?" said I;

"will the tyrant dare to use force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to strike him[2208]?"

"Yes," he said,

"after he has once taken from him his arms."

"A very parricide," said I,

"you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged into the fire[2209] of enslavement to slaves, and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable liberty[2210] has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel and bitter servile servitude.[2211]"

"Yes indeed," he said,

"that is just what happens."

"Well, then," said I,

"shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we have sufficiently described the transformation of a democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the tyranny itself?"

"Quite sufficiently," he said.

[2207]For the juxtaposition *οἷος οἷον* Cf. *Symp.* 195 A, Sophocles *El.* 751, *Ajax* 557, 923, *Trach.* 995, 1045.

[2208]Cf. on 574 C, pp. 346-347, note e.

[2209]As we say, "Out of the frying-pan into the fire." Cf. *Anth. Pal.* ix. 17. 5 "ἐκ πυρὸς ὡς αἶνος 'πεσες ἐς φλόγα", Theodoret, *Therap.* iii. p. 773 "καὶ τὸν καπνὸν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, ὡς ἔοικε, φύγοντες, εἰς αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ἐμπεπτώκαμεν". See Otto, p. 137; also Solon 7 (17) (*Anth. Lyr.*,Bergk-Hiller, 9 in Edmonds, *Greek Elegy and Iambus,* i. p. 122, Loeb Classical Library) "εἰς δὲ μονάρχου δῆμος ἀιδρείῃ δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν", Herod. iii. 81 "τυράννου ὕβριν φεύγοντας ἄνδρας ἐς δήμου ἀκολάστου ὕβριν πεσεῖν", and for the idea *Epist.* viii. 354 D.

[2210]Cf. *Epist.* viii. 354 D.

[2211]For the rhetorical style Cf. *Tim.* 41 "θεοὶ θεῶν", *Polit.* 303 C "σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς", and the biblical expressions, God of Gods and Lord of Lords, e.g. *Deut.* x. 17, *Ps.* cxxxvi. 2-3, *Dan.* xi. 36, *Rev.* xix. 16. Cf. Jebb on Soph. *O. T.* 1063 "τρίδουλος".

Book 9

"There remains for consideration," said I,

"the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy."

"Why, yes, he still remains," he said.

"Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss?"

"What?"

"In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clearness."

"Well," said he,

"will our consideration of them not still be opportune[2212]?"

"By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures[2213] and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled[2214] by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous."

"What desires do you mean?" he said.

"Those," said I,

"that are awakened in sleep[2215] when the rest of the soul, the ratio-

[2212]For *ἐν καλῷ* cf. Soph. *El.* 348, Eurip. *Heracleid.* 971, Aristoph. *Eccl.* 321, *Thesm.* 292.

[2213]Cf. on 558 D.

[2214]For *κολαζόμεναι* cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c.

[2215]Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 102 b 5 ff. "ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον", etc.; also his *Problem.* 957 a 21 ff. Cic. *De divin.* i. 29 translates

nal, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts.[2216] You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly[2217] and shamelessness."

"Most true," he said.

"But when, I suppose, a man's condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep[2218] and not disturb the better

this passage. Cf. further Herod. vi. 107, Soph. *O.T.* 981-982. Hazlitt writes "We are not hypocrites in our sleep," a modern novelist, "In sleep all barriers are down." The Freudians have at last discovered Plato's anticipation of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.* p. 74: "It has been perhaps Freud's most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the conscious field." "The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep" sententiously observes an eminent modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, *The New Psychology of the Unconscious,* p. xiii. and *ibid.* p. 93: "Freud refers to Plato's view that the virtuous man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following passage in the *Republic.* . . . " Cf. *ibid.* p. 95: "The germ of several aspects of the Freudian view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the censor, was to be found in Plato. The Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable." Many of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, exalted the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, and made it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on Aesch. *Eumen.* 104, Pindar, *fr.* 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589: "εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὐδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις | δείκνυσι τέρπνων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν", "but it sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, in many a dream it giveth presage of a decision of things delightful or doleful." (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic. *De div.* i. 30, Sir Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici,* pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf. the irony of *Tim.* 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart's "Myths of Plato," *Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods,* vol. iii., 1906, pp. 495-498.

[2216]The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the context for *ἤθος, φύσις* and such words.

[2217]For the idiom *οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει* cf. Soph. *Trach.* 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 D and on 593 A, p. 200, note b.

[2218]Cf. Browning, *Bishop Blougram's Apology,* "And body gets its sop and holds its noise." Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the *Republic*, *Laws*, *Gorgias* and *Phaedo.* Cf. Herbert L. Stewart, "Was Plato an Ascetic?" *Philos. Re.,* 1915, pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, *Christian Ethics,* p. 90: "The asceticism of the true

part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future;"

"and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep[2219] with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case[2220] he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless."[2221]

"I certainly think so," he said.

"This description has carried us too far,[2222] but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,[2223] a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it."

"Well, I do."

"Now recall[2224] our characterization of the democratic man. His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so?"

"Yes."

"And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father's niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being drawn both ways he settles

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Platonist has always been sane moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination of self-restraint and simplicity with humanism."

[2219]Cf. *Ephesians* iv. 26 "Let not the sun go down upon your wrath."

[2220]*ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ*: cf. 382 B, 465 A, 470 C, 492 C, 590 A, *Lysis* 212 C, *Laws* 625 D.

[2221]This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, "Pater's complaint that Plato's sentences are long may be regarded as Pater's single excursion into humor." But Pater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato's example. He calls this passage Plato's evening prayer.

[2222]Plato always returns to the point after a digression. Cf. 543 C, 471 C, 544 B, 568 D, 588 B, *Phaedo* 78 B, *Theaet.* 177 C, *Protag.* 359 A, *Crat.* 438 A, *Polit.* 287 A-B, 263 C, 302 B, *Laws* 682 E, 697 C, 864 C, and many other passages. Cf. also *Lysias* ii. 61 "ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθην", Demosth. *De cor.* 211, Aristot. *De an.* 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, and Plato's carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in 353 C, *Theaet.* 182 C, 206 C, *Meno* 93 A-B, *Gorg.* 479 D-E, 459 C-D, etc.

[2223]For the irony of the expression Cf. *Laws* 693 D, Aesch. *Eumen.* 373.

[2224]Cf. 559 D f.

down in a compromise[2225] between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth,[2226] as he supposes,[2227] he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat."

"That was and is our belief about this type."

"Assume,[2228] then, again," said I,

"that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn[2229] in his ways of life."

"I so assume."

"And suppose the experience of his father to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his other kin lend support to[2230] these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group."

"And when these dread magi[2231] and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in his soul a ruling passion[2232] to be the protector[2233] of his idle and prodigal[2234] appetites, a monstrous winged[2235] drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?"

"Nothing but that," he said.

"And when the other appetites, buzzing[2236] about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,[2237] why then this protector of the soul has madness for his body-guard and runs amuck,[2238] and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites ac-

[2225] *εἰς μέσον*: cf. p. 249, note f.

[2226] Ironical. *δή*. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire on "moderate" drinking and "moderate" preparedness.

[2227] *ὡς ᾤετο* is another ironical formula like *ἵνα δή, ὡς ἄρα*, etc.

[2228] *θές*: Cf. *Theaet.* 191 C, *Phileb.* 33 D.

[2229] This is the *αὖ* of the succession of the generations. Cf. p. 247, note f.

[2230] Cf. 559 E.

[2231] An overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff.

[2232] Cf. *Symp.* 205 D.

[2233] *προστάτην*: cf. 562 D and 565 C-D.

[2234] For *τὰ ἕτοιμα* cf. 552 B, *Symp.* 200 D and E, and Horace, *Odes* i. 31. 17 "frui paratis."

[2235] Cf. *Alc. I.* 135 E "ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον" and the fragment of Eubulus (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178): *τίς ἦν ὁ γράψας πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἄρα ἢ κηροπλαστήσας Ἔρωθ' ὑπόπτερον*

[2236] Cf. 564 D.

[2237] Cf. *Phaedrus* 253 E.

counted[2239] worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges[2240] him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.[2241]"

"A perfect description," he said,

"of the generation of the tyrannical man."

"And is not this analogy," said I,

"the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant[2242]?"

"That may well be," he said.

"And does not a drunken man,[2243] my friend," I said,

"have something of this tyrannical temper?"

"Yes, he has."

"And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods."

"Yes indeed, he does," he said.

"Then a man becomes tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend," I said,

"when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal."

"Assuredly."

"Such, it seems, is his origin and character,[2244] but what is his manner of life?"

"As the wits say, you shall tell me.[2245]"

"I do," I said;

"for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans[2246] and all the doings of those whose[2247] souls are entirely swayed[2248] by the indwelling tyrant Eros."

[2238] For *οἰστρᾷ* Cf. *Phaedr.* 240 D.

[2239] For *ποιουμένας* in this sense cf. 538 C, 498 A, 574 D.

[2240] Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c.

[2241] *ἐπακτοῦ*: cf. 405 B, Pindar, *Pyth.* vi. 10, Aesch. *Seven against Thebes* 583, Soph. *Trach.* 259.

[2242] Cf. 573 D, Eurip. *Hippol.* 538, *Andromeda, fr.* 136 (Nauck) *θεῶν τύραννε . . . Ἔρως*, and *What Plato Said,* p. 546 on *Symp.* 197 B.

[2243] For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood Cf. *Laws* 649 B, 671 B, *Phaedr,* 238 B.

[2244] Cf. Adam *ad loc.*, who insists it means *his* origin as well as that of others, and says his character is still to be described. But it has been in C and before.

[2245] Cf. *Phileb.* 25 B and perhaps *Rep.* 427 E with 449 D. The slight jest is a commonplace today. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the *Philebus.*

[2246] Cf. Vol. I. p 160, note a on 373 A. Emendations are superfluous.

[2247] *ὧν ἄν*: cf. 441 D-E *ὅτου*, etc., 583 A "ἐν ᾧ" and my review of Jowett and Campbell, *A.J.P.* xvi. p. 237.

[2248] Cf. *Phaedr.* 238 B-C.

"Inevitably," he said.

"And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things?"

"Many indeed."

"And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended."

"Of course."

"And after this there are borrowings and levyings[2249] upon the estate?"

"Of course."

"And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings[2250] of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?"

"Most certainly."

"And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every source[2251] or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.[2252]"

"He is."

"And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better[2253] of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father's estate."

"Of course," he said,

"what else?"

"And if they resist him, would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them?"

"Certainly."

"And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force?"

"I think so," he said.

"And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant?"

"I am not without my fears," he said,

"for the parents of such a one."

[2249] For *παραιρέσεις* cf. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot. *Pol.* 1311 a 12, 1315 a 38.

[2250] *ἐννεοττευμένας* Cf. *Alc. I.* 135 E, *Laws* 776 A, 949 C, Aristoph. *Birds* 699, 1108.

[2251] Cf. Aesch. *Eumen.* 544.

[2252] Cf. *Gorg.* 494 A "ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας".

[2253] Cf. Vol. I. 349 B f.

"Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven's name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his by necessity[2254] and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows[2255] upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favorites if he brought them under the same roof?"

"Yes, by Zeus," he said.

"A most blessed lot it seems to be," said I,

"to be the parent of a tyrant son."

"It does indeed," he said.

"And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted[2256] and fail such a one, and the swarm[2257] of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall[2258] of someone's house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep[2259] of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honorable and the base, the opinions accounted just,[2260] will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated[2261] and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul."

"But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity,[2262] so to speak, of him in whom it dwells[2263] to dare anything

[2254]The word *ἀναγκαῖαν* means both "necessary" and "akin." Cf. Eurip. *Androm.* 671 "τοιαῦτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φίλους".

[2255]For the idiom *πληγαῖς . . . δοῦναι* Cf. *Phaedr.* 254 E "ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν" with Thompson's note. Cf. 566 C "θανάτῳ δέδοται". For striking his father cf. 569 B, *Laws* 880 E ff., Aristoph. *Clouds* 1375 ff., 1421 ff.

[2256]For *ἐπιλείπῃ* cf. 568 E, 573 E.

[2257]Cf. *Meno* 72 A, *Cratyl.* 401 E, Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 297.

[2258]He becomes a *τοιχωρύχος* or a *λωποδύτης* (Aristoph. *Frogs* 772-773, *Birds* 497, *Clouds* 1327). Cf. 575 B, *Laws* 831 E.

[2259]*νεωκορήσει* is an ironical litotes. So *ἐφάψεται* in the preceding line.

[2260]For *ποιουμένας* cf. 573 B. for the thought cf 538 C.

[2261]Cf. 567 E.

[2262]Cf. on 591 E.

and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen,[2264] in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one?"

"It is this," he said.

"And if," I said,

"there are only a few of this kind in a city, and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquillity they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils."

"What kind of evils do you mean?"

"Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap,[2265] and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes."

"Yes, small evils indeed,[2266]" he said,

"if the men of this sort are few."

"Why, yes," I said,

"for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don't come within hail[2267] of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out of that one of them who has the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul."

"Naturally," he said,

"for he would be the most tyrannical."

"Then if the people yield willingly—'tis well,[2268] but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastized his

[2263] *τὸν ἔχοντα*: Cf. *Phaedr.* 239 C, *Laws* 837 B, Soph. *Antig.* 790 and also *Rep.* 610 C and E.

[2264] For the tyrant's companions cf. Newman, i. p. 274, note 1.

[2265] Cf. the similar lists of crimes in *Gorg.* 508 E, Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 62.

[2266] So Shaw and other moderns argue in a somewhat different tone that crimes of this sort are an unimportant matter.

[2267] *οὐδ' ἵκταρ βάλλει* was proverbial, "doesn't strike near," "doesn't come within range." Cf. Aelian, *N.A.* xv. 29. Cf. also *οὐδ' ἐγγύς*, *Symp.* 198 B, 221 D, Herod. ii. 121, Demosth. *De cor.* 97.

[2268] In the Greek the apodosis is suppressed. Cf. *Protag.* 325 D. Adam refers to Herwerden, *Mn.* xix. pp. 338 f.

mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear motherland[2269]—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man's desire.[2270]"

"Yes," he said,

"this, just this."

"Then," said I,

"is not this the character of such men in private life and before they rule the state: to begin with they associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything to serve them, or, if they themselves want something, they themselves fawn[2271] and shrink from no contortion[2272] or abasement in protest of their friendship, though, once the object gained, they sing another tune.[2273]"

"Yes indeed," he said.

"Throughout their lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedom[2274] or true friendship."

"Quite so."

"May we not rightly call such men faithless[2275]?"

"Of course."

"Yes, and unjust to the last degree, if we were right in our previous agreement about the nature of justice."

"But surely," he said,

"we were right."

"Let us sum up,[2276] then," said I,

"the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who, in his

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[2269]So also the Hindus of Bengal, *The Nation,*July 13, 1911, p. 28. Cf. Isoc. iv. 25 "πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα", Lysias ii. 18 "μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα", Plut. 792 E (*An seni resp.*) "ἡ δὲ πατρὶς καὶ μητρὶς ὡς Κρῆτες καλοῦσι". Vol. I. p. 303, note e, on 414 E, *Menex.* 239 A.

[2270]Cf. the accidental coincidence of Swinburne's refrain, "This is the end of every man's desire" (*Ballad of Burdens*).

[2271]*ὑποπεσόντες*: cf. on 494 C "ὑποκείσονται".

[2272]*σχήματα* was often used for the figures of dancing. Cf. *Laws* 669 D, Aristoph. *Peace* 323, Xen. *Symp.* 7. 5, Eurip. *Cyclops* 221. Isoc. *Antid.* 183 uses it of gymnastics.

[2273]Cf. *Phaedr.* 241 A "ἄλλος γεγονώς", Demosth. xxxiv. 13 "ἕτερος ἤδη . . . καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός".

[2274]Cf. Lucian, *Nigrinus* 15 "ἄγευστος μὲν ἐλευθερίας, ἀπείρατος δὲ παρρησίας"Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1176 b 19, 1179 b 15.

[2275]Cf. *Laws* 730 C, 705 A.

[2276]Cf. *Phaedr.* 239 D "ἓν κεφάλαιον"

waking hours, has the qualities we found in his dream state."

"Quite so."

"And he is developed from the man who, being by nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and the longer he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger this quality becomes."

"Inevitably," said Glaucon, taking up the argument.

"And shall we find," said I,

"that the man who is shown to be the most evil will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserable[2277] in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.[2278]"

"That much, certainly," he said,

"must needs be true."

"Does not the tyrannical man," said I,

"correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude,[2279] the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise?"

"Surely."

"And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness is the same as that of the man to the man?"

"Of course."

"What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it?"

"They are direct contraries," he said;

"the one is the best, the other the worst."

"I'll not ask which is which," I said,

"because that is obvious. But again in respect of happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the same or different? And let us not be dazzled[2280] by fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few[2281] of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire city, as is right, and declare our opinion only after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses and contemplated its life as a whole."

[2277] Cf. *Gorgias* 473 C-E.

[2278] Cf. the defiance of 473 A and 579 D "κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ", *Phaedr.* 277 E "οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ", and *Phileb.* 67 B, also *Gorg.* 473 E "you say what nobody else would say," and perhaps 500 D "διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλή". Cf. Schopenhauer's "The public has a great many bees in its bonnet."

[2279] Cf. *Tim.* 75 D, *Rep.* 555 A, *Parmen.* 133 A. For the analogy of individual and state cf. on 591 E.

[2280] Cf. 577 A, 591 D, 619 A "ἀνέκπληκτος", *Crat.* 394 B, *Gorg.* 523 D, *Protag.* 355 B. Cf. also Epictet. iii. 22. 28 "ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπομένοις", and Shelley, " . . . accursed thing to gaze on prosperous tyrants with a dazzled eye."

[2281] *εἴ τινες*: Cf. *Gorg.* 521 B "ἐάν τι ἔχω".

"That is a fair challenge," he said,

"and it is clear to everybody that there is no city more wretched than that in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than that governed by a true king.[2282]"

"And would it not also be a fair challenge," said I,

"to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing him from outside, overawed by the tyrants' great attendance,[2283] and the pomp and circumstance which they assume[2284] in the eyes of the world, but is able to see through it all? And what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity of judgement and who has lived under the same roof with a tyrant[2285] and has witnessed his conduct in his own home and observed in person his dealings with his intimates in each instance where he would best be seen stripped[2286] of his vesture of tragedy,[2287] and who had likewise observed his behavior in the hazards of his public life—and if we should ask the man who has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the happiness or misery of the tyrant as compared with other men?"

"That also would be a most just challenge," he said.

"Shall we, then, make believe," said I,

"that we are of those who are thus able to judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions?"

"By all means."

[2282]For the contrast of tyranny and kingdom cf. 587 B, *Polit.* 276 E. It became a commonplace in later orations on the true king. Cf. Dümmler, *Prolegomena,* pp. 38-39.

[2283]The word *προστάσεως* is frequent in Polybius. Cf. also Boethius iv. chap. 2. Cf. 1*Maccabees* xv. 32, "When he saw the glory of Simon, and the cupboard of gold and silver plate, and his great attendance [*παράστασιν*]." Cf. also Isoc. ii. 32 "ὄψιν", and Shakes. *Measure for Measure*II. ii. 59 "ceremony that to great ones 'longs,"*Henry V.*IV. i. 280 "farced title running 'fore the king."

[2284]For *σχηματίζονται* cf. Xen. *Oecon.* 2. 4. "σὸν σχῆμα ὁ σὺ περιβέβλησαι", Dio Cass. iii. *fr.* 13. 2 "σχηματίσας . . . ἑαυτόν" and *σχηματισμός*, *Rep.* 425 B, 494 D.

[2285]It is easy conjecture that Plato is thinking of himself and Dionysius I. Cf. *Laws* 711 A.

[2286]Cf. Thackeray on Ludovicus and Ludovicus rex, Hazlitt, "Strip it of its externals and what is it but a jest?" also *Gory.* 523 E, Xen. *Hiero* 2. 4, Lucian, *Somnium seu Gallus* 24 "ἢν δὲ ὑποκύψας ἴδῃς τὰ γ' ἔνδον" . . . , Boethius, *Cons.* iii. chap. 8 (Loeb, p. 255), and for the thought Herod. i. 99.

[2287]Cf. Longinus, *On the Sublime* 7 "τὸ ἔξωθεν προστραγῳδούμενον", and Dümmler, *Akademika* p. 5.

"Come, then," said I,

"examine it thus. Recall the general likeness between the city and the man, and then observe in turn what happens to each of them."

"What things?" he said.

"In the first place," said I,

"will you call the state governed by a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state?"

"Utterly enslaved," he said.

"And yet you see in it masters and freemen."

"I see," he said,

"a small portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.[2288]"

"If, then," I said,

"the man resembles the state, must not the same proportion[2289] obtain in him, and his soul teem[2290] with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most frenzied, plays the despot?"

"Inevitably," he said.

"Then will you say that such a soul is enslaved or free?"

"Enslaved, I should suppose."

"Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it really wishes[2291]?"

"Decidedly so."

"Then the tyrannized soul— to speak of the soul as a whole[2292]— also will least of all do what it wishes, but being always perforce driven and drawn by the gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repentance.[2293]"

"Of course."

"And must the tyrannized city be rich or poor?"

[2288] In *Menex.* 238 E Plato says that other states are composed of slaves and master, but Athens of equals.

[2289] For *τάξιν* cf. 618 B "ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν".

[2290] *γέμειν*: cf. 544 C, 559 C, *Gorg.* 522 E, 525 A.

[2291] Cf. 445 B, *Gorg.* 467 B, where a verbal distinction is drawn with which Plato does not trouble himself here. In *Laws* 661 B "ἐπιθυμῇ" is used. Cf. *ibid.* 688 B "τἀναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσιν", and Herod. iii. 80.

[2292] Cf. *Cratyl.* 392 C "ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος".

[2293] Cf. Julian, *Or.* ii. 50 C. In the Stoic philosophy the *stultus* repents, and *omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui.* Cf. also Seneca, *De benef.* iv. 34 "non mutat sapiens consilium . . . ideo numquam illum poenitentia subit," Von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Frag.* iii. 147. 21, 149. 20 and 33, Stob. *Ec.* ii. 113. 5, 102. 22, and my emendation of *Eclogues* ii. 104. 6 W. in *Class. Phil.* xi. p. 338.

"Poor."

"Then the tyrant soul also must of necessity always be needy[2294] and suffer from unfulfilled desire."

"So it is," he said.

"And again, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be full of terrors and alarms?"

"It must indeed."

"And do you think you will find more lamentations and groans and wailing and anguish in any other city?"

"By no means."

"And so of man, do you think these things will more abound in any other than in this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and passions?"

"How could it be so?" he said.

"In view of all these and other like considerations, then, I take it, you judged that this city is the most miserable of cities."

"And was I not right?" he said.

"Yes, indeed," said I.

"But of the tyrant man, what have you to say in view of these same things?"

"That he is far and away the most miserable of all," he said.

"I cannot admit," said I,

"that you are right in that too."

"How so?" said he.

"This one," said I,

"I take it, has not yet attained the acme of misery.[2295]"

"Then who has?"

"Perhaps you will regard the one I am about to name as still more wretched."

"What one?"

"The one," said I,

"who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live out[2296] his life in private station[2297] but is so unfortunate that by some unhappy chance

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[2294]Cf. *Laws* 832 A "πεινῶσι τὴν ψυχήν", Xen. *Symp.* 4. 36 "πεινῶσι χρημάτων", *Oecon.* xiii. 9 "πεινῶσι γὰρ τοῦ ἐπαίνου", Aristot. *Pol.* 1277 a 24 "Jason said he was hungry when he was not a tyrant," Shakes. *Tempest* I. ii. 112 "so dry he was for sway." Cf. Novotny, p. 1902, on *Epist.* vii. 335 B, also Max. Tyr. *Diss.* iv. 4 "τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη πενέστερον ἀνδρὸς ἐπιθυμοῦντος διηνεκῶς" . . . ; Julian, *Or.* ii. 85 B, Teles (Hense), pp. 32-33. for the thought see also *Gorg.* 493-494. cf. also 521 A with 416 E, *Phaedr.* 279 C, and *Epist.* 355 C.

[2295]Cf. on 508 E, p. 104, note c.

[2296]Cf. *Protag.* 355 A, *Alc. I.* 104 E, 579 C.

he is enabled to become an actual tyrant."

"I infer from what has already been said," he replied,

"that you speak truly."

"Yes," said I,

"but it is not enough to suppose such things. We must examine them thoroughly by reason and an argument such as this.[2298] For our inquiry concerns the greatest of all things,[2299] the good life or the bad life."

"Quite right," he replied.

"Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say. For I think we must get a notion of the matter from these examples."

"From which?"

"From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant's numbers are greater.[2300]"

"Yes, they are."

"You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves?"

"What should they fear?"

"Nothing," I said;

"but do you perceive the reason why?"

"Yes, because the entire state is ready to defend each citizen."

"You are right," I said.

"But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves[2301] and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no freeman could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear,[2302] do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves?"

"The greatest in the world,[2303]" he said,

[2297]Stallbaum quotes Plut. *De virtut. et vit.* p. 101 D, Lucian, *Herm.* 67 "ἰδιώτην βίον ζῆν", Philo, *Vit. Mos.* 3.

[2298]Adam *ad loc.* emends *τῷ τοιούτῳ* to *τῷ τοιοῦτω*, insisting that the MS. reading cannot be satisfactorily explained.

[2299]Cf. Vol. I. p. 71, note f on 344 D-E, and *What Plato Said,* p. 484, on *Laches* 185 A.

[2300]Cf. *Polit.* 259 B. But Plato is not concerned with the question of size or numbers here.

[2301]Plato's imaginary illustration is one of his many anticipations of later history, and suggests to an American many analogies.

[2302]Cf. *Critias, fr.* 37 Diels ii.3 p. 324, on Sparta's fear of her slaves.

[2303]For *ἐν παντί* cf. 579 B, *Symp.* 194 A "ἓν παντὶ εἴης", *Euthyd.* 301 A "ἓν παντὶ

"if you ask me."

"And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wish[2304]? And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants."

"He would certainly have to," he said,

"or else perish."

"But now suppose," said I,

"that god established round about him numerous neighbors who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another,[2305] but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands."

"I think," he said,

"that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies."

"And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? Yet greedy[2306] and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivals[2307] that other freemen yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman,[2308] envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing."

"Most certainly," he said.

"And does not such a harvest of ills[2309] measure the difference

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ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας", Xen. *Hell.* v. 4. 29, Thucyd. vii. 55, Isoc. xiii. 20 "ἐν πᾶσιν . . κακοῖς". Cf. "παντοῖος εἶναι (γίννεσθαι)" Herod. ix. 109, vii. 10. 3, iii. 124, Lucian, *Pro lapsu* 1.

[2304]For the idiom *οὐδὲν δεόμενος* cf. 581 E, 367 A-B, 410 B, 405 C, *Prot.* 331 C, and Shorey in *Class. Journ.* ii. p. 171.

[2305]For ancient denials of the justice of slavery cf. Newman, Aristot. *Pol.* i. pp. 140 ff., Philemon, *fr.* 95 (Kock ii. p. 508)*κἂν δοῦλος ἐστί, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει, φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ. ἡ δ' αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο*, and *Anth. Pal.* vii. 553 with Mackail's note, p. 415.

[2306]Cf. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant's terrors cf. Menander,*Ἀσπίς* (*fr.* 74, Kock iii p. 24), Tacitus, *Ann.* vi. 6, 579 E and Xen. *Hiero* 6.8. The tyrant sees enemies everywhere.

[2307]Cf. Xen. *Hiero* 1. 12 "οἱ δὲ τύραννοι οὐ μάλα ἀμφὶ θεωρίας ἔχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἰέναι αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλές". Cf. *Crito* 52 B "ἐπὶ θεωρίαν".

[2308]Cf. *Laws* 781 C, *Gorg.* 485 D.

[2309]*τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς* is the measure of the excess of the unhappiness of the actual tyrant over that of the tyrannical soul in private life. Cf. my review of Jowett, *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 366.

between the man who is merely ill-governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical temper, whom you just now judged to be most miserable, and the man who, having this disposition, does not live out his life in private station but is constrained by some ill hap to become an actual tyrant, and while unable to control himself[2310] attempts to rule over others, as if a man with a sick and incontinent body[2311] should not live the private life but should be compelled to pass his days in contention and strife with other persons?"

"Your analogy is most apt and true,[2312] Socrates," he said.

"Is not that then, dear Glaucon," said I,

"a most unhappy experience in every way? And is not the tyrant's life still worse than that which was judged by you to be the worst?"

"Precisely so," he said.

"Then it is the truth, though some may deny it,[2313] that the real tyrant is really enslaved to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety; and throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the city which he rules; and he is like it, is he not?"

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,[2314] envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse[2315] of all iniquity, and so in consequence be himself most unhappy[2316] make all about him so?"

[2310] Cf. 580 C and *What Plato Said,* p. 506, on *Gorg.* 491 D.

[2311] For the analogy of soul and body cf. 591 B and on 564 D, p. 313, note g.

[2312] Cf. *Soph.* 252 C "ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές".

[2313] Cf. on 576 C, p. 354, note b.

[2314] Cf. 576 B-C.

[2315] *πανδοκεύς* is a host or inn-keeper; Cf. *Laws* 918 B.Here the word is used figuratively. Cf. Aristoph. *Wasps* 35 "φάλαινα πανδοκεύτρια", "an all-receptive grampus" (Rogers).

[2316] On the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. Xen. *Hiero* passim, *e.g.* 4. 11, 6. 4, 8, 15. the *Hiero* is Xenophon's rendering of the Socratico-Platonic conception of the unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See too Gerhard Heintzeler, *Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon,* esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.; Cic. *De amicit.* 15, Isoc. *Nic.* 4-5, *Peace* 112, *Hel.* 32 ff. But in *Euag.* 40 Isocrates says all men would admit that tyranny "is the greatest and noblest and most coveted of all good things, both human and divine." In *Epist.* 6. 11. ff. he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better than the tyrant's But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many maintain. Cf. further

"No man of sense will gainsay that," he said.

"Come then," said I,

"now at last, even as the judge of last instance[2317] pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man."

"Nay," he said,

"the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary."

"Shall we hire a herald,[2318] then," said I,

"or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best man[2319] and the most righteous to be the happiest,[2320] and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself;[2321] and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, become, most of a tyrant over himself and over the state?"

"Let it have been so proclaimed by you," he said.

"Shall I add the clause "alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not known"[2322]?"

"Add that to the proclamation," he said.

"Very good," said I;

"this, then, would be one of our proofs, but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it."

"What is it?"

"Since," said I,

"corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tri-

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Gorg. 473 E, *Alc. I.* 135 B, *Phaedr.* 248 E, *Symp.* 182 C, Eurip. *Ion* 621 ff., *Suppl.* 429 ff., *Medea* 119 ff., *I.A.* 449-450, Herodotus iii. 80, Soph. *Ajax* 1350 "not easy for a tyrant to be pious"; also Dio Chrys. *Or.* iii. 58 f., Anon. Iambl. *fr.* 7. 12, Diels ii.3 p. 333, J. A. K. Thomson, *Greek and Barbarian,* pp. 111 ff., Dümmler, *Prolegomena,* p. 31, Baudrillart, *J. Bodin et son temps,* p. 292-293 "Bodin semble . . . se souvenir de Platon flétrissant le tyran. . . . "

[2317]Adam has an exhaustive technical note on this.

[2318]Cf. *Phileb.* 66 A "ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων", etc., Eurip. *Alc.* 737 "κηρύκων ὕπο". Grote and other liberals are offended by the intensity of Plato's moral conviction. See *What Plato Said,* p. 364, *Laws* 662-663, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p.25.

[2319]Plato puns on the name Ariston. For other such puns Cf. *Gorg.* 463 E, 481 D, 513 B, *Rep.* 600 B, 614 B, *Symp.* 174 B, 185 C, 198 C.

[2320]Cf. *Laws* 664 B-C.

[2321]Cf. on 570 C, p. 367, note a.

[2322]Cf. 367 E, 427 D, 445 A, 612 B.

partite,[2323] it will admit,[2324] I think, of another demonstration also."

"What is that?"

"The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls."

"What do you mean?" he said.

"One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms,[2325] we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name,[2326] but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element;" "for we called it the appetitive part[2327] because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part,[2328] because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires."

"And rightly," he said.

"And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring it together under one head[2329] in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part?"

"I, at any rate, think so," he said.

"And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute?"

"Yes, indeed."

"And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honor?"

[2323] Cf. 435 B-C ff.

[2324] Practically all editors reject *τὸ λογιστικόν*. But Apelt, p. 525, insists that *δέξεται* cannot be used without a subject on the analogy of 453 D "ἔοικεν", 497 C "δηλώσει" and *δείξει*, hence we must retain *λογιστικόν*, in the sense of "ability to reckon," and he compares *Charm.* 174 B and the double sense of *λογιστικόν* in *Rep.* 525 B, 587 D, 602 E. He says it is a mild mathematical joke, like *Polit.* 257 A.

[2325] Cf. *Phileb.* 26 C "τὸ . . . πλῆθος". Cf. Friedländer, *Platon,* ii. p. 492, n. 2.

[2326] Here again the concept is implied (Cf. on 564 B, p. 313, note e and Introd. pp. x-xi). Cf. *Parmen.* 132 C, 135 B, *Phileb.* 16 D, 18 C-D, 23 E, 25 C, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1130 b 2 "ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν", and *εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα*, 581 A, Schleiermacher's interpretation of which, "so würden wir uns in der Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen," approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 596, on *Soph.* 267 D.

[2327] Vol. I. 439 D.

[2328] Cf. Vol. I. p. 380, note b.

[2329] Since there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience's sake. See also p. 371, note e.

"Most appropriately."

"But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is ever towards[2330] knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and reputation."

"Much the least."

"Lover of learning[2331] and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that."

"Quite so," he said.

"Is it not also true," I said,

"that the ruling principle[2332] of men's souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen?"

"That is so," he said.

"And that is why we say that the primary classes[2333] of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain."

"Precisely so"

"And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to each?"

"By all means."

"Are you aware, then" said I,

"that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn,[2334] which is the most pleasurable of these lives, each will chiefly

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[2330]Or "is bent on," *τέταται.* Cf. 499 A "ζητεῖν . . . τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως", *Symp.* 222 A and Bury *ad loc.*, *Symp.* 186 B "ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει". For the thought cf. also *Phileb.* 58 D.

[2331]Cf. *Phaedo* 67 B "τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς".

[2332]Cf. 338 D, 342 C.

[2333]Cf. my review of Jowett in *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 366, which Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (*Republic*) adopt. For the three types of men cf. also *Phaedo* 68 C, 82 C. Stewart, *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, "The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (*Rep.* 581). . . . Michelet and Grant point out that this threefold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heracleides Ponticus (*apud* Cic. *Tusc.* v. 3). . . . " Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also Diog. L. vii. 130 on Stoics, Plutarch, *De liber. educ.* x. (8 A), Renan, *Avenir de Ia science,* p. 8. Isoc. *Antid.* 217 characteristically recognizes only the three motives, pleasure, gain, and honor. For the entire argument cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1176 a 31, 1177 a 10, and *ibid*, Introd. pp. liv-lv.

[2334]For *ἐν μέρει* cf. 468 B, 520 C and D, 577 C, 615 A, *Gorg.* 496 B, *Laws* 876 B, 943 A, 947 C, *Polit.* 265 A; Contrasted with *ἐν τῷ μέρει*, *Meno* 92 E, *Gorg.* 462 A, 474 A. The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g. *καινὸν οὐδέν* (*Gorg.* 448 A) has nothing to do with the idiom *οὐδὲν καινόν* (*Phaedo* 100 B);*τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα* (*Rep.* 612 C) is different from *λόγου ἕνεκα*

commend his own[2335]? The financier will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning area of no value except in so far as they produce money."

"True," he said.

"And what of the lover of honor[2336]?" I said;

"does he not regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgar[2337] and low, and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honor, mere fume[2338] and moonshine?"

"It is so," he said.

"And what," said I,

"are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures compared with the delight of knowing the truth[2339] and the reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure,[2340] and call[2341] them literally[2342] the pleasures of necessity,[2343] since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?"

"We may be sure of that," he said.

"Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which

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(*Theaet.* 191 C—*dicis causa*);*πάντα τἀγαθά* (*Laws* 631 B) has no connection with the idiomatic *πάντ' ἀγαθά* (*Rep.* 471 C, Cf. *supra ad loc.*); nor Pindar's *πόλλ' ἄνω τὰ δ' αὖ κάτω* (*Ol.* xii. 6) with *ἄνω κάτω* as used in *Phaedo* 96 B, *Gorg.* 481 D, etc. Cf. also *ἐν τέχνῃ Prot.* 319 C with *ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ*317 C,*νῷ ἔχειν Rep.* 490 A with *ἐν νῷ ἔχειν*344 D, etc.,*τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκεν Phaedr.* 235 E with *παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν*237 C. The same is true of words—to confuse *καλλίχορος* with *καλλίχοιρος* would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about *ὁμοουσία* and *ὁμοιουσία* were perhaps not quite as ridiculous as they are generally considered.

[2335]Cf. *Laws* 658 on judging different kinds of literature.

[2336]Cf. p. 255, note f, on 549 A. Xenophon is the typical *φιλότιμος*. In *Mem.* iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians "excel others in love of honor, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honor and renown" (Marchant, Loeb tr.). Cf. *Epist.* 320 A, *Symp.* 178 D, and also Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 2. 1, *Mem.* iii. i. 10.

[2337]Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1095 b 16, and on 528 E.

[2338]Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 920, and Turgeniev's novel, *Smoke.*

[2339]Cf. *Phileb.* 58 C on dialectic.

[2340]Cf. 598 B, *Epist.* iii. 315 C, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1 "πόρρω φιλοσοφίας". Hermann's text or something like it is the only idiomatic one, and *τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω* must express the philosopher's opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. *A.J.P.* xiii. p. 366.

[2341]For the infinitive cf. 492 C "καὶ φήσειν", 530 B "καὶ ζητεῖν".

[2342]*τῷ ὄντι* marks the etymological use of *ἀναγκαίας*. Cf. on 511 B and 551 E, p. 266, note a.

[2343]Cf. 558 D f.

is actually the more pleasurable[2344] or free from pain, how could we determine which of them speaks most truly?"

"In faith, I cannot tell," he said.

"Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judged[2345] rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and discussion[2346]? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these?"

"How could he?" he said.

"Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain?"

"There is a vast difference," he said;

"for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things,[2347] but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it."

"The lover of wisdom, then," said I,

"far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure."

"Yes, far."

"And how does he compare with the lover of honor? Is he more unacquainted with the pleasure of being honored than that other with that which comes from knowledge?"

"Nay, honor," he said,

"if they achieve their several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is honored by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honor brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savored the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings."

"Then," said I,

"so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three."

[2344]This anticipates *Laws* 663 A, 733 A-B, 734 A-B.

[2345]i.e. what is the criterion? Cf. 582 D "ὃι' οὗ", Sext. Empir. Bekker, p. 60 (*Pyrrh. Hypotyp.* ii. 13-14) and p. 197 (*Adv. Math.* vii. 335). Cf. Diog. L. *Prologue* 21, and *Laches* 184 E. For the idea that the better judge cf. also *Laws* 663 C, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1176 a 16-19.

[2346]Cf. 582 D, *On Virtue* 373 D, Xen. *Mem.* iii. 3. 11.

[2347]The force of *οὐ* extends through the sentence. Cf. *Class. Phil.* vi. (1911) p. 218, and my note on *Tim.* 77 a in *A.J.P.* p. 74. Cf. *Il.* v. 408, xxii, 283, Pindar, *Nem.* iii. 15, *Hymn Dem.* 157.

"By far."

"And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompanied[2348] by intelligence."

"Surely."

"And yet again, that which is the instrument, or *ὄργανον*, of judgement[2349] is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honor, but of the lover of wisdom."

"What is that?"

"It was by means of words and discussion[2350] that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not?"

"Yes."

"And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher."

"Of course."

"Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real."

"Quite necessarily."

"And if honor, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honor and victory?"

"Obviously."

"But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows?"

"Of necessity," he said,

"that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true."

"There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasurable."

"How could it be otherwise?" he said.

"At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life."

"And to what life and to what pleasure," I said,

"does the judge assign the second place?"

"Obviously to that of the warrior and honor-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker."

"And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems."

"Surely," said he.

[2348] For the periphrasis *γεγονὼς ἔσται* Cf. *Charm.* 174 D "ἀπολελοιπὸς ἔσται".

[2349] Cf. 508 B, 518 C, 527 D.

[2350] Cf. on 582 A, p. 376, note d.

"That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the saviour[2351] and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even real[2352] or pure,[2353] but is a kind of scene-painting,[2354] as I seem to have heard from some wise man[2355]; and yet[2356] this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.[2357]"

"Much the greatest. But what do you mean?"

"I shall discover it," I said,

"if you will answer my questions while I seek."

"Ask, then," he said.

"Tell me, then," said I,

"do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?"

"We certainly do."

"And is there not such a thing as a neutral state[2358]"

"There is."

"Is it not intermediate between them, and in the mean,[2359] being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it?"

"It is that," said he.

"Do you not recall the things men say in sickness?"

[2351]The third cup of wine was always dedicated to Zeus the Saviour, and *τρίτος σωτήρ* became proverbial. Cf. *Charm.* 167 A, *Phileb.* 66 D, *Laws* 692 A, 960 C, *Epist.* vii. 334 D, 340 A. Cf. Hesychius *s. v. τρίτος κρατήρ.* Brochard, *La Morale de Platon,* missing the point, says, "Voici enfin un troisième argument qui paraît à Platon le plus décisif puisqu'il l'appelle une vicoire vraiment olympique." For the idea of a contest Cf. *Phileb. passim.*

[2352]Cf. *Phileb.* 36 C, 44 D "ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς". For the unreality of the lower pleasures Cf. *Phileb.* 36 A ff. and esp. 44 C-D, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* pp. 23-25, *What Plato Said,* pp. 322-323 and 609-610, Introd. pp. lvi-lix, Rodier, *Remarques sur le Philèbe*, p. 281.

[2353]Cf. *Phileb.* 52 C "καθαρὰς ἡδονάς", and 53 C "καθαρὰ λύπης".

[2354]Cf. *Laws* 663 C, *Phaedo* 69 B, 365 C, 523 B, 602 D, 586 B, Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 266.

[2355]One of Plato's evasions. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 513, on *Meno* 81 A, *Phileb.* 44 B. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 266 misses the point and says that by the wise man Plato means himself.

[2356]For this rhetorical *καίτοι* cf. 360 C, 376 B, 433 B, 440 D, *Gorg.* 452 E, *Laws* 663 E, 690 C.

[2357]Cf. *Phileb.* 22 E, Aesch. *Prom.* 919, Soph. *Antig.* 1046.

[2358]If any inference could he drawn from the fact that in the *Philebus* 42 D ff. and 32 E the reality of the neutral state has to be proved, it would be that the *Philebus* is earlier, which it is not.

[2359]For *ἐν μέσῳ* Cf. *Phileb.* 35 E.

"What sort of things?"

"Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well,[2360] though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were Ill."

"I remember," he said.

"And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering?"

"I do."

"And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight."

"Yes," he said,

"for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace."

"And so," I said,

"when a man's delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful."

"It may be so," he said.

"What, then,we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure."

"It seems so"

"Is it really possible for that which is neither to become both[2361]?"

"I think not."

"And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion,[2362] are they not?"

"Yes."

"And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two?"

"Yes, we did."

"How, then, can it be right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful?"

"In no way."

"This is not a reality, then, but an illusion," said I;

"in such case the quietude in juxtaposition[2363] with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these

[2360] Cf. perhaps *Phileb.* 45 B, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1095 a 24, and Heracleit. *fr.* 111, Diels i.3 p. 99 "νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδύ".

[2361] Cf. *Phileb.* 43 E, *Hipp. Maj.* 300 B f.

[2362] Aristotle attacks this doctrine with captious dialectic in his *Topics* and *De anima.*

[2363] Cf. 586 C, and *Phileb.* 42 B and 41 E.

illusions have no real bearing[2364] on the truth of pleasure, but are a kind of jugglery.[2365]"

"So at any rate our argument signifies," he said.

"Take a look, then," said I,

"at pleasures which do not follow on pain, so that you may not haply suppose for the present that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain and pain from pleasure."

"Where shall I look," he said,

"and what pleasures do you mean?"

"There are many others," I said,

"and especially, if you please to note them, the pleasures connected with smell.[2366] For these with no antecedent pain[2367] suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them."

"Most true," he said.

"Let us not believe, then, that the riddance of pain is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain."

"No, we must not."

"Yet, surely," said I,

"the affections that find their way through the body[2368] to the soul[2369] and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain.[2370]?"

"Yes, they are."

"And is not this also the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains that precede them and arise from the expectation of them?"

"It is."

"Do you know, then, what their quality is and what they most resemble?"

"What?" he said.

"Do you think that there is such a thing in nature[2371] as up and

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[2364]For *οὐδὲν ὑγιές* in this sense cf. on 523 B.

[2365]Cf. *Phileb.* 44 C-D, Xen. *Oecon.* 1. 20 "προσποιούμεναι ἡδοναὶ εἶναι", etc.

[2366]For the idea that smells are not conditioned by pain Cf. *Tim.* 65 A, *Phileb.* 51 B and E, and Siebeck, *Platon als Kritiker Aristotelischer Ansichten,* p. 161.

[2367]Cf. *Gorg.* 493-494, *Phileb.* 42 C ff., and *Phaedr.* 258 E, which Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 267 overlooks.

[2368]Cf. *Phaedo* 65 A, *Phaedr.* 258 E, Vol. I. p. 8, note a, on 328 D, and p. 8, note b.

[2369]Cf. *Tim.* 45 D (of sensations)*μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς*, *Laws* 673 A, *Rep.* 462 C "πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη". Cf. also *Phileb.* 33 D-E, 34, 43 B-C, and *What Plato Said,* p. 608.

[2370]Cf. *Phileb.* 44 B, 44 C "λυπῶν . . . ἀποφυγάς", *Protag.* 354 B.

down and in the middle?"

"I do."

"Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is transported from below to the center would have any other opinion than that he was moving upward[2372]? And if he took his stand at the center and looked in the direction from which he had been transported, do you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere but above, never having seen that which is really above?"

"No, by Zeus," he said,

"I do not think that such a person would have any other notion."

"And if he were borne back," I said,

"he would both think himself to be moving downward and would think truly."

"Of course."

"And would not all this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance with the true and real up and down and middle?"

"Obviously."

"Would it surprise you, then," said I,

"if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that, when they are moved in the direction of the painful, they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black,[2373] so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain?"

"No, by Zeus," he said,

"it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so."

"In this way, then, consider it.[2374] Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or emptinesses[2375] of the bodily habit?"

[2371]For *ἐν τῇ φύσει* Cf. *Parmen.* 132 D.

[2372]For the purposes of his illustration Plato takes the popular view of up and down, which is corrected in *Tim.* 62 C-D and perhaps by the ironical *δή* in *Phaedo* 112 C. Cf. Zeller, *Aristotle*(Eng.)i. p. 428.

[2373]Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 1011 b 30-31 and *Eth. Nic.* 1154 a 30 "διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι".

[2374]The argument from the parallel of body and mind here belongs to what we have called confirmation. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 528, on *Phaedo* 78 B, The figurative use of repletion and nutrition is not to be pressed in proof of contradictions with the *Philebus* or *Gorgias.* Cf. *Matthew* v. 6 "Hunger and thirst after righteousness."

"Surely."

"And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul?"

"It is indeed."

"And he who partakes of nourishment[2376] and he who gets, wisdom fills the void and is filled?"

"Of course."

"And which is the truer filling and fulfillment, that of the less or of the more real being?"

"Evidently that of the more real."

"And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,[2377] knowledge and reason,[2378] and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent[2379]? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing?"

"That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses," he said.

"Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge?"

"By no means."

"Or of truth and reality?"

"Not of that, either."

"And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence?"

"Necessarily."

"And is it not generally true that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than those that serve the soul?"

"Much less."

[2375]For κενώσεις Cf. *Phileb.* 35 B, 42 C-D, *Tim.* 65 A.

[2376]For the figure of nourishment of the soul Cf. *Protag.* 313 D, *Phaedr.* 248 B, and *Soph.* 223 E.

[2377]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 517, on *Meno* 98 A-B.

[2378]Different kinds of intelligence are treated as synonyms because for the present purpose their distinctions are irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and D *διάνοια*. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 43 and p. 47, n. 339. Plato does not distinguish synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as Prodicus did. Cf. *Protag.* 358 A-B.

[2379]Cf. *Symp.* 209 A "φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν".

"And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul?"

"I do."

"Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things?"

"Of course."

"If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure."

"Most inevitably," he said.

"Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to[2380] feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam[2381] to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted[2382] stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth[2383] and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle,[2384] grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights; and in their greed[2385] kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part[2386] of their souls."

"You describe in quite oracular style,[2387] Socrates," said Glaucon,

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[2380]For *ξυνόντες* see Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 1404.

[2381]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 528, on *Phaedo* 79 C for *πλανάω* of error in thought. This is rather the *errare* of Lucretius ii. 10 and the post-Aristotelian schools.

[2382]Cf. on 576 A "ἄγευστος", and for the thought of the whole sentence cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* xiii., Teubner, vol. i. p. 240.

[2383]Cf. Milton, *Comus,* "Ne'er looks to heaven amid its gorgeous feast," Rossetti, "Nineveh," *in fine,* "That set gaze never on the sky," etc. Cf. S. O. Dickermann, *De Argumentis quibusdam ap. Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obviis e structura hominis et animalium petitis,* Halle, 1909, who lists Plato's *Symp.* 190 A, *Rep.* 586 A, *Cratyl.* 396 B, 409 C, *Tim.* 90 A, 91 E, and many other passages.

[2384]Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1095 b 20 "βοσκημάτων βίον". Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 611, on *Phileb.*, *in fine.*

[2385]Cf. 373 E, *Phaedo* 66 C ff., Berkeley, *Siris* 330 "For these things men fight, cheat, and scramble."

[2386]*τὸ στέγον*: Cf. *Gorg.* 493 B, *Laws* 714 A.

[2387]Plato laughs at himself. Cf. 509 C and 540 B-C. The picturesque, allegorical

"the life of the multitude."

"And are not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure, illusions of scene-painting, so colored by contrary juxtaposition[2388] as to seem intense in either kind, and to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls, and to be fought for,[2389] as Stesichorus says the wraith of Helen[2390] was fought for at Troy through ignorance of the truth?"

"It is quite inevitable," he said,

"that it should be so."

"So, again, must not the like hold of the high-spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satisfying that part of his nature—his covetousness of honor by envy, his love of victory by violence, his ill-temper by indulgence in anger, pursuing these ends without regard to consideration and reason?"

"The same sort of thing," he said,

"must necessarily happen in this case too."

"Then," said I,

"may we not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them,[2391] take only those pleasures which reason approves,[2392] will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest[2393] pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their own, if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its "own"[2394]?"

"But indeed," he said,

"it is most truly its very own."

"Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving

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style of oracles was proverbial. For *χρησμῳδεῖν* Cf. *Crat.* 396 D, *Apol.* 39 C, *Laws* 712 A.

[2388] Cf. on 584 A, p. 384, note a.

[2389] For *περιμαχήτους* cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1168 b 19, *Eth. Eud.* 1248 b 27, and on 521 A, p. 145, note e.

[2390] For the Stesichorean legend that the real Helen remained in Egypt while only her phantom went to Troy Cf. *Phaedr.* 243 A-B, Eurip. *Hel.* 605 ff., *Elect.* 1282-1283, Isoc. *Hel.* 64, and *Philologus* 55, pp. 634 ff. Dümmler, *Akademika* p. 55, thinks this passage a criticism of Isoc. *Helena* 40. Cf. also Teichmüller, *Lit. Fehden,* i. pp. 113 ff. So Milton, *Reason of Church Government,* "A lawny resemblance of her like that air-born Helena in the fables." For the ethical symbolism Cf. 520 C-D.

[2391] Cf. *Phaedo* 69 B, and *Theaet.* 176 B "μετὰ φρονήσεως".

[2392] *ἐξηγῆται* has a religious tone. See on *ἐξηγητής* 427 C. Cf. 604 B.

[2393] Cf. on 583 B, p. 380, note b.

[2394] Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 491, on *Lysis* 221 E.

part and is not filled with inner dissension,[2395] the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task[2396] and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible,[2397] the truest."

"Precisely so."

"And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien pleasure and not the true."

"That is so," he said.

"And would not that which is furthest removed from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this effect[2398]?"

"Quite so," he said.

"And is not that furthest removed from reason which is furthest from law and order?"

"Obviously."

"And was it not made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic and tyrannical appetites?"

"Quite so."

"And least so the royal and orderly?"

"Yes."

"Then the tyrant's place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest remove[2399] from true and proper pleasure, and the king's at the least."

"Necessarily."

"Then the tyrant's life will be least pleasurable and the king's most."

"There is every necessity of that."

"Do you know, then," said I,

"how much less pleasurably the tyrant lives than the king?"

"I'll know if you tell me,[2400]" he said.

"There being as it appears three pleasures, one genuine and two

[2395]Cf. 352 A, 440 B and E, 442 D, 560 A, *Phaedr.* 237 E.

[2396]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 480 on *Charm.* 161 B.

[2397]For *εἰς τὸ δυνατόν* cf. 500 D, 381 C, *Laws* 795 D, 830 B, 862 B, 900 C.

[2398]What follows (587 B-588 A) is not to be taken too seriously. It illustrates the method of procedure by minute links, the satisfaction of Plato's feelings by confirmations and analogies, and his willingness to play with mathematical symbolism. Cf. 546 B f. and William Temple, *Plato and Christianity,* p. 55: "Finally the whole thing is a satire on the humbug of mystical number, but I need not add that the German commentators are seriously exercised. . . . " See however A. G. Laird in *Class. Phil.* xi. (1916) pp. 465-468.

[2399]Cf. *Polit.* 257 B "ἀφεστᾶσιν"

[2400]Cf. Vil. I. p. 282, note a, on 408 D and p. 344, note b, on 573 D.

spurious, the tyrant in his flight from law and reason crosses the border beyond[2401] the spurious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not easy to express except perhaps thus."

"How?" he said.

"The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came between."

"Yes."

"And would he not also dwell with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three stages removed from that other, if all that we have said is true?"

"That is so."

"And the oligarch in turn is at the third remove from the royal man if we assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king.[2402]"

"Yes, the third."

"Three times three, then, by numerical measure is the interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure."

"Apparently."

"The phantom[2403] of the tyrant's pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number."

"Quite so."

"But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this separation becomes."

"It is clear," he said,

"to a reckoner."

"Then taking it the other way about, if one tries to express the extent of the interval between the king and the tyrant in respect of true pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplication that he lives 729 times as happily and that the tyrant's life is more painful by the same distance.[2404]"

"An overwhelming[2405] and baffling calculation," he said,

"of the difference[2406] between the just and the unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain!"

[2401]For *εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα* Cf. *Phaedo* 112 B and 509 B.

[2402]Cf. Vol. I. p. 422, note b, on 445 D and *Menex.* 238 D.

[2403]Cf. *Phaedo* 66 C "εἰδώλων", where Olympiodorus (Norvin, p. 36) takes it of the unreality of the lower pleasures.

[2404]Cf. Spencer, *Data of Ethics,* p. 14 "Hence estimating life by multiplying its length into its breadth." For the mathematical jest Cf. *Polit.* 257 A-B.

[2405]Humorous as in 509 C "ὑπερβολῆς".

[2406]Cf. *Phileb.* 13 A, 14 A, *Parmen.* 141 C, *Theaet.* 209 A and D.

"And what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the lives of men if days and nights and months and years pertain to them."

"They certainly do," he said.

"Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good and just man over the bad and unjust is so great as this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and beauty of life and virtue."

"Inconceivably indeed, by Zeus," he said.

"Very good," said I.

"And now that we have come to this point in the argument, let us take up again the statement with which we began and that has brought us to this pass.[2407] It was, I believe, averred that injustice is profitable to the completely unjust[2408] man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposition?"

"Yes, that."

"Let us, then, reason with its proponent now that we have agreed on the essential nature of injustice and just conduct."

"How?" he said.

"By fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition may see precisely what it is that he was saying."

"What sort of an image?" he said.

"One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of," said I,

"as that of the Chimaera[2409] or Scylla[2410] or Cerberus,[2411] and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one."

"Yes, they do tell of them."

"Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast[2412] that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths."

"It is the task of a cunning artist,[2413]" he said,

"but nevertheless, since speech is more plastic than wax[2414] and

[2407] Plato keeps to the point. Cf. 472 B, *Phileb.* 27 C, and p. 339 note e, on 572 B.

[2408] Cf. 348 B, 361 A.

[2409] Cf. Homer, *Il.* vi. 179-182, *Phaedr.* 229 D.

[2410] *Od.* xii. 85 ff.

[2411] Hesiod, *Theog.* 311-312.

[2412] Stallbaum *ad loc.* gives a long list of writers who imitated this passage. Hesiod, *Theog.* 823 f., portrays a similar monster in Typhoeus, who had a hundred serpent-heads. For the animal in man c. *Tim.* 70 E, *Charm.* 155 D-E, *Phaedr.* 230 A, 246 A ff., Boethius, *Cons.* iv. 2-3, Horace *Epist.* i. 1. 76, Iamblichus, *Protrept.* chap. iii.

[2413] Cf. 596 C.

[2414] Cf. Cic. *De or.* iii. 45 "sicut mollissimam ceram . . . fingimus." Otto, 80, says

other such media, assume that it has been so fashioned."

"Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest[2415] and the second second in size."

"That is easier," he said,

"and is done."

"Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together."

"They are so united," he said.

"Then mould about them outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to look within[2416] but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man."

"The sheath is made fast about him," he said.

"Let us, then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that it profits him to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion, but to starve the man[2417] and so enfeeble him that he can be pulled about[2418] whithersoever either of the others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile with one another the two creatures but suffer them to bite and fight and devour one another.[2419]"

"Yes," he said,

"that is precisely what the panegyrist of injustice will be found to say."

"And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us[2420] complete domination[2421] over the entire man and make him take charge[2422] of the many-headed beast—like a farmer[2423] who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of

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it is a proverb. For the development of this figure cf. Pliny, *Epist.* vii. 9 "ut laus est cerae, mollis cedensque sequatur." For the idea that word is more precise or easy than deed Cf. 473 A, *Phaedo* 99 E, *Laws* 636 A, 736 B, *Tim.* 19 E.

[2415]Cf. 442 A.

[2416]Cf. 577 A.

[2417]The whole passage illustrates the psychology of 440 B ff.

[2418]Cf. *Protag.* 352 C "περιελκομένης", with Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1145 b 24.

[2419]Perhaps a latent allusion to Hesiod, *Works and Days* 278.

[2420]Cf. "the inward man," *Romans* vii. 22, *2 Cor.* iv. 16, *Ephes.* iii. 16.

[2421]Cf. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy,* p. 10 "Religion says: "The kingdom of God is within you"; and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an *internal* condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality."

[2422]Cf. *Gorg.* 516 A-B.

[2423]Cf. *Theaet.* 167 B-C, and *What Plato Said,* p. 456, on *Euthyphro* 2 D.

the wild—and he will make an ally[2424] of the lion's nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth."

"Yes, that in turn is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice."

"From every point of view, then, the panegyrist of justice speaks truly and the panegyrist of injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real knowledge of what he censures in him who disparages it."

"None whatever, I think," said he.

"Shall we, then, try to persuade him gently,[2425] for he does not willingly err,[2426] by questioning him thus: Dear friend, should we not also say that the things which law and custom deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like reason— the fair and honorable things being those that subject the brutish part of our nature to that which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that which is divine,[2427] while the foul and base are the things that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he assent or not?"

"He will if he is counselled by me."

"Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the worst? Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to fierce and evil men, it would not profit him,[2428] no matter how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be deemed wretched and is not taking the golden bribe much more disastrously than Eriphyle[2429] did when she received the necklace as the price[2430] of her husband's life?"

[2424] Cf. 441 A.

[2425] *πρᾴως*: cf. the use of *ἠρέμα* 476 E, 494 D.

[2426] Plato always maintains that wrong-doing is involuntary and due to ignorance. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 640 on *Laws* 860 D.

[2427] Cf. 501 B, Tennyson, "Locksley Hall Sixty Years after," *in fine*, "The highest Human Nature is divine."

[2428] Cf. *Matt.* xvi.26, *Mark* viii. 36, "What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" A typical *argumentum ex contrario.* Cf. 445 A-B and Vol. I. p. 40, note c. On the supreme value of the soul Cf. *Laws* 726-728, 743 E, 697 B, 913 B, 959 A-B. Cf. 585 D.

[2429] Cf. *Od.* xi. 326, Frazer on Apollodorus iii. 6. 2 (Loeb). Stallbaum refers also to Pindar, *Nem.* ix. 37 ff, and Pausan. x. 29. 7.

"Far more," said Glaucon,

"for I will answer you in his behalf."

"And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because that sort of thing emancipates that dread,[2431] that huge and manifold beast overmuch?"

"Obviously," he said.

"And do we not censure self-will[2432] and irascibility when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snake[2433] in us?"

"By all means."

"And do we not reprobate luxury and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it?"

"Surely."

"And flattery and illiberality when they reduce this same high-spirited element under the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth up and become an ape[2434] instead of a lion?"

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"And why do you suppose that "base mechanic"[2435] handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them?"

"So it seems," he said.

"Then is it not in order that such an one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave of that best man[2436] who has within himself the divine governing principle, not

[2430]For *ἐπί* in this sense cf. Thompson on *Meno* 90 D. Cf. *Apol.* 41 A "ἐπὶ πόσῳ", Demosth. xlv. 66.

[2431]See Adam *ad loc.* on the asyndeton.

[2432]*αὐθάδεια*: Cf. 548 E.

[2433]Not mentioned before, but, as Schleiermacher says, might be included in *τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα*. Cf. Adam *ad loc.* Or Plato may be thinking of the chimaera (*Il.* vi. 181).

[2434]Cf. 620 C.

[2435]Cf. p. 49, note e.

[2436]For the idea that it is better to be ruled by a better man Cf. *Alc. I.* 135 B-C, *Polit.* 296 B-C, Democr. *fr.* 75 (Diels ii.3 p. 77), Xen. *Mem.* i. 5. 5 "δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν", Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 1. 40 "βελτίονας εἶναι". Cf. also *Laws* 713 D-714 A, 627 E, *Phaedo* 62 D-E,

because we suppose, as Thrasymachus[2437] did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same?"

"Yes, and rightly so," he said.

"And it is plain," I said,

"that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally of all classes in the state, "

"and this is the aim of our control of children,[2438] our not leaving them free before we have established, so to speak, a constitutional government within them[2439] and, by fostering the best element in them with the aid of the like in ourselves, have set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler in the child, and then, and then only, we leave it free."

"Yes, that is plain," he said.

"In what way,[2440] then, Glaucon, and on what principle, shall we say that it profits a man to be unjust or licentious or do any shameful thing that will make him a worse man, but otherwise will bring him more wealth or power?"

"In no way," he said.

"And how that it pays him to escape detection in wrongdoing and not pay the penalty[2441]? Or is it not true that he who evades detection

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and *Laws* 684 C. Cf. Ruskin, *Queen of the Air,* p. 210 (Brantwood ed., 1891): "The first duty of every man in the world is to find his true master, and, for his own good, submit to him; and to find his true inferior, and, for that inferior's good, conquer him." Inge, *Christian Ethics,* p. 252: "It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free." Carlyle (*apud* M. Barton and O. Sitwell, *Victoriana*): "Surely of all the rights of man the right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser, to be gently or forcibly held in the true course by him, is the indisputablest." Plato's idea is perhaps a source of Aristotle's theory of slavery, though differently expressed. Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1254 b 16 f., Newman i. pp. 109-110, 144 f., 378-379, ii. p. 107. Cf. also *Polit.* 309 A f., *Epist.* vii. 335 D, and Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers,* iii. p. 106.

[2437] Cf. 343 B-C.

[2438] Cf. *Lysis* 207 E f., *Laws* 808 D, Isoc.xv. 290, Antiphon, *fr.* 61 (Diels ii.3 p. 303).

[2439] Cf. on 591 E, p. 412, note d.

[2440] Cf. on 501 D, p. 74, note a.

[2441] The paradoxes of the *Gorgias* are here seriously reaffirmed. Cf. especially *Gorg.* 472 E ff., 480 A-B, 505 A-B, 509 A f. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 187, 380 B "οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι", and *Laws* 728 C; and for the purpose of punishment, *What Plato Said,* p. 495, on *Protag.* 324 A-B.

becomes a still worse man, while in the one who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best, attains to a much more precious condition in acquiring sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom, than the body[2442] does when it gains strength and beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is more precious than the body?"

"Most assuredly," he said.

"Then the wise man will bend all his endeavors[2443] to this end throughout his life; he will, to begin with, prize the studies that will give this quality to his soul and disprize the others."

"Clearly," he said.

"And then," I said,

"he not only will not abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face set in that direction, but he will not even make health his chief aim,[2444] nor give the first place to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless these things are likely to bring with them soberness of spirit, but he will always be found attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in his soul.[2445]"

"By all means," he replied,

[2442]The *a fortiori* argument from health of body to health of soul is one of the chief refutations of the immoralists. Cf. 445 D-E f., *Gorg.* 479 B, *Crito* 47 D-E. For the supreme importance of the soul cf. on 589 E.

[2443]Cf. *Gorg.* 507 D, Isoc. *Epist.* vi. 9, Xen. *Ages.* 7. 1.

[2444]Health in the familiar skolion (Cf. *Gorg.* 451 E, *Laws* 631 C, 661 A, 728 D-E, *Euthydem.* 279 A-B, *Meno* 87 E, Soph. *frag.* 356) is proverbially the highest of ordinary goods. Cf. *Gorg.* 452 A-B, *Crito* 47 D, *Eryxias* 393 C. In fact, for Plato as for modern "scientific" ethics, health in the higher sense—the health of the soul—may be said to be the ultimate sanction. Cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xvi and xxi, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 26, *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic,* pp. 192-194 f. But an idealistic ethics sometimes expresses itself in the paradox that "not even health," highest of earthly goods, is of any value compared with the true interests of the soul. Cf. *Laws* 661 C-E ff., 728 D-E, 744 A, 960 D, *Laches* 195 C; and Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy,* p. 17 "Bodily health and vigor . . . have a more real and essential value . . . but only as they are more intimately connected with a perfect spiritual condition than wealth and population are." This idea may be the source of the story from which the Christian Fathers and the Middle Ages derived much edification, that Plato intentionally chose an unhealthy site for the Academy in order to keep down the flesh. Cf. Aelian, *Var. Hist.* ix. 10, perhaps the first mention, Porphyry, *De abstinentia* i. 36, Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* ii. 1.4 416, n. 2; Camden on Cambridge, Gosse, *Gossip in a Library,* p. 23, and Himerius, *Ecl.* iii. 18 (Diels ii.3 p. 18)*ἑκὼν δὲ ἐνόσει σῶμα Δημόκριτος, ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ τὰ κρείττονα.*

[2445]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 485, on *Laches* 188 D.

"if he is to be a true musician.[2446]"

"And will he not deal likewise with the ordering and harmonizing of his possessions? He will not let himself be dazzled[2447] by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up the mass[2448] of his wealth without measure,[2449] involving himself in measureless ills."

"No, I think not," he said.

"He will rather," I said,

"keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul,[2450] and taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess or deficiency of wealth,[2451] will so steer his course and add to or detract from his wealth on this principle, so far as may be."

"Precisely so," he said.

"And in the matter of honors and office too this will be his guiding principle: He will gladly take part in and enjoy those which he thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private life he will shun those that may overthrow the established habit[2452] of his soul."

"Then, if that is his chief concern," he said,

"he will not willingly take part in politics.[2453]"

[2446] Cf. *Phaedo* 61 A.

[2447] Cf. p. 355, note d, on 576 D.

[2448] *ὄγκον*: cf. Horace's use of *acervus*, Shorey on *Odes* ii. 2. 24.

[2449] Cf. Vol. I. p. 163, note g, Newman i. p. 136. For the evils of wealth Cf. *Laws* 831 C ff., 870 B-C, *Rep.* 434 B, 550 D ff., etc.

[2450] This analogy pervades the *Republic.* Cf. 570 C and p. 240, note b, on 544 D-E, Introd. Vol. I. p. xxxv. Cf. "ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει" 590 E, 605 B. For the subordination of everything to the moral life cf. also 443 D and p. 509, note d, on 618 C.

[2451] As in the state, extremes of wealth and poverty are to be avoided. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 645, on *Laws* 915 B.

[2452] Almost Aristotle's use of *ἕξις*.

[2453] Cf. pp. 52-55 on 496 D-E. The later schools debated the question whether the "sage" would take part in politics. Cf. Seneca, *De otio.* xxx. 2 f. and Von Arnim, *Stoic Vet. Frag.* i. p. 62. 22 f.: "Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam (sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit;" *ibid.* iii. p. 158. 31 ff.: "consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rempublicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos;" *ibid.* p. 174. 32: "negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum;" *ibid.* 37 ff.: "praeterea, cum sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam, etiamsi recesserit"; *ibid.* iii. p. 157. 40 ff. "ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας" *ibid.* p. 172. 18 f. "δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύεσθαι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον". . . ; *ibid.* 173. 19 ff. "ἔφαμεν δ' ὅτι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον οἷον ἐστι. μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐάν τι κωλύῃ καὶ μάλιστ' ἂν μηδὲν ὠφελεῖν μέλλῃ τὴν πατρίδα, κινδύνους δὲ παρακολουθεῖν ὑπολαμβάνῃ μεγάλους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας"; *ibid.* p. 175. 3 f. "πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων"; *ibid.* 6 ff. "Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν

"Yes, by the dog,[2454]" said I,

"in his own city he certainly will, yet perhaps not in the city of his birth, except in some providential conjuncture.[2455]"

"I understand," he said;

"you mean the city whose establishment we have described, the city whose home is in the ideal;[2456] for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth.[2457]"

"Well," said I,

"perhaps there is a pattern[2458] of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen.[2459] But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever

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τῷ Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς γράφων, οὕτω ῥντορεύσειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγείας"

[2454]Cf. on 399 E, *Phaedr.* 228 B, *Gorg.* 466 C, 461 A, 482 B, *Phaedo* 98 E, 567 E.

[2455]*θεία . . . τύχη.* So *θεῖα μοῖρα* is often used to account for an exception, e.g.493 A, *Laws* 875 C, 642 C, *Meno* 99 E, etc. Cf. "θεῖον . . . ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου" 492 E.

[2456]Lit. "in words." This is one of the most famous passages in Plato, and a source of the idea of the City of God among both Stoics and Christians. Cf. Marc. Aurel. ix. 29 "μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἔλπιζε", Justin Martyr's *επὶ γῆς διατρίβουσιν ἀλλ' ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτεύονται*, which recalls *Philippians* iii. 20 "ἡμῶν δὲ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει" and also *Heb.* xii. 22, xi. 10 and 16, xiii. 14, *Eph.* ii. 19, *Gal.* iv. 26, *Rev.* iii. 12 and xxi. 2 ff. Ackermann, *Das Christliche bei Platon,* p. 24, compares *Luke* xvii. 21 "the kingdom of God is within you." Cf. also *John* xviii. 36. Havet, *Le Christianisme et ses origines,* p. 207, says, "Platon dit de sa République précisément ce qu'on a dit plus tard du royaume de Dieu, qu'elle n'est pas de ce monde." Cf. also Caird, *Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy,* ii. p. 170, Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*(tr. Buchanan), vol. i. p. 332, ii. pp. 73-74 and 338, Proclus, *Comm.* 352 (Kroll i. 16); Pater, *Marius the Epicurean,* p. 212 "Marcus Aurelius speaks often of that City on high, of which all other cities are but single habitations . . . ," p. 213 " . . . the vision of a reasonable, a divine order, not in nature, but in the condition of human affairs, that unseen Celestial City, Uranopolis, Callipolis . . . ";*ibid.* p. 158 "thou hast been a citizen in this wide city," and pp. 192-193. Cf. further Inge, *Christian Ethics,* pp. 104-105, "let us fly hence to our dear country, as the disciples of Plato have repeated one after another. There are a few people who are so well adjusted to their environment that they do not feel, or rarely feel, this nostalgia for the infinite . . . " Somewhat different is the Stoic idea of a world state and of the sage as citizen of the world, e.g. Marc. Aurel. iv. 4, Sen. *De otio* 31, Cic. *Nat. deor.* ii. 62 (154). Cf. Newman, *Aristot. Pol.* i. p. 92; also *ibid.* pp. 87-88. For the identification of the *πόλις* with philosophy cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 15 and vii. 40, Lucian, *Hermotim.* 22, *Sale of Lives* 17, *Ver. Hist.* 17, Proclus i. 16 (Kroll). Diogenes Laertius, ii. 7, reports that, when Anaxagoras was reproached for not concerning himself with the affairs of his country, he replied, "Indeed, I am greatly concerned with my country," and pointed to heaven.

[2457]Cf. 499 C-D.

[2458]Cf. *Theaet.* 176 E, which Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 179 says must refer to the *Republic, Laws* 739 D-E, 746 B, and *What Plato Said,* p. 458 on *Euthyphro* 6 E.

[2459]*ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν*: Adam "found a city in himself." See his note *ad loc.* Cf. Jebb

will come into being.[2460] The politics of this city only will be his and of none other."

"That seems probable," he said.

on Soph. *Oed. Col.* 1004.

[2460]Cf. 499 C-D, 472 B-E, and *What Plato Said,* p. 564.

Book 10

"And truly," I said,

"many other considerations assure me that we were entirely right in our organization of the state, and especially, I think, in the matter of poetry.[2461]"

"What about it?" he said.

"In refusing to admit[2462] at all so much of it as is imitative[2463]; for that it is certainly not to be received is, I think, still more plainly apparent now that we have distinguished the several parts[2464] of the soul."

"What do you mean?"

"Why, between ourselves[2465]—for you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all other imitators—that kind of art seems to be a corruption[2466] of the mind of all listeners who do not possess, as an antidote[2467] a knowledge of its real nature."

[2461] In Book III. On the whole question see Introd. Max. Tyr. *Diss.* 23 "Εἰ καλῶς Πλάτων Ὅμηρον τῆς Πολιτείας παρητήσατο", and 32 "ἔστι καθ' Ὅμηρον αἵρεσις". Strabo i. 2 3. Athenaeus v. 12. 187 says that Plato himself in the *Symposium* wrote worse things than the poets whom he banishes. Friedländer, *Platon,* i. p. 138, thinks that the return to the poets in Book X. is intended to justify the poetry of Plato's dialogues. On the banishment of the poets and Homer cf. also Minucius Felix (Halm), pp. 32-33, Tertullian (Oehler), lib. ii. c. 7, Olympiodorus, Hermann vi. p. 367, Augustine, *De civ. Dei,* ii. xiv.

[2462] Supra 394 D, 568 B, and on 398 A-B, 607 A.

[2463] In the narrower sense. Cf. Vol. I. p. 224, note c, on 392 D, and *What Plato Said,* p. 561.

[2464] Lit. "species." Cf. 435 B ff., 445 C, 580 D, 588 B ff., *Phaedr.* 271 D, *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 42.

[2465] Cf. *Gorg.* 462 B, *Protag.* 309 A, 339 E.

[2466] Cf. 605 C, *Meno* 91 C, *Laws* 890 B.

[2467] *φάρμακον*: this passage is the source of Plutarch's view of literature in education;

"What is your idea in saying this?" he said.

"I must speak out," I said,

"though a certain love and reverence for Homer[2468] that has possessed me from a boy would stay me from speaking. For he appears to have been the first teacher and beginner of all these beauties of tragedy. Yet all the same we must not honor a man above truth,[2469] but, as I say, speak our minds."

"By all means," he said.

"Listen, then, or rather, answer my question."

"Ask it," he said.

"Could you tell me in general what imitation is? For neither do I myself quite apprehend what it would be at."

"It is likely, then,[2470]" he said,

"that *I* should apprehend!"

"It would be nothing strange," said I,

"since it often happens that the dimmer vision sees things in advance of the keener.[2471]"

"That is so," he said;

"but in your presence I could not even be eager to try to state anything that appears to me, but do you yourself consider it."

"Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point by our customary procedure[2472]? We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea

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see *Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat* 15 C.

[2468]Isoc. ii. 48-49 is perhaps imitating this. For Homer as a source of tragedy cf. also 598 D, 605 C-D, 607 A, 602 B, *Theaet.* 152 E, schol. Trendelenburg, pp. 75 ff.; Dryden, *Discourse on Epic Poetry:* "The origin of the stage was from the epic poem . . . those episodes of Homer which were proper for the state the poets amplifies each into an action," etc. Cf. Aristot. *Poet.* 1448 b 35 f., Diog. Laert. iv. 40, and 393 A ff.

[2469]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 532, on *Phaedo* 91 C, Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 16 "ἄμφοιν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν", Henri-Pierre Cazac, *Polémique d'Aristote contre la théorie platonicienne des Idées,* p. 11, n.: "Platon lui-même, critiquant Homère, . . . fait une semblabe réflexion, "On doit plus d'égards à la vérité qu'à un homme." Cousin croit, après Camérarius, que c'est là l'origine du mot célèbre d'Aristote." Cf. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei.* x. 30 "homini praeposuit veritatem."

[2470]For *ἦ που* Cf. *Phaedo* 84 D.

[2471]Perhaps a slight failure in Attic courtesy. Cf. *Laws* 715 D-E, and for *ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων*927 B, *Euthydem.* 281 D, *Rep.* 404 A, Themist. *Orat.* ii. p. 32 C. Cf. the saying *πολλάκι καὶ κηποῦρος ἀνὴρ μάλα καίριον εἶπεν.*

[2472]Cf. *Phaedo* 76 D, 100 B, *Phileb.* 16 D, 479 E, Thompson on *Meno* 72 D. See Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* ii. 1. p. 660. The intentional simplicity of Plato's positing of the concept here (cf. 597 A), and his transition from the concept to the "idea," has been mistaken for a primitive aspect of his thought by many interpreters. It is quite uncritical to use Aristot. *Met.* 991 b 6 ff. to prove that Plato's "later" theory of

or form[2473] in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name. Do you not understand?"

"I do."

"In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are many couches and tables."

"Of course."

"But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table."

"Yes."

"And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes[2474] on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he?"

"By no means."

"But now consider what name you would give to this craftsman."

"What one?"

"Him who makes all the things[2475] that all handicraftsmen severally produce."

"A truly clever and wondrous man you tell of."

"Ah, but wait,[2476] and you will say so indeed, for this same handicraftsman is not only able to make all implements, but he produces all plants and animals, including himself,[2477] and thereto earth and heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in Hades under the

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ideas did not recognize ideas of artefacts, and therefore that this passage represents an earlier phase of the theory. He deliberately expresses the theory as simply as possible, and a manufactured object suits his purpose here as it does in *Cratyl.* 389. See also *ibid*, Introd. pp. xxii-xxiii.

[2473]"Forms" with a capital letter is even more misleading than "ideas."

[2474]Cf. *Cratyl.* 389 A-B. There is no contradiction, as many say, with 472 D.

[2475]Cf. Emerson, *The Poet*: "and therefore the rich poets—as Homer, Chaucer, Shakespeare and Raphael—have no limits to their riches except the limits of their lifetime, and resemble a mirror carried through the streets ready to render an image of every created thing." (Cf. 596 D-E "κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν" and Julian, *Or.* v. 163 D.) Empedocles, *fr.* 23 (Diels i.3 pp. 234-235): "ὡς δ' ὁπόταν γραφέες . . . δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας . . . "

[2476]Climax beyond climax. Cf. on 508 E p. 104, note c.

[2477]It is a tempting error to refer this to God, as I once did, and as Wilamowitz, *Platon.* i. p. 604 does. So Cudworth, *True Intel. System of the Universe,* vol. ii. p. 70: "Lastly, he is called *ὃς πάντα τά τε ἄλλα ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἑαυτόν*, "he that causeth or produceth both all other things, and even himself."" But the producer of everything, including himself, is the imitator generalized and then exemplified by the painter and the poet. Cf. *Soph.* 234 A-B.

earth."

"A most marvellous sophist,[2478]" he said.

"Are you incredulous?" said I.

"Tell me, do you deny altogether the possibility of such a craftsman, or do you admit that in a sense there could be such a creator of all these things, and in another sense not? Or do you not perceive that you yourself would be able to make all these things in a way?"

"And in what way,[2479] I ask you," he said.

"There is no difficulty," said I,

"but it is something that the craftsman can make everywhere and quickly. You could do it most quickly if you should choose to take a mirror and carry it about everywhere. You will speedily produce the sun and all the things in the sky, and speedily the earth and yourself and the other animals and implements and plants and all the objects of which we just now spoke."

"Yes," he said,

"the appearance of them, but not the reality and the truth."

"Excellent," said I,

"and you come to the aid of the argument opportunely. For I take it that the painter too belongs to this class of producers, does he not?"

"Of course."

"But you will say, I suppose, that his creations are not real and true. And yet, after a fashion, the painter[2480] too makes a couch, does he not?"

"Yes," he said,

"the appearance of one, he too."

"What of the cabinet-maker? Were you not just now saying that he

[2478]Eurip. *Hippol.* 921 "δεινὸν σοφιστὴν εἶπας".

[2479]*καὶ τίς* is sceptical as in Aristoph. *Acharn.* 86.

[2480]Art is deception. Diels ii.3 p. 339, Dialex. 3 (10) "ἐν γὰρ τραγωιδοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις κε πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος", Xen. *Mem.* iii. 10. 1 "γραφική ἐστιν εἰκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων". Cf. Plut. *Quomodo adolescens* 17 F-18 A on painting and poetry. There are many specious resemblances between Plato's ideas on art and morality and those of the "lunatic fringe" of Platonism. Cf. Jane Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual,* pp. 21-22, Charles F. Andrews, *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas,* p. 332. William Temple, *Plato and Christianity,* p. 89: "In the tenth book of the *Republic* he says that, whereas the artificer in making any material object imitates the eternal idea, an artist only imitates the imitation (595 A-598 D); but in Book V he said that we do not blame an artist who depicts a face more beautiful than any actual human face either is or ever could be (472 D)." But this does not affect Plato's main point here, that the artist imitates the "real" world, not the world of ideas. The artist's imitation may fall short of or better its model. But the model is not the (Platonic) idea.

does not make the idea or form which we say is the real couch, the couch in itself,[2481] but only some particular couch?"

"Yes, I was."

"Then if he does not make that which really is, he could not be said to make real being but something that resembles real being but is not that. But if anyone should say that being in the complete sense[2482] belongs to the work of the cabinet-maker or to that of any other handicraftsman, it seems that he would say what is not true."

"That would be the view," he said,

"of those who are versed[2483] in this kind of reasoning."

"We must not be surprised, then, if this too is only a dim adumbration in comparison with reality."

"No, we must not."

"Shall we, then, use these very examples in our quest for the true nature of this imitator?"

"If you please," he said.

"We get, then, these three couches, one, that in nature[2484] which, I take it, we would say that God produces,[2485] or who else?"

"No one, I think."

"And then there was one which the carpenter made."

"Yes," he said.

"And one which the painter. Is not that so?"

"So be it."

"The painter, then, the cabinet-maker, and God, there are these three presiding over three kinds of couches."

"Yes,three."

"Now God,whether because he so willed or because some compulsion was laid upon him[2486] not to make more than one couch in nature,

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[2481] *ὃ ἔστι* belongs to the terminology of ideas. Cf. *Phaedo* 74 D, 75 B, 75 D, *Rep.* 507 B.

[2482] *τελέως . . . ὄν*: Cf. 477 A, and *Soph.* 248 E "παντελῶς ὄντι".

[2483] An indirect reference to Plato and his school like the "friends of ideas" in *Soph.* 248 A.

[2484] Cf. 597 C, 598 A, 501 B "φύσει", *Phaedo* 103 B, *Parmen.* 132 D.

[2485] Proclus says that this is not seriously meant (*apud* Beckmann, *Num Plato artifactorum Ideas statuerit,* p. 12). Cf. Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* ii. 1, p. 666, who interprets the passage correctly; A. E. Taylor, in *Mind,* xii. p. 5 "Plato's meaning has been supposed to be adequately indicted by such half-jocular instances as that of the idea of a bed or table in *Republic* x.," etc.

[2486] In *Tim.* 31 A the same argument is used for the creation of one world "ἵνα . . . κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ". See my *De Plat. Idearum doct.* p. 39. Cf. Renan, *Dialogues Phil.* p. 25: "Pour forger les premières tenailles, dit le Talmud, il fallut des tenailles. Dieu les créa."

so wrought and created one only,[2487] the couch which really and in itself is. But two or more such were never created by God and never will come into being."

"How so?" he said.

"Because," said I,

"if he should make only two, there would again appear one of which they both would possess the form or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in and of itself, and not the other two."

"Right," he said.

"God, then, I take it, knowing this and wishing to be the real author of the couch that has real being and not of some particular couch, nor yet a particular cabinet-maker, produced it in nature unique."

"So it seems."

"Shall we, then, call him its true and natural begetter, or something of the kind?"

"That would certainly be right," he said,

"since it is by and in nature[2488] that he has made this and all other things."

"And what of the carpenter? Shall we not call him the creator of a couch?"

"Yes."

"Shall we also say that the painter is the creator and maker of that sort of thing?"

"By no means."

"What will you say he is in relation to the couch?"

"This," said he,

"seems to me the most reasonable designation for him, that he is the imitator of the thing which those others produce."

"Very good," said I;

"the producer of the product three removes[2489] from nature you call the imitator?"

"By all means," he said.

[2487] The famous argument of the third man. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 585, on *Parmen.* 132 A and Introd. p. xxiii.

[2488] Cf. *Soph.* 265 E "θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ", Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* i. 3. 4 "those things which Nature is said to do are by divine art preformed, using nature as an instrument," Browne, *apud* J. Texte, *Etudes de littérature européenne,* p. 65 "la nature est l'art de Dieu," Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 13 "deoque tribuenda, id est mundo," *De leg.* i. 7. 21, Seneca, *De benef.* iv. 7 "quid enim aliud est natura quam deus?" Höffding, *Hist. of Mod. Philos.* ii. 115 "Herder uses the word Nature in his book in order to avoid the frequent mention of the name of God."

[2489] Cf. 587 C, *Phaedr.* 248 E, where the imitator is sixth in the scale.

"This, then, will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three removes from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators."

"It would seem so."

"We are in agreement, then, about the imitator. But tell me now this about the painter. Do you think that what he tries to imitate is in each case that thing itself in nature or the works of the craftsmen?"

"The works of the craftsmen," he said.

"Is it the reality of them or the appearance? Define that further point.[2490]"

"What do you mean?" he said.

"This: Does a couch differ from itself according as you view it from the side or the front or in any other way? Or does it differ not at all in fact though it appears different, and so of other things?"

"That is the way of it," he said:

"it appears other but differs not at all."

"Consider, then, this very point. To which is painting directed in every case, to the imitation of reality as it is[2491] or of appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of a phantasm or of the truth?"

"Of a phantasm,[2492]" he said.

"Then the mimetic art is far removed[2493] from truth, and this, it seems, is the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches or lays hold of only a small part of the object and that a phantom[2494]; as, for example, a painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, and other craftsmen, though he himself has no expertness in any of these arts,[2495] but nevertheless if he were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a carpenter he would deceive children and foolish men,[2496] and make them believe it to be a real carpenter."

"Why not?"

"But for all that, my friend, this, I take it, is what we ought to bear in mind in all such cases: When anyone reports to us of someone, that he has met a man who knows all the crafts and everything else[2497]

[2490]Cf. *Gorg.* 488 D, *Soph.* 222 C.

[2491]Cf. *Soph.* 263 B, *Cratyl.* 385 B, *Euthydem.* 284 C.

[2492]Cf. 599 A, *Soph.* 232 A, 234 E, 236 B, *Prot.* 356 D.

[2493]Cf. 581 E.

[2494]For *εἴδωλον* cf. p. 197, note e.

[2495]Commentators sometimes miss the illogical idiom. So Adam once proposed to emend *τεχνῶν* to *τεχνίτων*, but later withdrew this suggestion in his note on the passage. Cf. 373 C, *Critias* 111 E, and my paper in *T.A.P.A.* xlvii. (1916) pp. 205-234.

[2496]Cf. *Soph.* 234 B.

that men severally know, and that there is nothing that he does not know[2498] more exactly than anybody else, our tacit rejoinder must be that he is a simple fellow, who apparently has met some magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator and has been deceived by him into the belief that he is all-wise,[2499] because of his own inability to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance[2500] and imitation."

"Most true," he said.

"Then," said I,

"have we not next to scrutinize tragedy and its leader Homer,[2501] since some people tell us that these poets know all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all things divine? For the good poet, if he is to poetize things rightly, must, they argue, create with knowledge or else be unable to create."

"So we must consider whether these critics have not fallen in with such imitators and been deceived by them, so that looking upon their works they cannot perceive that these are three removes from reality, and easy to produce without knowledge of the truth. For it is phantoms,[2502] not realities, that they produce. Or is there something in their claim, and

[2497] So Dryden, *Essay on Satire:* "Shakespeare . . . Homer . . . in either of whom we find all arts and sciences, all moral and natural philosophy without knowing that they ever studied them," and the beautiful rhapsody of Andrew Lang, *Letters to Dead Authors,* p. 238: "They believe not that one human soul has known every art, and all the thoughts of women as of men," etc. Pope, pref. to his translation of the *Iliad:* "If we reflect upon those innumerable knowledges, those secrets of nature and physical philosophy which Homer is generally supposed to have wrapped up in his allegories, what a new and ample scene of wonder may this consideration afford us." Cf. Xen. *Symp.* 4. 6. Brunetière, *Epoques,* p. 105, says: "Corneille . . . se piquait de connaître à fond l'art de la politique et celui de la guerre." For the impossibility of universal knowledge Cf. *Soph.* 233 A, *Charm.* 170 B, Friedländer, *Platon,* ii. p. 146 on *Hipp. Min.* 366 C ff. Cf. also *Ion* 536 E, 541 B, 540 B, and *Tim.* 19 D. Tate, "Plato and Allegorical Interpretation," *Class. Quarterly,* Jan. 1930, p. 2 says: "The true poet is for Plato philosopher as well as poet. He must know the truth." This ignores the *ἄρα* in 598 E. Plato there is not stating his own opinion but giving the arguments of those who claim omniscience for the poet. Wilamowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 313 n. 1 completely misunderstands and misinterprets the passage. Cf. *Class. Phil.* xxvii. (1932) p. 85. E.E. Sikes, *The Greek View of Poetry,* p. 175, says Rymer held that "a poet is obliged to know all arts and sciences." Aristotle from a different point of view says we expect the wise man to know everything in the sense in which that is possible, *Met.* 982 a 8.

[2498] Cf. "οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχί" *Charm.* 175 C, "οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ" *Ala. I* 105 E, *Phil.* 54 B, *Phaedo* 110 E, *Euthyph.* 3 C, *Euthydem.* 294 D, Isoc. *Panegyr.* 14, Herod. v. 97.

[2499] *πάσσοφος* is generally ironical in Plato. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 489, on *Lysis* 216 A.

[2500] For *ἀνεπιστημοσύνην* Cf. *Theaet.* 199 E f.

[2501] For Homer as tragedian cf. on 595 B-C, p. 420, note a.

[2502] Cf. on 598 B.

do good poets really know the things about which the multitude fancy they speak well?"

"We certainly must examine the matter," he said.

"Do you suppose, then, that if a man were able to produce both the exemplar and the semblance, he would be eager to abandon himself to the fashioning of phantoms[2503] and set this in the forefront of his life as the best thing he had?"

"I do not."

"But, I take it, if he had genuine knowledge of the things he imitates he would far rather devote himself to real things[2504] than to the imitation of them, and would endeavor to leave after him many noble deeds[2505] and works as memorials of himself, and would be more eager to be the theme of praise than the praiser."

"I think so," he said;

"for there is no parity in the honor and the gain."

"Let us not, then, demand a reckoning[2506] from Homer or any other of the poets on other matters by asking them, if any one of them was a physician and not merely an imitator of a physician's talk, what men any poet, old or new, is reported to have restored to health as Asclepius did, or what disciples of the medical art he left after him as Asclepius did his descendants; and let us dismiss the other arts and not question them about them; but concerning the greatest and finest things of which Homer undertakes to speak, wars and generalship[2507] and the administration of cities and the education of men, it surely is fair to question him and ask, "Friend Homer, if you are not at the third remove from truth and reality in human excellence, being merely that creator of phantoms whom we defined as the imitator, but if you are even in the second place and were capable of knowing what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what city was better governed owing to you,[2508] even as Lacedaemon was because of Lycurgus,[2509] and many other cities great and small

[2503]Cf. 598 B.

[2504]Cf. Petit de Julleville, *Hist. lit. francaise* vii. p. 233, on the poet Lamartine's desire to be a practical statesman, and *ibid*: "Quand on m'apprendrait que le divin Homère a refusé les charges municipales de Smyrne ou de Colophon, je ne croirais jamais qu'il eût pu mieux mériter de la Grèce en administrant son bourg natal qu'en composant l'*Iliade* et l'*Odyssée*."

[2505]But Cf. *Symp.* 209 D.

[2506]For the challenge to the poet to specify his knowledge Cf. *Ion* 536 E f.

[2507]Cf. *Ion* 541 A f.

[2508]Cf. *Gorg.* 515 B, *Laches* 186 B.

[2509]Cf. *Laws* 630 D, 632 D, 858 E, *Symp.* 209 D, *Phaedr.* 258 B, *Minos* 318 C,

because of other legislators. But what city credits you with having been a good legislator and having benefited them? Italy and Sicily say this of Charondas and we of Solon.[2510] But who says it of you?" Will he be able to name any?"

"I think not," said Glaucon;

"at any rate none is mentioned even by the Homerids themselves." "Well, then, is there any tradition of a war in Homer's time that was well conducted by his command or counsel?"

"None."

"Well, then, as might be expected of a man wise in practical affairs, are many and ingenious inventions[2511] for the arts and business of life reported of Homer as they are of Thales[2512] the Milesian and Anacharsis[2513] the Scythian?"

"Nothing whatever of the sort."

"Well, then, if no public service is credited to him, is Homer reported while he lived to have been a guide in education to men who took pleasure in associating with him and transmitted to posterity a certain Homeric way of life[2514] just as Pythagoras[2515] was himself especially honored for this, and his successors, even to this day, denominating a certain way of life the Pythagorean,[2516] are distinguished among their contemporaries?"

"No, nothing of this sort either is reported; for Creophylos,[2517] Socrates, the friend of Homer, would perhaps be even more ridiculous than his name[2518] as a representative of Homeric culture and education,

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Herod. i. 65-66, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 1. 2 and *passim*, Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus.*

[2510]Cf. *Symp.* 209 D, *Phaedr.* 258 B, 278 C, *Charm.* 155 A, 157 E, *Prot.* 343 A, *Tim.* 20 E ff., Herod. i. 29 ff. and 86, ii. 177, v. 113, Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* v. ff., Diog. Laert. i. 45 ff., Plutarch, *Life of Solon,*Freeman, *The Work and Life of Solon.*

[2511]On the literature of "inventions," *εὑρήματα*, see Newman ii. p. 382 on Aristot. *Pol.* 1274 b 4. Cf. Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 663 "inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artes," and *Symp.* 209 A.

[2512]Diog. Laert. i. 23-27.

[2513]Diog. Laert. i. 105 says he was reported to be the inventor of the anchor and the potter's wheel.

[2514]In the (spurious?) seventh epistle, 328 A, Plato speaks of the life and *λόγος* advocated by himself. Cf. Novotny, *Plato's Epistles,* p. 168.

[2515]Diels i3 pp. 27 f.

[2516]Cf. "*ὀρφικοὶ . . . βίοι*" *Laws* 782 C.

[2517]"Of the beef-clan." The scholiast says he was a Chian and an epic poet. See Callimachus's epigram *apud* Sext. Empir., Bekker, p. 609 (*Adv. Math.* i. 48), and Suidas *s. v. κρεώφυλος*

[2518]Modern Greeks also are often very sensitive to the etymology of proper names. Cf. also on 580 B, p. 369, note d.

if what is said about Homer is true. For the tradition is that Homer was completely neglected in his own lifetime by that friend of the flesh."

"Why, yes, that is the tradition," said I;

"but do you suppose, Glaucon, that, if Homer had really been able to educate men[2519] and make them better and had possessed not the art of imitation but real knowledge, he would not have acquired many companions and been honored and loved by them? But are we to believe that while Protagoras[2520] of Abdera and Prodicus[2521] of Ceos and many others are able by private teaching to impress upon their contemporaries the conviction that they will not be capable of governing their homes or the city[2522] unless they put them in charge of their education, and make themselves so beloved for this wisdom[2523] that their companions all but[2524] carry them about on their shoulders,[2525] yet, forsooth, that Homer's contemporaries, if he had been able to help men to achieve excellence,[2526] would have suffered him or Hesiod to roam about rhapsodizing and would not have clung to them far rather than to their gold,[2527] and constrained them to dwell with them[2528] in their homes, or failing to persuade them, would themselves have escorted them wheresoever they went until they should have sufficiently imbibed their culture?"

"What you say seems to me to be altogether true, Socrates," he said.

"Shall we, then, lay it down that all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer,[2529] are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things that they "create,[2530]" and do not lay hold on truth? but, as we were just now saying, the painter will fashion, himself knowing nothing of the cobbler's art, what appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to

[2519]See on 540 B, p. 230, note d.

[2520]Cf. *Prot.* 315 A-B, 316 C.

[2521]See *What Plato Said,* p. 486, on *Laches* 197 D.

[2522]For *διοικεῖν* Cf. *Protag.* 318 E.

[2523]See Thompson on *Meno* 70 B.

[2524]On *μόνον οὐκ* Cf. *Menex.* 235 C, *Ax.* 365 B.

[2525]Stallbaum refers to Themist. *Orat.* xxii. p. 254 A "ὃν ἡμεῖς διὰ ταύτην τὴν φαντασίαν μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρομεν", Erasmus, *Chiliad* iv. Cent. 7 n. 98 p. 794, and the German idiom *einen auf den Händen tragen.*

[2526]Cf. *Protag.* 328 B.

[2527]The article perhaps gives the word a contemptuous significance. So *Meno* 89 B "τὸ χρυσίον".

[2528]*οἴκοι εἶναι*: J. J. Hartman, *Ad Platonis Remp.* 600 E, *Mnem.* 1916, p. 45, would change *εἶναι* to *μεῖναι.* But cf. Cic. *Att.* vii. 10 "erimus una."

[2529]Cf. 366 E. *Gorg.* 471 C-D, *Symp.* 173 D.

[2530]Or "about which they versify," playing with the double meaning of *ποιεῖν.*

those who know nothing but judge only by forms and colors[2531]?"

"Certainly."

"And similarly, I suppose, we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases[2532] the colors of the several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant, who see things only through words,[2533] will deem his words most excellent, whether he speak in rhythm, meter and harmony about cobbling or generalship or anything whatever. So mighty is the spell[2534] that these adornments naturally exercise; though when they are stripped bare of their musical coloring and taken by themselves,[2535] I think you know what sort of a showing these sayings of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed them."

"I have," he said.

"Do they not," said I,

"resemble the faces of adolescents, young but not really beautiful, when the bloom of youth abandons them?[2536]"

"By all means," he said.

"Come, then," said I,

"consider this point: The creator of the phantom, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of the reality but only the appearance. Is not that so?"

[2531]For the association of *χρώματα* and *σχήματα* Cf. *Phileb.* 12 E. 47 A, 51 B, *Laws* 669 A, *Soph.* 251 A, *Meno* 75 A with Apelt's note, *Cratyl.* 431 C, *Gorg.* 465 B, *Phaedo* 100 D, Aristot. *Poet.* 1447 a 18-19.

[2532]Cf. *Symp.* 198 B, *Apol.* 17 C. The explicit discrimination of *ὀνόματα* as names of agents and *ῥήματα* as names of actions is peculiar to *Soph.* 262. But Cf. *Cratyl.* 431 B, 425 A, *Theaet.* 206 D. And in *Soph.* 257 B "ῥήματι" is used generally. See *Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 56-57. Cf. *Euthydem.* 304 E with *Symp.* 187 A, *Phaedr.* 228 D, 271 C and my note in *Class. Phil.* xvii. (1922) p. 262.

[2533]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 593 on *Soph.* 240 A.

[2534]Cf. 607 C, *Laws* 840 C, *Protag.* 315 A-B.

[2535]Cf. *Gorg.* 502 C "εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμόν", 392, *Ion* 530 b, Epicharmus *apud* Diog. Laert. iii. 17 "περιδύσας τὸ μέτρον ὃ νῦν ἔχει", Aeschines, *In Ctes.* 136 "περιελόντες τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ μέτρον", Isoc. *Evag.* 11 "τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ" with Horace, *Sat.* i. 4. 62 "invenias etiam disiecti membra poetae," Aristot. *Rhet.* 1404 a 24 "ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τήνδε τὴν δόξαν". Sext. Empir., Bekker, pp. 665-666 (*Adv. Math.* ii. 288), says that the ideas of poets are inferior to those of the ordinary layman. Cf. also Julian, *Or.* ii. 78 D, Coleridge, *Table Talk:* "If you take from Virgil his diction and metre what do you leave him?"

[2536]Aristot. *Rhet.* 1406 b 36 f. refers to this. Cf. Tyrtaeus 8 (6). 28 "ὅφρ' ἐρατῆς ἥβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ", Mimnermus i. 4 "ἥβης ἄνθη γίγνεται ἁρπαλέα"; Theognis 1305: "παιδείας πλουηράτου ἄνθος ὠκύτερον σταδίου" Xen. *Symp.* 8. 14 "τὸ μὲν τῆς ὥρας ἄνθος ταχὺ δήπου παρακμάζει", Plato, *Symp.* 183 E "τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι"

"Yes."

"Let us not, then, leave it half said but consider it fully."

"Speak on," he said.

"The painter, we say, will paint both reins and a bit."

"Yes."

"But the maker[2537] will be the cobbler and the smith."

"Certainly."

"Does the painter, then, know the proper quality of reins and bit? Or does not even the maker, the cobbler and the smith, know that, but only the man who understands the use of these things, the horseman[2538]?"

"Most true."

"And shall we not say that the same holds true of everything?"

"What do you mean?"

"That there are some three arts concerned with everything, the user's art,[2539] the maker's, and the imitator's."

"Yes."

"Now do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightness[2540] of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the use[2541] for which each is made or by nature adapted?"

"That is so."

"It quite necessarily follows, then, that the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by experience, and that he reports to the maker the good or bad effects in use of the thing he uses. As, for example, the flute-player reports to the flute-maker which flutes respond and serve rightly in flute-playing, and will order the kind that must be made, and the other will obey and serve him."

"Of course."

"The one, then, possessing knowledge, reports about the goodness

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[2537]The δέ γε has almost the effect of a retort.

[2538]Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 1094 a 10-11 "καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἡ χαλινοποιική". . .

[2539]For the idea that the user knows best see *Cratyl.* 390 B, *Euthydem.* 289 B, *Phaedr.* 274 E. Zeller, *Aristotle*(Eng.) ii. p. 247, attributes this "pertinent observation" to Aristotle. Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1277 b 30 "αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος". See 1282 a 21, 1289 a 17. Coleridge, *Table Talk:* "In general those who do things for others know more about them than those for whom they are done. A groom knows more about horses than his master." But Hazlitt disagrees with Plato's view.

[2540]So in *Laws* 669 A-B, Plato says that the competent judge of a work of art must know three things, first, what it is, second, that it is true and right, and third, that it is good.

[2541]For the reference of beauty to use see *Hipp. Maj.* 295 C ff.

or the badness of the flutes, and the other, believing, will make them."

"Yes."

"Then in respect of the same implement the maker will have right belief[2542] about its excellence and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to listen to him, but the user will have true knowledge."

"Certainly."

"And will the imitator from experience or use have knowledge whether the things he portrays are or are not beautiful and right, or will he, from compulsory association with the man who knows and taking orders from him for the right making of them, have right opinion[2543]?"

"Neither."

"Then the imitator will neither know nor opine rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations."

"It seems not."

"Most charming,[2544] then, would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in respect of true wisdom about his creations."

"Not at all."

"Yet still he will none the less[2545] imitate, though in every case he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant multitude."

"Why, what else?"

"On this, then, as it seems, we are fairly agreed, that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play,[2546] not to be taken seriously,[2547] and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or heroic verse,[2548] are all altogether imitators."

"By all means."

"In heaven's name, then, this business of imitation is concerned

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[2542] *πίστιν ὀρθήν* is used because of *πιστεύων* above. It is a slightly derogatory synonym of *δόξαν ὀρθήν* below, 602 A. Cf. 511 E.

[2543] This does not contradict book V. 477-478. For right opinion and knowledge cf. 430 B and *What Plato Said,* p. 517, on *Meno* 98 A-B.

[2544] *χαρίεις* is ironical like *χαριέντως* in 426 A and *καλόν* in *Theaet.* 183 A, but Glaucon in his answer takes it seriously.

[2545] Note the accumulation of particles in the Greek. Similarly in 619 B, *Phaedo* 59 D, 61 E, 62 B, 64 A, *Parmen.* 127 D, Demosth. xxiii. 101, *De cor.* 282, Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 64 A, Isoc. *Peace* 1, Aristot. *De gen. et corr.* 332 a 3, *Iliad* vii. 360.

[2546] Cf. on 536 C, p. 214, note b.

[2547] Cf. 608 A.

[2548] For *ἐν ἔπεσι* cf. 607 A, 379 A, *Meno* 95 D.

with the third remove from truth, is it not?"

"Yes."

"And now again, to what element[2549] in man is its function and potency related?"

"Of what are you speaking?"

"Of this: The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far[2550] does not appear equal."

"Why, no."

"And the same things appear bent and straight[2551] to those who view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colors, and there is obviously every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so scene-painting in its exploitation[2552] of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of witchcraft,[2553] and so do jugglery and many other such contrivances."

"True."

"And have not measuring and numbering and weighing[2554] proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparently[2555] greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned[2556] and numbered or even weighed?"

"Certainly."

"But this surely would be the function[2557] of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates.[2558]"

"Why, yes, of that."

"And often when this has measured[2559] and declares that certain things are larger or that some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at the same time an appearance of the contrary."

"Yes."

"And did we not say[2560] that it is impossible for the same thing at

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[2549]The antithesis of *περί* and *πρός* marks the transition.

[2550]Cf. *Protag.* 356 A, 523 C.

[2551]Cf. Tennyson (*The Higher Pantheism*) "For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool." For the illusions of sense, and measurement as a means of correcting them Cf. *Phileb.* 41 E-42 A f., 55 E, *Protag.* 356 C-D, *Euthyphro* 7 C.

[2552]*ἐπιθεμένη* helps to personify *σκιαγραφία*. Cf. *Gorg.* 464 C.

[2553]Adam's "leaves no magic art untried" is misleading. *ἀπολείπειν* is here used as in 504 C. For the idiomatic *οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει* see p. 200, note b, on 533 A.

[2554]Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 9.

[2555]Cf. *Protag.* 356 D "ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις"

[2556]*λογισάμενον*: Cf. *Laws* 644 D, *Crito* 46 B.

[2557]Cf. Vol. I. p. 36, note a. Of course some of the modern connotations of "function" are unknown to Plato.

[2558]For *λογιστικοῦ* cf. on 439 D.

[2559]See p. 448, note c, and my *Platonism and the History of Science,* p. 176.

one time to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing?"

"And we were right in affirming that."

"The part of the soul, then, that opines in contradiction of measurement could not be the same with that which conforms to it."

"Why, no."

"But, further, that which puts its trust in measurement and reckoning must be the best part of the soul."

"Surely."

"Then that which opposes it must belong to the inferior elements of the soul."

"Necessarily."

"This, then, was what I wished to have agreed upon when I said that poetry, and in general the mimetic art, produces a product that is far removed from truth in the accomplishment of its task, and associates with the part in us that is remote from intelligence, and is its companion and friend[2561] for no sound and true purpose.[2562]"

"By all means," said he.

"Mimetic art, then, is an inferior thing cohabiting with an inferior and engendering inferior offspring.[2563]"

"It seems so."

"Does that," said I,

"hold only for vision or does it apply also to hearing and to what we call poetry?"

"Presumably," he said,

"to that also."

"Let us not, then, trust solely to the plausible analogy[2564] from painting, but let us approach in turn that part of the mind to which mimetic poetry appeals and see whether it is the inferior or the nobly serious part."

"So we must."

"Let us, then, put the question thus: Mimetic poetry, we say, imitates human beings acting under compulsion or voluntarily,[2565] and as a result of their actions supposing themselves to have fared well or

[2560] 436 B, Vol. I. p. 383.

[2561] Cf. 604 D, *Phaedr.* 253 D and E.

[2562] Cf. Lysias ix. 4 "ἐπὶ μηδενὶ ὑγιεῖ" and for the idiom *οὐδὲν ὑγιές* on 523 B, p. 153, note f.

[2563] Cf. 496 A, and on 489 D, p. 26, note b.

[2564] Cf. *Phaedo* 92 D "διὰ τῶν εἰκότων".

[2565] Cf. 399 A-B, *Laws* 655 D, 814 E ff., Aristot. *Poet.* 1448 A 1-2 "ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι", *ibid.* 1449 b 36-37 f.

ill and in all this feeling either grief or joy. Did we find anything else but this?"

"Nothing."

"Is a man, then, in all this of one mind with himself, or just as in the domain of sight there was faction and strife and he held within himself contrary opinions at the same time about the same things,[2566] so also in our actions there is division and strife[2567] of the man with himself? But I recall that there is no need now of our seeking agreement on this point, for in our former discussion[2568] we were sufficiently agreed that our soul at any one moment teems with countless such self-contradictions."

"Rightly," he said.

"Yes, rightly," said I;

"but what we then omitted[2569] must now, I think, be set forth."

"What is that?" he said.

"When a good and reasonable man," said I,

"experiences such a stroke of fortune as the loss of a son or anything else that he holds most dear, we said, I believe, then too,[2570] that he will bear it more easily than the other sort."

"Assuredly."

"But now let us consider this: Will he feel no pain, or, since that is impossible, shall we say that he will in some sort be moderate[2571] in his grief?"

"That," he said,

"is rather the truth."

"Tell me now this about him: Do you think he will be more likely to resist and fight against his grief when he is observed by his equals or when he is in solitude alone by himself?"

"He will be much more restrained," he said,

"when he is on view."

"But when left alone, I fancy, he will permit himself many utter-

[2566] See *What Plato Said,* p. 505, on *Gorg.* 482 A-B.

[2567] Cf. 554 D, and p. 394, note e, on 586 E.

[2568] 439 B ff.

[2569] Plato sometimes pretends to remedy an omission or to correct himself by an afterthought. So in Book V. 449 B-C ff., and *Tim.* 65 C.

[2570] 387 D-E.

[2571] This suggests the doctrine of *μετριοπάθεια* as opposed to the Stoic *ἀπάθεια*. Joel ii. 161 thinks the passage a polemic against Antisthenes. Seneca, *Epist.* xcix. 15 seems to agree with Plato rather than with the Stoics: "inhumanitas est ista non virtus." So Plutarch, *Cons. ad Apol.* 3 (102 cf.). See also *ibid.* 22 (112 E-F). Cf. Horace, *Odes* ii. 3. 1 "aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem," and also *Laws* 732 C, 960 A.

ances which, if heard by another, would put him to shame, and will do many things which he would not consent to have another see him doing."

"So it is," he said.

"Now is it not reason and law that exhorts him to resist, while that which urges him to give way to his grief is the bare feeling itself?"

"True."

"And where there are two opposite impulses[2572] in a man at the same time about the same thing we say that there must needs be two things[2573] in him."

"Of course."

"And is not the one prepared to follow the guidance of the law as the law leads and directs?"

"How so?"

"The law, I suppose, declares that it is best to keep quiet as far as possible in calamity and not to chafe and repine, because we cannot know what is really good and evil in such things[2574] and it advantages us nothing to take them hard, and nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern,[2575] and our grieving checks[2576] the very thing we need to come to our aid as quickly as possible in such case."

"What thing," he said,

"do you mean?"

"To deliberate,"[2577] I said,

"about what has happened to us, and, as it were in the fall of the dice,[2578] to determine the movements of our affairs with reference to the numbers that turn up, in the way that reason indicates[2579] would be the best, and, instead of stumbling like children, clapping one's hands to the stricken spot[2580] and wasting the time in wailing, ever to

[2572]Cf. *Laws* 645 A, *Phaedr.* 238 C, and for the conflict in the soul also *Rep.* 439 B ff.

[2573]The conflict proves that for practical purposes the soul has parts. Cf. 436 B ff.

[2574]Cf. *Apology, in fine.*

[2575]Cf. *Laws* 803 B and *Class. Phil.* ix. p. 353, n. 3, Friedländer, *Platon,* i. p. 143.

[2576]Höffding, *Outlines of Psychology,* p. 99, refers to Saxo's tale of the different effect which the news of the murder of Regner Lodbrog produced on his sons: he in whom the emotion was the weakest had the greatest energy for action.

[2577]Cf. Herod. i. 20 "πρὸς τὸ παρεὸν βουλεύηται".

[2578]Cf. Eurip. *Electra* 639 and *fr.* 175 "πρὸς τὸ πῖπτον", *Iph. Aul.* 1343 and *Hippol.* 718 "πρὸς τὰ νῦν πεπτωκότα", Epictet. ii. 5. 3. See also Stallbaum *ad loc.*

[2579]Cf. 440 B, 607 B, Herod. i. 132.

[2580]Cf. Demosthenes' description of how barbarians box iv. 40 (51), "ἀεὶ τῆς πληγῆς ἔχεται".

accustom the soul to devote itself at once to the curing of the hurt and the raising up of what has fallen, banishing threnody[2581] by therapy."

"That certainly," he said,

"would be the best way to face misfortune and deal with it."

"Then, we say, the best part of us is willing to conform to these precepts of reason."

"Obviously."

"And shall we not say that the part of us that leads us to dwell in memory on our suffering and impels us to lamentation, and cannot get enough of that sort of thing, is the irrational and idle part of us, the associate of cowardice[2582]?"

"Yes, we will say that."

"And does not the fretful part of us present[2583] many and varied occasions for imitation, while the intelligent and temperate disposition, always remaining approximately the same, is neither easy to imitate nor to be understood when imitated, especially by a nondescript mob assembled in the theater? For the representation imitates a type that is alien to them."

"By all means."

"And is it not obvious that the nature of the mimetic poet is not related to this better part of the soul and his cunning is not framed[2584] to please it, if he is to win favor with the multitude, but is devoted to the fretful and complicated type of character because it is easy to imitate?"

"It is obvious."

"This consideration, then, makes it right for us to proceed to lay hold of him and set him down as the counterpart[2585] of the painter; for he resembles him in that his creations are inferior in respect of reality; and the fact that his appeal is to the inferior part of the soul and not to the best part is another point of resemblance. And so we may at last say that we should be justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters this element in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational part, just as when in a state[2586] one puts bad men in power and turns the

[2581] Cf. Soph. *Ajax* 582 "θρηνεῖν ἐπῳδὰς πρὸς τομῶντι πήματι" with Ovid, *Met.* i. 190: "sed immedicabile vulnus Ense recidendum est."

[2582] Cf. on 603 B, p. 450, note a.

[2583] *ἔχει* in the sense of "involves," "admits of," as frequently in Aristotle's *Metaphysics.*

[2584] For *πέπηγεν* cf. 530 D.

[2585] *ἀντίστροφον* is used as in Aristot. *Rhet.* 1354 a 1.

city over to them and ruins the better sort. Precisely in the same manner we shall say that the mimetic poet sets up in each individual soul a vicious constitution by fashioning phantoms far removed from reality, and by currying favor with the senseless element that cannot distinguish the greater from the less, but calls the same thing now one, now the other."

"By all means."

"But we have not yet brought our chief accusation against it. Its power to corrupt, with rare exceptions, even the better sort is surely the chief cause for alarm."

"How could it be otherwise, if it really does that?"

" Listen and reflect. I think you know that the very best of us, when we hear Homer[2587] or some other of the makers of tragedy imitating one of the heroes who is in grief,[2588] and is delivering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating his breast, feel pleasure,[2589] and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness,[2590] and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way."

"I do know it, of course."

"But when in our own lives some affliction comes to us, you are also aware that we plume ourselves upon the opposite, on our ability to remain calm and endure, in the belief that this is the conduct of a man, and what we were praising in the theatre that of a woman.[2591]"

"I do note that."

"Do you think, then," said I,

"that this praise is rightfully bestowed when, contemplating a character that we would not accept but would be ashamed of in ourselves, we do not abominate it but take pleasure and approve?"

"No, by Zeus," he said,

"it does not seem reasonable."

"Oh yes,[2592]" said I,

"if you would consider it in this way."

"In what way?"

"If you would reflect that the part of the soul that in the former

[2586]Cf. p. 412, note d.

[2587]Cf. p. 420, note a, on 595 B-C.

[2588]For *ἐν πένθει* cf. Soph. *El.* 290, 846, Herod. i. 46.

[2589]Cf. *Phileb.* 48 A.

[2590]See the description in *Ion* 535 E, and *Laws* 800 D.

[2591]This is qualified in 387 E-388 A by *οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις*. Cf. also 398 E.

[2592]Cf. Vol. I. p. 509, note b, on 473 E.

case, in our own misfortunes,[2593] was forcibly restrained, and that has hungered for tears and a good cry[2594] and satisfaction, because it is its nature to desire these things, is the element in us that the poets satisfy and delight, and that the best element in our nature, since it has never been properly educated by reason or even by habit, then relaxes its guard[2595] over the plaintive part, inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief; but it thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain,[2596] and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether. That is, I think, because few are capable of reflecting that what we enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves.[2597] For after feeding fat[2598] the emotion of pity there, it is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings."

"Most true," he said.

"Does not the same principle apply to the laughable,[2599] namely,that if in comic representations,[2600] or for that matter in private talk,[2601] you take intense pleasure in buffooneries that you would blush to practise yourself, and do not detest them as base, you

[2593]Cf. Isoc. *Panegyr.* 168 for a different application.

[2594]This contains a hint of one possible meaning of the Aristotelian doctrine of *κάθαρσις*, *Poet.* 1449 b 27-28. Cf. "κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς" *Pol.* 1342 a 14, and my review of Finsler, "Platon u. d. Aristot. Poetik," *Class. Phil.* iii. p. 462. But the tone of the Platonic passage is more like that of Ruskin, *Sesame and Lilies:* "And the human nature of us imperatively requiring awe and sorrow of some kind, for the noble grief we should have borne with our fellows, and the pure tears we should have wept with them, we gloat over the pathos of the police court and gather the night dew of the grave."

[2595]This anticipates the idea of the "censor" in modern psychology.

[2596]Cf. "τῇ δ' ἀσφαλείᾳ κερδανεῖς" Eurip. *Herc. Fur.* 604, which is frequently misinterpreted; Herod. viii. 60. 3.

[2597]For the psychology Cf. *Laws* 656 B and on 385 C-D.

[2598]Cf. 442 A.

[2599]Cf. Vol. I. p. 211, note f, La Bruyère, *Des Ouvrages de l'esprit* (Oeuvres, ed. M. G. Servois, i. p. 137): "D'où vient que l'on rit si librement au théâtre, et que l'on a honte d'y pleurer?"

[2600]In the *Laws* 816 D-E Plato says that the citizens must witness such performances since the serious cannot be learned without the laughable, nor anything without its opposite; but they may not take part in them. That is left to slaves and foreigners. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 239, note B, on 396 E.

[2601]I.e. as opposed to public performances. Cf. *Euthydem.* 305 D "ἐν δὲ ἰδίοις λόγοις", *Theaet.* 177 B, *Soph.* 232 C "ἔν γε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις", and *Soph.* 222 C "προσομιλητικήν" with Quintil. iii. 4. 4. Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos,* p. 285, fantastically says that it means prose and refers to Sophron. He compares 366 E. But see *Laws* 935 B-C.

are doing the same thing as in the case of the pathetic? For here again what your reason, for fear of the reputation of buffoonery, restrained in yourself when it fain would play the clown, you release in turn, and so, fostering its youthful impudence, let yourself go so far that often ere you are aware you become yourself a comedian in private."

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"And so in regard to the emotions of sex and anger, and all the appetites and pains and pleasures of the soul which we say accompany all our actions,[2602] the effect of poetic imitation is the same. For it waters[2603] and fosters these feelings when what we ought to do is to dry them up, and it establishes them as our rulers when they ought to be ruled, to the end that we may be better and happier men instead of worse and more miserable."

"I cannot deny it," said he.

"Then, Glaucon," said I,

"when you meet encomiasts of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator of Hellas,[2604] and that for the conduct and refinement[2605] of human life he is worthy of our study and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet, we must love[2606] and salute them as doing the best they can,[2607] and concede to them that Homer is the most poetic[2608] of poets and the first of tragedians,[2609] but we must know the truth, that we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men.[2610]"

"For if you grant admission to the honeyed muse[2611] in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best."

[2602] Cf. 603 C.

[2603] Cf. 550 B.

[2604] Isocrates, *Panegyr.* 159, says Homer was given a place in education because he celebrated those who fought against the barbarians. Cf. also Aristoph. *Frogs* 1034 ff.

[2605] The same conjunction is implied in Protagoras's teaching, *Protag.* 318 E and 317 B.

[2606] For the *μέν* Cf. *Symp.* 180 E, Herod. vii. 102.

[2607] The condescending tone is that of *Euthydem.* 306 C-D.

[2608] Aristotle, *Poet.* 1453 a 29, says that Euripides is *τραγικώτατος* of poets.

[2609] Cf. 605 C, 595 B-C.

[2610] Cf. *Laws* 801 D-E, 829 C-D, 397 C-D, 459 E, 468 D, Friedländer, *Platon,* i. p. 142, and my review of Pater, *Plato and Platonism,* in *The Dial,* 14 (1893) p. 211.

[2611] Cf. *Laws* 802 C "τῆς γλυκείας Μούσης". See Finsler, *Platon u. d. aristot. Poetik,* pp. 61-62.

"Most true," he said.

"Let us, then, conclude our return to the topic of poetry and our apology, and affirm that we really had good grounds then for dismissing her from our city, since such was her character. For reason constrained us.[2612] And let us further say to her, lest she condemn us for harshness and rusticity, that there is from of old a quarrel[2613] between philosophy and poetry. For such expressions as "the yelping hound barking at her master and mighty in the idle babble" *Unknown* "of fools," [2614] and "the mob that masters those who are too wise for their own good," *Unknown* and the subtle thinkers who reason that after all they are poor, and countless others are tokens of this ancient enmity. But nevertheless let it be declared that, if the mimetic and dulcet poetry can show any reason for her existence in a well-governed state, we would gladly admit her, since we ourselves are very conscious of her spell. But all the same it would be impious to betray what we believe to be the truth.[2615] Is not that so, friend? Do not you yourself feel her magic[2616] and especially when Homer[2617] is her interpreter?"

"Greatly."

"Then may she not justly return from this exile after she has pleaded her defence, whether in lyric or other measure?"

"By all means."

"And we would allow her advocates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to plead her cause[2618] in prose without metre, and show that she is not only delightful but beneficial to orderly government and all the life of man. And we shall listen benevolently, for it will be clear gain for us if it can be shown that she bestows not only pleasure but benefit."

"How could we help being the gainers?" said he.

"But if not, my friend, even as men who have fallen in love, if they think that the love is not good for them, hard though it be,[2619] nevertheless

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[2612]See on 604 C, p. 455, note h.

[2613]For the quarrel between philosophy and poetry Cf. *Laws* 967 C-D, Friedländer, *Platon,* ii. p. 136. It still goes on in modern times.

[2614]Wilamowitz, *Platon,* i. p. 252, conjectures that these quotations are from Sophron; cf. also *ibid.* ii. pp. 386-387.

[2615]Cf. p. 420, note b, on 595 C.

[2616]Cf. *ibid*, Introd. p. lxiii.

[2617]In *Laws* 658 D Plato says that old men would prefer Homer and epic to any other literary entertainment.

[2618]This was taken up by Aristotle (*Poetics*), Plutarch (*Quomodo adolescens*), Sidney (*Defense of Poesie*), and many others.

[2619]*βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δέ*: Cf. *Epist.* iii. 316 E, and vii. 325 A, and Raeder, *Rhein. Mus.*

refrain, so we, owing to the love of this kind of poetry inbred in us by our education in these fine[2620] polities of ours, will gladly have the best possible case made out for her goodness and truth, but so long as she is unable to make good her defence we shall chant over to ourselves[2621] as we listen the reasons that we have given as a counter-charm to her spell, to preserve us from slipping back into the childish loves of the multitude; for we have come to see that we must not take such poetry seriously as a serious thing[2622] that lays hold on truth, but that he who lends an ear to it must be on his guard fearing for the polity in his soul[2623] and must believe what we have said about poetry."

"By all means," he said,

"I concur."

"Yes, for great is the struggle,[2624]" I said,

"dear Glaucon, a far greater contest than we think it, that determines whether a man prove good or bad, so that not the lure of honor or wealth or any office, no, nor of poetry either, should incite us[2625] to be careless of righteousness and all excellence."

"I agree with you," he replied,

"in view of what we have set forth, and I think that anyone else would do so too."

"And yet," said I,

"the greatest rewards of virtue and the prizes proposed for her we have not set forth."

"You must have in mind an inconceivable[2626] magnitude," he replied,

"if there are other things greater than those of which we have spoken.[2627]? For surely the whole time from the boy to the old man would be small compared with all time.[2628]"

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lxi. p. 470, Aristoph. *Clouds* 1363 "μόλις μὲν ἀλλ' ὅμως", Eurip. *Phoen.* 1421 "μόλις μέν, ἐξέτεινε δ'", and also Soph. *Antig.* 1105, *O.T.* 998, Eurip. *Bacch.* 1027, *Hec.* 843, *Or.* 1023, *El.* 753, *Phoen.* 1069, *I.A.* 688, 904.

[2620] Ironical, as *καλλίστη* in 562 A.

[2621] For *ἐπᾴδοντες* Cf. *Phaedo* 114 D, 77 E.

[2622] Cf. 602 B.

[2623] Cf. on 591 E, p. 412, note d.

[2624] Cf. *Phaedo* 114 C, 107 C, *Phaedr.* 247 B, *Gorg.* 526 E, Blaydes on Aristoph. *Peace* 276, and for the whole sentence *Phaedo* 83 B-C, 465 D, 618 B-C f. and p. 404, note d, on 589 E.

[2625] *ἐπαρθέντα*: cf. 416 C.

[2626] Cf. 404 C, 509 A, 548 B, 588 a, *Apol.* 41 C, *Charm.* 155 D.

[2627] Clement, *Strom.* iv. p. 496 B "ὀθούνεκ' ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνη οὐκ ἐκ θυραίων τἀπίχειρα λαμβάνει, αὐτὴ δ' ἑαυτὴν ἄθλα τῶν πόνων ἔχει".

[2628] Cf. on 496 A, p. 9, mote f and 498 D.

"Nay, it is nothing," he said.

"What then? Do you think that an immortal thing[2629] ought to be seriously concerned for such a little time, and not rather for all time?"

"I think so," he said;

"but what is this that you have in mind?"

"Have you never perceived," said I,

"that our soul is immortal and never perishes?" And he, looking me full in the face[2630] in amazement,[2631] said,

"No, by Zeus, not I; but are you able to declare this?"

"I certainly ought to be,[2632]" said I,

"and I think you too can, for it is nothing hard."

"It is for me," he said;

"and I would gladly hear from you this thing that is not hard.[2633]"

"Listen," said I.

"Just speak on," he replied.

"You speak of[2634] good and evil, do you not?"

"I do."

"Is your notion of them the same as mine?"

"What is it?"

"That which destroys and corrupts in every case is the evil; that which preserves and benefits is the good."

"Yes, I think so," he said.

"How about this: Do you say that there is for everything its special good and evil, as for example for the eyes ophthalmia, for the entire body disease, for grain mildew, rotting for wood, rust for bronze and iron, and, as I say, for practically everything its congenital evil and disease[2635]?"

"I do," he said.

"Then when one of these evils comes to anything does it not make

[2629]For the colorless use of *πρᾶγμα* see *What Plato Said*, p. 497, on *Protag.* 330 C-D. Cf. Shakes. *Hamlet*,I. iv. 67 "being a thing immortal as itself."

[2630]*ἐμβλέψας*: Cf. *Charmides* 155 C.

[2631]Glaucon is surprised in spite of 498 D. Many uncertain inferences have been drawn from the fact that in spite of the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*(245 C ff.) interlocutors in Plato are always surprised at the idea of immortality. Cf. *ibid*, Introd. p. lxiv.

[2632]For the idiomatic *εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ* cf. 430 E*Charm.* 156 A, *Menex.* 236 B, 612 D.

[2633]Cf. *Protag.* 341 A "τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο", which is a little different, Herod. vii. 11 "τὸ δεινὸν τὸ πείσομαι".

[2634]See Vol. I. p. 90, note a and *What Plato Said*, p. 567, on *Cratyl.* 385 B.

[2635]Ruskin, *Time and Tide* 52 (Brantwood ed. p. 68): "Every faculty of man's soul, and every instinct of it by which he is meant to live, is exposed to its own special form of corruption,"; Boethius, *Cons.* iii. 11 (L.C.L. trans. p. 283), things are destroyed by what is hostile; Aristot. *Top.* 124 a 28 "εἰ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτικὸν διαλυτικόν".

the thing to which it attaches itself bad, and finally disintegrate and destroy it?"

"Of course."

"Then the congenital evil of each thing and its own vice destroys it, or if that is not going to destroy it, nothing else remains that could; for obviously[2636] the good will never destroy anything, nor yet again will that which is neutral and neither good nor evil[2637]."

"How could it?" he said.

"If, then, we discover[2638] anything that has an evil which vitiates it, yet is not able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not thereupon know that of a thing so constituted there can be no destruction?"

"That seems likely," he said.

"Well, then," said I,

"has not the soul something that makes it evil?"

"Indeed it has," he said,

"all the things that we were just now enumerating, injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and ignorance."

"Does any one of these things dissolve and destroy it? And reflect, lest we be misled by supposing that when an unjust and foolish man is taken in his injustice he is then destroyed by the injustice, which is the vice of soul. But conceive it thus: Just as the vice of body which is disease wastes and destroys it so that it no longer is a body at all,[2639] in like manner in all the examples of which we spoke it is the specific evil which, by attaching itself to the thing and dwelling in it with power to corrupt, reduces it to nonentity. Is not that so?"

"Yes."

"Come, then, and consider the soul in the same way.[2640] Do injustice and other wickedness dwelling in it, by their indwelling and

[2636] *γε vi termini.* Cf. 379 A, *Phaedo* 106 D.

[2637] See *What Plato Said,* p. 490, on *Lysis* 216 D.

[2638] Cf. Vol. I. p. 529, note a, on 478 D.

[2639] Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1309 b 28 "μηδὲ ῥῖνα ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι".

[2640] The argument that follows is strictly speaking a fallacy in that it confounds the soul with the physical principle of life. Cf. on 35 C and on 352 E, *Gorg.* 477 B-C, and *ibid*, Introd. p. lxvii. But Dean Inge, "Platonism and Human Immortality" (*Aristot. Soc.*, 1919, p. 288) says: "Plato's argument, in the tenth book of the *Republic,* for the immortality of the soul, has found a place in scholastic theology, but is supposed to have been discredited by Kant. I venture to think that his argument, that the soul can only be destroyed by an enemy (so to speak) *in pari materia,* is sound. Physical evils, including death, cannot touch the soul. And wickedness does not, in our experience, dissolve the soul, nor is wickedness specially apparent when the soul (if it perishes at death) would be approaching dissolution." Cf. 610 C. Someone might object that wickedness does destroy the soul, conceived as a spiritual principle.

attachment to it, corrupt and wither it till they bring it to death and separate it from the body?"

"They certainly do not do that," he said.

"But surely," said I,

"it is unreasonable to suppose that the vice of something else destroys a thing while its own does not."

"Yes, unreasonable."

"For observe, Glaucon," said I,

"that we do not think it proper to say of the body either that it is destroyed by the badness of foods themselves, whether it be staleness or rottenness or whatever it is;[2641]"

"but when the badness of the foods themselves engenders in the body the defect of body, then we shall say that it is destroyed owing to these foods, but by[2642] its own vice, which is disease. But the body being one thing and the foods something else, we shall never expect the body to be destroyed by their badness, that is by an alien evil that has not produced in it the evil that belongs to it by nature."

"You are entirely right," he replied.

"On the same principle," said I,

"if the badness of the body does not produce in the soul the soul's badness we shall never expect the soul to be destroyed by an alien evil apart from its own defect—one thing, that is, by the evil of another."

"That is reasonable," he said.

"Either, then, we must refute this and show that we are mistaken, or,[2643] so long as it remains unrefuted, we must never say that by fever or any other disease, or yet by the knife at the throat or the chopping to bits of the entire body, there is any more likelihood of the soul perishing because of these things, until it is proved that owing to these affections of the body the soul itself becomes more unjust and unholy. But when an evil of something else occurs in a different thing and the evil that belongs to the thing is not engendered in it, we must not suffer it to be said that the soul or anything else is in this way destroyed."

"But you may be sure," he said,

"that nobody will ever prove this, that the souls of the dying are made more unjust by death."

"But if anyone," said I,

[2641] Plato generally disregards minor distinctions when they do not affect his point.

[2642] Cf. 610 D.

[2643] For the challenge to refute or accept the argument Cf. *Soph.* 259 A, 257 A, *Gorg.* 467 B-C, 482 B, 508 A-B, *Phileb.* 60 D-E.

"dares to come to grips with the argument[2644] and say, in order to avoid being forced to admit the soul's immortality, that a dying man does become more wicked and unjust,[2645] we will postulate that, if what he says is true, injustice must be fatal to its possessor as if it were a disease, and that those who catch it die because it kills them by its own inherent nature, those who have most of it quickest, and those who have less more slowly, and not, as now in fact happens, that the unjust die owing to this but by the action of others who inflict the penalty."

"Nay, by Zeus," he said,

"injustice will not appear a very terrible thing after all if it is going to be[2646] fatal to its possessor, for that would be a release from all troubles.[2647] But I rather think it will prove to be quite the contrary, something that kills others when it can, but renders its possessor very lively indeed,[2648] and not only lively but wakeful,[2649] so far, I ween, does it dwell[2650] from deadliness."

"You say well," I replied;

"for when the natural vice and the evil proper to it cannot kill and destroy the soul, still less[2651] will the evil appointed for the destruction of another thing destroy the soul or anything else, except that for which it is appointed."[2652]

"Still less indeed," he said,

"in all probability."

"Then since it is not destroyed by any evil whatever, either its own or alien, it is evident that it must necessarily exist always, and that if it

[2644] Or "to take the bull by the horns." For *ὁμόσϵ ἰέναι* see *What Plato Said,* p. 457, on *Euthyph.* 3 C. Cf. "ἐγγὺς ἰόντες" *Phaedo* 95 B.

[2645] Herbert Spencer nearly does this: "Death by starvation from inability to catch prey shows a falling short of conduct from its ideal." It recalls the argument with which Socrates catches Callicles in *Gorg.* 498 E, that if all pleasures are alike those who feel pleasure are good and those who feel pain are bad.

[2646] For the future indicative after *ϵἰ*, usually minatory or monitory in tone, cf. Aristoph. *Birds* 759, *Phileb.* 25 D.

[2647] Cf. *Phaedo* 107 C, 84 B, Blaydes on Aristoph. *Acharn.* 757.

[2648] *μάλα* is humorous, as in 506 D, *Euthydem* 298 D, *Symp.* 189 A.

[2649] Cf. Horace, *Epist.* i. 2. 32 "ut iugulent hominem surgunt de nocte latrones."

[2650] For the metaphor Cf. *Proverbs* viii. 12 "σοφία κατεσκήνωσα βουλήν". Plato personifies injustice, as he does justice in 612 D,*σκιαγραφία* in 602 D, bravery in *Laches* 194 A,*κολαστική* in *Soph.* 229 A,*κολακευτική Gorg.* 464 C,*σμικρότης Parmen.* 150 A "πονηρία" *Apol.* 39 A-B, and many other abstract conceptions. See further *Phileb.* 63 A-B, 15 D, 24 A, *Rep.* 465 A-B, *Laws* 644 C, *Cratyl.* 438 D.

[2651] *σχολῇ*: cf. 354 C, *Phaedo* 106 D.

[2652] Cf. 345 D.

always exists it is immortal."

"Necessarily," he said.

"Let this, then," I said,

"be assumed to be so. But if it is so, you will observe that these souls must always be the same. For if none perishes they could not, I suppose, become fewer nor yet more numerous.[2653] For if any class of immortal things increased you are aware that its increase would come from the mortal and all things would end by becoming immortal.[2654]"

"You say truly."

"But," said I,

"we must not suppose this, for reason will not suffer it nor yet must we think that in its truest nature the soul is the kind of thing that teems with infinite diversity and unlikeness and contradiction in and with itself.[2655]"

"How am I to understand that?" he said.

"It is not easy," said I,

"for a thing to be immortal that is composed of many elements[2656] not put together in the best way, as now appeared to us[2657] to be the case with the soul."

"It is not likely."

"Well, then, that the soul is immortal our recent argument and our other[2658] proofs would constrain us to admit. But to know its true nature we must view it not marred by communion with the body[2659] and other miseries as we now contemplate it, but consider adequately in the light of reason what it is when it is purified, and then you will find it to be a far more beautiful thing and will more clearly distinguish justice and injustice and all the matters that we have now discussed.

[2653]Cf. Carveth Read, *Man and His Superstitions* p. 104: "Plato thought that by a sort of law of psychic conservation there must always be the same number of souls in world. There must therefore be reincarnation. . . . "

[2654]Cf. *Phaedo* 72 C-D.

[2655]The idea of self-contradiction is frequent in Plato. See *What Plato said,* p. 505, on *Gorg.* 482 B-C.

[2656]*σύνθετον*: Cf. *Phaedo* 78 C, Plotinus, *Enneades* i. 1. 12, Berkeley, *Principles,* 141: "We have shown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended; and it is consequently incorruptible. . . . cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance." See also Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1, pp. 828-829.

[2657]603 D. see also Frutiger, *Mythes de Platon,* pp. 90 f.

[2658]Such as are given in the *Phaedo, Phaedrus,* and perhaps elsewhere.

[2659]Cf. also *Phaedo* 82 E, 83 D-E, 81 C, and *Wisdom of Solomon* ix 14 "φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχήν, καὶ βρίθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφρόντιδα", "for the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things."

But though we have stated the truth of its present appearance, its condition as we have now contemplated it resembles that of the sea-god Glaucus[2660] whose first nature can hardly be made out by those who catch glimpses of him, because the original members of his body are broken off and mutilated and crushed and in every way marred by the waves, and other parts have attached themselves[2661] to him, accretions of shells[2662] and sea-weed and rocks, so that he is more like any wild creature than what he was by nature—even such, I say, is our vision of the soul marred by countless evils. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucon."

"Where?" said he.

"To its love of wisdom. And we must note the things of which it has apprehensions, and the associations for which it yearns, as being itself akin to the divine[2663] and the immortal and to eternal being, and so consider what it might be if it followed the gleam unreservedly and were raised by this impulse out of the depths of this sea in which it is now sunk, and were cleansed and scraped free[2664] of the rocks and barnacles which, because it now feasts on earth, cling to it in wild profusion of earthy and stony accretion by reason of these feastings that are accounted happy.[2665]"

"And then one might see whether in its real nature[2666] it is manifold[2667] or single in its simplicity, or what is the truth about it and how.[2668] But for the present we have, I think, fairly well described its sufferings and the forms it assumes in this human life of ours."

"We certainly have," he said.

"Then," said I,

"we have met all the other demands of the argument, and we have not invoked the rewards and reputes of justice as you said Homer and Hesiod[2669] do, but we have proved that justice in itself is the best

[2660] See schol. Hermann vi. 362, Eurip. *Or.* 364 f., Apollonius, *Argon.* 1310 ff., Athenaeus 296 B and D, *Anth. Pal.* vi. 164, Frazer on Pausanias ix. 22. 7, Gädecker, *Glaukos der Meeresgott,* Göttingen, 1860.

[2661] Cf. *Tim.* 42 C "προσφύντα".

[2662] Cf. *Phaedr.* 250 C "ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι", *Phaedo* 110 A.

[2663] Cf. *Phaedo* 79 D, *Laws* 899 D, and 494 D "τὸ σιγγενὲς τῶν λόγων".

[2664] Cf. *Phileb.* 55 C "περικρούωμεν", 519 A "περιεκόπη".

[2665] Cf. *Charm.* 158 A, *Laws* 695 A, 783 A. See *λεγόμενα ἀγαθά*491 C, 495 A, *Laws* 661 C.

[2666] Cf. *Phaedo* 246 A.In *Tim.* 72 D Plato says that only God knows the truth about the soul. See *Laws* 641 D, and *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 42.

[2667] Cf. *Phaedr.* 271 A.

[2668] *ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως*: cf. 621 B, *Phaedo* 100 D, *Tim.* 37 A-B, *Laws* 652 A, 834 E, 899 A and B.

thing for the soul itself, and that the soul ought to do justice whether it possess the ring of Gyges[2670] or not,[2671] or the helmet of Hades[2672] to boot."

"Most true," he said.

"Then," said I,

"Glaucon, there can no longer be any objection,[2673] can there, to our assigning to justice and virtue generally, in addition, all the various rewards and wages that they bring to the soul from men and gods, both while the man still lives and, after his death?"

"There certainly can be none," he said.

"Will you, then, return to me what you borrowed[2674] in the argument?"

"What, pray?"

"I granted to you that the just man should seem and be thought to be unjust and the unjust just; for you thought that, even if the concealment of these things from gods and men was an impossibility in fact, nevertheless, it ought to be conceded for the sake of the argument,[2675] in order that the decision might be made between absolute justice and absolute injustice. Or do you not remember?"

"It would be unjust of me,[2676]" he said,

"if I did not."

"Well, then, now that they have been compared and judged, I de-

[2669] 363 B-C.

[2670] 359 D f.

[2671] Cf. 367 E.

[2672] *Iliad* v. 845, Blaydes on Aristoph. *Acharn.* 390.

[2673] Cf. *Soph.* 243 A, *Laws* 801 E "ἄνευ φθόνων", Eurip. *Hippol.* 497 "οὐκ ἐπίφθονον", Aeschines, *De falsa legatione* 167 (49). Friedländer, *Platon,* ii. p. 406 does object and finds the passage inconsistent with the idealism of 592 and with *Laws* 899 D ff. and 905 B. Cf. Renan, *Averroes,* pp. 156-157, Guyau, *Esquisse d'une morale,* pp. 140-141. See *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 80 and n. 612, *Idea of Justice in Plato's Republic,* pp. 197-198. Gomperz, ignoring this passage and interpreting the *Republic* wholly from 367 E, strangely argues that *Phaedo* 107 C proves that the *Phaedo* must have been composed at a time when Plato was less sure of the coincidence of justice and happiness. A religious thinker may in his theodicy justify the ways of God to man by arguing that worldly happiness is not the real happiness, and yet elsewhere remark that, as a rule, the righteous is not forsaken even in this world. Cf. *Psalm* 37.25 ff., *Prov.* 10.3 and *passim.* See Renan, *Hist. du Peuple d'Israel,* p. 376: "Il en est de ces passages comme de tant de préceptes de l'Evangile, insensés si on en fait des articles de code, excellents si on n'y voit, que l'expression hyperbolique de hauts sentiments moraux."

[2674] Cf. *Polit.* 267 A.

[2675] *τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα*: not the same as *λόγου ἕνεκα.* See on 581 C, p. 374, note a.

[2676] Cf. "εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ" 608 D.

mand back from you in behalf of justice the repute that she in fact enjoys[2677] from gods and men, and I ask that we admit that she is thus esteemed in order that she may gather in the prizes[2678] which she wins from the seeming and bestows on her possessors, since she has been proved to bestow the blessings that come from the reality and not to deceive those who truly seek and win her."

"That is a just demand," he said.

"Then," said I,

"will not the first of these restorations be that the gods certainly[2679] are not unaware[2680] of the true character of each of the two, the just and the unjust?"

"We will restore that," he said.

"And if they are not concealed, the one will be dear to the gods[2681] and the other hateful to them, as we agreed in the beginning.[2682]"

"That is so."

"And shall we not agree that all things that come from the gods work together for the best[2683] for him that is dear to the gods, apart from the inevitable evil caused by sin in a former life[2684]?"

"By all means."

"This, then, must be our conviction about the just man, that whether he fall into poverty or disease or any other supposed evil, for him all these things will finally prove good, both in life and in death. For by the gods assuredly that man will never be neglected who is willing and eager to be righteous, and by the practice of virtue to be likened unto god[2685] so far as that is possible for man."

"It is reasonable," he said,

"that such a one should not be neglected by his like.[2686]"

"And must we not think the opposite of the unjust man?"

[2677] For the idiom *ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης* cf. 365 A "ὡς . . . ἔχουσι τιμῆς", 389 C "ὅπως . . . πράξεως ἔχει", Thucyd. i. 22 "ὡς . . . μνήμης ἔχοι". For the thought cf. Isoc. viii. 33.

[2678] Cf. *Phileb.* 22 B and E.

[2679] *γε vi termini.* Cf. 379 A and *Class. Phil.* x. p. 335.

[2680] Cf. 365 D.

[2681] Cf. *Phileb.* 39 E.

[2682] Cf. 352 B.

[2683] This recalls the faith of Socrates in *Apol.* 41 C-D and *Phaedo* 63 B-C, and anticipates the theodicy of *Laws* 899 D ff., 904 D-E ff.

[2684] Besides obvious analogies with Buddhism, this recalls Empedocles *fr.* 115, Diels i3 p. 267.

[2685] Cf. "ὁμοίωσις θεῷ" *Theaet.* 176 B, and *What Plato Said,* p. 578, p. 72, note d.

[2686] Cf. *Laws* 716 C-D, 904 E.

"Most emphatically."

"Such then are the prizes of victory which the gods bestow upon the just."

"So I think, at any rate," he said.

"But what," said I,

"does he receive from men? Is not this the case, if we are now to present the reality? Do not your smart but wicked men fare as those racers do who run well[2687] from the scratch but not back from the turn? They bound nimbly away at the start, but in the end are laughed to scorn and run off the field uncrowned and with their ears on their shoulders.[2688] But the true runners when they have come to the goal receive the prizes and bear away the crown. Is not this the usual outcome for the just also, that towards the end of every action and association and of life as a whole they have honor and bear away the prizes from men?"

"So it is indeed."

"Will you, then, bear with me if I say of them all that you said[2689] of the unjust? For I am going to say that the just, when they become older, hold the offices in their own city if they choose, marry from what families they will, and give their children in marriage to what families they please, and everything that you said of the one I now repeat of the other; and in turn I will say of the unjust that the most of them, even if they escape detection in youth, at the end of their course are caught and derided, and their old age is made miserable by the contumelies of strangers and townsfolk. They are lashed and suffer all things[2690] which you truly said are unfit for ears polite.[2691] Suppose yourself to have heard from me a repetition of all that they suffer. But, as I say, consider whether you will bear with me."

"Assuredly," he said,

[2687]For the order Cf. *Laws* 913 B "λεγόμενον εὖ", Thucyd. i. 71. 7, Vahlen, *Op. acad.* i. 495-496. for the figure of the race cf. Eurip. *El.* 955, 1*Corinthians* ix. 24 f., *Heb.* xii. 1, *Gal.* ii. 2, v. 7, *Phil.* ii. 16.

[2688]English idiom would say, "with their tails between their legs." Cf. Horace, *Sat.* i. 9. 20 "dimitto auriculas." For the idea cf. also *Laws* 730 C-D, Demosth. ii. 10, and for *εἰς τέλος*, *Laws* 899 E "πρὸς τέλος", Hesiod, *Works and Days* 216 "ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα", Eurip. *Ion* 1621 "εἰς τέλος γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐσθλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀξίων", "for the good at last shall overcome, at last attain their right." (Way, Loeb tr.)

[2689]Cf. Vol. I. pp. 125-127, 362 B-C.

[2690]He turns the tables here as in *Gorg.* 527 A. The late punishment of the wicked became an ethical commonplace. Cf. Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta* 1, also *Job* and *Psalms passim.*

[2691]Cf. 361 E "ἀγροικοτέρως", and *Gorg.* 473 C.

"for what you say is just."

"Such then while he lives are the prizes, the wages, and the gifts that the just man receives from gods and men in addition to those blessings which justice herself bestowed."

"And right fair and abiding rewards," he said.

"Well, these," I said,

"are nothing in number and magnitude compared with those that await both[2692] after death. And we must listen to the tale of them," said I,

"in order that each may have received in full[2693] what is due to be said of him by our argument."

"Tell me," he said,

"since there are not many things to which I would more gladly listen."

"It is not, let me tell you," said I,

"the tale[2694] to Alcinous told[2695] that I shall unfold, but the tale of a warrior bold,[2696] Er, the son of Armenius, by race a Pamphylian.[2697] He once upon a time was slain in battle, and when the corpses were taken up on the tenth day already decayed, was found intact, and having been brought home, at the moment of his funeral, on the twelfth day[2698] as he lay upon the pyre, revived,[2699] and after coming to life

[2692] i.e. the just and unjust man.

[2693] *τελέως*: cf. 361 A.

[2694] See Proclus, *In Remp.*,Kroll ii. 96 ff., Macrob. in *Somnium Scip.* i. 2. The Epicurean Colotes highly disapproved of Plato's method of putting his beliefs in this form. See Chassang, *Histoire du roman,* p. 15. See also Dieterich, *Nekyia,* pp. 114 ff., and Adam *ad loc.*

[2695] *Odyssey* ix.-xii. The term also became proverbial for a lengthy tale. See K. Tümpel, *Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος*, *Philologus* 52. 523 ff.

[2696] Plato puns on the name Alcinous. For other puns on proper names see on 580 B. See Arthur Platt, "Plato's Republic, 614 B," *Class. Review,* 1911, pp. 13-14. For the *ἀλλὰ μέν* without a corresponding *δέ* he compares Aristoph. *Acharn.* 428 "οὐ Βελλεροφόντης· ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνος μὲν ἦ χωλός . . ." (which Blaydes changed to *ἀλλὰ μήν*), *Odyssey* xv. 405 and *Eryxias* 308 B.

[2697] Perhaps we might say, "of the tribe of Everyman." For the question of his identity see Platt, loc. cit.

[2698] Thomas Browne, *Urn Burial,* ch. iii., "Plato's historian of the other world lies twelve days incorrupted, while his soul was viewing the large stations of the dead," See also Rohde, *Psyche* ii.6 pp. 92-93.

[2699] Stories of persons restored to life are fairly common in ancient literature. There are Eurydice and Alcestis in Greek mythology, in the Old Testament the son of the widow revived by Elijah (1*Kings* xvii. 17 ff. Cf. 2*Kings* iv. 34 ff. and xiii. 21), in the New Testament the daughter of Jairus (*Matt.* ix. 23 f.), the son of the widow of Nain (*Luke* vii. 11 ff.), and Lazarus(*John* xi.). but none of these recount their adventures.

related what, he said, he had seen in the world beyond. He said that when his soul[2700] went forth from his body he journeyed with a great company and that they came to a mysterious region[2701] where there were two openings side by side in the earth, and above and over against them in the heaven two others, and that judges were sitting[2702] between these, and that after every judgement they bade the righteous journey to the right and upwards through the heaven with tokens attached[2703] to them in front of the judgement passed upon them, and the unjust to take the road to the left[2704] and downward, they too wearing behind signs of all that had befallen them, and that when he himself drew near they told him that he must be the messenger[2705] to mankind to tell them of that other world,[2706] and they charged him to give ear and to observe everything in the place. And so he said that here he saw, by each opening of heaven and earth, the souls departing after judgement had been passed upon them, while, by the other pair of openings, there came up from the one in the earth souls full of squalor and dust, and from the second there came down from heaven a second procession of souls clean and pure, and that those which arrived from time to time appeared to have come as it were from a long journey

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Cf. also *Luke* xvi. 31 "If they hear not Moses and the prophets neither will they be persuaded through one rose from the dead." But in that very parable Lazarus is shown in Abraham's bosom and the rich man in torment. See further, Proclus, *In Remp.* ii. pp. 113-116, Rohde, *Psyche* ii.6 p. 191.

[2700]For the indirect reflexive cf. p. 507, note f, on 617 E.

[2701]For the description of the place of judgement cf. also *Gorg.* 524 A. Cf. *Phaedo* 107 D, 113 D, where there is no description but simply the statement that the souls are brought to a place and judged. On the topography of the myth in general cf. Bréhier, *La Philos. de Plot.* pp. 28-29: "Voyez, par exemple, la manière dont Numénius . . . interprète le mythe du Xe livre de Ia *République,* et comment il précise, avec Ia lourdeur d'un théologien, les traits que la poésie de Platon avait abandonnés à l'imagination du lecteur. Le lieu du jugement devient le centre du monde; le ciel platonicien devient Ia sphère des fixes; le "lieu sonterrain" où sont punies les âmes, ce sont les planètes; la "bouche du ciel," par laquelle les âmes descendront à la naissance, est le tropique du Cancer; et c'est par le Capricorne qu'elles remontent."

[2702]Cf. *Gorg.* 523 E f., 524 E-525 B, 526 B-C.

[2703]*Gorg.* 526 B.

[2704]Cf. *Gorg.* 525 A-B, 526 B. For "right" and "left" cf. the story of the last judgement, *Matt.* xxv. 33-34 and 41.

[2705]Cf. the rich man's request that a messenger be sent to his brethren, *Luke* xvi. 27-31.

[2706]ἐκεῖ: so in 330 D, 365 A, 498 C, *Phaedo* 61 E, 64 A, 67 B, 68 E, *Apol.* 40 E, 41 C, *Crito* 54 B, *Symp.* 192 E. In 500 D and *Phaedr.* 250 A it refers to the world of the ideas, in 516 C and 520 C to the world of the cave.

and gladly departed to the meadow[2707] and encamped[2708] there as at a festival,[2709] and acquaintances greeted one another, and those which came from the earth questioned the others about conditions up yonder, and those from heaven asked how it fared with those others."

"And they told their stories to one another, the one lamenting and wailing as they recalled how many and how dreadful things they had suffered and seen in their journey beneath the earth[2710]—it lasted a thousand years[2711]—while those from heaven related their delights and visions of a beauty beyond words. To tell it all, Glaucon, would take all our time, but the sum, he said, was this. For all the wrongs they had ever done to anyone and all whom they had severally wronged they had paid the penalty in turn tenfold for each, and the measure of this was by periods of a hundred years each,[2712] so that on the assumption that this was the length of human life the punishment might be ten times the crime; as for example that if anyone had been the cause of many deaths or had betrayed cities and armies and reduced them to slavery, or had been participant in any other iniquity, they might receive in requital pains tenfold for each of these wrongs, and again if any had done deeds of kindness and been just and holy men they might receive their due reward in the same measure; and other things not worthy of record he said of those who had just been born[2713] and lived but a short time; and he had still greater requitals to tell of piety and impiety towards the gods and parents[2714] and of self-slaughter. For he said that he stood by when one was questioned by another "Where

[2707] Cf. *Gorg.* 524 A.

[2708] Cf. 621 A, 610 E, and *John* i. 14 "ἐσκήνωσεν".

[2709] Cf. 421 B.

[2710] Cf. *Phaedr.* 256 D, *Epist.* vii. 335 B-C.

[2711] *Phaedr.* 249 A, Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 748.

[2712] The ideal Hindu length of life is said to be 100 years.

[2713] For the words Cf. *Tim.* 76 E "εὐθὺς γιγνομένοις". Plato does not take up the problem of infant damnation! Warburton says, "and I make no doubt but the things not worth to be remembered was the doctrine of infants in purgatory, which appears to have given Plato much scandal, who did not at that time at least reflect upon its original and use." See also Mozley, *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination,* p. 307, *apud* Seebohm. *The Oxford Reformers* (3rd ed.), p. 495: "Augustine had laid down that the punishment of such children was the mildest of all punishment in hell. . . . Aquinas laid down the further hypothesis that this punishment was not pain of body or mind, but want of the Divine vision." Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 427, *Anth. Pal.* ix. 359. 10 "θανεῖν αὐτίκα τικτόμενον". Stallbaum and Ast think *ἀποθανόντων* dropped out of the text after *γενομένων.*

[2714] Cf. *Phaedo* 113 E-114 A, where there is a special penalty for murderers and parricides.

is Ardiaeus[2715] the Great?" Now this Ardiaeos had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia just a thousand years before that time and had put to death his old father and his elder brother, and had done many other unholy deeds, as was the report. So he said that the one questioned replied, "He has not come," said he, "nor will he be likely to come here. For indeed this was one of the dreadful sights we beheld; when we were near the mouth and about to issue forth and all our other sufferings were ended, we suddenly caught sight of him and of others, the most of them, I may say, tyrants.[2716] But there were some of private station, of those who had committed great crimes. And when these supposed that at last they were about to go up and out, the mouth would not receive them, but it bellowed when anyone of the incurably wicked[2717] or of those who had not completed their punishment tried to come up.""

""And thereupon," he said, "savage men of fiery aspect[2718] who stood by and took note of the voice laid hold on them[2719] and bore them away. But Ardiaeus and others they bound hand and foot and head and flung down and flayed them and dragged them by the wayside, carding them on thorns and signifying to those who from time to time passed by for what cause they were borne away, and that they were to be hurled into Tartarus.[2720]" And then, though many and manifold dread things had befallen them, this fear exceeded all—lest each one should hear the voice when he tried to go up, and each went up most gladly when it had kept silence. And the judgements and penalties were somewhat after this manner, and the blessings were their counterparts. But when seven days had elapsed for each group in the meadow, they were required to rise up on the eighth and journey on, and they came in four days to a spot whence they discerned, extended from above throughout the heaven and the earth, a straight light like a pillar, most nearly resembling the rainbow, but brighter and purer. To this they came after going forward a day's journey, and they saw there at the middle

[2715]Cf. Archelaus in *Gorg.* 471.

[2716]Cf. *Gorg.* 525 D-526 A.

[2717]Cf. *Gorg.* 525 C, and *What Plato Said,* p. 536, on *Phaedo* 113 E. Biggs, *Christian Platonists,* ii. p. 147 "At the first assize there will be found those who like Ardiaeus are incurable."

[2718]This naturally suggests the devils, of Dante (*Inferno* xxi. 25 ff.) and other mediaeval literature. See Dieterich, *Nekyia,* p.4 and pp. 60 f.

[2719]See Rogers on Aristoph. *Knights* 262. Cf. Herod. i. 92 "ἐπὶ κνάφου ἕλκων διέφθειρε".

[2720]*Il.* viii. 13 f., Hesiod, *Theog.* 682, 721, etc., Pind. *Pyth.* i. 15 f., Eurip. *Orest.* 265 "μέσον μ' ὀχμάζεις ὡς βάλῃς εἰς Τάρταρον".

of the light the extremities of its fastenings stretched from heaven; for this light was the girdle of the heavens like the undergirders[2721] of triremes, holding together in like manner the entire revolving vault. And from the extremities was stretched the spindle of Necessity,[2722] through which all the orbits turned. Its staff and its hook were made of adamant, and the whorl of these and other kinds was commingled. And the nature of the whorl was this: Its shape was that of those in our world, but from his description we must conceive it to be as if in one great whorl, hollow and scooped out, there lay enclosed, right through, another like it but smaller, fitting into it as boxes that fit into one another,[2723] and in like manner another, a third, and a fourth, and four others, for there were eight of the whorls in all, lying within one another, showing their rims as circles from above and forming the continuous back of a single whorl about the shaft, which was driven home through the middle of the eighth. Now the first and outmost whorl had the broadest circular rim, that of the sixth was second, and third was that of the fourth, and fourth was that of the eighth, fifth that of the seventh, sixth that of the fifth, seventh that of the third, eighth that of the second;"

"and that of the greatest was spangled, that of the seventh brightest, that of the eighth took its color from the seventh, which shone upon it. The colors of the second and fifth were like one another and more yellow than the two former. The third had the whitest color, and the fourth was of a slightly ruddy hue; the sixth was second in whiteness. The staff turned as a whole in a circle with the same movement, but

[2721] Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Knights* 279, Acts xxvii. 17.

[2722] Plotinus, *Enn.* ii. 3 9, p. 35, vol. ii. Budé e. "Mais (dira-t-on) rappelons-nous "le fuseau"; pour les anciens, c'était un fuseau matériel que tournent en filant les Moires; pour Platon, il représente le ciel des fixes; or les Moires et la Nécessité, leur mère, en le faisant tourner, filent le destin de chaque être à sa naissance; par elle, les êtres engendrés arrivent â la naissance," etc. St. Paulinus Nolanus calls it a *deliramentum.* Tannery, *Science hellène,* p. 238, thinks it alludes to the system of Parmenides. "Le fuseau central de la Nécessité l'indique suffisamment; si la présence des sirènes est une marque de pythagorisme, elle pent seulement signifier soit les relations de Parménide avec l'école soit plutôt l'origine des déterminations particulières que donne Platon et qui évidemment ne remontent pas à l'Eléate." Cf. *ibid.* p. 246. For various details of the picture cf. Milton, the Genius's speech in "Arcades" (quoted and commented on in E.M.W. Tillyard, *Milton,* p. 376).

[2723] Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philos.* pp. 216-217 "In Plato's Myth of Er, which is certainly Pythagorean in its general character, we do not hear of spheres but of the "lips" of concentric whorls fitted into one another like a nest of boxes . . . " With 616-617 Cf. *Laws* 822 A-B, *Tim.* 36 D, Dante, *Convivio,* ii. 3. 5 ff. The names of the planets occur first in *Epinomis* 987 B-C.

within the whole as it revolved the seven inner circles revolved gently in the opposite direction to the whole,[2724] and of these seven the eighth moved most swiftly, and next and together with one another the seventh, sixth and fifth; and third[2725] in swiftness, as it appeared to them, moved the fourth with returns upon itself, and fourth the third and fifth the second. And the spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and up above on each of the rims of the circles a Siren stood, borne around in its revolution and uttering one sound, one note, and from all the eight there was the concord of a single harmony.[2726] And there were another three who sat round about at equal intervals, each one on her throne, the Fates,[2727] daughters of Necessity, clad in white vestments with filleted heads, Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, who sang in unison with the music of the Sirens, Lachesis singing the things that were, Clotho the things that are, and Atropos the things that are to be. And Clotho with the touch of her right hand helped to turn the outer circumference of the spindle, pausing from time to time. Atropos with her left hand in like manner helped to turn the inner circles, and Lachesis alternately with either hand lent a hand to each. Now when they arrived they were straight-way bidden to go before Lachesis, and then a certain prophet[2728] first marshalled them in orderly intervals, and thereupon took from the lap of Lachesis lots and patterns of lives and went up to a lofty platform and spoke, "This is the word of Lachesis, the maiden daughter of Necessity, "Souls that live for a day,[2729]

[2724]Burnet, *op. cit.* p. 123, says; "This view that the planets had an orbital motion from west to east is attributed by Aetios ii. 16. 3 to Alkmaion (96), which certainly implies that Pythagoras did not hold it. As we shall see (152) it is far from clear that any of the Pythagoreans did. It seems rather to be Plato's discovery." Cf. *ibid.* p. 352.

[2725]The best mss. have *τὸν* before *τρίτον*. It is retained by some editors, but Schleiermacher rejected it and Adam and Burnet omit it.

[2726]The music of the spheres. Cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* iii. 9. 26, Mayor, vol. iii. p. 86, Macrob. on *Somn. Scip.* ii. 3, Ritter-Preller (9th ed.), pp. 69-70 (81-82), K. Gronau, *Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese,* pp. 59-61. Aristotle's comment, *De caelo* 290 b 12 ff., is that the notion of a music of the spheres is pretty and ingenious, but not true. He reports the (Pythagorean?) explanation that we do not hear it because we have been accustomed to it from birth. see Carl v. Jan, "Die Harmonie der Sphären," *Philologus,* lii. 13 ff.

[2727]Pictured in Michelangelo's *Le Parche.* Cf. Catullus 64. 306 ff.; Lowell, "Villa Franca": "Spin, Clotho, spin, Lachesis twist and Atropos sever."

[2728]See *What Plato Said,* p. 550, on *Phaedr.* 235 C.

[2729]Cf. *Laws* 923 A, Pindar, *Pyth.* viii. 95, Aesch. *Prom.* 83, 547, Aristot. *Hist. an.* 552 b 18 f., Cic. *Tusc.* i. 39. 94, Plut. *Cons. ad Apol.* 6 (104 A)*ἀνθρώπων . . . ἐφήμερα τὰ σώματα*, *ibid.* 27 (115 D)*ἐφήμερον σπέρμα.* See also Stallbaum *ad loc.*, and for the thought Soph. *Ajax* 125-126, *Iliad* i. 146, Mimnermus ii. 1, Soph. *fr.* 12

now is the beginning of another cycle of mortal generation where birth is the beacon of death. No divinity[2730] shall cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own deity. Let him to whom falls the first lot first select a life to which he shall cleave of necessity. But virtue has no master over her,[2731] and each shall have more or less of her as he honors her or does her despite. The blame is his who chooses: God is blameless.[2732]"" So saying, the prophet flung the lots out among them all, and each took up the lot that fell by his side, except himself; him they did not permit.[2733] And whoever took up a lot saw plainly what number he had drawn."

"And after this again the prophet placed the patterns of lives before them on the ground, far more numerous than the assembly. They were of every variety, for there were lives of all kinds of animals and all sorts of human lives, for there were tyrannies among them, some uninterrupted till the end[2734] and others destroyed midway and issuing in penuries and exiles and beggaries; and there were lives of men of repute for their forms and beauty and bodily strength otherwise and prowess and the high birth and the virtues of their ancestors, and others of ill repute in the same things, and similarly of women. But there was no determination of the quality of soul, because the choice of a different life inevitably[2735] determined a different character. But all other things were commingled with one another and with wealth and poverty and sickness and health and the intermediate[2736] conditions. —And there, dear Glaucon, it appears, is the supreme hazard[2737] for a man. And this is the chief reason why it should be our main concern

and 859 (Nauck), *Job* vii. 6, viii. 9, ix. 25, xiv. 2, xxi. 17, etc.

[2730]Zeller-Nestle, p. 166, says that this looks like intentional correction of *Phaedo* 107 D. Cf. *Phaedo* 113 D and *Lysias* ii. 78 "ὅ τε δαίμων ὁ τὴν ἡμετέραν μοῖραν εἰληχὼς ἀπαραίτητος". Arnobius, *Adversus gentes,* ii. 64, says that similarly Christ offers us redemption but does not force it upon us.

[2731]Cf. Milton's "Love Virtue; she alone is free" (*Comus*).

[2732]Justin Martyr. *Apol.* xliv. 8, quotes this. Cf. *Tim.* 42 D, Dieterich, *Nekyia,* p. 115, *Odyssey* i. 32 f., Bacchylides xiv. 51 f. (Jebb, p. 366) "Ζεὺς . . . οὐκ αἴτιος θνατοῖς μεγάλων ἀχέων", etc., Manitius, *Gesch. d. lat. Lit. d. Mittelalters,* ii. p. 169. For the problem of evil in Plato see *What Plato Said,* p. 578 on *Theaet.* 176 A, and for the freedom of the will *ibid.* pp. 644-645 on *Laws* 904 C.

[2733]Cf. *Symp.* 175 C, where the words are the same but the construction different. For the indirect reflexive cf. 614 B "οὗ ἐκβῆναι", *Symp.* 176 D, *Symp.* 223 B "ἓ δὲ ὕπνον λαβεῖν".

[2734]For *διατελεῖς* Cf. *Laws* 661 D "τυραννίδα διὰ τέλους".

[2735]For the idiom *ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν* Cf. *Phaedo* 91 E, *Laws* 771 E, 928 E, Lysias vi. 35.

[2736]*μεσοῦν Phaedr.* 241 D.

[2737]Cf. *Phaedo* 107 C, 114 D, *Gorg.* 526 E, Eurip. *Medea* 235 "ἀγὼν μέγιστος",

that each of us, neglecting all other studies, should seek after and study this thing[2738]—if in any way he may be able to learn of and discover the man who will give him the ability and the knowledge to distinguish the life that is good from that which is bad, and always and everywhere to choose the best that the conditions allow, and, taking into account all the things of which we have spoken and estimating the effect on the goodness of his life of their conjunction or their severance, to know how beauty commingled with poverty or wealth and combined with what habit of soul operates for good or for evil, and what are the effects of high and low birth and private station and office and strength and weakness and quickness of apprehension and dullness and all similar natural and acquired habits of the soul, when blended and combined with one another,[2739] so that with consideration of all these things he will be able to make a reasoned choice between the better and the worse life, with his eyes fixed on the nature of his soul, naming the worse life that which will tend to make it more unjust and the better that which will make it more just. But all other considerations he will dismiss, for we have seen that this is the best choice, both for life and death."

"And a man must take with him to the house of death an adamantine[2740] faith in this, that even there he may be undazzled[2741] by riches and similar trumpery, and may not precipitate himself into tyrannies and similar doings and so work many evils past cure and suffer still greater himself, but may know how always to choose in such things the life that is seated in the mean[2742] and shun the excess in either direction, both in this world so far as may be and in all the life to come; for this is the greatest happiness for man. And at that time also the messenger from that other world reported that the prophet spoke thus: "Even for him who comes forward last, if he make his choice wisely and live strenuously, there is reserved an acceptable life, no evil one.

Thucyd. i. 32. 5 "μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος", Aristoph. *Clouds* 955 "νῦν γὰρ ἅπας . . . κίνδυνος ἀνεῖται", *Frogs* 882 "ἀγὼν . . . ὁ μέγας", Antiphon v. 43 "ἐν ᾧ μοι ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἦν". For the expression Cf. *Gorg.* 470 E "ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστιν".

[2738]Cf. 443-444, 591 E-592 A, *Gorg.* 527 B f., *Laws* 662 B f., 904 A ff.

[2739]The singular verb is used after plural subjects, because the subjects are united in the writer's mind into one general idea. Cf. *Rep.* 363 A, *Laws* 925 E, *Symp.* 188 B.

[2740]See *Unity of Plato's Thought,* p. 25, *Laws* 661-662, and for the word 360 B, *Gorg.* 509 A.

[2741]Cf. 576 D.

[2742]An anticipation of the Aristotelian doctrine, *Eth. Nic.* 1106 b 6 f. Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 629, on *Laws* 691 C.

Let not the foremost in the choice be heedless nor the last be discouraged." When the prophet had thus spoken he said that the drawer of the first lot at once sprang to seize the greatest tyranny,[2743] and that in his folly and greed he chose it without sufficient examination, and failed to observe that it involved the fate of eating his own children, and other horrors, and that when he inspected it at leisure he beat his breast and bewailed his choice, not abiding by the forewarning of the prophet. For he did not blame himself[2744] for his woes, but fortune and the gods and anything except himself. He was one of those who had come down from heaven, a man who had lived in a well-ordered polity in his former existence, participating in virtue by habit[2745] and not by philosophy; and one may perhaps say that a majority of those who were thus caught were of the company that had come from heaven, inasmuch as they were unexercised in suffering. But the most of those who came up from the earth, since they had themselves suffered and seen the sufferings of others, did not make their choice precipitately. For which reason also there was an interchange of good and evil for most of the souls, as well as because of the chances of the lot. Yet if at each return to the life of this world a man loved wisdom sanely, and the lot of his choice did not fall out among the last, we may venture to affirm, from what was reported thence, that not only will he be happy here but that the path of his journey thither and the return to this world will not be underground and rough but smooth and through the heavens."

"For he said that it was a sight worth seeing to observe how the several souls selected their lives. He said it was a strange, pitiful, and ridiculous spectacle, as the choice was determined for the most part by the habits of their former lives.[2746] He saw the soul that had been Orpheus', he said, selecting the life of a swan,[2747] because from hatred of the tribe of women, owing to his death at their hands, it was unwilling to be conceived and born of a woman. He saw the soul of Thamyras[2748] choosing the life of a nightingale; and he saw a swan

[2743]Cf. Isoc. *Epist.* vi. 12 Xen. *Hiero* 7. 2 "ὅμως προπετῶς φέρεσθε εἰς αὐτήν".

[2744]Cf. *What Plato Said,* p. 532, on *Phaedo* 90 D.

[2745]*Phaedo* 82 B.

[2746]Cf. *Phaedo* 81 E ff., *Phaedr.* 248-249, *Tim.* 42 A-D, 91 D ff. For the idea of reincarnation in Plato see *What Plato Said,* p. 529, on *Phaedo* 81 E-82 B.

[2747]Urwiek, *The Message of Plato,* p. 213, says: "If Plato knew anything at all of Indian allegory, he must have known that the swan (Hamsa) is in Hinduism the invariable symbol of the immortal Spirit; and to say, as he does, that Orpheus chose the life of a swan, refusing to be born again of a woman, is just an allegorical way of saying that he passed on into the spiritual life. . . . "

changing to the choice of the life of man, and similarly other musical animals. The soul that drew the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion; it was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telamon, which, because it remembered the adjudication of the arms of Achilles, was unwilling to become a man. The next, the soul of Agamemnon, likewise from hatred of the human race because of its sufferings, substituted the life of an eagle.[2749] Drawing one of the middle lots the soul of Atalanta caught sight of the great honors attached to an athlete's life and could not pass them by but snatched at them. After her, he said, he saw the soul of Epeius,[2750] the son of Panopeus, entering into the nature of an arts and crafts woman. Far off in the rear he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites[2751] clothing itself in the body of an ape. And it fell out that the soul of Odysseus drew the last lot of all and came to make its choice, and, from memory of its former toils having flung away ambition, went about for a long time in quest of the life of an ordinary citizen who minded his own business,[2752] and with difficulty found it lying in some corner disregarded by the others, and upon seeing it said that it would have done the same had it drawn the first lot, and chose it gladly. And in like manner, of the other beasts some entered into men[2753] and into one another, the unjust into wild creatures, the just transformed to tame, and there was every kind of mixture and combination. But when, to conclude, all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of their lots, they were marshalled and went before Lachesis. And she sent with each, as the guardian of his life and the fulfiller of his choice, the genius[2754] that he had chosen, and this divinity led the soul first to Clotho, under her hand and her turning[2755] of the spindle to ratify the destiny of his lot and choice; and after contact with her the genius again led the soul to the spinning of Atropos[2756] to make the web of its destiny[2757] irreversible,"

[2748]Like Orpheus a singer. He contended with the Muses in song and was in consequence deprived by them of sight and of the gift of song. Cf. also *Ion* 533 B-C, *Laws* 829 D-E, *Iliad* ii. 595.

[2749]Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 114 ff.

[2750]Who built the Trojan horse. See Hesychius *s. v.*

[2751]Cf. *Iliad* ii. 212 ff.

[2752]For *ἀπράγμονος* cf. on 565 A, p. 316, note b.

[2753]*Phaedr.* 249 specifies that only beasts who had once been men could return to human form.

[2754]Cf. 617 E, and for daemons in Plato *What Plato Said,* pp. 546-547, on *Symp.* 202 E, Dieterich, *Nekyia,* p. 59.

[2755]*δίνης*: Cf. *Cratyl.* 439 C and *Phaedo* 99 B.

[2756]Cf. *Laws* 960 C.

"and then without a backward look it passed beneath the throne of Necessity. And after it had passed through that, when the others also had passed, they all journeyed to the Plain of Oblivion,[2758] through a terrible and stifling heat, for it was bare of trees and all plants, and there they camped at eventide by the River of Forgetfulness,[2759] whose waters no vessel can contain. They were all required to drink a measure of the water, and those who were not saved by their good sense drank more than the measure, and each one as he drank forgot all things. And after they had fallen asleep and it was the middle of the night, there was a sound of thunder and a quaking of the earth, and they were suddenly wafted thence, one this way, one that, upward to their birth like shooting stars.[2760] Er himself, he said, was not allowed to drink of the water, yet how and in what way he returned to the body he said he did not know, but suddenly recovering his sight[2761] he saw himself at dawn lying on the funeral pyre.—And so, Glaucon, the tale was saved,[2762] as the saying is, and was not lost. And it will save us[2763] if we believe it, and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our soul unspotted from the world.[2764] But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever, that we may be dear to ourselves[2765] and to the gods both during our sojourn

[2757] *τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα*: Cf. *Laws* 957 E, *Theaet.* 169 C, and the Platonic epigram on Dion, *Anth. Pal.* vii. 99 "Μοῖραι ἐπέκλωσαν", *Od.* i. 17, iii. 208, etc., Aesch. *Eumen.* 335, Callinus i. 9 "Μοῖραι ἐπικλώσως".

[2758] Cf. Aristoph. *Frogs* 186.

[2759] In later literature it is the river that is called Lethe. Cf. *Aeneid* vi. 714 f.

[2760] In *Tim.* 41 D-E each soul is given a star as its vehicle. Cf. Aristoph. *Peace* 833 f. "ὡς ἀστέρες γιγνόμεθ' ὁταν τις ἀποθάνῃ" . . . with the Platonic epigram to *Ἄστηρ: . . νῦν δὲ θανὼν λάμπεις Ἔσπερος ἐν φθιμένοις* There is an old superstition in European folklore to the effect that when a star falls a soul goes up to God. Cf. also Rohde, *Psyche,* ii.6 p. 131.

[2761] Cf. *Phaedrus* 243 B "ἀνέβλεψεν".

[2762] Cf. *Phileb.* 14 A, *Laws* 645 B, *Theaet.* 164 D.

[2763] *Phaedo* 58 B "ἔσωσε τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη". *σώζειν* is here used in its higher sense, approaching the idea of salvation, not as in *Gorg.* 511 C f., 512 D-E, *Laws* 707 D, where Plato uses it contemptuously in the tone of "whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it."

[2764] Cf. *James* i. 27, *Phaedo* 81 B, 2*Peter* iii. 14, and the Emperor Julian's last speech "animum . . . immaculatum conservavi." Cf. *Marius the Epicurean,* pp. 15-16: "A white bird, she told him once, looking at him gravely, a bird which he must carry in his bosom across a crowded public place his own soul was like that."

[2765] Cf. *Laws* 693 B "ἑαυτῇ φίλην", *Rep.* 589 B, Horace, *Epist.* i. 3. 29 "si nobis vivere cari." Jowett's "dear to one another" misses the point. Cf. my review of

here and when we receive our reward, as the victors in the games[2766] go about to gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well.[2767]"

Lemercier, *Les Pensées de Marc-Aurèle,* in *Class. Phil.* vii. p. 115: "In iii. 4, *in fine*, the words *οὔγε οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκονται* are omitted because "le gens que méprise Marc-Aurèle sont loin de mépriser eux-mêmes." That is to forget that Seneca's "omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui" is good Stoic doctrine, and that the idea that only the wise and good man can be dear to himself is found in the last sentence of Plato's *Republic.*" Cf. also *Soph. OC 309 τίς γὰρ ἐσθλὸς οὐχ αὑτῷ φίλος;.*

[2766]Cf. Vol. I. p. 480, note c, on 465 D.

[2767]For the thought Cf. *Gorg.* 527 C "εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας". Cf. Vol. I. p. 104, note b, on 353 E. The quiet solemnity of *εὖ πράττωμεν* illustrates the same characteristic of style that makes Plato begin his *Laws* with the word *θεός*, and Dante close each of the three sections of the *Divine Comedy* with *stelle.*

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